Mrs Daisy Gilpin, nee Refell, and Ms Pearl Raffell v Alhaji Sow and Others (CC 12/2015) [2026] (6 October 2026)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIERRA LEONE (LAND, PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION)

BETWEEN: MRS DAISY GILPIN (NEE REFFELL) AND MS PEARL RAFFELL — Plaintiffs AND ALHAJI SOW, PA BARRIE, ISATA BAH, BINTA JALLOH, AMADU BARRIE, SAJOH JALLOH, MAMADU BAH, MOHAMED JALLOH, ABIBATU BARRIE, MR ABUBAKARR, MADAM ADAMA AND MADAM AMIE — Defendants AND MOHAMED YASIN BAH AND IBRAHIM CHAPATOR BAH — Interested parties / applicants

Counsel: E.T. Koroma for the plaintiffs / respondents. A.S. Marrah and U.K. Sesay for the interested parties / applicants.

Ruling of the Honourable Mr Justice Abdul Rahman Mansaray J, 6 October 2026. CC 12/2015.

Background

1. This is a ruling on a notice of motion dated 9 January 2026, brought by the interested parties / applicants, Mohamed Yassin Bah and Ibrahim Chapator Bah. The applicants pray for an order joining them as parties pursuant to Order 18, rule 6 of the High Court Rules 2007. They also seek an order staying execution of, and setting aside, the default judgment dated 6 July 2020 pursuant to Order 46, rule 11, and an order restoring them to possession of the disputed property at Freetown Road, Wilberforce.

2. The main action was instituted by the plaintiffs in 2015 against twelve defendants. The plaintiffs subsequently obtained a default judgment on 6 July 2020. The applicants state they became aware of these proceedings only in 2025, when a writ of possession and assistance was served on the property.

3. The plaintiffs resisted the intervention by an affidavit in opposition sworn on 25 May 2026 and a supplemental affidavit in opposition sworn on 1 July 2026. They contend that the judgment was obtained within the bounds of regular procedure, that the applicants' title documents are fabricated, and that the application is an abuse of process engineered to freeze an execution that has been active since 2015.

The factual conflict in the affidavits

4. The applicants claim a proprietary interest by a deed of conveyance dated 25 January 2011 (exhibit A) which they say was executed by the plaintiffs. They claim undisturbed possession since that date, and that they received notice of the action only when the writ of possession emerged in 2025.

5. The plaintiffs depose that the applicants are mere strangers with whom they have never engaged in any land transaction, and that exhibit A is fictitious. They emphasise that, during litigation before Hon. Justice Monfred Sesay JA, notices and direct service were levied upon all occupants, and that another occupier, Samir Antar, applied for joinder and entered a consent judgment (exhibit DGPR3). They argue that the applicants' failure to step forward until 2026 is an inordinate and fatal delay.

The Issues

6. The issues are twofold. First, whether a non-party asserting an adverse interest can be joined after a final or default judgment has already been recorded. Second, whether the dispute surrounding the authenticity of the applicants' deed of conveyance creates a triable issue, or is an absolute bar to setting aside a regular default judgment.

The analysis and authorities

7. The threshold for joining a party under Order 18 rule 6(2)(b) of the High Court Rules 2007 is whether that party's presence is required to try and settle the dispute completely. The plaintiffs argue that the finality of a judgment must be protected. They cite the earlier stage of this action before Hon. Justice Monfred Sesay JA, where other occupants sought joinder in time.

8. Post-judgment joinder is exceptionally restrictive. In Attorney-General v Birmingham, Tame, and Rea District Drainage Board (1881) 17 Ch D 685, once a final judgment is recorded a court is generally functus officio regarding joinder, unless execution would cause an irremediable injustice to an unserved party who holds legal rights.

9. The plaintiffs showed that they took steps to warn occupants. The court must still balance case management with due process. If the applicants are physical occupants holding a registered instrument, execution would evict them without determining their claim.

10. On the deed, the plaintiffs' argument is that the purported 2011 conveyance is questionable and fictitious, and that a regular default judgment should not be uprooted on an unverified document.

11. In Cropper v Smith (1884) 26 Ch D 700 the court held that the primary object of the judiciary is to decide the substantive rights of the parties, rather than to penalise them for procedural absences. An indulgence is granted only if it does not introduce an uncompensated injustice and is brought in good faith.

12. On setting aside a default judgment, the test is not whether the applicant has conclusively proved the case, but whether there is an arguable or meritorious defence. In Evans v Bartlam (1937) AC 473 the House of Lords held that a regular default judgment may be set aside if the court sees a triable issue of fact or law.

13. The contradiction between the applicants' registered deed and the plaintiffs' denial of its existence is a triable issue of fact. A chamber application on conflicting affidavits is not the forum in which to decide whether a deed is forged. That inquiry needs a trial, oral evidence, cross-examination and forensic scrutiny. To refuse joinder would validate the plaintiffs' title and destroy the applicants' claimed title without a trial. The court referred to the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem), as affirmed in Conteh v Reginam (1957-60) ALR SL 47 and Amadu Hassan v John Kerefa-Smart (1962) SLLR 36.

The orders

14. The court noted the plaintiffs' frustration at the delay since the 2020 judgment, but would not permit execution over property which the plaintiffs may have divested by a 2011 deed. The dispute over authenticity requires a trial on the merits.

15. The court granted the application, subject to timelines, and ordered:

1. Mohamed Yassin Bah and Ibrahim Chapator Bah are added as defendants to the action intituled C.C. 12/15.

2. The judgment in default dated 6 July 2020 and the writ of possession and assistance are set aside, conditional upon the added defendants filing and serving their defence within seven days of this order.

3. Execution is stayed, and the applicants shall remain in possession pending trial.

Honourable Mr Justice Abdul Rahman Mansaray J.