Sample exam questions with model answers in IRAC form: Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion.
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How to use IRAC: name the legal Issue, state the Rule with cases, Apply it to the facts, then give a clear Conclusion. Try each question yourself before reading the model answer.
Problem question · Negligence: the duty of care, Negligence: breach of duty, Damage: causation and remoteness
1. The exploding drink
Aminata buys a sealed bottle of juice made by FreshCo and gives it to her friend Fatu. The bottle explodes when Fatu opens it, cutting her hand. The cut becomes badly infected because Fatu has a rare blood condition, and she is off work for six months. FreshCo says it had no contract with Fatu and could not have known about her condition. Advise Fatu.
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Issue
Does FreshCo owe Fatu a , did it breach that duty, and is it liable for the full extent of her injury, including the effects of her blood condition?
Rule
A manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer (Donoghue v Stevenson), now tested by foreseeability, proximity and whether it is fair, just and reasonable (Caparo v Dickman). Breach is judged by the reasonable manufacturer, weighing the likelihood and seriousness of harm (Bolton v Stone; Paris v Stepney). uses the (Barnett v Chelsea). asks whether the kind of damage was foreseeable (The Wagon Mound (No 1)), and the takes the victim as he finds her (Smith v Leech Brain).
Application
Fatu is FreshCo's 'neighbour': it is foreseeable that the person who opens a sealed bottle will be hurt if it is defective, and the lack of a contract does not matter (Donoghue). A sealed bottle exploding suggests a manufacturing fault; Fatu may rely on , since the bottle was in FreshCo's control and such explosions do not normally happen without carelessness. But for the defect she would not have been cut. A cut is a foreseeable kind of harm, so under the FreshCo is liable for the infection and the long absence, even though her condition was unknown.
Conclusion
FreshCo is likely to be liable in for Fatu's whole injury, including lost earnings for six months.
Problem question · Trespass to the person, Defences to trespass to the person
2. The locked shop
A shopkeeper, Musa, suspects Kadie of theft. He grabs her arm, shouts 'If the police were not on their way I would teach you a lesson!', and locks her in the storeroom for twenty minutes. Kadie was asleep for most of that time and did not know the door was locked. No goods are found. Advise Kadie.
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Issue
Has Musa committed , and , and does he have any defence?
Rule
Battery is the intentional, direct application of force without consent; the slightest touch suffices (Cole v Turner). Assault is causing reasonable fear of imminent battery, but words can negate a threat (Tuberville v Savage). False imprisonment is total restraint without lawful (Bird v Jones); knowledge is not required (Meering v Grahame-White Aviation; Murray v Ministry of Defence). A private person's arrest must be lawful, and the defendant must prove it.
Application
Grabbing Kadie's arm is a direct, intentional touching without consent: a battery. His words, like those in Tuberville v Savage, suggest he will not strike because the police are coming, so there may be no assault. Locking her in the storeroom is a total restraint. It does not matter that she was asleep, though this may reduce damages. Musa will try to rely on a lawful arrest, but he must prove it was lawful under the Criminal Procedure Act, and that he handed her over to the police as soon as possible. Twenty minutes in a locked storeroom on bare suspicion, with no goods found, makes this defence weak.
Conclusion
Kadie has strong claims in battery and false imprisonment. Assault is doubtful because of Musa's words.
Ibrahim drives for QuickMove Ltd. He is told never to give lifts. He gives a lift to a stranger, then detours five miles to visit his girlfriend, and crashes, injuring a pedestrian. Earlier that day he lit a cigarette while refuelling and caused a small fire. Advise the victims.
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Issue
Is QuickMove for Ibrahim's ?
Rule
An employer is liable for torts its employees commit in the , including improper ways of doing authorised work (Century Insurance; Limpus v London General Omnibus), but not for a 'frolic of his own' (Joel v Morison; Storey v Ashton). Whether he is an employee depends on control, integration and the multiple test (Ready Mixed Concrete).
