12. Leases and licences

A lease is an estate for a certain period, shorter than a fee simple. It must give exclusive possession, and the term must be certain. A tenancy "for the duration of the war" failed in Lace v Chantler because, when it was granted, no one could say when it would end. Periodic tenancies are certain enough, because each period is fixed even though the tenancy goes on until notice.

A legal lease must be made by deed. Section 3 of the Real Property Act 1845 says a lease required to be in writing is void as a legal estate unless made by deed. A contract for a lease must be evidenced in writing and signed by the person to be charged, under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. Equity will still enforce a concluded agreement, especially where there has been part performance.

That is the rule in Walsh v Lonsdale. Where there is a contract for a lease which equity would specifically enforce, the parties are treated as if the lease had been granted. The tenant who has gone into possession and paid rent on the agreed terms holds an equitable lease. It binds everyone except a bona fide purchaser of a legal estate without notice. Parker v Taswell is the earlier step: an imperfect lease can be read as a contract to grant one.

Registration is a separate Sierra Leone requirement. The times are ten days in the Western Area, one month in the Provinces, one year if the deed is executed abroad. Registration does not create the title. It records the instrument.

A licence is a permission to be on land, which would otherwise be a trespass. Thomas v Sorrell is the classic statement. A dispensation or licence passes no interest and alters no property.

A bare licence is gratuitous. It can be revoked at will, and a successor in title is not bound. Armstrong v Sheppard & Short is the case.

A licence coupled with a grant lets the licensee enter in order to take something: cut timber, watch the match where the right to be there is part of a proprietary interest. If the interest is legal, the licence binds successors. Doe d Hanley v Wood is cited for the right to insist on the licence while the interest lasts.

A contractual licence is paid for, or given for consideration. Wood v Leadbitter held that a ticket to the races could be revoked, and that the holder who stayed became a trespasser. After the Judicature Acts, Hurst v Picture Theatres went the other way. Equity would have injuncted the revocation of a contractual licence, so the cinema-goer who was thrown out recovered. Winter Garden Theatre v Millennium Productions says the contract decides whether the licence is revocable. Tanner v Tanner shows that a contract can be inferred where a woman gave up a rent-controlled flat and moved in for the sake of the children.

A licence by estoppel arises where the owner encourages another to spend money, or to act to their detriment, in the belief that they have or will have an interest. Ramsden v Dyson is Lord Kingsdown's statement. Willmott v Barber is Fry J's five probanda: a mistake as to rights, expenditure on the faith of it, the owner's knowledge of his own right, knowledge of the other's mistake, and encouragement. Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees loosened that list. The question is whether it would be unconscionable to insist on the strict right. Crabb v Arun District Council is the right of access granted by encouragement and then blocked. Hopgood v Brown is the boundary agreed by building up to it.

The deserted wife's right to occupy the home was once said to bind purchasers. National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth rejected that. Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce held that a personal right of occupation, unsupported by a proprietary interest, does not bind a third party. Lee v Lee remains authority for the husband's duty, as between the spouses, to provide a home or an alternative.