Lanbuk on the Law of Evidence: cases
114 cases, each with its facts, the issue, what was held and the principle.
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- Woolmington v DPP (1935)The golden thread is that the prosecution bears the burden of proof throughout a criminal trial. The burden does not move to the accused because he raises accidRead the full judgment
- Kargbo v R (1967)Woolmington applies in Sierra Leone. The judge must direct the jury that the prosecution proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. The accused does not prove his
- Musa Sesay and Four Others v The StateThe burden of proving guilt is on the prosecution.
- R v Carr-Briant (1943)A legal burden on the accused is discharged on the balance of probabilities.
- Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947)Beyond reasonable doubt is a high probability, short of certainty. It is not a shadow of a doubt. The balance of probabilities is 'more probable than not'. Equa
- R v Edwards (1975)Where a statute prohibits an act except in the case of persons who hold a licence or a qualification, the accused may have to prove that he holds it.
- R v Hunt (1987)An implied statutory burden depends on the construction of the particular Act, including practicality and the seriousness of the offence. It is not automatic.
- R v Hayes (1977)The test for competence to be sworn is secular. It is understanding, not a fixed age and not a particular belief.
- R v Baskerville (1916)Corroboration must be independent, admissible and credible, and it must implicate the accused in a material particular. It is not enough that it is consistent w
- Davies v DPP (1954)An accomplice warning is required where the witness is a party to the offence charged, a receiver testifying against the thieves, or a party to another offence
- R v Lucas (1981)The lie must be deliberate, it must relate to a material issue, the motive must be realisation of guilt and fear of the truth, and it must be shown to be a lie
- DPP v Hester (1973)Mutual corroboration is allowed where each piece of evidence is itself admissible and one of them is sworn. Two unsworn children cannot corroborate each other.
- R v Christie (1914)A recent complaint in a sexual case is admitted to show consistency, and to negative consent where consent is in issue. It is not independent evidence that the
- R v Turnbull (1977)The judge warns of the special need for caution, explains that a convincing witness can be mistaken, directs the jury to the circumstances of the observation, aRead the full judgment
- Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1965)Evidence of a condition affecting a witness's reliability may be given by a witness qualified to speak to it. Credit is not always a closed subject.
- Folkes v Chadd (1782)Expert opinion is admissible on a subject outside the ordinary competence of the court.
- R v Turner (1975)Expert evidence of mental state is admitted where the matter is outside ordinary experience, such as insanity or diminished responsibility. It is not admitted t
- R v Leathem (1861)Illegality in obtaining an item is not, by itself, a ground of exclusion.
- Kuruma son of Kaniu v R (1955)Relevant evidence illegally obtained is admissible, subject to a discretion where admission would be unfair.
- R v Sang (1980)Improperly obtained evidence is admissible, subject to those two discretions. Entrapment is not a defence in England or, in Sierra Leone.
- Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd (1942)Public interest immunity, where the executive certifies that disclosure would harm national security, was treated as conclusive.
- Waugh v British Railways Board (1980)The dominant-purpose test governs litigation privilege. A dual purpose, in which operation or safety weighs at least as heavily as the litigation, is not enough
- R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B (1996)Legal professional privilege is not balanced against some other interest in the particular case. It yields to crime or fraud, and to statute, not to a claim tha
- R v Cox and Railton (1884)Legal professional privilege does not cover advice sought to commit, or to further, a crime or a fraud. Honest advice about whether a past act was criminal rema
- Calcraft v Guest (1898)Privilege protects the client from being compelled to disclose. It does not make the information inadmissible in the hands of a stranger who has already obtaine
- Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd (1942)The privilege is for criminal jeopardy, judged by the court, not by the witness. It does not cover ordinary civil liability. It must be claimed.
- Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1894)Evidence of other criminal acts is not admissible merely to show a disposition to commit the kind of crime charged. It is admissible if it is relevant to whethe
- R v George Joseph Smith (1915)Where the other acts are so similar that accident becomes an affront to common sense, they may be proved to show design.
- R v Straffen (1952)Evidence of other offences may be admitted on identity where the features are so distinctive that they point to the accused rather than to coincidence.
- DPP v Boardman (1975)Similar-fact evidence is admitted when its probative force justifies the prejudice. Striking similarity is the measure Boardman used. The old categories are ill
- DPP v P (1991)The test is positive probative value weighed against prejudice. Identity cases will often need a striking similarity. Other cases may not.
- M'Naghten's Case (1843)Insanity is a legal burden on the accused. It is proved within these rules, on the balance of probabilities.
- R v Sodeman (1936)Where the accused bears a legal burden, the standard is the balance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- R v Podola (1960)Unfitness raised by the defence is a legal burden on the balance of probabilities. It is a condition of being tried, not a gap in the accused's memory of the da
- R v Robertson (1968)Unfitness is inability to take part in the trial. It is not foolishness, and it is not a delusion that leaves that understanding intact.
- R v Dunbar (1958)An express statutory reverse burden is a legal burden. Carr-Briant fixes the standard at the balance of probabilities.
