3. Corroboration

R v Baskerville is the definition. Corroboration is independent evidence, admissible in the case, which a reasonable jury could find credible, and which implicates the accused in a material particular. It must confirm both that the crime was committed and that the accused committed it. A detail that is consistent with the story, but does not point to the accused, is not corroboration.

As a matter of law, some charges fail if there is no corroboration. The list is perjury, under the Perjury Act 1911; treason, under the State Offences Act 1963; speeding, where Nicholas v Penny treated an untested police speedometer as needing support; affiliation proceedings; certain election offences; the unsworn evidence of a child; and specified offences under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, sections 2 to 4, 22 and 23, and procurement under section 7. Rape is not on that list. Rape does not require corroboration as a matter of law.

An unsworn child cannot corroborate another unsworn child. A sworn child can. DPP v Hester is the mutual-corroboration case. The accused was charged with indecent assault. A younger child gave unsworn evidence and an older child gave sworn evidence. The House of Lords held that the sworn child's evidence could corroborate the unsworn child. The two do not become unable to support each other merely because each speaks to the same incident.

Where the law does not require corroboration, practice may still require a warning. If the warning is not given, a conviction can be quashed. The categories are the sworn evidence of children, sexual complaints generally, and the evidence of an accomplice called by the prosecution.

Davies v DPP sets out who counts as an accomplice for that warning. The accused was convicted of murder arising out of a fight between two groups of youths. A youth who had been in the fight gave evidence. The House of Lords held that an accomplice, for the warning, falls into one of three classes: a party to the offence charged; a receiver giving evidence against the thieves; or a person who was party to another offence which the prosecution is allowed to prove in order to establish the charge. The judge decides whether there is evidence that the witness is an accomplice. If the facts are disputed, the jury decides whether he is. The warning should be in plain language. The word "danger" is not compulsory, but it is hard to improve on. The warning is not the same thing when the witness is called for the defence. R v Prater, R v Bagley and R v Loveridge mark that limit. Bagley and Loveridge are named only. The judge tells the jury what evidence is capable of being corroboration. The jury decides whether it is.

A lie can be corroboration, but only on the four conditions in R v Lucas. The lie must be deliberate. It must relate to a material issue. The motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth, not shame, panic or a wish to protect someone else. And the statement must be shown to be a lie by evidence other than the witness who needs to be corroborated, or by an admission. A failure to give evidence is not corroboration.

A recent complaint is not corroboration. It shows consistency. R v Whitehead and R v Christie are the authorities. Distress, by itself, is not independent of the complainant, so it fails the Baskerville test, unless someone else observed it. R v Redpath is the case where a stranger saw the girl's distress, and that observation could support her. R v Chauhan is in the same line. In R v Dowley the distress was seen about a mile away and some time later. The Court of Appeal would not interfere with the jury's use of it, but distance and delay go to weight.