
Judgment
ZUPCO v Mashinge (SC 21 of 2021) [2021] ZWSC 21 (26 March 2021)
ZUPCO v Mashinge is a judgment from Zimbabwe on 26 March 2021. Cite it as [2021] ZWSC 21. Search it by the party names, the citation [2021] ZWSC 21, or Zimbabwe judgment.
ZimbabwePDF · 65 KB[2021] ZWSC 21Judgment
March 26, 2021
ZIMBABWE
ZUPCO
v.
Mashinge
SC 21 of 2021
[2021] ZWSC 21
Proceeding. Judgment. Zimbabwe.
Judgment No. SC 21/2021
Civil Appeal No. SC 625/17 1
REPORTABLE (20)
ZIMBABWE UNITED PASSENGER COMPANY
V
BEAULAR MASHINGE
SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE
MAKARAU JA, GOWORA JA & BERE JA
HARARE: SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 & MARCH 26 2021
P. Ngwenya, for appellant
Respondent in person
MAKARAU JA
1. On 24 February 2017, the Labour Court granted, with no order as to costs, an application
for review brought by the respondent against the appellant. It thereby set aside the
decision of the appellant to dismiss the respondent whom it reinstated with no loss of
salary and benefits with effect from the date of the dismissal. In the alternative and if
reinstatement was untenable, it ordered that the appellant pays damages to the respondent.
2. This is an appeal, with leave, against that order.
BACKGROUND
3. The respondent was employed by the appellant as a bus conductor. Suspecting that she
had committed an act of theft or fraud, the appellant brought the respondent before a
Judgment No. SC 21/2021
Civil Appeal No. SC 625/17 2
disciplinary committee. The disciplinary committee failed to reach a decision in the
matter. Instead of referring the matter to the Chief Executive as is provided for in the
governing code of conduct, the deadlocked disciplinary committee referred the matter to
the Division Operations Manager who, clearly oblivious of his incompetence in the
matter, found the respondent guilty and dismissed her from employment.
4. On the sole basis that the referral of the matter to the Division Operations Manager was a
nullity, the respondent approached the court a quo on review seeking to have the decision
dismissing her set aside. At the hearing of the matter a quo, the court held the appellant
barred for want of filing heads of argument on time. It however proceeded to determine
the matter on the merits. It granted the application. After setting aside the appellant’s
decision to dismiss the respondent, it made the additional order of reinstatement detailed
above. Aggrieved by the order of reinstatement, the appellant noted this appeal.
THE APPEAL
5. In the appeal, the appellant raised one ground of appeal as follows:
“The learned judge in the court a quo erred at law in ordering reinstatement of the
respondent or alternatively payment of damages in lieu of reinstatement, in an
application for review where only a procedural irregularity was determined.”
6. Quite clearly and correctly so, the appellant did not challenge the correctness of the court
a quo’s order to set aside the decision of the Division Operations Manager to dismiss the
appellant as a nullity and therefore as unlawful. This therefore considerably narrows
down the issues that fell to be resolved in this appeal.
THE ISSUE
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Civil Appeal No. SC 625/17 3
7. The sole issue that arose in this appeal is whether, after setting aside the dismissal of the
respondent as unlawful, it was competent for the court a quo to order the reinstatement of
the respondent with no loss of salary and benefits with effect from the date of the
dismissal, or in lieu thereof, the payment of damages.
8. Whilst the appellant argued both in its heads of argument and orally before the court that
the only relief the court a quo could grant in the matter was a remittal of the matter to the
appellant, the issue of the appropriate remedy a quo does not arise in this appeal. This is
so because the issue was not raised in the sole ground of appeal that I have reproduced
above. Whilst it may be regarded as a point of law that can be raised at any time, no
procedural foundation was laid for the raising of the point.
9. In any event and more importantly in my view, the power to remit a matter to a lower
court or tribunal is a common law power inherent in the High Court and in the court a quo
by virtue of s 89 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01], used in its discretion and in
circumstances where it is not possible or desirable for the court to substitute its own
discretion in the matter. There has been no proper attack on the exercise of the court’s
discretion in this regard. I will therefore disregard this issue as it has not been properly
raised.
THE LAW
10. It is common cause that the matter was placed before the court a quo by way of an
application for review. It is further common cause that reviews before the Labour Court
are governed by s 89 of the Labour Court [ Chapter 28.01 ], which provides that the
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Labour Court shall exercise the same powers of review in relation to labour matters as
would be exercisable by the High Court.
11. The powers of the High Court on review are based on the common law and on the
provisions of the High Court Act [Chapter 7.06].
