Grand Valley Estates (Pty) Limited and Others v Mpumalanga Tourism & Parks Agency and Others (34502/2010) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1021 (30 September 2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA CASE NO: 34502/2010 In the matter between: GRAND VALLEY ESTATES (PTY) LIMITED EDGE TO EDGE 17 (PTY) LIMITED MONTVIEW PROPERTIES (PTY) LIMITED MOTIFPROPS 1021 CC CRADLE OF LIFE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LIMITED WILDERNESS CONSERVATION PROJECTS (PTY) LIMITED MOUNTAIN VIEW INVESTMENTS (PTY) LIMITED FREDERICK COENRAAD DANIEL NO HENNING WILLERS NO JOHAN VOORHOVEN NO FREDERICK COENRAAD DANIEL SIMON HUBA

(1) REPORTABLE: ¥ES / NO First Plaintiff Second Plaintiff Third Plaintiff Fourth Plaintiff Fifth Plaintiff Sixth Plaintiff Seventh Plaintiff Eighth Plaintiff Ninth Plaintiff Tenth Plaintiff Eleventh Plaintiff Twelfth Plaintiff*

(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ¥ES / NO and

Page 2 MPUMALANGA TOURISM & PARKS AGENCY First Defendant DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS & TOURISM, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT Second Defendant* MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT Third Defendant* REGIONAL LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONER, MPUMALANGA PROVINCE Fourth Defendant NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF SA POLICE Fifth Defendant DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & LAND AFFAIRS, MPUMALANGA PROVINCE Sixth Defendant* MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & LAND AFFAIRS, MPUMALANGA PROVINCE Seventh Defendant ALBERT LUTHULI MUNICIPALITY Eighth Defendant ABE SIBIYA Ninth Defendant* JAN MULLER Tenth Defendant DRIES PIENAAR Eleventh Defendant* DR DELANIE TIBA Twelfth Defendant* SOLLY MOSIDI Thirteenth defendant ANDRÉ COETZEE Fourteenth Defendant* CHARLES NGOBENI Fifteenth defendant* MAUREEN SITHOLE Sixteenth Defendant* NCEBA NQANA Seventeenth Defendant* HARRY MABOA Eighteenth Defendant LINDA MABATHA Nineteenth Defendant*

Page 3 SIBUSISO RADEBE Twentieth Defendant* BONGANI MWALI Twenty-first Defendant* PRO KHOZA Twenty-second Defendant* SUPERINTENDENT PHILLIPUS LOURENS KRITZINGER Twenty-third Defendant DR FERREIRA DU PLESSIS Twenty-fourth Defendant* GREATER BADPLAAS LAND CLAIMS COMMITTEE Twenty-fifth Defendant*

Judgment

Tuchten J: 1 This is an action for delictual damages. For the plaintiffs to succeed, they must prove dolus on the part of the defendants.

Introduction

2 This case has a long procedural history. As the case number shows, the plaintiffs instituted their action in 2010. The framework for the action selected by the plaintiffs, including the multiplicity of defendants cited and the nature of the allegations made by them, contributed to a lengthy lead time before the case ultimately came to court for hearing on the merits.

Page 4 3 The case came before court twice before me in circumstances I shall briefly describe. At one of these hearings, on 21 October 2024, clarity was achieved on the status of certain defendants who had either died or for some reason were not represented before me on that date. After some debate, the plaintiffs withdrew, or confirmed previous withdrawals, against all such defendants. I have identified the defendants against whom the plaintiffs have withdrawn by asterisks marked against their names in the heading to this judgment. The result is that all the remaining parties to the action are represented before me by counsel. 4 In the present proceedings, Adv J Joubert appears for the first to seventh and eleventh plaintiffs and Adv Berdou for the eighth to tenth plaintiffs. Advs Rossouw SC and and De Beer appear for the 1st, 10th, 13th and 23rd defendants while Adv Mpshe and Adv Shole appear for the 4 th, 7 th and 18 th defendants. Although there is this separate representation at a formal level, generally it will not be necessary to distinguish between the positions taken by counsel appearing for one party or another. I shall thus sometimes describe a submission as emanating from counsel for the plaintiffs or the defendants without identifying the counsel who actually made the submission.

Page 5 5 In an interlocutory judgment which I handed down on 1 November 2024 (the witness regimes judgment), I summarised the case for the plaintiffs, as I saw it. At the start of the trial, counsel for the plaintiffs said in their opening address that my summary adequately reflected the nature of the plaintiffs’ case. So I shall in substance repeat what I previously wrote. 6 The trial proper before me began on 20 January 2025. It ran, according to my notes, for some 67 court days. Argument was completed on 3 September 2025 and I reserved judgment. The pleadings 7 The case for the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs sought to utilise certain properties in the Badplaas Valley, Mpumalanga for a project which they called the Cradle of Life Nkomazi Wilderness, referred to in the particulars of claim as the Project. I shall also call it the Project or Nkomazi. These properties, the plaintiffs say, were acquired with the Project in mind. The commercial essence of the Project was the creation, on land owned or controlled by the plaintiffs, of a game reserve with associated high end tourism facilities