Application
Ibrahim appears to be an employee, as he drives for the company under its control. The refuelling fire is like Century Insurance: a careless way of doing his job, so QuickMove is liable. Giving a forbidden lift is arguably a prohibited mode of driving (Limpus), but the five-mile detour for personal reasons looks like a new and independent journey (Storey v Ashton). If so, the crash happened outside the course of employment.
Conclusion
QuickMove is likely liable for the fire. For the crash the answer depends on the degree of deviation, and on these facts the company is probably not liable.
Problem question · Defamation, Defences to defamation
4. The radio rumour
During a calm radio interview, Sahr says: 'Everyone knows the headteacher of Hilltop School steals exam fees.' The headteacher is not named. Sahr later says he was just repeating what a parent told him. Advise the headteacher.
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Issue
Is the statement , does it refer to the headteacher, was it published, and is there a defence?
Rule
A statement is defamatory if it lowers the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people (Sim v Stretch). It must refer to the claimant; naming is not needed if people who know him would understand it to refer to him (Morgan v Odhams). It must be published to a third party. Imputing a crime is . Repetition is no defence (De Crespigny v Wellesley). Justification needs substantial truth, and words spoken in heat may be (Bakare v Ishola).
Application
An accusation of stealing fees plainly lowers the headteacher's reputation. Though unnamed, 'the headteacher of Hilltop School' identifies one person. The broadcast publishes the words to many people, and imputing theft is actionable per se. Repeating what a parent said is no defence. The words were spoken calmly, so this is not vulgar abuse (compare Ibeanu v Uba). Sahr could plead justification only if he can prove the theft is substantially true.
Conclusion
The headteacher has a strong defamation claim unless Sahr can prove the allegation true.
Essay question · Negligence: the duty of care, Negligence: economic loss
5. From the neighbour principle to Caparo
'The development of the duty of care shows the courts moving from a general principle to an incremental approach.' Discuss.
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Issue
How has the test for a duty of care changed, and why?
Rule
Donoghue v Stevenson (neighbour principle); Home Office v Dorset Yacht (the principle applies unless there is a reason to exclude it); Anns v Merton (two-stage test); Yuen Kun Yeu v A-G Hong Kong (Anns not always a suitable guide); Caparo v Dickman (three-stage test); Hedley Byrne and Junior Books on .
Application
Lord Atkin's neighbour principle replaced a list of separate duty situations with a general idea based on reasonable foresight. Dorset Yacht and Anns pushed this further, presuming a duty unless policy said otherwise, and this widened liability greatly, especially for economic loss (Junior Books). The courts then grew worried that judges had powers 'far too wide'. Yuen Kun Yeu doubted Anns, and Caparo set out the three-stage test, which treats foresight as necessary but not enough, adding proximity and what is fair, just and reasonable. Policy still matters, but it now comes in only after foresight and proximity are settled. The economic loss cases show the same retreat: Junior Books is now treated as unique (Simaan v Pilkington).
Conclusion
The statement is broadly right. The law moved from a general principle towards caution and incremental growth, with Caparo at its centre, while still keeping the flexible idea that 'the categories of negligence are never closed'.
At first the courts doubted that psychiatric illness was real, feared faked claims and worried about opening the floodgates. They allowed recovery only for fear of immediate injury to oneself (Dulieu). Hambrook extended this to fear for one's children, but only where the mother saw the danger herself. McLoughlin v O'Brian set the modern controls: a close tie of love and affection, closeness in time and space including the immediate aftermath, and perception with one's own senses rather than being told. These limits are criticised as arbitrary, since a mother who arrives two hours later can recover while one told by telephone cannot. But they keep liability within reasonable bounds. Attia shows the law can still grow in a principled way.
Conclusion
The limits rest on policy rather than pure logic. They remain because they give certainty and protect defendants from unlimited liability.
