
Lanbuk on Criminal Law: cases
72 cases, each with its facts, the issue, what was held and the principle.
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- Younghusband v Luftig (1949)A conviction requires both the external element and the mental element.
- Fowler v Padget (1798)A later, or an earlier, state of mind does not do duty for a mental element at the time of the act, apart from the Dutch-courage exception.
- Haughton v Smith (1975)The label actus reus is a shorthand. Guilt is of the person who has the required mind.
- R v White (1910)A result crime requires causation. Wanting the result, and seeing the result, is not enough.
- Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963)Involuntary conduct is a complete defence. Where the cause is an internal disease of the mind, the defence is insanity, not automatism.
- R v Sullivan (1984)A disturbance of the mind from an internal condition is insanity, even if the condition is temporary and the person recovers.
- R v Quick (1973)An external cause of unconsciousness, such as a therapeutic drug, founds non-insane automatism. An internal disease founds insanity.
- Hill v Baxter (1958)Voluntariness is part of the act. A reflex is not an act.
- R v Pittwood (1902)A contractual duty owed to the public can be the duty that makes an omission criminal.
- R v Instan (1893)A person who has taken on the care of a helpless relative, and who alone knows of the need, can be convicted for failing to act.
- R v Stone and Dobinson (1977)Once care of a helpless person is undertaken, gross neglect of that duty can be manslaughter.
- R v Miller (1983)A person who creates a dangerous situation owes a duty to take reasonable steps once he knows of the danger.
- Larsonneur (1933)Some status offences are satisfied by the state of affairs alone. Voluntariness is not an element.
- Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983)Being found in a forbidden condition can be proved without a voluntary act of going there.
- Martin v State (1944)Where the statute speaks of appearing in public, the appearance must be the accused's own act.
- Powell v Texas (1968)A manifestation of a condition in a public place can be punished even where the condition itself could not.
- Lim Chin Aik v R (1963)A prohibition that has not been published is not a basis for a conviction.
- R v Jordan (1956)Abnormal treatment that replaces the wound as the cause of death is a new intervening act.
- R v Smith (1959)The chain breaks only when the wound is merely the setting, or merely part of the history.
- R v Malcherek (1981)Disconnecting life support after brain-stem death does not relieve the person who inflicted the injury.
- R v Roberts (1971)A victim's foreseeable response to the accused's attack does not break the chain of causation.
- R v Blaue (1975)The thin-skull rule covers a religious belief as well as a physical weakness.
- R v Hayward (1908)A physical weakness unknown to the accused does not reduce the causal effect of his attack.
- R v Swindall and Osborne (1846)Contributory negligence is not a defence to a criminal charge of causing death.
- R v Moloney (1985)Intention is aim, or foresight of a virtual certainty. Foresight of a likely result is not enough for murder.
- R v Hancock and Shankland (1986)Foresight of probability is evidence from which intention may be inferred. It is not the test of intention.
- R v Nedrick (1986)Where intention is not direct, the jury looks for foresight of a virtual certainty, not of a likely result.
- R v Woollin (1999)The model direction is virtual certainty. A substantial risk is recklessness, not the intention required for murder.
- R v Steane (1947)Where a statute requires an intent to bring about a particular result, the purpose with which the act is done can determine that intent. Motive and intention ar
- R v Ahlers (1915)The intention that matters is the purpose with which the accused acted, not every consequence he could be said to have brought about.
- Sherras v De Rutzen (1895)Mens rea is presumed. Silence in one section is not, by itself, strict liability.
- Sweet v Parsley (1970)A court leans against strict liability, especially where the offence is serious and the accused is not at fault.
- Alphacell Ltd v Woodward (1972)The word cause, in a pollution statute, can dispense with mens rea.
- Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain Ltd (1986)The contrast between sections, and the purpose of the Act, can show that Parliament intended strict liability.
- Whitehouse v Lemon (1979)Blasphemy, as stated here, does not require an intention to outrage. It requires an intention to publish words that are held to be blasphemous.
- R v Huggins (1730)There is no general criminal vicarious liability. Command or personal involvement is required.
- Allen v Whitehead (1930)Where a statute places a personal duty on a licensee or occupier, full delegation carries the delegate's knowledge with it.
