Henneh Watfa v Alhaji S. Barrie (CIV APP 62 of 2005) [2006] SLCA 17 (4 May 2006)

Civ. App. 62/2005 TN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN; HENNEH WaFTA, + APPELLANT/APPLICANT AND ALHAJISANU BARRIE - RESPONDENT CORAM; HON MR JUSTICE J. KAMANDA, J.A. HON MRS JUSTICE S.BASH-TAQI, J.A. HON MR JUSTICE G. GELAGA KING, J.A. Berthan Macaulay (Jnr) Esq., for the Applicant Abdul Serry-Kemal, Esq, for the Respondent RULING DELIVERED ON THE 4™ DAY OF MAY, 2006 HON MR JUSTICE G. GELAGA KING, J.A.: A Notice of Motion dated o® November, +2005 was filed by the Applicant as a preliminary matter, prior to the hearing of the Grounds of Appeal herein. I opine that, more appropriately, it should have, in that circumstance, been entered as a Miscellaneous Application to distinguish it from the substantive appeal hearing itself. Be that as it may, the motion seeks two main orders: 1, That this Hon. Court do grant an injunction restraining the respondent by himself, his servants, agents or howsoever otherwise from conveying, selling, mortgaging, or in any way disposing of the property delineated in survey plan LS. 2922/95 dated 21 December, 1995 and the building thereon and forming part of the conveyance marked ‘exhibit “BMJ 6E2" to the affidavit of Mr Berthan Macaulay (Jnr) sworn to on the 9 day of November, 2005 in support of the application herein, pending the hearing and determination of this epplication,

2. That an identical injunction as in 1. above be granted, pending the hearing and determination of the appeal herein. ‘The Notice of Motion is supported by the affidavit of Mr Berthan Macaulay (Jnr) sworn to.on the of day of November, 2005 and filed herein and counsel for the Applicant said he was making the application under rule 31 ofthis Court’s Rules, Public Notice No.29 of 1985. He based his submissions on the affidavit and exhibits in support. Ex. “BMJt” is a ‘copy of the writ of summons issued by the respondent against the applicant in which he claimed: “(1) Recovery of possession of the premises known as 18 Sani Abacha Street Freetown, the property ofthe plaintiff.

(2) Mesne profits at the rate of $200,000 US per annum from the 1 day of January, 2002 until possession is delivered up.

(3) __Interest thereon at such rate as the court shall allow.”

To that writ the Applicant filed a Defence and Counterclaim, ex. “BMJ2",

rather incomprehensibly in paragraph 6: iia

‘Save as herein expressly admitted the Defendant admits each and every allegation of fact contained as ifthe same were set out and traversed seriatim.”.

He then went onto plead in similar incomprehensible vein in paragraph 8:

. . . The Defendant did not execute the said conveyance but wrote back to the Defendant requesting that the purchase price be increased to United States Dollars One Hundred and Twenty Thousand which said sum the Defendant eventually agreed to pay.” Emphasis mine.

Judgement was eventually entered for the plaintiff, the Respondent herein and the Applicants Counterelaim was dismissed, as exhibited in “BMJa™

Mr Macaulay went on to submit that he was asking for an injunction to be granted in order to preserve the status quo vis a vis the property in dispute and cited the following cases:

American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon 1975 1 AILE. R504

Haja Adama Mansaray v. Alhaji Ibrahim Mansaray Civ. App. 37/81 (unreported)

Eboe v. Eboe [1961] G-L.R. 432 (High Court), and

NB Landmark Ltd. v. Lakiani [2001-2002] SGLR

Mr Serry-Kamal, in reply, referred to his affidavit in opposition sworn to on 24% January, 2006 and filed herein and submitted that there was no legal basis for the application as there was no provision in the Rules of this Court which allows the application for an injunction to be made after judgement has been delivered by the trial ‘court and which empowers this Court to grant it. He referred to O. 37 r. 10 of the High Court Rules which makes provision for a plaintiff before or after judgement to apply for an injunction to restrain a defendant from the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract complained of and submitted that that there was no similar provision in this Court’s Rules. He argued that in the instant application it is the Lunsuecessful defendant who is applying for an injunction against the successful plaintiff. ‘Mr Serry-Kamal submitted further that the proper course was for the Applicant to apply for a stay of execution of the judgement. Referring to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of his affidavit, he stressed that Respondent has no intention of selling the said property and there is no evidence that the respondent is in the process of trying to sell the property. He contended that rule 31 deals specifically with the substantive appeal when it comes to be considered.