Page 6 8 The plaintiffs say that during or about October 2007 and thereafter, a collusive corrupt, fraudulent and unlawful relationship (which the plaintiffs label the collusive agreement) came into being to force the plaintiffs “out of Nkomazi”, ie the Project. 9 During the exercise of the collusive agreement, say the plaintiffs, certain of the defendants withheld the “Big Five Permits” from the plaintiffs. This, the plaintiffs say, crippled the Project. In addition, the defendants “colluded and some were manipulated” to damage the plaintiffs’ reputations and all their business and commercial interests. The defendants who are not organs of state are said to have acted in a manner which rendered the organ of state defendants, in addition to their direct liabilities, vicariously liable. 10 Once the plaintiffs had been driven from the Project, the plaintiffs say, Big Five permits were then granted to a firm called Dubai World. This is said to have been an “unauthorised, and/or mala fide, and/or biased, and/or ultra vires exercise of power by the first and/or one or more of ninth to fifteenth defendants”, thereby also infringing certain of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Page 7 11 The 1 st, 4th and 9 th to 25 th defendants colluded, the plaintiffs say, to place the plaintiffs under duress and, ultimately, certain of the plaintiffs sold Nkomazi Wilderness to Dubai World for a much lower price than would have been realised if “the reserve” had been issued with Big Five and large predator permits. The alleged acts of duress included “[h]ijack[ing] the Msauli Village” after large sums had been spent to rehabilitate it, withholding crucial permits, procuring the destruction of a fence, victimising the 11 th plaintiff (Mr Daniel) who acted as a whistle blower, presenting fictitious land claims, arranging violent public actions, bribing and misleading the press to spread false information about the 11 th plaintiff to discredit him and ruin his reputation, instigating violence and intimidation against Mr Daniel, his family and his business to drive him out of the Badplaas Valley, threatening to liquidate the 1 st plaintiff (Grand Valley), instigating an unlawful raid on the Cradle of Life Rehabilitation Centre, laying criminal charges against Mr Daniel, informing prospective investors in Nkomazi that the Grand Valley would be replaced by Dubai World and promising to issue to Dubai World permits which had been refused to Grand Valley. 12 All these actions, the plaintiffs say, caused them to suffer damages. In particulars of claim amended in November 2024 and dated 5 December 2024, Grand Valley alone of the plaintiffs claimed

Page 8 R812 million for loss of profits and R655 million in respect of the loss of the value of vacant land, valued as at 28 February 2008, plus mora interest. The plaintiffs do not persist in the other claims for damages which had previously featured in their particulars of claim before the November 2024 amendment. To be clear, the amendment means that the claims of the plaintiffs other than those of Grand Valley have not been proceeded with. In short, they were abandoned. 13 In the end, the plaintiffs asked for judgment only against the 1 st and 4th defendants. 14 I was told that the original trial judge was not required to make a finding on damages because that issue was separated for later adjudication. However, when I interrogated this question, it appeared that although the question of separation of issues concerning damages had been raised during the very lengthy, indeed tortuous, pre-trial proceedings, a separation of these issues was never finalised and no order for separation was ever made. After hearing the parties, I ruled as trial manager that there would be no separation and that all the issues would be decided at a single hearing. The parties accepted my ruling.

Page 9 15 Despite the late amendment, which significantly increased the quantum of damages claimed, the defendants elected and, through counsel conveyed to me their election, to proceed with the trial on the pleadings as they stood after the November 2024 amendment. 16 In their plea, the defendants deny the alleged collusive agreement and further deny committing the individual acts which the plaintiffs say gave substance to the collusive agreement. They plead that if the plaintiffs suffered any damages as alleged, the plaintiffs could and should have mitigated them. Then there are a number of defences styled special pleas. 17 In the first special plea, the defendants plead a failure to comply with s 103(2) of the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 1 (the MNCA). This special plea was however withdrawn. 18 In the second special plea, the defendants plead a written settlement agreement concluded on 15 May 2009. The defendants contend that this settlement agreement covered the subject matter of the present action. 1 10 of 1998

Page 10 19 In the third special plea, the defendants contend that the alleged acts of oppression of which the plaintiffs complain would have been susceptible to remedial action under PAJA 2 or the Constitution. Having not sought such remedial action, the defendants say, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim consequential damages. 20 In the fourth special plea, the defendants contend that there has been a failure to join an essential party to the proceedings, ie Dubai World. This special plea was abandoned. 21 In the fifth special plea, the defendants plead that the plaintiffs settled their claims against Dubai World in separate legal proceedings. The defendants argue that s 2(13) of the Apportionment of Damages Act3 (the ADA), renders it legally impossible for any party to settle against one joint wrongdoer and thereby avoid the consequences of s 2(13). The essence of the defence is that as Dubai World has settled the plaintiffs’ claim in full, any liability of the present defendants has been discharged. 2 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 3 34 of 1956

