12. Stealing, receiving and false pretences

Section 1 defines stealing. The words that carry the mens rea are "fraudulently", "without a claim of right made in good faith", and "with intent". The intention of the taker, sometimes called the animus furandi, must exist at the time of the taking and carrying away. A later intention can be thrown back to the taking where the original taking was already a trespass. Riley is that timing rule.

A claim of right made in good faith negatives the mens rea. It is an honest belief, not a belief that happens to be correct in law. "Fraudulently" is not an empty word once claim of right has been considered. Williams, in Lord Goddard's judgment, holds that the prosecution must still prove the intention. Temporary loss of possession can be enough. Manning took his master's potato bags and placed them so that they could be sold again. The owner was deprived, for a time, of property that was his. That was larceny.

Receiving is section 33. The goods must already have been stolen at the time of the receipt. The receiver must know, or ought to know, that they were stolen. The circumstances can show that knowledge: an unlikely seller, an unlikely price, an unlikely place, an unlikely hour. There must also be an intention to take the goods as his own. If he was innocent when he received them, a later dishonest intention does not turn the receipt into a crime. Mathews applies the same timing rule as in larceny. Recent possession is a separate evidential idea. Marsh v State and Abdul Muktar v R are the names given to it.

A clerk or servant who steals property already in the master's possession is charged under section 17(1)(a). Embezzlement, section 17(1)(b), is the case where he receives the property for the master and keeps it. Gale is cheques received for the employer. Davenport was charged with larceny by a servant when the facts were embezzlement. The conviction was set aside and embezzlement substituted. The taking must be in the course of the employment.

False pretences, section 32(1), is a false representation of an existing fact. The fact may be past or present. It may not be a fact in the future. A statement of intention is not enough. Gordon is that limit. Opinion and exaggeration are not enough. Bryan stamped spoons with the letter "A" and called them the equivalent of Elkington's. That was sales talk, not a statement that they were Elkington's manufacture, and the conviction was quashed. A representation can be made by conduct. Bernard wore an Oxford undergraduate's gown and obtained credit that was given to members of the university. The gown was the pretence. Hazelton issued cheques on an account he knew was virtually closed. The cheque represented that he had an account and authority to draw. It did not represent that the account held that exact sum. He had no authority, and the conviction stood.

The pretence must cause an obtaining of ownership, not a mere right to possession. That is what separates false pretences from larceny by a bailee, who receives possession and not ownership. The mens rea is an intent to defraud, section 40(1). Fraudulent conversion, section 20(1)(iv), fills the gap for a trustee, an agent, or a bailee who receives property and dishonestly converts it. Yule, a solicitor, paid a client's costs, including counsel's fees, into his own account. "Entrusted" in section 21 has a fiduciary sense. The person was trusted to deal with the property in a particular way. A debt is not "proceeds". Hotine is that limit.