
THE REPUBLIC VRS KAYODE & 3 ORS (J6/01/2024) [2024] GHASC 39 (17 July 2024)
THE REPUBLIC VRS KAYODE & 3 ORS is a judgment from Ghana on 17 July 2024. Cite it as [2024] GHASC 39. Search it by the party names, the citation [2024] GHASC 39, or Ghana judgment.
July 17, 2024
GHANA
THE REPUBLIC VRS KAYODE & 3 ORS
J6/01/2024
[2024] GHASC 39
Proceeding. Judgment. Ghana.
Page 1 of 17
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA
Coram
PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING) OWUSU (MS.) JSC PROF. MENSA- BONSU (MRS.) JSC KULENDI JSC ACKAH-YENSU (MS.) JSC KWOFIE JSC DARKO ASARE JSC REFERENCE NO.J6/01/2024 17TH JULY , 2024 THE REPUBLIC …………….. REPUBLIC/ VRS 1.ABIOLA AYORINDE KAYODE …....... 1ST FUGITIVE/
Alias Abk Alias Abdul Rahman Ibrahim
2.ADEWALE ANIYELOYE 3.RICHARD UZUH 4.BANSON
J U D G M E N T KWOFIE JSC: This reference to the Supreme Court was sent by the District Court, Kaneshie, Accra who stated the question for determination as follows: “whether or not the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom which was signed on 22nd December 1931 Page 2 of 17
and came into force on 24 th June 1935 forms part of the laws of Ghana within the meaning of Article 11(1) (d) of the 1992 Constitution and Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act 1960 (Act 22) in the light of the fact that Article 16 of the said Treaty makes the Treaty applicable to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast”.
Background
The reference emanated from a request for extradition of the fugitive presented to Ghana by the United States (USA) government based on the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain which was signed on 22 nd December 1931 pursuant to the of the fugitive in the United States on 21 st August 2019 for offences of fraud committed by the fugitive and his co-conspirators. The 1st fugitive/applicant (referred to in this judgment as the applicant) Abiola Ayorinde Kayode alias ABK has been charged in the United States District Court for the Di strict of Nebraska on 22 nd August 2019 on an ind ictment for engaging in a large transna tional criminal enterprise, involving numerous financial fraud schemes in the case of United States vs. Alex Ogunshiakin, Felix Okpoh and Abiola. The operations targeted Chief Financial Officers, Controllers or other financial employees of businesses who received spoofed emails that appeared to be from the chief executive officers, owners or other executives of the businesses and requested that the recipient or target employees submit a wire transfer. They succeeded in defrauding over 70 companies, their victims , who reported a combined loss of over 6 Million Dollars. The applicant Abiola Ayorinde Kayode (ABK) and others conspired to defraud victims and launder the proceeds of the fraud through a business email compromise scheme which is Nigerian based and involves a large, complex, and loosely organized group of criminals with different specialties in various aspects of the scheme. Investigations revealed that illicit funds obtained in the scheme were transferred to bank accounts in China, the United Arab Emirates and other countries. Page 3 of 17
The Applicant’s involvement in the fraudulent scheme included providin g Amiyeloye, a member of the scheme with US bank accounts which were used by the applicant to receive the wire transfer from the businesses they defrauded. Investigations further revealed that the applicant’s chat and email messages showed bank account s requests he made to Ugbah a member of the group and which Ugbah subsequently provided. The applicant also provided details of a Bank of America account and a Tran sit Employees Federal Credit Union Account. The applicant also received money from A miyeloye and Uzuh via Nigerian bank electronic transfers. Amiyeloye confirmed the applicant’s involvement in the conspiracy and identified him when shown the photograph that the applicant provided for his 2014 U.S. Visa application. The bank accounts information were also listed on the applicant’s 2014 and 2016 US Visa applications. On this basis , extradition proceedings were commenced before the District Magistrate Court, Kaneshie, Accra for the of the applicant , pending the surrender of the applicant to the U.S. Government to stand trial. This application was strenuously opposed by counsel for the applicant who sought leave of the court to file a written response to the extradition request which was refused by the Court. Coun sel then filed an appeal to the High Court against the ruling of the District Court ordering him to res pond orally to the request for extradition. He also filed an application for pending the determination of the appeal. Subsequently co unsel for the applicant filed an application requesting the District Court to refer the case to the Supreme Court for constitutional interpretation on the basis that the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain does not apply to present day Ghana. The District Court in a ruling, granted the applicant’s request to stay the extradition proceedings and refer the case to the Supreme Court. The trial Magistrate was of the opinion that a case had been made for a reference to the Supreme Court as “there appears to be some lack of clarity as to the applicability or otherwise of the 1931 Treaty to the entirety of present day Ghana and as to whether the said Treaty can be considered as being part of the existing laws of Ghana under Article 11(1) (d) of the 1992 Constitution”. The District Court framed this question to the Supreme Court for resolution: Page 4 of 17
i) Whether or not the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom which was signed on 22 nd December 1931 and came into force on 24 th June 1935 forms part of the laws of Ghana within the meaning of Article 11(1)(d) of the 1992 Constitution and Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act 1960 (Act 22) in the light of the fact that Article 16 of the said Treaty makes the treaty applicable to the Northern territories of the Gold Coast. Submissions of Counsel for the Applicant and Counsel for the Respondent to the Supreme Court. In order to further appreciate the circumstances under which this case comes before the apex Court, we will adopt the statement contained in the ruling of the District Court Kaneshie, Accra by which the reference was made under 3 headings: i) Findings of Fact relevant to the matter or question referred to the Court. ii) Arguments of Counsel for the Fugitive/Applicant iii) Arguments of Counsel for the Republic/Respondent