- Gatland v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1968)Where a statute prohibits an act 'without lawful authority or excuse', the excuse is a matter the accused proves. Ease of proof is the reason.
- John v Humphreys (1955)An implied statutory exception, where the accused can produce the document and the prosecution cannot easily prove a negative, puts a legal burden on the accuse
- Nimmo v Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd (1968)The words of the statute decide who proves an exception. A qualification of a duty owed to a workman is not lightly turned into a burden on the injured person.
- Mancini v DPP (1942)Provocation raises an evidential burden only. Enough evidence to put it before the jury is required. Once it is left, the prosecution must disprove it beyond re
- R v Lobell (1957)Self-defence is an evidential burden, not a legal burden. It is not insanity, and it is not a statutory exception.
- R v Gill (1963)Duress is an evidential burden. It is not a legal burden on the balance of probabilities.
- Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963)Lord Denning described automatism as an act done by the muscles without any control by the mind, or done while the actor is not conscious of what he is doing. T
- R v Summers (1952)The criminal standard can be put as being sure. The phrase 'beyond reasonable doubt' remains the standard. The direction must make the jury understand it.
- R v Walters (1969)The effect of the summing-up, not a ritual formula, is what an appellate court examines.
- R v Ferguson (1979)A model direction tells the jury to convict only if they are sure. It does not invite them to grade their doubts.
- R v Brasier (1779)Competence to swear depends on understanding the oath, not on a fixed age. A complaint repeated by someone else is not a substitute for the child's own evidence
- R v Wallwork (1958)There is no fixed age of competence, but a child who cannot give an account should not be put in the box. A previous conviction is not admitted merely to show d
- R v Wright and Ormerod (1990)A recent complaint is not evidence of the facts complained of. It supports the witness only so far as she has herself spoken to those facts.
- R v Hill (1851)Defective intellect does not disqualify a witness who understands the obligation to tell the truth.
- R v Bellamy (1985)A witness whose understanding is in doubt is sworn only if the judge is satisfied of the solemn duty to tell the truth. The inquiry is the judge's.
- R v Ruston (1786)Competence does not require speech. It requires understanding of the oath and a means of answering.
- R v Paines (1987)A witness who does not understand the proceedings is not sworn. If the incapacity will pass, the court waits.
- R v Stretton (1986)Illness of a witness is managed by discretion. The judge is not bound to halt the trial, and not bound to force the witness back.
- R v Prater (1960)The Baskerville warning is for an accomplice tendered by the prosecution. A defendant witness is in a different position. A warning may still be wise. It is not
- R v Whitehead (1929)A complaint admitted to show consistency is the complainant's own previous statement. It cannot corroborate her.
- R v Redpath (1962)Distress corroborates only if it is independent of the complainant. Her own distress, described by her, is not independent. Someone else's observation of it can
- R v Chauhan (1981)The independence required by Baskerville can be satisfied by a third person's observation of distress. It is not satisfied by the complainant's own description
- R v Dowley (1983)Whether observed distress implicates the accused is a question of fact. Remoteness is for the jury unless no reasonable jury could treat it as support.
- Nicholas v Penny (1950)Where a statute requires corroboration of a speed, the instrument that measures it must itself be shown to be reliable, or be supported by other evidence.
- R v Hersey (1998)Turnbull is a rule for disputed visual identification. A voice is a different kind of evidence, and it is tested by its own safeguards, including a parade and,
- R v Oliva (1965)A criminal judge is not a party, but he is not powerless. Calling a witness is the exception, used so that a material account is not kept from the jury.
- Burrough v Martin (1809)Authorship, for a memory-refreshing document, includes a record made under the witness's supervision. The document is not itself the evidence.
- Attorney-General's Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979)The test is whether the events were fresh, not whether the pen was in the witness's hand as the event happened.
- Maugham v Hubbard (1828)Refreshing memory includes a case where the document produces a conviction that the fact happened, and not only a case where the witness then remembers it.
- Dyer v Best (1866)The document must still be contemporaneous, and it must be produced so that the other side can see it. It does not become proof of everything it contains.
- R v Cheng (1976)The original is the rule. A derivative document is allowed when the original is gone and the witness verifies the chain.
- R v Fenlon (1980)Failure to cross-examine is acceptance. It is not a licence to ambush the witness in a closing speech.
- Thomas v David (1836)Bias is an exception to the rule that answers on credit are final.
- Dunn v Aslet (1838)A matter that shows the witness cannot be impartial goes to more than credit in the narrow sense. It may be contradicted.
- R v Mendy (1976)Tampering, or briefing a witness about the evidence already given, is bias. A denial of it is not final.
- R v Chard (1971)Expert evidence is admitted on matters outside ordinary experience. The state of mind of a person who is not said to be ill is inside it.
- R v Jeffries (1997)An opinion that does no more than tell the tribunal how to decide the case is not expert evidence. It is advocacy.
- R v Anderson (1972)The tribunal of fact does not delegate an ordinary statutory standard to a witness.
- R v Silverlock (1894)A hobby pursued with real skill can be expertise. The judge decides whether the witness has it. The jury decides what weight to give the opinion.
