Abdul R. Jalloh v The State (CR APP 3/2025) [2025] SLCA 13 (10 December 2025)

(CR. APP. 3/2025 INTHE COURT OF APPEAL OF SIERRA LEONE, BETWEEN: ABDUL RAHMAN JALLOH =~ APPELLANT/APPLICANT ‘AND THE STATE = RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT

Coram

HON. JUSTICE SULAIMAN AHMAD BAH JA. (PRESIDING) HON. JUSTICE AIAH § ALLIEU JA. HON. JUSTICE AUGUSTINE K MUSA J. COUNSEL: E, LASSAYO AND A $ SESAY FOR THE APPELLANT/APPLICANT AJM BOCKARIE, PRINCIPAL STATE COUNSEL FOR THE, RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT RULING DELIVERED ON THE ory OF DECEMBER 2025.

‘The Application

1. On the 28" day July 2025, Abdul Rahman Jalloh, the appellanvapplicant, (herein after referred to as ‘the appellant’) was convicted by the High Court of Sierra Leone in Kenema for the offence of Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

2. On the 7 day of October, 2025, Counsel for the appellant filed a Notice of Motion to this Court praying for the appellant to be granted bail pending the hearing and determination of his appeal

3. In support of the application are the affidavit in support, a supplemental affidavit and

an affidavit in reply deposed to on, the 7" day of October 2025, the 24" day of October 2025 and the 3" day of November 2025, respectively. These affidavits in summary state amongst other things, the following: ‘That the appellant was indicted for murder on the 14" September 2024, convicted and sentenced by the High Court in Kenema on the 28" day of July 2025; that between the 31* day of January 202Sand the28" day of July 2025, (the date of his conviction and sentence,) the appellant was released on bail ‘and attended every court hearing without fail’; that ‘given his record of compliance with his previous bail terms, his profound family and community ties, and the commitment of substantial sureties, he poses no flight risk as his sole intention is to remain and pursue his appeal and prove his ‘innocence’; that the appellant is not a danger to the safety and security of the public; that a notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the appellant on the 22" day of August 2025 containing six (6) grounds of appeal; and, that the said grounds ‘are substantial and raise serious legal questions that demonstrate a strong likelihood of success’,

The Submissions

4, Inhis submissions Counsel for the appellant relied on the entirety of the affidavits filed together with the exhibits attached thereto. He referred to section 67(2) of the Courts ‘Act 1965 Act No 31 of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Courts Act’) and Rule 53(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1985 Statutory Instrument 29 of 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CAR’) and submitted that the cited provisions gives the Court an unfettered discretion to admit the appellant to bail pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. In support of his submission, Counsel relied on Cr. App 4/13 Mustapha Amara vs The State (herein after referred to as ‘the Mustapha Amara case’) and Mise App 22001 Hon Justice M O Taju Deen vs The State (herein after referred to as ‘the Taju ‘Deen case’ and submitted that a common factor among the cases, is that, proof of good grounds of appeal would suffice as that was the basis for the granting of bail. Further, Counsel submitted that the appellant grounds of appeal are good and strong grounds. In support, Counsel continued to submit: that the Learned Trial Judge (hereinafter referred to as LTP) did not properly address the jury on the effect of inconsistent statements; that the LTJ did not direct the jury on the effect of the evidence of an ‘accomplice: and, that the LTY failed to properly direct the jury on the evidence of the appellant's defence of alibi In addition to the good grounds of appeal, Counsel also submitted that the appellant should be granted bail on the basis of him being a family man, operating a good business and with strong connections to the community.

5, In response, AJM Bockarie for the State/respondent commenced by relying on an affidavit in opposition, he deposed to on the 7 day of October 2025. He submitted that

the tests to be considered by the Court in granting bail pending appeal are set out in the

