Essay
Dicey's rule of law in Sierra Leone
'Dicey's account of the rule of law is of little use in understanding the constitution of Sierra Leone.' Discuss.
issue
Whether Dicey's three meanings of the rule of law still explain a system with a written, supreme constitution and a Bill of Rights.
rule
Dicey's three meanings: the supremacy of regular law over arbitrary power; equality before the law; and rights flowing from ordinary court decisions. Entick v Carrington; M v Home Office; Sunday Times v UK on certainty. The 1991 Constitution: section 171(15) (supremacy), section 17 (liberty), section 120(3) (judicial independence), section 28 (enforcement of rights), section 48(4) (presidential immunity), section 29 (emergency powers).
application
The first meaning still matters: under section 17 no one may be detained except on the listed lawful grounds, and the courts insist that officials show legal authority, as in Entick. Clear law is also required. But modern government relies on discretion, and section 29 gives the President wide emergency powers, so arbitrariness can only be limited, not removed. The second meaning is qualified: the President is immune while in office under section 48(4), and Members of Parliament have privileges. Yet officials remain subject to the courts, as M v Home Office shows. The third meaning fits Sierra Leone least: here rights come from a written Chapter III, enforced by the High Court under section 28 and protected by the supremacy of the Constitution, which is the reverse of Dicey's model. Even so, the common law idea of legal authority still shapes how the courts read the Constitution.
conclusion
Dicey's first two meanings remain useful as ideals and tests, though they must be adjusted for discretion and immunities. His third meaning does not describe Sierra Leone, where rights depend on a supreme written constitution. The statement is therefore too strong: Dicey is still useful, but as a starting point, not a full account.
Essay
Separation of powers under the 1991 Constitution
To what extent does the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone give effect to the doctrine of the separation of powers?
issue
Whether the Constitution separates personnel, functions and control among the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary, and how far it uses checks and balances instead.
rule
Montesquieu's three powers. Sections 73 (Parliament), 53 (executive power), 120 (judicial power), 56(1) (no Member of Parliament as Minister), 76(1) (disqualifications), 124(1)(b) and 127 (review of enactments), 51 (removal of the President), 60 (collective responsibility), 135 and 137 (judicial appointment and tenure). Duport Steels v Sirs; X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian.
application
Functions are clearly divided: sections 73, 53 and 120 vest the three powers in three organs. Personnel are more separated than in Britain, because Ministers cannot sit in Parliament. But the President is part of Parliament under section 73 and must assent to bills, so there is overlap. Control runs in all directions: the Supreme Court can strike down Acts, Parliament approves Ministers and judges and can remove the President, and the Cabinet answers to Parliament. Judges are protected by security of tenure. The weakness is a strong executive presidency with wide power over appointments, which depends on Parliament using its checks.
conclusion
The Constitution gives effect to a strong but not pure separation of powers. It separates functions and personnel more than the British model and relies on checks and balances to stop any one branch dominating.
Essay
Parliamentary or constitutional supremacy?
Compare the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom with the position of Parliament under the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone.
issue
Whether the Parliament of Sierra Leone has the same unlimited power as the United Kingdom Parliament, and what role the courts play.
rule
The two limbs of parliamentary supremacy: unlimited law-making power and no body able to question an Act. Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway v Wauchope; Lee v Bude; British Railways Board v Pickin; Cheney v Conn; Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke; R (Jackson) v Attorney-General. Marbury v Madison. Sections 73, 108, 124(1)(b), 127 and 171(15) of the 1991 Constitution.
application
In the United Kingdom the courts apply any Act and will not look behind it (Pickin), and a statute prevails over a treaty (Cheney v Conn). Only obiter remarks in Jackson suggest limits. In Sierra Leone Parliament holds the legislative power under section 73, but section 171(15) makes the Constitution supreme, and the Supreme Court can declare an enactment void under sections 124 and 127, on the Marbury model. Parliament also cannot amend the Constitution by ordinary majority, as section 108 requires special majorities and, for entrenched clauses, a referendum.
conclusion
The United Kingdom Parliament is legally sovereign. The Parliament of Sierra Leone is supreme only within the Constitution, and the Supreme Court is the guardian of that limit.
Problem
Appointing a Minister
After an election the President appoints Ama, a sitting Member of Parliament, as Minister of Finance, and Kofi as Attorney-General and Minister of Justice. Neither nomination is put to Parliament. A citizen wants to challenge both. Advise.
issue
Whether a Member of Parliament can be a Minister, whether ministerial appointments need parliamentary approval, and whether the Attorney-General's appointment is different. Which court hears the case?
rule
Section 56(1): no Member of Parliament may be appointed Minister. Section 56(2): a Minister must be approved by Parliament. Section 64: the Attorney-General is appointed by the President from people qualified to be Justices of the Supreme Court. Sierra Leone Bar Association v Attorney-General (2004). Sections 124(1)(a) and 127: Supreme Court jurisdiction.
application
Ama's appointment breaches section 56(1) because she is a Member of Parliament. It also lacks the approval section 56(2) requires. Both defects make it unconstitutional unless she gives up her seat and is approved. Kofi's appointment is different. In the Bar Association case the Supreme Court held that section 64 is not subject to section 56(2), so his appointment does not need parliamentary approval, provided he has the qualifications of a Supreme Court Justice. The citizen should bring an action in the Supreme Court for interpretation and a declaration under sections 124(1)(a) and 127.
conclusion
Ama's appointment is likely to be declared unconstitutional. Kofi's is likely to be upheld if he is qualified. The proper forum is the Supreme Court.
Problem
An arrest and a long detention
Police arrest Sorie for theft. They tell him nothing, refuse to let him call a lawyer, and keep him in a cell for six days before taking him to court. Advise Sorie.
issue
Whether Sorie's rights under section 17 were breached, and what remedies he has.
rule
Section 17(1) (reasonable suspicion), 17(2)(a) (reasons in writing within twenty-four hours), 17(2)(b) (access to a lawyer), 17(3) (court within seventy-two hours for ordinary offences). Christie v Leachinsky; DPP v Hawkins; R v Samuel. Section 28 (enforcement in the High Court); habeas corpus; false imprisonment.
application
The arrest may be lawful at the start if the police had reasonable suspicion. But they did not give reasons within twenty-four hours, so from that point the detention was unlawful (Christie; Hawkins). Refusing a lawyer breached section 17(2)(b), and any confession may be excluded (Samuel). Theft is not a capital, life or economic offence, so the seventy-two-hour limit applied. Six days breached section 17(3), and he should have been released. While detained he could have sought habeas corpus. Now he may apply to the High Court under section 28 for redress, and sue for false imprisonment.
conclusion
Sorie's rights under section 17 were breached in three ways. He can seek a declaration and compensation from the High Court under section 28 and damages for false imprisonment, and he may challenge any confession obtained without a lawyer.