Problem question · Occupiers' liability, Trespass to land
7. The building site
BuildCo is building a school in Bo. The site is fenced, but BuildCo knows a section has been broken for weeks and that local children use the gap as a short cut. Ibrahim, aged 9, goes through the gap and falls into an unlit, unfenced pit. Separately, BuildCo's workers park a crane whose arm swings over Mariama's house next door every day. Advise Ibrahim and Mariama.
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Issue
Does BuildCo owe Ibrahim, a child , any duty, and is the crane's swinging arm a to Mariama's land?
Rule
In Sierra Leone is governed by the common law. A trespasser was once owed no duty (Addie v Dumbreck), but an occupier who knows of a serious danger and the likely presence of trespassers owes a (British Railways Board v Herrington). Children are owed more care, and a danger may be an (Glasgow Corporation v Taylor). Trespass to land is a direct, unjustified intrusion, actionable per se, and includes intrusion into airspace at a low height (Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco), but not at heights beyond ordinary use (Bernstein v Skyviews).
Application
BuildCo knew the fence was broken and that children came through it. An unlit pit is a serious danger to a child. Under Herrington, a humane occupier with BuildCo's resources would repair a fence or cover the pit, which is cheap and easy. Ibrahim's age means he cannot be expected to see the risk as an adult would, and the main responsibility of parents (Phipps v Rochester) is weaker for a 9-year-old on a known short cut. As for Mariama, the crane arm passes through the airspace just above her house, the height used for the ordinary enjoyment of her land, as in Kelsen. It is a trespass even if no damage is done.
Conclusion
BuildCo is likely liable to Ibrahim for breach of its duty of common humanity. Mariama can obtain an , or damages, for trespass to her airspace.
Problem question · Trespass to goods, conversion and detinue
8. The lost phone
Sahr finds a smartphone on the floor of a public waiting room in a bank in Freetown and hands it to the bank manager, asking for it back if the owner does not appear. The manager keeps it in a drawer, then sells it to Kadiatu, who buys it in good faith. The true owner never comes forward. Advise Sahr.
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Issue
Who has the better right to the phone, Sahr or the bank, and can Sahr sue the bank or Kadiatu?
Rule
A finder has a right to goods good against everyone except the true owner (Armory v Delamirie). An occupier has a better right than a finder of things lying loose on the premises only if it clearly showed an intention to control the premises and things on them (Parker v British Airways Board). is a serious dealing inconsistent with the claimant's rights, and good faith is no defence (Hollins v Fowler). lies where goods are kept after demand and refusal.
Application
The phone was lying loose in a public area of the bank. Unless the bank had shown a clear intention to control lost items there, Sahr, as finder, has the better right (Parker). The manager held the phone for Sahr. By selling it, the bank dealt with it in a way that denied Sahr's right, which is conversion. Kadiatu also converted it by buying and keeping it, even though she acted honestly (Hollins v Fowler). If Sahr demands the phone from Kadiatu and she refuses, he may also sue in detinue and seek its return.
Conclusion
Sahr can sue the bank in conversion for the value of the phone and can claim the phone itself from Kadiatu in detinue or conversion.
Essay question · Private nuisance, Public nuisance
9. Give and take between neighbours
'The law of is a law of give and take.' Discuss, explaining how courts decide whether an interference is unreasonable and how private nuisance differs from public nuisance.
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Issue
How do courts balance competing uses of land, and what separates private from public nuisance?
Rule
Private nuisance is unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land. Reasonableness depends on locality (Sturges v Bridgman), but not where there is physical damage (St Helen's Smelting v Tipping); on duration; on abnormal sensitivity (Robinson v Kilvert); and on malice (Christie v Davey). Only those with an interest in land may sue (Hunter v Canary Wharf). affects a class of the public (AG v PYA Quarries), and individuals sue only for (Castle v St Augustine's Links).
