Vasileios Kagias & Ioanna Loukopoulou v Peter Conteh v ORS (CIV APP 15/2026) [2026] SLCA 12 (27 October 2026)

VASILEIOS KAGIAS AND IOANNA LOUKOPOULOU v PETER CONTEH AND AMINATA KAMARA Civ. App. 15/2026; [2026] SLCA 12 Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone 27 October 2026 In the matter of the Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989 and the Child Rights Act No. 16 of 2025; in the matter of an application for the adoption of Mariama Conteh (child)

Coram

Hon. Mrs Justice Fatmatta Bintu Alhadi JSC (Presiding), Hon. Mr Justice Michael P. H. Mamie JA, Hon. Mr Justice Augustine Musa J Judgment delivered by Alhadi JSC; Mamie JA and Musa J agreeing. Counsel: Ms I. Jalloh (Chambers of Macauley, Bangura & Co) for the Appellants

Facts

By Originating Summons dated 8 October 2025 the appellants applied to the High Court to adopt the juvenile Mariama Conteh, to change her name to Mariama Ioli Kagia and for liberty to take her out of Sierra Leone. They relied on affidavits, the written consent of the biological parents (the respondents) and a letter of recommendation from the Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs. They also asked the court, relying on section 3(1) of the Child Rights Act 2007, to waive section 3(4) of the Adoption Act 1989, which bars an adoption order unless the applicant and child reside in Sierra Leone and the child has been in the applicant's care for at least six consecutive months. By judgment dated 5 December 2025 Kamara J refused the application, not being convinced that adoption was a necessity or in the child's best interest, finding that the biological parents could care for the child within their means and expressing doubts about the purpose of the adoption. The appellants appealed on three grounds: (A) the judge wrongly introduced a test of "necessity" in place of the section 6 Adoption Act criteria; (B) she misapplied the best-interest principle and relied on extraneous considerations; (C) the judgment was against the weight of the law and the evidence.

Issues

1. Whether the trial judge misinterpreted and misapplied the best-interest-of-the-child principle and substituted a test of necessity for the statutory criteria in section 6 of the Adoption Act 1989 (Grounds A and B).

2. How the Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989 and the Child Rights Act No. 16 of 2025 operate together, and whether the court can dispense with the mandatory requirements of section 3(4) of the Adoption Act.

3. Whether the judgment was against the weight of the evidence (Ground C).

Held

Appeal dismissed on all grounds. Adoption is a creature of statute and courts may not add conditions Parliament did not enact; section 6 of the Adoption Act does not require that adoption be "necessary". However, the appellants themselves invoked the Child Rights Act and asked the High Court to dispense with section 3(4) of the Adoption Act, which they had not complied with; they could not approbate and reprobate. Section 3(4) is mandatory and the lower court has no authority to dispense with it. The trial judge was entitled, and arguably obliged, to consider the Child Rights Act, did not err, and engaged in detail with the evidence. Her findings were not perverse; an appellate court will not interfere merely because another conclusion was possible.

Orders

i. The prayer for an order authorising the appellants to adopt the child Mariama Conteh is refused. ii. The change of the child's name from Mariama Conteh to Mariama Ioli Kagia is refused. iii. The appellants are not at liberty to take the child out of the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone.

Key Principles

1. Adoption jurisdiction derives exclusively from statute; courts must interpret, not amend, the Adoption Act and may not import conditions (such as "necessity") that Parliament omitted (expressio unius; casus omissus).

2. Section 3(4)(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act 1989 (residence and six months' continuous care and possession) is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the court.

3. A party who invites the court to apply the Child Rights Act cannot complain on appeal that the court did so (approbation and reprobation).

4. In adoption proceedings the welfare of the child is the first consideration (Re D (An Infant)); giving a child to applicants who have not met the mandatory criteria, or who are strangers to the child, is not in the child's best interest.

5. A ground that a judgment is against the weight of the evidence succeeds only where the conclusion falls outside the range reasonably open on the evidence; rejecting evidence is not failing to consider it.

Why It Matters in Sierra Leone

The Court of Appeal clarifies the relationship between the Adoption Act 1989 and the Child Rights Act 2025, confirms that the residence and six-month care requirements for adoption are mandatory, and notes that the Child Rights Act 2007 had been repealed and replaced by the 2025 Act.

Legislation Cited

Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989, sections 2(2), 3(4)(a) and (b), 6; Child Rights Act No. 16 of 2025, sections 2(1), 3; Child Rights Act No. 7 of 2007, section 3(1) (repealed).