Mr Berthan Macaulay, responding, contended that the Respondent's argument ran counter to the express wording of . 31, which expressly states that this Court may grant ‘any injunction which the court below is authorized to grant and that generally this Court hhas as full urisdiction over the whole proceedings as if they were instituted in this Court ‘as 2 court of first instance. He posited that this all-embracing generality relating to jurisdiction is buttressed in s. 129 (3) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act No. 6 of 1991. He maintained that the application is not for a stay of execution. He finally referred to r. 22 of our Rules which states that after an appeal has been entered and until it has finally been disposed of this Court is seised of the proceedings as between the

ets 14 | . parties, | It seems to me that the principal questions which arise for determination in this application are twofolé, namely:

(1) Whether this Court has the power, under rule 33, at this stage of the proceedings to | grant the application for an injunction, and |

(11) If it does have the power, whether we ought to grant it. ] There is, also, an incidental question: whether the proper course is to apply for a stay of execution as contended by the Respondent, rather than an injunction as prayed for by | the Applicant who contends that after his counterclaim for specific performance and | damages had been dismissed by Ademosu, J., in the High Court, there was nothing to ‘stay , citing Eboe v. Eboe and NB Landmark Ltd. V. Lakiani, supra. He has, therefore, | not applied for a stay, but instead has opted for an injunction. This incidental question | can be disposed of in a short shrift and in terms of a local adage: “Don't take off your Jacket when you have not been invited to a fight. In other words its the unfettered and ‘undoubted right of she Applicant to decide, for better or worse, on what course he will take. And he has exercised that right by seeking an injunction and not a stay of execution, 0 that isthe end of that contention. I shall now go on to principal question (1) which must necessarily hinge on the construction of rule

31. The relevant portions of which read: “The Court ... may make any interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant. ..and generally shall have as fll jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as ifthe proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted in the Court as a Court of first instance.” In construing that section, regard must also be had tor.22 which states: “After an appeal has been entered and until itis finally disposed of, the Court shall be eised of the whole of the proceedings as between the partis thereto.” he appeal in this mate has bee filed.and thi Couti ised 0 Deo dbaLathat beine tie Glseand Meoing rilo-22, is Court. cert — tert hhasageotnepedngsto nna opi So = tthe etthorty £0 grant. even though the Appellant has not evew begun to argue hi Here alee has this Court of Appeal, because, ofsreSivasswellsasis.a29.(3),of the neuiattonrwhteW St3t-Tnter ala that the Court of Appeal shalt aye all the power prisdjetion vested in the COurt from which the appeat is brought = Bath parties agree thet the High Court by 0. 37 1.10 is empowered, with or without terms, to restrain .. the respondent from the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract complained of, or from the commission of any injury or breach of contract of a like kind relating to the same property or right, or arising out of the same contract.” I am not persuaded that this is the appropriate authority in the instant case. I would myself call in aid the provisions of s. 25 (8) of the Judicature Act 1873 which state

that “the High Court may grant... an injunction. ..in all cases in which it appears to the Court to be Just or convenient so to do. ..” And so may the Court of Appeal. For these reasons, principal question (1) must be answered in the affirmative. Now that we have held that this Court has the power to grant the injunction sought, I | shall now adumbrate on principal question (IN): Ought we then to grant the injunction | sought? In answering this question itis instructive to refer to the guidelines in deciding ‘whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction which are to be found principally in the case of American Cyanamid v. Ethicon, supra. But before I dwell on those guidelines, let me state that the fundamental question that has to be answered when the court is hearing an application for an interlocutory injunction is what weight should it give tothe relative strengths ofthe partes’ case? 1 may be recalled that in the American Cyanamid application for an interlocutory injunction both Graham J. at first instance and the Court of Appeal based their approaches on a perceived rule of law that the court should not grant the interim {injunction unless the applicant had shown that on the whole of the affidavit evidence, a Prima facie case had been made out. As this was a primary issue, no injunction could issue unless the applicant had first made out his ease on the affidavit evidence then before the court. As Russel LJ, put it and the other members ofthe court agreed (1974) FSR. 312, 333: “. if there be no prima facie case on the point essential to entitle the plaintiffs to ‘complain of the defendants’ proposed activities, that isthe end to interlocutory rele” However, in the House of Lords, Lord Diplock, who gave the only speech said that this sine qua non was a “technical rule” of “comparatively recent origin” which would stultify the courts discretion to grant interlocutory relief by reference to the balance of , probabilities. He had this to say at page 408: “Your Lordships should in. my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expressions as ‘a probability,’ ‘a prima facie case, in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The | court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. | In other words, that there is a serious issue to be tried.” (Emphasis mine). | He then went on to say that the court should go on to consider whether the balance of, | ‘convenience lay in granting or refusing the interlocutory relief that is sought. In this \ regard, the overriding principle is that the court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to permanent injunction, he | ‘would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained. He opined that “if damages in the measure recoverable at common law would | ‘be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no | interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff's case appeared to be at that stage.” In the ease before us where the injunction is applied for under a counterclaim, the defendant isto be regarded as a‘plaintff and the plaintif as a “defendant” | Lord Diplock’s guidelines which I accept and adopt may be summarized as follows:

(1) Has the applicant shown that there isa serious question to be tried?

The pages read for this report end here. The judgment continues in the PDF.