Application
The phrase 'give and take' captures the idea that neighbours must accept ordinary noise and inconvenience, while the law stops what goes beyond that. Locality allows industry in industrial areas but protects quiet residential ones. The sensitivity rule stops a claimant demanding more than ordinary protection, while malice tips the balance against a spiteful . Coming to the nuisance is not a defence (Coventry v Lawrence), which protects newcomers but can be hard on long-established businesses; damages in lieu of an (Miller v Jackson) soften this. Public nuisance is less about give and take between two neighbours and more about protecting the community, which is why it is also a crime and why only special damage lets an individual sue.
Conclusion
Private nuisance balances neighbours' interests through the test of reasonableness, while public nuisance protects the public at large. The 'give and take' description fits private nuisance well, but is limited where physical damage or malice is involved.
Problem question · The rule in Rylands v Fletcher, Liability for animals
10. The fuel tank and the goats
Foday runs a large fuel depot in Kenema, storing thousands of litres of diesel. A storm of normal seasonal strength damages a tank, and diesel flows onto Hawa's farm, killing her crops. While Hawa is repairing her fence, Foday's goats stray onto her farm and eat her seedlings. Advise Hawa.
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Issue
Is Foday strictly liable for the diesel under Rylands v Fletcher, and for the goats in ?
Rule
A person who brings onto land something likely to do mischief if it escapes, for a , is strictly liable for foreseeable damage caused by its escape (Rylands v Fletcher; Transco v Stockport; Cambridge Water). is a defence only for natural events no human foresight could guard against (Nichols v Marsland). The owner of straying livestock is strictly liable for damage to land and crops (cattle trespass), except for animals straying from a highway while being driven with care (Tillett v Ward).
Application
Storing thousands of litres of diesel is an exceptional, high-risk use of land, not an ordinary one, and diesel is likely to cause harm if it escapes. It escaped onto Hawa's land, and crop damage from spilt fuel is plainly foreseeable. A storm of normal seasonal strength is not an act of God, because it could be foreseen and guarded against. The goats strayed from Foday's land, not from the highway, so the exception does not apply; Hawa's fence being under repair does not defeat the claim unless she had a duty to fence.
Conclusion
Foday is likely strictly liable for the crop damage caused by the diesel, and for the damage caused by the goats in cattle trespass.
Essay question · Remedies in tort, Limitation of actions, Defamation: other defences and remedies
11. Money or an order?
Explain the aims of damages in and the circumstances in which a court will grant an injunction instead of, or as well as, damages. Briefly explain why limitation periods matter to a claimant.
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Issue
What remedies does tort offer, how do courts choose between damages and injunctions, and how do time limits affect claims?
Rule
Damages aim to restore the claimant to his pre-tort position (Livingstone v Rawyards Coal). are limited to the Rookes v Barnard categories (confirmed in Cassell v Broome). Injunctions are discretionary; interim injunctions follow American Cyanamid v Ethicon; mandatory injunctions need a strong probability of grave harm (Redland Bricks v Morris); damages may replace an injunction (Shelfer; Coventry v Lawrence). Time runs from accrual: the act for torts , the damage for (Pirelli v Oscar Faber).
Application
Damages suit one-off losses such as personal injury, where money is the only realistic remedy. Where a wrong is continuing, such as a nuisance or repeated , money alone lets the defendant 'buy' the right to keep harming, so an injunction is the natural remedy. Courts may still prefer damages where an injunction would be oppressive or the harm small, as in Shelfer and Coventry. In , courts rarely grant interim injunctions where the defendant will plead truth, to protect free speech. Whatever the remedy, a claimant who delays may lose it: the Sierra Leone Limitation Act sets time limits, and equity may refuse an injunction to a claimant who delays.
Conclusion
Damages are the ordinary remedy and aim at compensation; injunctions prevent continuing or threatened harm and are granted at the court's discretion. Acting quickly is essential, both for limitation and for injunctions.
