2. The maxims of equity

The maxims grew out of Chancery practice. They are guides, not statutes, and none of them decides a case alone. Here are the twelve usually taught.

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy: equity steps in where the common law gives no remedy for a right that deserves protection. The trust is the classic example. At law the trustee owns the property, so the beneficiary had no claim there. Equity gave him one. The quia timet injunction, which stops a threatened wrong before it happens, is another. The right must still be one a court can enforce. A purely moral wrong is not enough.

Equity follows the law: equity does not override statute, and it usually follows common law rules. Equitable interests in land mirror the legal estates. Where land is in joint names, equity starts from the position that the beneficial interest follows the legal title, unless a different intention is shown. Stack v Dowden applies that idea to a family home.

He who seeks equity must do equity: a claimant must be ready to act fairly in the future. If a purchase is set aside, the buyer must get his money back with interest.

Where the equities are equal, the law prevails: if a legal owner and an equitable owner have equally good claims, the legal right wins. The bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value without notice takes free of earlier equitable interests. Pilcher v Rawlins is the leading case.

Where the equities are equal, the first in time prevails: between two equitable interests, the earlier one usually wins. Registration of land titles has reduced the importance of these two maxims, but they still explain the doctrine of notice.

Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation: if a person who must do something does something else that could count as doing it, equity treats it as performance. A legacy to a creditor at least equal to the debt may be presumed to pay the debt.

Equity regards as done that which ought to be done: if a contract can be specifically enforced, equity treats the parties as if it had been performed. A specifically enforceable agreement for a lease gives an equitable lease, which is Walsh v Lonsdale. A contract to sell land passes the equitable interest to the buyer, and the seller holds the legal title on a constructive trust until completion. A-G for Hong Kong v Reid relied on this maxim: a fiduciary who takes a bribe holds it on trust for his principal from the moment he receives it.

Equality is equity: where people share property and there is no basis for dividing it otherwise, equity divides it equally. Equity dislikes the right of survivorship, and in some cases presumes a tenancy in common.

Equity looks to the intent rather than the form: equity looks at substance. A transfer meant as security is a mortgage whatever it is called. A trust can be made without the word trust.

Delay defeats equity: equity helps the vigilant, not the idle. An unreasonable delay that makes it unjust to give relief is called laches. Limitation statutes now cover many claims, so laches matters most where no statute applies.

Equity acts in personam: equity's orders are against the person. A court may order a defendant within its reach to deal with land abroad. In Webb v Webb the European Court of Justice accepted that a father's claim that his son held a flat in France on resulting trust for him was a personal claim, not a claim about rights in land, so the English court could hear it.

He who comes to equity must come with clean hands: past misconduct that is directly connected with the claim can bar relief. It must relate to the matter in issue. In Argyll v Argyll the Duchess's adultery did not stop her getting an injunction to protect marital confidences, because it was not connected with the relief she sought.