- R v Oakley (1979)Expertise may be acquired by practice. It is confined to the field in which it was acquired.
- R v Weightman (1991)The exception for psychiatric evidence is illness, or some other condition outside ordinary experience. It is not a commentary on character.
- Lowery v The Queen (1974)The Board decided the case on its own facts. It did not lay down a general rule that psychologists may give evidence of personality on a criminal charge.
- R v Masih (1986)A condition inside ordinary experience is not the subject of expert evidence, even if a psychiatrist has measured it.
- R v Reynolds (1989)Expert evidence of mental state is for a condition outside lay experience. A bare attack on intention is not such a condition.
- R v Lupien (1970)Where the mental process is outside common knowledge, expert evidence is admissible even though it bears on why the accused did what he did.
- R v Smith (Stanley) (1979)Non-insane automatism, including an act done in sleep, is outside ordinary experience. The accused must lay a foundation, and that foundation is expert evidence
- R v Davies (1962)A non-expert may give an opinion that is only a compendious statement of perceived facts: speed, distance, age, identity, handwriting. He may not give a technic
- Elias v Pasmore (1934)Illegality in obtaining a document is not, by itself, a reason to keep relevant evidence out of a criminal trial.
- Callis v Gunn (1964)A false representation used to obtain evidence does not make the evidence inadmissible. Unfairness is a discretion, not an automatic rule.
- Jones v Owens (1870)The thing found is admissible if it is relevant. The officer's want of power is a separate question.
- Jeffrey v Black (1978)Unlawful entry goes to the officer's civil liability and to discipline. It does not, by itself, answer the criminal charge.
- Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent (1986)A bona fide mistake about a police power is not a reason to exclude real evidence obtained afterwards.
- R v Apicella (1985)Absence of consent to a procedure is a reason to look at fairness. It is not an automatic exclusion. On these facts the evidence stood.
- King v The Queen (1969)Kuruma governs a search for drugs as it governs a search for ammunition.
- R v Christou (1992)An undercover purchase is not, by itself, a reason to exclude what the accused freely said and did. Section 78 is a discretion about fairness, not a rule agains
- R v Maqsud Ali (1966)A relevant recording is admissible though the speakers did not know they were being recorded.
- R v BaileyA secret recording is not excluded merely because the place was a cell.
- R v Khan (1997)Unlawfully obtained real evidence, including a conversation, is admissible, subject to the discretion recognised in Sang and, in England, in section 78 of PACE.
- R v Payne (1963)The discretion to exclude is used where evidence was obtained by a promise that it would not be given. It is not a general rule that illegally obtained evidence
- Greenough v Gaskell (1833)Legal advice privilege protects the taking of advice. Litigation privilege is the separate limb, and it does require litigation, pending or contemplated.
- Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881)A document from a surveyor, a doctor or an accountant is not privileged merely because a solicitor asked for it. The dominant purpose must be litigation, unless
- Balabel v Air India (1988)Look at the transaction as a whole. What is necessary to give or receive the advice is privileged. A pre-existing document does not become privileged by being p
- Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd (1972)The party who wants to defeat privilege must show a prima facie case that the communication was in furtherance of a crime or a fraud. An allegation in a pleadin
- R v Tompkins (1977)Privilege is a right not to be compelled to disclose. It is not a right to stop an opponent using a document he already has.
- AT&T Istel Ltd v Tully (1993)The privilege is for a real and appreciable risk of a criminal charge. It is not a general right of silence in civil discovery. A fence around later criminal us
- Walker v Wilsher (1889)An offer of settlement is not an admission. The protection covers the negotiations, and it covers costs as well as liability.
- Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council (1989)Without-prejudice privilege is the joint privilege of the parties to the talks. It lasts after settlement. It can be waived only with the consent of each of the
- R v Bond (1906)Other misconduct is admissible if it rebuts a defence that would otherwise be open. It is not admissible as bare propensity.
- R v Ball (1911)Where the defence is 'we were together, but nothing criminal passed', evidence of a previous sexual relationship may be relevant to that issue.
- R v Thompson (1918)Possession of articles that connect the accused with the particular method of the crime may be admitted on identity. Propensity alone would not do.
- R v Rance (1975)Boardman's language is a guide to the strength of the evidence. It is not a spell.
- R v Scarrott (1978)Similar-fact evidence is not admitted because the stories sound alike. It is admitted because, taken together, they prove something that one story does not.
- R v H (1995)P is the test. Later cases in this chapter do not go back to a closed list of categories.
- Machin v AshA document the accused can produce, and the prosecution can prove only by a negative, is the kind of exception that is his burden, on the balance of probabiliti
- Kennedy v HM Advocate (1944)Drunkenness is not insanity. It does not put a legal burden on the accused.
- R v Johnson (1961)An alibi is a denial that he was there. It is not a statutory exception and it is not insanity.
- R v Bagley (1980)The warning in Davies v DPP is for an accomplice called by the Crown. A defence witness is not in that class.
- R v LoveridgeA witness called by the defence, even one who could be called an accomplice, does not attract the warning required for a Crown accomplice.