Alimamy Turay v Cecilia Koroma (CIV APP 3 of 1980) [1981] SLSC 6 (17 December 1981)

j ‘DLTUE SUPREME COURT oF SIERRA LEONE Morass ] ton, mies Justice B, Livesey Luke = Gade i Hon, Mr, Justice C.A, Harding = FS. Hon, Mr, Justice 0.B.R, Tejan = 8c. Hon, Mre,Juatice Avunor-Renner = 58.0. Hon, Mr, Justice K.E,0, During - AL pe. App. No. 3/80 Setweente | en | Ceciiia Koroma - Respondent 4A. Thomas, Bq, for the Appellant ‘tatenent jHVESEY LUKE C341 | Tae respondent was injured in a motor accident on the Jrectown/Bo Road on 17th July, 1975. As a result, action vas “akon against the appellant for damages for negligence. The E sponaent was a 13 year old school girl at the time of the cctdent, She suffered from a fractured pelvis as a result of Joe accident. She was admitted in hospital from 17th July, 1975 |» 6th September, 1975 and continued physiothoraphy treatment Lireatter a» an out-patient, When the Specialist Gynaccologist Int obstrotrictan examined her on Stet Mareh, 197 hie findings . ere the fracture had healed but there vas gross deformity of ‘se pelvis canal 4.e. the birth canal, The injuries were ‘manent. As @ result of the deformity of the pelvis, future far tore pregnancies vill have to be delivered by osesarean dren, The carriage of « pregnancy wil be painful as a result etme bone injuries to the pelvis, She vould probably always

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Although the reason for the proceedings was irrelevant yet Pertinent and useful evidence did emerge from them,

Tt was from those proceedings that the learned trial judge sould have, instead of making a negative finding as he did, found the 19th August, 1966 as the Court of Appeal, the learned C.J. and 0.B.R, Tejan J.S.C, found as the date of execution of the deed.

It was from the evidence in those proceedings that the Yeason for non-registration within 10 days of the 6th August, 1966 emerged,

I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the Court of Appeal, having established the date of execution, considered a Feason for the failure to register that was not in relation to that date.

. ‘The reason for failure to register within 10 days from 6th August, 1966 as disclosed by the evidence was that the ‘applicant in the High Court felt that the decd was not yet ripe for registration as both parties had not by then signed the * document, This misapprehension in my opinion must have been induced by the testimunium clause in the deed. Considering all the circumstances and the dictum of Lord Aitkin at p.649 of the report in Evans & Bartham cited by my brother Tejan J.S.C, I would say the reason was excusable.

I would therefore dismiss the appeal and grant leave to tha Reepondents to register the deed Ex, "A" to take effect as from

19th August, 1966, + Hon, Mr, Justice CS, Davies Justice of Appeal

= 18h At 40 necessary to refer to the judguent; After the learned Judge had considered and decided on the claim for special damages he proceoded thus: "I have now to consider plaintiff's future or Prospective loss of earnings, I realise that Plaintife 4s an infant sti1i attending schoo. fand has not yet embarked on any career, and 20 there is no figure for net annual 1008 at the date of trial, There is no scale on vhich T can weigh the injuries of thie elri for componsation, am therefore reduced to a pure guess-vork for the circumstances of this Kind of case dety anything Like « precise arimmetionl calculation, I therefore have to take everything into consideration in granting the plaintate a Lump suity whch I consider cepmensurate enough in the etrcunstances of sme learned judge thon highlighted certain "salient pointe” in the medical oviderge and then continued: i x rotlise in the ctrounstances, T nave to vard « tump sum once and for ait, which wil bo considered reasonable and in doing so T have to take into account all the above consstersttone.* Ee mould be noted that in the firet passage the Learned judge ania the; he had to consider "the plaineiftte future oF 1 crospective 100 of oncning." He also said that he hed to eake HD caverytning iste consideration in granting the plaintiff « usp un." ‘Ta the eecond passage the Learned judge said that 49 ating © once for a11 lump sun avard he had to take inte account wali the abop considerations." It scans quite clear to me that Dane of the “ibove considerations” the juige was referring te 3a

the second passage was the very first “consideration” he mentioned at the boginning of the first passage i.e, "future or prospective oss of earnings." Therefore, when the two passages are read together, I an left in no doubt that the learned judge took “future or prospective loss of earnings" into consideration in assessing gonoral damages,

I don't think that there 4s any dispute that the evidence in this case does not warrant the avard of any damages in respect of “future or prospective loss of earnings." Since the judge, An my view, took that head of damages! into consideration in making his avards, in my judgment, he thereby orred.

‘The principles governing an appellate court in appeals against avard of damages are well-settled, In Idrissa Conteh vy Abdul J, Kamara (supra) this court said inter alia:

"But a well eotablished rule has been accepted

over the years as governing an Appellate Court

in tho exercise of its power to review an avard

of damages by a judge sitting alonoj The rule

4e that an Appollate Court will not interfere

with an avard of damages unless 4t 1s satisfied

that the Judge acted on a wrong principle of 1av,

or has misapprehended the facts or has made a

wholly erroncous estimate of the damages to

which the claimant is entitled,” See also Flint v, Lovell (1935) 1 K.B, 354 C.A, por Greer Lid. at ps 3603 and Qven v, Sykes (1936) 1 X.B. 192 C.A, per Greer Lids at pe

198. In my judgnont the loarned judge gave weight to mattera that ought not to have affected his mind. He thereby misapprehended the facts, resulting in his making an erroneous estimate of the damaget to which the respondent 4 entitled. In these circumstances, this court has the power and the duty to correct the error by interfering with the avard of damages,

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