- Vane v Yiannopoullos (1965)Delegation is not presumed from the mere fact of employment. It must be a handing over of the management.
- Coppen v Moore (No 2) (1898)A statute that uses 'sell' can treat the employer's act as done when the employee conducts the sale, because only the employer passes title.
- Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (1972)Identification is confined to the directing mind. A local manager's fault is not automatically the company's fault.
- R v McDonnell (1966)A person cannot conspire with a company that has no mind separate from his own.
- R v Macklin and Murphy (1838)Joint principals in the first degree need not each strike the fatal blow.
- R v Michael (1840)A person who causes the actus reus through someone who has no mens rea is the principal in the first degree.
- Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher (1963)An intention formed before the drinking still coincides with the later act. Dutch courage is not a defence.
- R v Kingston (1995)Involuntary intoxication is relevant only where it prevents the mens rea. It is not a defence where the intent was formed.
- DPP v Morgan (1976)Where the offence requires mens rea, a mistake that means the accused did not have that mens rea need not be reasonable.
- R v Smith (David) (1974)A claim of right is a belief. It is not a requirement that the belief is correct, or even justifiable.
- R v Dudley and Stephens (1884)Choosing a victim so that others may live is not a defence to murder.Read the full judgment
- United States v Holmes (1842)Even the American direction, which Dudley later disapproved, required a fair method of selection. A choice made by the crew was not fair.
- Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins) (2001)Necessity can, in an extreme case of conflicting duties, be a defence to what would otherwise be murder. It is not a general defence of choosing the weaker pers
- F v West Berkshire Health Authority (1990)Necessity can justify medical treatment of a person who lacks capacity, where the treatment is in that person's interests.
- R v Julien (1969)In the English cases, retreat is a factor in whether the force was reasonable. It is not a precondition.
- Beckford v R (1988)Private defence can be used before the attack lands, and it is a general defence, not confined to completed crimes of violence.
- Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1983) (1984)Preparations for a reasonably apprehended attack can be justified. The force, and the preparation, must still be reasonable.
- R v Donovan (1934)Consent does not justify the intentional infliction of bodily harm, outside recognised exceptions such as lawful sport.
- R v Brown (1994)Public policy limits consent. Agreement between adults is not itself a good reason for intentional bodily harm.
- R v Gorrie (1918)Between seven and fourteen the prosecution must prove knowledge that the act was gravely wrong. Naughty is not enough.
- B v R (1960)Age between seven and fourteen raises a presumption, not a bar. Strong evidence, including what the child says and does, can displace it.
- Mulcahy v R (1868)The actus reus of conspiracy is the agreement. The plot itself is the act.
- R v Cocker (1989)Provocation requires a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. A considered response to a plea is murder, if the intention to kill is there.
- R v Johnson (1989)Starting a fight does not, by itself, exclude provocation. It weighs heavily in the reasonable-person question.
- DPP v Camplin (1978)The self-control is that of an ordinary person. The gravity of the provocation is judged as it would appear to a person with the accused's characteristics.
- R v Larkin (1943)Constructive manslaughter does not require malice aforethought. It requires an unlawful act that is dangerous, and death caused by that act.
- R v Church (1966)The danger is objective. It is enough that some physical harm would be foreseen by a reasonable person.
- DPP v Newbury and Jones (1977)Constructive manslaughter does not require subjective foresight of the danger. The unlawful act must still cause the death.
- R v Franklin (1883)The unlawful act must be a crime, not only a tort.
- R v Lamb (1967)Constructive manslaughter fails if the supposed unlawful act is not, on its own facts, a crime.
- R v Adomako (1995)Gross-negligence manslaughter replaces the old recklessness test. The negligence must be so bad that it is a crime.
- R v Manning (1871)An intention to deprive permanently can be found where the taker intends to treat the goods as his own to dispose of, even if he expects them to come back.
- R v Bryan (1857)Section 32 of the Larceny Act 1916 requires a false representation of an existing fact. Mere exaggeration is not enough.
- R v Hazelton (1874)A false pretence may be implied by conduct. A cheque is a representation of authority to draw, not of a particular credit balance.
- R v Yule (1964)Fraudulent conversion covers a person who receives ownership or possession of property for a limited purpose and then applies it dishonestly.