i) Findings of Fact relevant to the matter in question referred to the Court. Respectfully, the main finding of fact crucial to the question referred is that the agreement grounding the application of the Republic for extradition of the 1 st fugitive from Ghana to the United States of America is the 1931 Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom. ii) Arguments of Counsel for Fugitive/Applicant The crux of the argument of counsel for the fugitive is that the Republic relies on the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain of 1931 to ground their application for extradition whilst there is no valid extradition treaty between Ghana and the United States of America. According to counsel, Article 16 of the Treaty made the treaty Page 5 of 17
applicable to the northern territories of the Gold Coast and that an erroneous interpretation had been adopted by the prosecution that the treaty applied to cover present day independent Republic called Ghana and form a part of the laws of Ghana. It was submitted that Ghana is distinct from the Northern territories of the Gold Coast and that under the Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1954 and the Ghana Independent Act, 1957, laws applicable in the various territories including Northern territories of Ghana remained so and never received universal application to the whole of present day Ghana. It was averred that the reliance by the prosecution on the Treaty contravened Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution and that there was the necessity for an interpretation by the Supreme Court in accordance with Article 1(2) and 130(2) of the 1992 Constitution, for a pronouncement to b e made on the validity of the Treaty relative to the constitutional provisions on the source of law in Ghana.
iii) Arguments of Counsel for Republic/Respondent The Respondent’s position was that the Court’s to refer a matter to the Supreme Court for constitutional interpretation only arose where a constitutional provision was unclear or ambiguous and that once a Court had jurisdiction to entertain a matte r, it could interpret provisions of the statute concerned. Respondent further stated that there was no issue of ambiguity or conflict in respect of Article 11(1)(d) of the 1992 Constitution to warrant a referral to the Supreme Court. It was submitted that article 16 of the Treaty ought to be read together with Article 2 thereof. In the Respondent’s view, the Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22) and the E xtradition Treaty of 1931 constituted enforceable existing laws under the 1992 Constitution. Counsel for Respondent submitted that the territories of Ghana were defined upon independence as all of Britain’s territories and it was trite that they comprised all the regions which existed Page 6 of 17
in Ghana before the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution. For the Respondent, the issue raised by the Applican t had already been settled by the Court s in the case of The Republic vs. Director of Prisons; Allotey and Another (No. 3) (1974) 2 GLR 388 and that no reasonable or exceptional grounds had been raised by the Applicant to warrant a stay of proceedings and a referral of the matter for interpretation. In his statement of case counsel for the applicant further contended that in the absence of provision s by law or an arrangement with a country such as a valid treaty, no extradition can be effected to any country. With specific reference to the Gold Coast and independent Ghana, Counsel submitted as follows: “In the case of the Extradition Acts of 1870 to 1932 , section 1 of the Extradition Act of 1959 made the Extradition (Southern Ghana) Ordinance and the Extradition Act of 1870 to 1932 applicable to the whole of Ghana after the attainment of independence. Regrettably, a similar saving was not made for the 1931 treaty between United States and the United Kingdom and it is this absence that leads 1 st fugitive (applicant) to contend that the treaty is invalid as it received no application to the territory presently known as Ghana upon independence , hence was not in force to be saved by the prevailing Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22). THE SUPREME COURT’S REFERENCE It is settled law per Article 130(2) of the 1992 Constitution that any court before whom a question of law relating to the enforcement or i nterpretation of the 1992 Constitution arises is bound to refer same to the Supreme Court for determination and dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court. Article 130 (1) and (2) of the 1992 Constitution provides as follows: “
(1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in – Page 7 of 17
a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution. (2) where an issue that relates to a matter or question referred to in clause (1) of this article arises in any proceedings in a court other than the Supreme Court, that court shall stay the proceedings and refer the question of law involved to the Supr eme Court for determination, and the court in which the question arouse shall dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court” In the case of Adumoah II vs. Adu Twum II (2000) SCGLR 165 the Supreme Court held thus: “The original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court under Articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution to interpret and enforce the provisions of the Constitution is a Special jurisdiction meant to be invoked in suits raising genuine or real issues of interpretation of a provision of the Constitution” It must however be noted that it is not every case involving an allegation of an interpretative issue in proceedings that imposes a duty to refer a case to the Supreme Court. Thus in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeal Ex parte: James Gyakye Quayson, Civil Motion No. J5/17/2022 judgment of the Supreme Court dated 9 th March 2022 (Unreported), this court stated per my respected brother Kulendi JSC as follows: “It is not in every case of an “alleged interpretative issue” that a lower Court must stay proceedings and refer the alleged interpretative issue for determination. The court has a duty to ascertain whether from the Page 8 of 17