Cases Cited

Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1952] AC 189; Hon. Abdul Kargbo & Another v Attorney General & Minister of Justice & Another (SC App 6 of 2022) [2023] SLSC 1; Farrell v Alexander [1977] AC 59; Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394; Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593; A & S (Children) v Lancashire County Council [2012] EWHC 1689; Attorney-General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436; Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142; Lissenden v C.A.V. Bosch Ltd [1940] AC 412; Re D (An Infant) (Adoption: Parent's Consent) [1977] 2 WLR 79; [1977] 1 All ER

145. Also cited: Bromley and Lowe, Bromley's Family Law (8th edn, Butterworths).

Judgment

ALHADI JSC: On the 23rd of February 2026 a Notice of Appeal was filed by the Appellant against the Judgment of the Hon. Mrs. Justice K.D. Kamara, J. dated the 5th day of December 2025 on three (3) grounds as follows: Ground A a. That the Learned High Court Judge (LJ), with respect, erred in law and in fact and consequently misdirected herself when she stated that the court has not been convinced that the adoption of the juvenile by the Applicants (now Appellants) at this material time is a necessity and in the best interest of the juvenile, relying on reasons that the Respondents are able to properly care for the juvenile within their means, and thereby refused the application to adopt the juvenile. Particulars The LJ, with respect, stated that “…..this Honourable Court has not been convinced that the adoption of the juvenile Mariama Conteh by the applicants herein, at this material time, based on the evidence adduced before this Hon. Court, is a necessity and is in the best interest of the said juvenile for the following reasons…” even though section 6 of the Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989 lays out in very clear and unambiguous terms the matters to be considered and of which the court shall be satisfied before making an adoption order. The said matters as specified in section 6 of the Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989 were with respect not countenanced by the judge. Rather, the LJ considered the making of an adoption order on the basis of a necessity where the biological parents are incapable of caring for the child. Ground B That the Learned High Court Judge (LJ), with respect, erred in law and in fact and consequently misdirected herself in the interpretation and the application of the “best interest of the child” principle as provided by section 3(1) of the Child Rights Act No.7 of 2007 thereby reaching a wrong decision in refusing the adoption application. The LJ, with respect, placed undue reliance on the intention of the parties, stating the testimonies of the Respondents “were riddled with inconsistencies” and creating doubt as to the purpose of the adoption, without identifying any material inconsistency sufficient to lawfully justify the refusal. The court also took into account extraneous considerations while failing to consider the totality of the Affidavit in Support of the application which, among others, shows that the juvenile had spent a significant period in an orphanage and that the Applicants had been providing care, support and stability for the juvenile and were in the position to continue doing so. The court did not sufficiently evaluate the juvenile's long-term stability, emotional security, and overall welfare and development, nor whether the proposed adoption would provide permanence and improved welfare prospects. Instead, the refusal was grounded largely on the view that the adoption of the child was not a necessity which was a misdirection in law and inconsistent with the proper application of the “best interest of the child” principle. Ground C That the Order is against the weight of well-established principles of law, precedents, authorities and the evidence. The Reliefs Sought are: a. That the court pursuant to Section 2 (1) of the Child Rights Act No.16 of 2025 do grant an Order, in the best interest of the child, authorizing the Applicants Vasileios Kagias and Ioann Loukopoulou pursuant to Section 2(2) of the Adoption Act No. 9 of 1989 to adopt the child Mariama Conteh. b. That on the granting of Order (1) above, the name of the child be changed from Mariama Conteh to Mariama Ioli Kagia. c. That the Applicants herein be at liberty to take the child out of the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone. d. Any further order (s) that this Honourable Court deems fit. Brief Background and Submission made by Counsel for the Appellant

1. The Appellants commenced proceedings in the High Court by Originating Summons dated the 8th October 2025 seeking the reliefs as stated above. The application was supported inter alia by affidavits, supplemental affidavits, documentary exhibits, the written consent of the biological parents and a letter of recommendation from the Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs.

2. The Appellants challenge the decision of the High Court in refusing the application for the adoption of a juvenile, Mariama Conteh, even though the biological parents of the said child gave their written and oral consent for the said adoption. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the Ministry responsible for children's affairs had recommended the said adoption; and that there was evidence demonstrating the suitability and financial capability of the prospective adoptive parents.

3. The Appellants contend that the Learned Judge (LJ) misdirected herself in law by introducing a new legal requirement of “necessity”, which finds no support in the Adoption Act No.9 of 1989, by failing to apply the statutory criteria prescribed under Section 6 of the Adoption Act. Counsel espoused that the LJ relied upon considerations extraneous to the statutory framework governing the adoption of a child, and misapplied the “best interest principle” contained in the Child Rights Act of

4. The Appellants further contend that the LJ displaced the specific statutory considerations enumerated in Section 6 of the Adoption Act and instead based her decision principally upon her assessment that the biological parents of the juvenile are capable of caring for the child within their means. This according to counsel, amounted to a misdirection in law because the statutory inquiry is directed towards the welfare and the best interests of the child and not towards the existence of parental incapacity or destitution.