ss case of Cr App 2/2015 Ishaka Sylvester Menjor vs The State (hereinafter referred to as “the Ishaka Sylvester Menjor case’). | (On the first test: ‘Does it appear prima facie that the grounds of appeal will succeed?” Counsel submitted that the grounds in the notice of appeal are arguable but whether they will succeed, that is yet to be determined. Further, he submitted that she Mustapha Amara case is easily distinguishable from this application, that in addition to the court holding that the grounds of appeal are prima facie good and strong grounds, the appellant had paid the fine imposed on him. On the second test: ‘Is there a risk that the term will be served by the time the appeal is heard and determined?” Counsel submitted that the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment; and, that it is unlikely he would have served a substantial portion of the sentence before his appeal is determined. Counsel referred to section 2(2) of the Abolition of Death Penalty Act 2022, Act No 6 of 2022 (hereinafter referred to as “the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act”), which state that life imprisonment means a ‘minimum of thirty (30) years. Further, Counsel submitted that the discretion in granting bail to a convict is different from the discretion exercised in granting bail to the defendant at the trial. Finally, ‘Counsel did submit that the appellant had failed to satisfy the two tests in the Ishaka Sylvester Menjoh case and therefore bail should not be granted

6. In reply, Counsel for the appellant relied on the affidavit in reply in its entirety and submitted that the appellant’s grounds being good and strong is sufficient for bal to be granted, Bail Pending Appeal

7. In support of the application for bail pending the determination of appeal, Counsel for ‘the appellant relied on rule 53(7) of the CAR and section 67(2) of the Courts Act. Itis not unseemly for an appellant to rely on both provisions in an application for bail pending an appeal; but, the correctness of such reliance would depend on when the application is made, Rule $3(7) of CAR

8. Rule $3(7) of CAR states: “Where an appellant is present before the Court, the Court may, on an application made by any person or, ifit thinks i, without any application, make ‘any order admitting the appellant to bail ..” (Emphasis added). This rule confers on the Court the discretion of granting bail to an appellant where the appellant is present before it or when the Court is seised of the appeal. In this application, the appellant exhibited a notice of appeal filed on the 22% day of August 2025, against his conviction by the High Court for murder on the 28 day of July 2025.

‘There is neither a constituted pane! of this Court to hear and determine the appeal, nor is there any evidence of the records of the appeal being settled. As a result, relying on this rule at this stage, as Counsel had done, is unhelpful.

Section 67(2) of the Courts Act

9. ‘The appropriate provision to be invoked in situations like this, as Counsel did, undoubtedly, is section 67(2) of the Courts Act, which states:

“[tphe Court of Appeal or the Court before whom he was convicted may, if it seems fit, on the application of the appellant, may admit the appellant to bail pending the determination of his appeal. (Emphasis added)

10. Counsel for the respondent is in agreement that Section 67(2) of the Courts Act rules the regime relating to bail pending the determination of appeal. Whilst both Counsel do not disagree on the Court's unfettered and wide discretion; yet, they are at variance as to how the discretion iso should be applied,

The Law

11.1n Mise App 15/2001 Hon Mr Justice M O Taju Deen vs The State (hereinafter “the Taju Deen case”), this Court in exercising its discretion in the granting of bail pending appeal, adopted with approval the tests laid in the decision of the West African Court of Appeal in Rv Theophilus Adenuga Tunwashe and Others {1935] WACA 236:

“(l) That bail will not be granted pending appeal save in exceptional circumstances or where the hearing is likely to be unduly delayed.

2) In dealing with the later class of cases the court will have regard not only to the length of time which must elapse before the appeal can be heard but also the length of the sentence to be appealed from, and further that these two ‘matters will be considered in relation to one another.” | 12, The Court has since been consistent in the approach of exercising its discretion or

determining what constitute “if i seems fit’ in section 67(2) of the Courts Act, in . granting bail pending appeal. In Cr. App 1/2012 Ibrahim Bah vs The State (herein after referred to as the ‘the Ibrahim Bah Case’) the Court stated: | “{t}to help this Court determine whether ‘it seems fit’ to grant an appellant bail, this Court would look, ... at the strength of the grounds of appeal, and the likelihood that the appellant would have served a substantial part of the sentence before his appeal has been heard [and determined].”"

13. Also, in the Ishaka Syvester Menjor case, this Court not only did cite and adopt the

tests adopted and applied in the Taju Deen case; but, succinctly articulated same and laid a framework of how the Court is to be persuaded in granting bail pending appeal as follows:

“When considering an application for bail the following test set out in WATTON vs R is the crucial litmus test for the presence of “exceptional circumstances”:

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