S v Brima Daboh (SC MISC APP 1 of 1979) [1980] SLSC 11 (21 May 1980)

I ee As DDE SUI coun op _sremra 10s ote ‘The Honourable Ag. Chief Justice B, Livesey luke - Presiding ‘Tho Honourable Mr. Justice C.A. Harding ~ Justice of the Suprene Cts ‘The Honourable Mrs. 4.v. Avunor-Renner = Justice of the Supreme Ct. SUP. OT. MISC. APP, 1/79 we sum = gerscam som “Bid” gee sapen Sem be tein ines pte ote 2 am Gf pits romeo Sita tn ed oh ee oe thls vine end Sih or ea Lun acetate 660 oE kat Sea St cali Pursuant to Coder 76 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1976, ses aetinnh bs aise oy angen o,c0 oes mt so pag see (a) Hotice of Application for Extension of Tine se ak a Sass RELL eeiep rien oct bcegins ec fo) ahs ee le ead ane wi ee

(4) final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings cn questions as to the interpretation of the Constitution; and

(0) PP OE ee

(2) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and this Act an appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Magesty in Council (How the s) Supreme Court7 with leave of the Court of Appeal in the following cases - (a) decisions in any civil or criminal Proceedings where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal the question involved in the appeal is one that by reason of the general or public importance or otherwise, ought to be submitted to Her Majesty in | Souneil ASnow the Supreme Court7." When the Application for leave came before the Court of Appeal for hearing, that Court indicated that At°wished to be addressed on the interpretation of the words "genera? and public importance." So quite clearly the Court of Appeal was adverting its mind to Section 70(2)(a) of the Courts Act, 1965. It turned out that the Court of Appeal was never addressed as requested,

. because on 6th February, 1979 the Court of Appeal granted the Director of Public Prosecutions leave to withdraw his application for leave to appeal. In the meantime, on 7th February, 1979,

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the Director of Public Prosecutions had sent to the Registrar of the Supreme Court Notice of Application for extension of time within which to appeal to the Supreme Court, That is the application now before us. The main reason given by the Director of Public Prosecutions for the application is that when he filed the Motion for the leave of the Court cf Appeal to appeal to the Supreme Court he did not advert his mind to Section 103(1)(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978, That sub-section provides as follows:-

"103(1) An appeal shall lie from a Judgment,

decree or order of the Court of Appeal to

the Supreme Court -—

Ka) oe as ea ta? genie Pinkees putes

() as of right, in any criminal cause or

matter in respect of which an appeal has been

brought to the Court of Appeal from a

judgment, decree or order of the High Court

of Justice in the exercise of its original

jurisdiction," i Mr. Tejan-Cole submitted that this sub-section confers an automatic right of appeal in all criminal matters brought to the Court of Appeal from a judgment decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, He submitted further that that sub-section rendered the leave of Court of Appeal tc appeal to the

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SA a Be Supreme Court unnecessary. He conceded in effect that his opplication to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal was unnecessary and that he should have appealed directly to the Supreme tourt without applying for leave of any sort.

Mr. Metzger conceded that the procedure laid down in the Rules of the Supreme Court 1976 for applying for extension of time within which to appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court had teen complied with and that Section 103(1)(b) of the 1978 Constitution makes provision for an appeal to lie as of tight from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal matters tried by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction. Learned Counsel however submitted that the grounds stated for the application for extension of time did not constitute “substantial grounds" to warrant the granting of the: application,

There is no doubt that Section 103(1)(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978 introduced far reaching and indeed radical chenges in the law releting to appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal matters. Prior to the coming into operation of the 1978 Constitution, on the 1uth June 1978, there

swas no right of appeal as of right from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal matters tried in the High Court in its original jurisdiction except where the decision complained of involved questions as to the interpretation of the Constitution (See Section 70(1)(a) of the Courts Act 1965). The position was that in a2 criminal proceedings except those coming within the

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