Idrissa Conteh v Abdul J. Kamara (SC CIV APP 2 of 1979) [1980] SLSC 4 (1 May 1980)

i loz ee | . IN HE SUPRINE COURT _OF SIERRA LEONE . ] Cs Cive App. Noe2/79 ~ ] const: . ] ‘The Hon. Justice E. Livesey Luke - Chief Justice : ‘The Hon, Justice 0.4. Handing | = 5.8.0, : | ‘The Hon. Justice 0.B.R. Tejan = J8.0, ] A The Hon, Justice A.V. awunor-Renner - J.5.C. The Hon. Justice H.B.4. Cole = Toke L ] ® BETWEEN: : 7 ] : IDRISSA CONTEH - APPELLANT R aD. r ] - ABDUL J. KAURL. = RESPONDENT ©] Vamenn nacmey 30, forte open. : AY s.n. snytue Q.c. vith him 4,E, Menley-paine for the Respondent, - q LUDGMENT

] 4 pelivered on Tuceday tet gril, 1260 ] | eivesey take Gade ‘i ‘The appellant is a farmer residing at Malel Village in the ]—Prenseiiis nistrict. on 43th Sones 1975 vhle travelling 99 {| passenger in a vehicle owed by the respondent, the appellant ] 4] fustained personal injuries as a result of the negligent driving a “| of the vehicle by the respon‘ent’s servant or agent. In May, * ~ 976 the appedlant instituted proceedings in the High Court <s] against the respondent for damages for negligence. The respondent id not file a defence to the action. In due course ] the action came up for trial, Liability was not in issue, . me only issue was the quantum of damages. ‘The sppeliant gave > evidence in support of his claim for special and general appellant. Both partics were represented by Counsel at the J | || eriat. the trial judge geve judgaent on 24th November, 1977 x avarding (2 appellant the oun of Le.2,000 ss general danages and the sum of Le.2,067 as speoial danages. avant, The uppeal was heard on Sth June 1978 end Judgment was qt 7 eves

] -e- J | certverea on 9th Februaxy 1979 allowing the sppesl and } reducing the general daneges to Le.4,500 and wholly setting > J aside the @Ward of special damages. It is against that Sudgnent that the sppeltant has appealed to this Court. J The isouds in this appeal may be briefly stated. They are (4) wacther the Court of ippeal was right in reducing the general ] danages awarded (4i)whether the Court of <ppeal was right in wholly disallowing the special damages awarded. ] In arguing the first issue, Mr. Berthan Macauley Jr. learned counsel for the appellant submitted thet the Court of :ppeal : | wrongly appiied well-ostablished principles governing the powers ] of an Appellate Court in interfering with an award of danages. Before determinhg the issues raised, I think that it is necessery J || te consider whether the Court of <ppeal has any power to review 2] awards of damages by a judge sitting alone, and if so, in what "| circumstances. I think thet it is importent to state that by | 1 Gj tastue of vole 9(41) of the Sierra Leone Court of <ppeal Rules, | |} 1973, end apes to the Court of peal is by way of re-hearing. | ] in appeal against an award of danagos is, like appeals generally, by way of re-hearing and therefore the Court of .ippeal has power ] to review the award. But a well established rule has been 4) accepted over the years as governing on ippéllate Court in the | cxorciso of ite power to review an award of damages by a judge ] {| sitting atone. The rule is thet an ppellate Court will not “| interfere with an award of damages unless it is satisfied that the judge acted on a wrong principle of lew, or has mis- 4] ] Speenented the tects ov hes ando a holly senoneous eotinate {| of tho deneges to which the claimant is entitled. The rule wos ] "| stovea witn much clarity by Greer I,J. ia tho English Court of appeal in Fiint v. Lovell (1935) 4 K.B.354. He said inter J ate et pe 360:— ".seeee I think it is right to say thet this | court will be disinelined to roveree the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of ‘ ] i domages mercly because they think that if they ‘ had tried the case in the first instance they | would have given a lesser sum. In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the ~ question of the anount of dameges it will E ] gonerally be necessary that this Court : E should be convinced eithir thet the judge 1 e2ted upon some wrong principle of law or f

