Problem
Fixture or chattel
Before completion of a sale of a house in Freetown, the seller removes three things. A marble statue that stood on a plinth in the garden and was not fixed. Tapestries tacked to wooden strips nailed to the dining-room wall. A conservatory bolted to the house. The buyer says all three passed with the land. Advise the buyer.
issue
Which of these objects had become part of the land, so that the seller had no right to take them?
rule
Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit. The tests are the degree of annexation and the purpose of annexation, both questions of law. An object resting on its own weight is prima facie a chattel. An object even slightly fixed is prima facie a fixture, unless it was fixed only so that it could be used or enjoyed as a chattel. An object that carries out a permanent architectural design can be a fixture though it is not fixed. A seller who wants to keep a fixture must say so in the contract.
application
The statue is Berkeley v Poulett. It stood on its own weight and was not part of a scheme that required it to stay. The buyer is unlikely to recover it unless the contract listed it. The tapestries are Leigh v Taylor. The nailing was only for display, so they remain chattels. The conservatory is Buckland v Butterfield. Bolting it to the house by a real structural attachment makes it part of the land. The seller should not have taken it, and the buyer can claim it, or damages.
conclusion
The buyer is on strong ground for the conservatory only. The statue and the tapestries were still chattels, unless the contract said they were included.
Essay
Two systems of land holding
Sierra Leone does not have a single law of land holding. Explain the dual system, and why a fee simple argument that would succeed in the Western Area may be the wrong claim in the Provinces.
issue
What is the difference between tenure in the Western Area and tenure in the Provinces, and what interest can a non-native take outside the Western Area?
rule
The Western Area applies the English law received on 1 January 1880, as later amended by local statute. Ownership is talked of in estates, and the largest is the fee simple, treated as absolute ownership. The Provinces kept customary title when the Protectorate was declared. Land is vested in the tribal authorities for the communities. Holding is communal, family, or, in the towns, individual. Individual freehold is confined to people whose personal law is customary law. A non-native takes a lease. Registration of a conveyance records the instrument. It does not create a title the vendor did not have.
application
A Freetown conveyance 'to B' passes the fee simple under the Adoption Act if the vendor had it. The same words in a provincial transaction do not conjure a fee simple out of family land. The chiefdom council holds for others. It cannot sell the inheritance as if it were a Crown grant. The Protectorate Land Ordinance, 1927 is the statute that tells a non-native what he can take, which is a lease, not the fee. Jabba v Radar equates the fee simple with absolute ownership where that estate exists. It is not a reason to plead it where the land is customary.
conclusion
The first question in a Sierra Leone land case is where the land is. Estates and deeds answer a Western Area claim. Community, family and the Ordinances answer a Provinces claim. Using the wrong one loses the case before the facts are reached.
Problem
Lease or licence
K agrees in writing to let a yard to M for seven years at a stated rent, with exclusive possession. No deed is signed. M enters and pays the rent. The freeholder then sells the yard to P, who knew of M's agreement, and P tries to turn M out. Separately, N paid for a seat at a film and was thrown out because the manager thought, wrongly, that N had not paid. Advise M and N.
issue
Does M have a lease that binds P, and did N become a trespasser when the cinema revoked his ticket?
rule
A legal lease must be by deed. An agreement that equity would specifically enforce is treated, by Walsh v Lonsdale, as an equitable lease between the parties, and it binds a purchaser who is not a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate without notice. Exclusive possession and a certain term are what distinguish a lease from a licence. A contractual licence gave no right to stay at common law, after Wood v Leadbitter. Hurst v Picture Theatres holds that equity would restrain the revocation, so the ejected licence-holder is not a trespasser.
application
M has no legal lease, because there is no deed. He has Walsh v Lonsdale in his favour against the original landlord, and P knew of the agreement, so P is not the purchaser without notice who would take free of it. M can stay for the seven years on the agreed terms. N never had a lease. He had a contractual licence. Wood v Leadbitter would have made him a trespasser. Hurst says the opposite once equitable remedies are taken into account. N can recover for the force used to remove him. He cannot claim an estate in the cinema.
conclusion
M holds an equitable lease and can resist P. N was not a trespasser, and he has a claim for the assault, not a claim to an interest in land.