Page 11 22 The sixth special plea is that to the extent that the plaintiffs’ claim arises from the presentation of false land claims, such land claims fall to be dealt with under ss 22(1) and 22(2) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act4 (the RLRA), and that the Land Claims Court established under the RLRA has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiffs’ claim to the extent that their claim is premised on matters reserved under the RLRA for the jurisdiction of the Land Claims Court. 23 The seventh special plea is lis pendens. The allegation is that certain of the land claims issues were indeed referred to and are presently serving before the Land Claims Court. 24 The eighth special plea is that a new cause of action was introduced by amendment on 19 May 2023 and had prescribed under s 11 of the Prescription Act.5 This plea was not pressed in argument. 25 Both a replication to the special pleas and a rejoinder were filed but it is unnecessary to deal with the matters raised in those pleadings. Some of the special pleas were abandoned. I shall deal with those that remained toward the end of this judgment. 4 22 of 1994 5 68 of 1968

Page 12 26 The case came initially for trial before Sardiwalla J. After hearing some twenty-five days of testimony, the learned judge was removed from active service for medical reasons, which I understand were related to a cognitive defect. All of that testimony was heard by remote platform, during the Covid pandemic. The testimony before the original trial judge was that of all the plaintiffs’ witnesses and, after the plaintiffs’ case had been closed, some of the evidence in chief of the defendants’ first witness. In addition, there was an inspection in loco, at which photographs were taken but no recordal was made by the original trial judge of what, if anything, was pointed out at the inspection. 27 I was appointed to hear the case after Sardiwalla J became incapacitated and I returned from retirement to do so. Interlocutory proceedings brought before me 28 I heard an earlier application for procedural directives on 13 May 2024 (the May 2024 application). The plaintiffs, who were the applicants in the May 2024 application, as they are in this present application, sought procedural directions for the further conduct of the trial. The parties described the central issue in the May 2024 application to be whether the trial should proceed before the new trial judge where

Page 13 Sardiwalla J left off, on the basis of the transcripts and video recordings of evidence, or whether the trial should start de novo. 29 After some argument was presented, the May 2024 application was resolved and the parties put up a draft which I made an order on 24 May 2024 (the May 2024 order). This order provided that the trial would commence de novo and be postponed to dates in 2025, running over the best part of the first two court terms, that a further interlocutory would be brought and heard on 21 and 22 October 2024 on the questions whether the pleadings for the trial should remain as they were as at the date of the May 2024 order, subject to any further applications for leave to amend (as contended for by the plaintiffs), or whether the pleadings for the de novo trial should revert to their form or status before the start of the aborted trial (as contended for by the defendants). The order further recorded that the plaintiffs intended to apply for the admission of certain evidence in terms of s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.6 The order stated that the contemplated interlocutory hearings and the trial itself would be regulated by para 15 of the Consolidated Practice Directive, 1 of 2024. The costs of the earlier application were made costs in the cause. 6 45 of 1988

Page 14 30 As foreshadowed in the May 2024 order, the plaintiffs sought orders that the transcripts of the evidence given by fourteen named witnesses at the aborted trial, together with the documents to which they made reference in their testimony, be admitted into evidence for the purposes of the de novo trial; 7 that the affidavits of two further witnesses be admitted into evidence; 8 that the joint minutes and photographs of an inspection in loco held during the aborted trial and the video recording of the inspection be admitted into evidence;9 that it be declared that certain admissions made by the defendants remain binding;10 and, finally, that the defendants be directed to file summaries of [the evidence of] the witnesses they intend to call. 11 31 In a judgment handed down on 1 November 2024, I dismissed all the relief sought by the plaintiffs. In the result, the trial had to begin again, de novo, on 20 January 2025. 7 Prayers 1 and 2 8 Prayer 3 9 Prayer 4 10 Prayer 5 11 Prayer 6

Page 15 32 Amendments to the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim were sought and were effected in November 2024. When I describe the plaintiffs’ allegations, I am referring to those made in the latest iteration of the particulars of claim. The trial begins 33 The trial accordingly began, as contemplated, on 20 January 2025. But complications relating to, and delays in, the preparation of the bundle of documents meant that evidence proper only began to be led a week later. An enormous compendium of documents was placed before me. I was also given a device on which the document being referred to in evidence was supposed to appear. The limitations of the technology were soon apparent: only the plaintiff’s document expert had control over what was being displayed and for how long; there was no way in which I, or counsel, could hold a page and compare it to other documents. Eventually, a solution of sorts was devised. The expert complied a new file of documents referred to in evidence (the core bundle) and these were printed out and given to counsel and to me. All this led to further delays.

Page 16 34 Mr Daniel was the first witness. He gave his evidence in chief over many days. After he had given evidence in chief over five days and had been cross-examined over a further three days, I allowed the evidence of the next witness, Mr Hutchinson, to be led. On the fifteenth day of the hearing, an application was brought by certain of the defendants for my recusal. The recusal application was brought by notice of motion supported by affidavits, the plaintiffs filed answering affidavits and the defendants replied. The recusal application was argued on 27 February 2025. I dismissed the recusal application on the same day, in an ex tempore judgment, with