arguments of the parties a genuine and real issue of interpretation of a provision of the Constitution arises” Further on, this court in the Gyakye Quayson case (supra) cautioned lower courts as follows: “However, Article 130 does not impose a command that an automatic and unexamined referral be made at every mention or allegation of an interpretative issue in pro ceedings. Indeed Article 130 enjoins an implied duty on the court to ascertain whether , having regard to the proceedings before it, a real and genuine question of interpretation arises to warrant a reference to the Supreme Court. The duty imposed under Article 130 (2) cannot be subordinated to the opinion or contentions of litigants. Even though other courts are admonished to be more inclined to refer than not, they must still nevertheless reach an informed and judicious opin ion whether an interpretative issue is evident before a referral to this court. In this regard, a mere agreement or consensus by parties that an interpretative issue arises in proceedings, should not of itself warrant an automatic referral to this court or even by this court to itself” See also the case of Republic vs. Maikankan (1971) 2 GLR 473 where this court explained the import of Article 130 (2) to the effect that it is only where in proceedi ngs before the lower court, ther e arises a real and genuine case of interpretation that the lower court is mandated to stay the proceedings and refer the said constitutional issue to the Supreme Court for interpretation. It is necessary to state at the outset that the District Court had to determine a straight forward issue of whether or not the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain which was signed on 22nd December 1931 and came into effect on 24th June 1935 applied to Ghana in order to enable the court to act on it and to order the extradition of the applicant to the United States to stand trial on the charges against him. This was in our view a matter purely within the jurisdiction or competence o f the Page 9 of 17
District Court to determine. We will show presently why the District Court ought to have made that determination without a reference to this court. In approaching the issue in this case, we make reference to the provisions of the 1931 Treaty, particularly Articles 1, 2, and 16 thereof which provide as follows: ARTICLE 1 The High Contracting Parties engage to deliver up to each other, under certain circumstances and conditions stated in the present Treaty, those persons who, being accused or of any of the crimes or offences enumerated in Article 3, committed within the jurisdiction of the one Party, shall be found within the territory of the other Party. ARTICLE 2 For the purposes of the present Treaty the territory of His Britannic Majesty shall be deemed to be Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and all parts of His Britannic Majesty’s dominions overseas other than those enumerated in Article 14, together with the territories enumerated in Article 16 and any territories to which it may be extended under Article
17. It i s understood that in respect of all territory of His Britannic Majesty as above defined other than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man, the present Treaty shall be applied so far as the laws permit. For the purposes of the present Treaty , the territory of the United States shall be deemed to be all territory wherever situated belonging to the United States, including its dependencies and all other territories under its exclusive administration or control. ARTICLE 16 The Treaty shall apply in the same manner as if they were Possessions of His Britannic Majesty to the following British Protectorates, that is to say, Page 10 of 17
the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Gambia Protectorate, Kenya Protectorate, Nigeria Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia, Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone Protectorate, Solomon Islands Protectorate, Somaliland Protectorate, Swaziland, Uganda Protectorate and Zanzibar, and to the following territories in respect of which a mandate on be half of the League of Nations has been accepted by His Britannic Majesty, that is to say, Cameroons under British mandate, and the Tanganyika Territory. As can be seen fr om the provisions of the Treaty, Article 2 thereof , the Treaty was to apply to the territory of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and all parts of His Britannic Majesty’s dominions overseas other than those enumerated in Article 14 together with the territories enumerated in Article 16 and any territories to which it may be extended under Article 17. (emphasis mine) Clearly, one only needs to determine what constituted His Britannic Majesty’s dominions overseas referred to in the 1931Treaty. There is no dispute that as at 1931, the British dominions overseas included the Coastal colonies of the then Gold Coast and the Ashanti Colony which were all under British colonial control. This provision clearly did not include Protectorates under Article 16 of the Treaty. To make the T reaty applicable to the Protectorates under Article 16, the said Article 16 expressly provided that the Treaty shall apply in the same manner to the British Protectorates set out therein including Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Therefore reading Article s 1, 2 and 16 of the Treaty together, it is clear that the Treaty was applicable to the coastal colony of the Gold Coast, Ashanti Territory and the Northern Protectorates and Togoland under British mandate. This geographical area set out therein constituted Ghana at the time of independence in 1957. It should be recalled that the Ashanti Order in Council of 1901 had been passed on September 26, 1901 to annex and make Ashanti part of the British dominions. Section 4 of the said Ashanti Order in Council states as follows: Page 11 of 17
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