J Hoe

] nigh'pr oo very enell as to make ity in tho judgement of this Court, an ontirely = j erroneous estimate of the damages to which the [aes is entitled" J In Owen v. Sykes (1936) 1 K.B, 192 C...., Greer L.J. elaborated ®] ‘upon the mule. Ho said at p. 198ti : 14 tat thie Court docs not readily interfere 4 with the estinate of damages mede by a learned a Jndge-at the trial. iin assessment of damages 1s is necessarily an estimate, and an estinate : fs necessarily a mnttor of degree, and it ia seons to me thet unless we come to the con e clusion that the learned judge took an al erroneous view of the evidence as to the Fi. + damage suffered by the plaintiff, or made some i wistake in giving weight to evidence that ought ] : not to hive affected his mind, or in leaving a out of consideration sosothing that ought to U4 have affected his mind, we ought tot to 14 interfere.” sof]. tora Wright after expressly approving of the rulo as stated by J 24) creer 1.5. in Flint v. Lovell (supra) continued his speech in pi the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn .ssocieted J a Coliierios Ltd. (1942) 4.C. 601 at p. 617 as follows:- |e "me scele must go down heavily against the ee figure attached Sf the. kppeliate Court Le q to interfere, whothor on the ground of excess | 4 or insufficiency." 4] me ruie nes poon adopted ond applicd by our Courts in Sicrra J "| Leone over “he years, and in ny view, rightly so. +] In delivering the judgment of the Court of .ppeal in * J ‘| Suleman Lesawarrack v. Reffa Brothers & The Northern -.ssurance Go. Utd, (1962) 2 S.L.L,R. 196 Bankole Jones ‘g. C.J. (es he “| then was) said inter alia at p. 197:- ~ J "in ‘.ppellate Court is not justified in ] ewstituting » figure of its own for that acrded below simply because it would 7 hove avanded e different figure if it had

i (oS ] ve J tricd the case ot first instance. It can only properly interfere if it is satisfied poi that the judge applied « wrong principle of law or thst the amount awarded is cither 50 inordinately high or so inordinately low ] thst it must be a wholly erroncous estimate r of the damage." d Sk 1e win be convenient to consider nov the peiactntes applicable in making assessment of general damages in personal ] Snjury cases, Tho nost inportaht principle applicable is thet gencral daneges must be fair and reasonable compensation for ] a tee aanese sutterca nnd thet perfect compensation is not possible nor permissible. The judge making the assessment must | ao his dost to arrive at a fair end reesonable estimate and for J 4] Giss purpose ne ney use contain aide by considering the evant °) of dameges undcr various “heads of damages" The accepted J “| neads are: the bodily injury sustained, the pain and suffering | Gndured, past, present and future, injury to health, loss of ] “| amenities, loss of expectation of life and the present and future financial loss. But the judea te not obliged te state 4g] the amount svemtodunder each herd. His duty is to satiety” ] A] nimete tnat atstne end of the day the tobal of tho suns awarded “| under the vrrious heads is fair and reasoneble: doa 1 See Watson v. Powles (1968) 1 @.B.

596. In this connection the words of Lord Denning M.R, in Fletcher v. ‘utocar snd Transporters 1 al Uta. (1968) 2 W.L.R, 743 C.u. arc instructive. Ho said inter t io at pe 748s 1 4 "In the first place, I think he has attempted ; to give a perfect compensation in money, J i wherers the lew says that he should not make 4 that ottempt. It is an impossible task. He should give 2 fair compensation." JJ ta ne continued at ps 749: | "In the second plrce, I think that the judge | wis wrong to take cach of the itens as a | separate heed of compensation. They are | | oaty aids to arriving at « fair and reesonsble x] compensation ] seseee There is to my mind, a considcreble Pisk of error in just nding up the items. 7 Tt is the risk of overlapping."

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