5. Counsel argued that it seemed that the LJ declined to grant the adoption orders principally because she was not satisfied that the adoption of the juvenile was a “necessity” and concluded that the biological parents remained capable of caring for the child within their means, as per what was adduced during the hearing.

6. Ms. Jalloh also espoused that the LJ expressed reservations concerning the intention of the biological parents and concluded that the proposed adoption did not sufficiently satisfy the “best interests of the child” principle.

7. The crux of the issue advanced by the Appellants is that the LJ introduced into law an additional threshold requiring proof that the adoption of a juvenile is an “actual necessity” before an adoption order could properly be made. It is argued that this requirement does not appear either expressly or by necessary implication in the Adoption Act of 1989 and that, by elevating the issue of necessity into a precondition for adoption, the learned judge effectively amended the statute under the guise of its interpretation. Application and Analysis of the Law, Evidence and Facts

8. On these points, the overarching principle is that the welfare and best interests of the child must be paramount in every matter affecting a child. This principle is now expressly embodied in the Child Rights Act of 2025. From that perspective, I must state from the outset that the LJ was indeed entitled to examine the surrounding circumstances, including the motivation or intention of the parties, the existing parental relationship, and whether the proposed adoption genuinely promotes the child's welfare.

9. Thus, one very critical issue before this court is not whether the welfare principle applies to adoption proceedings, albeit that proposition is of no serious controversy, but rather whether the welfare principle authorises a court to impose legal conditions which Parliament itself did not enact.

10. This appeal therefore, present questions extending beyond the facts of the individual case. It presents an opportunity for this Court of Appeal to clarify the relationship between two important statutes governing the rights of children and the laws governing their adoption in Sierra Leone, namely, The Adoption Act No.9 of 1989 and the Child Rights Act No.16 of 2025.

11. Further, this Court ought to address and clarify the proper limits of judicial discretion in adoption proceedings and the circumstances in which an appellate court may interfere with those discretions.

12. Before dealing with the grounds of appeal raised herein, it is prudent for one to reiterate that the determination of all the grounds of this present appeal depends fundamentally upon the proper interpretation of two statutes governing the rights and welfare of children in Sierra Leone, namely the Adoption Act No.9 of 1989 and the Child Rights Act No.16 of 2025.

13. Although the appeal arises from the refusal of an application for an adoption order, a careful reading of both the ruling of the LJ and the grounds of appeal reveals that the dispute is not primarily one of contested facts. Rather, it concerns whether the LJ correctly understood the scope of her statutory jurisdiction and whether, in exercising that jurisdiction, she applied the legal criteria prescribed by Parliament or substituted them with considerations that, however well-intentioned, finds no foundation in the governing legislation.

14. Moreover, this appeal raises an important question concerning the proper interpretation of the Adoption Act No.9 of 1989 in light of the Child Rights Act No.16 of 2025 and the extent to which the “best interests of the child” principle governs adoption proceedings in Sierra Leone.

15. Grounds A and B raise substantially the same question, namely whether the LJ properly interpreted and applied the “best interest of the child” principle under section 3(1) of the Child Rights Act No.7 of 2007 in determining the application for adoption.

16. In essence, the grounds complain that the LJ erred in law and in fact by misdirecting herself in the interpretation and application of the statutory principle that the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in matters concerning children. Counsel further argue that, the LJ placed undue reliance on perceived inconsistencies in the evidence regarding the purpose of the adoption without identifying any material inconsistency capable of justifying the refusal of the application, in their estimation.

17. The grounds also allege that the LJ took into account irrelevant considerations whilst failing to consider the totality of the evidence, particularly the affidavit evidence demonstrating that the juvenile had spent a considerable period in an orphanage and that the Applicants had consistently provided care, support, stability, and were willing and able to continue doing so.

18. It is further alleged that insufficient consideration was given to the juvenile's longterm welfare, emotional security, stability, and the permanence which the proposed adoption would afford the child. Instead, the refusal of the application is said to have been based principally on the view that the adoption was “not a necessity”, thereby substituting a test of necessity with the statutory requirement that the child's best interests be the paramount consideration.

19. Firstly, it is a sine qua non that Courts are entrusted with the interpretation of legislations and not their amendment. Judicial fidelity to legislative intention is one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. Where Parliament has prescribed the conditions under which a statutory power may be exercised, the courts are not at liberty to enlarge or restrict those conditions according to their own perception of desirable policy. As Lord Simonds famously cautioned in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1952] AC 189 at Pp.191-192, that: “It is not for a court of law to import into a statute word which are not to be found there. Such an approach... is not to be justified. It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do. It would be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation”.