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Lanbuk on Mercantile Law: model answers

Essay and problem questions answered with IRAC: issue, rule, application, conclusion.

Posted By lanbuk.com

Problem

The diamond

Henty Ltd, retail jewellers, took a large diamond to diamond cutters Piercy Ltd to be cut for a fee. Piercy told Henty's employee to return and collect it the next day. Piercy cut the diamond, locked it in their safe, and locked up for the night. That night a thief broke into Piercy's workshop and stole the diamond. Will Piercy be liable to Henty for this loss? Would your answer be different if Piercy's employee had been tricked into handing the diamond to a thief who produced a convincing forged letter of authority from Henty? Would it matter if the thief succeeded six months later, after Piercy had repeatedly asked Henty to collect the diamond?

issue

Is Piercy a bailee, what standard of care applies to a theft from its safe, who must prove the absence of fault, and do the forged collection and the long delay change that duty?

rule

Work done on goods for a reward is a bailment. The bailee must take the care the circumstances require: Houghland v R R Low; Sutcliffe. Once the bailor proves delivery and non-return, the bailee must prove the loss happened without fault: Coldman v Hill; Houghland; Volcafe. Handing goods to an unauthorised person, or failing to return them when asked, can be a deviation and then liability is strict: Edwards v Newland; Mitchell v Ealing LBC. An involuntary bailee, who never agreed to have the goods, is traditionally not liable for mere negligence: Howard v Harris; Hiort v Bott.

application

Piercy received the diamond to cut it for a fee, so this is a bailment for reward. Possession passed, Henty remained owner, and Piercy consented. Henty proves delivery and loss. Piercy must prove the burglary happened without its default. Locking the cut diamond in a safe and locking the workshop is evidence of the care a diamond cutter would be expected to take. If that is all the evidence, and nothing shows a failing such as a known weak lock or a key left out, Piercy can discharge the burden. If the court is left not knowing whether the precautions were enough, Piercy is liable, because the burden is on it. The forged letter is different. Piercy still holds as bailee. Its employee parted with the diamond to a person who was not Henty. That is a failure in the custody of the goods. Piercy must show that reasonable care would not have detected the forgery. A convincing forgery may do that. If a simple check with Henty would have exposed it, Piercy has not disproved negligence. Handing the stone to an unauthorised person can also be put as a deviation, which would make liability strict. The six-month delay does not make Piercy an involuntary bailee. Piercy agreed to take the diamond. The purpose, cutting and next-day collection, is long over, and Piercy has pressed Henty to collect. The duty is still reasonable care in those circumstances, which may be less demanding than on the night of the cutting, but the burden of disproving fault remains. Only if Piercy had never consented, as where goods arrive by mistake, would the traditional involuntary-bailee rule apply.

conclusion

Piercy is a bailee for reward and must disprove negligence. A locked safe can be enough if that is proved. Liability is much harder to escape if staff handed the diamond over on a forgery they could have checked. The delay does not end the bailment. It only colours what care was reasonable.

Problem

The warehouse and the hurricane

Electron plc arranged to store a large consignment of valuable products in Securestore Ltd's warehouse in Manchester. Electron paid all storage charges in advance and told Securestore to have the goods ready for collection in six months. After delivery, Securestore sold the goods to Transtech plc and employed Cargosure Ltd to carry them to Transtech's factory in Leeds. During the transit Cargosure's lorry was blown over by freak hurricane-force winds and the cargo was destroyed. What rights, if any, does Electron have against Securestore and against Cargosure?

issue

Did Securestore's sale deviate from the bailment, is Securestore liable for what happened in transit, and does Cargosure owe any duty in bailment to Electron?

rule

Paid storage is a bailment for reward. Selling the goods, or handing them to a carrier so as to deliver them to a buyer, is a departure from a bailment to keep them for six months. Deviation makes liability strict, is a repudiatory breach, and can be conversion if it blithely ignores the bailor's interest: Lilley v Doubleday; Garnham, Harris and Elton v Ellis; Mitchell v Ealing LBC. The head bailee is liable for a sub-bailee's negligence even without personal fault: Morris v C W Martin. A sub-bailee owes the owner the duties of a bailee only if he has notice that someone other than the immediate bailee is interested: The Pioneer Container; Marcq v Christie Manson & Woods. A carrier who is a bailee must then disprove fault. Hurricane-force winds may be an act of God, but the carrier must prove the cause and that it was not at fault: Volcafe. Few modern carriers are common carriers.

application

Securestore was a bailee for a fixed term of six months, paid in advance. Electron remained owner. Selling the consignment to Transtech was not a use the bailment allowed. It was a deviation, and a blatant disregard of Electron's interest, so it is conversion as well as a repudiatory breach. Electron can sue Securestore for the goods without proving that Securestore was careless about the hurricane. Securestore's own sale is enough. Electron also has an immediate right to possession. Any exclusion clause in the warehousing contract does not protect a bailee who has deviated. Cargosure carried goods it was told belonged to the sale from Securestore to Transtech. Unless Cargosure knew Electron still owned them, Marcq applies and there is no bailment between Electron and Cargosure. Electron's claim is then against Securestore alone. If Cargosure did know of Electron, it assumed a bailee's duty. It would have to prove that the hurricane caused the loss and that no want of care on its part contributed. Freak hurricane-force winds are capable of being an act of God, but that is for Cargosure to prove. The problem also cites Hollins v Fowler (1875) LR 7 HL 757 at 766–767. The extract does not give that holding, so it is not used as a decided rule here. The conversion claim rests on the sale itself, as a deviation and a blatant disregard of Electron's interest.

conclusion

Electron can recover from Securestore for conversion and deviation, regardless of the hurricane. Electron can sue Cargosure as bailee only if Cargosure had notice of Electron's interest, and even then Cargosure can escape by proving the hurricane and the absence of fault.