12. Section 28 of the High Court Act provides that on a review of any proceeding or decision
in civil matters, the High Court shall have the power, subject to any other law, to set aside
or correct the decision or proceedings reviewed. By virtue of s 89 of the Labour Court,
the Labour Court similarly has power to set aside or correct the decision or proceedings
reviewed.
13. As discussed above, the only issue that arose in this appeal is whether the court a quo
could competently order the reinstatement of the respondent when it did not consider the
merits of the charges preferred against the respondent in the disciplinary proceedings
under review. The appellant argued that the court had no such competence. It correctly
based its argument on the position of law that upon the setting aside of a fatally irregular
decision in disciplinary proceedings without a consideration of the merits of the matter,
the status quo ante of the parties is restored. It mainly relied on the cases of
Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v Chikomwe and 211 Others SC 77/2000, and
Air Zimbabwe (Private) Limited v Chiku Mnensa and Another SC 89/04, both decisions
of this Court.
14. It appears to me that the appellant understood the legal position enunciated in the above
authorities to only mean that the setting aside of fatally irregular proceedings on review
automatically restores the proceedings to the last valid proceeding. In other words, it
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understood the legal position to be purely procedural, affecting only the procedural rights
of the parties and not their substantive rights.
15. The appellant was partially correct. Its understanding however represents the narrow
procedural position. It is not uncommon for procedural irregularities to also affect the
substantive rights of the parties to the dispute. It is not uncommon for procedural
irregularities to produce nullities that then restore in full the rights of the parties ante.
16. The broader and more readily acceptable position in my view is that the status quo ante of
the parties that is restored upon the setting aside of the irregular employment disciplinary
proceedings also relates substantively to the contractual status of the parties. Put simply,
it must be understood to mean broadly that upon the setting aside of fatally defective
disciplinary proceedings, the employment contract is restored, without necessarily or by
implication negating the remedies and procedures available to each of the parties to
terminate the contract in terms of the agreed terms.
17. It thus presents itself clearly to me that the restoration of the contract in such a situation
has no effect on the merits of the charge or charges against the employee and the right of
the employer to proceed against the employee in terms of the governing code of conduct.
18. The position that I come up with above was obliquely endorsed by McNally JA in Air
Zimbabwe Corporation v Mlambo 1997 (1) ZLR 220 (S) where, at page 223 H he
accepted as correct the submission by counsel for the respondent to the effect that:
“…as soon as there is a finding that the disciplinary findings were a nullity, it must
follow that the employee is reinstated. After all, the basis for his dismissal has been set
aside. So he has not been properly dismissed.” (The emphasis is mine).
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Civil Appeal No. SC 625/17 6
19. The conclusion that I reach above is similar to the conclusion reached by this Court in the
case of Minerals Marketing Corporation v Mazimavi 1995 (2) ZLR 353 (S) where the
court upheld the decision of the tribunal a quo to reinstate the employee after finding that
a gross irregularity had occurred during the disciplinary proceedings.
20. The clear position of the law appears to me to be that upon the setting aside of
employment disciplinary proceedings as a nullity, both the procedural and the substantive
rights of the parties are restored to the position immediately before the nullified process.
In other words, where a dismissal is set aside as being a nullity, the employee is reinstated
as such notwithstanding the further disciplinary proceedings that the court may order by
way of remittal or otherwise.
21. I thus reject as stating the correct position at law the argument by the appellant that the
court a quo could only confine itself to confirming or nullifying the disciplinary
proceedings of the appellant without granting substantive relief in the matter.
ANALYSIS
22. Applying the law to the facts of this matter, it cannot be disputed that by setting aside the
dismissal of the respondent by the Division Operations Manager, the court a quo
effectively restored the status of the respondent as an employee of the appellant, albeit
one who had charges pending against her and had appeared before a disciplinary
committee.
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23. The record is not clear whether, prior to her being brought before the disciplinary
committee, the respondent was on suspension with or without salary. This is a material
consideration. In the absence of evidence that the respondent was on suspension pending
the determination of the charges against her, the appeal has no merit.
24. I note in passing that the issue that the employees in the Air Zimbabwe v Mensa case were
on suspension was the turning point in that case. The court reasoned that before the
suspension was lawfully lifted, the employees could not be reinstated. In that case the
employees concerned were on suspension without salary. This is the status they reverted
to after the setting aside of the disciplinary proceedings. This reasoning does not and
cannot apply in casu. It was not argued a quo that the respondent was on suspension
without salary before she was unlawfully dismissed. It was similarly not so argued before
us.
25. In the circumstances of this matter, the setting aside of the unlawful dismissal of the
respondent restored her status as an employee of the appellant. To this extent and in the
absence of evidence that she had been lawfully suspended without salary before she was
dismissed, the order a quo cannot be faulted.
26. In the result, I find no merit in the appeal which I must dismiss.
27. In view of the fact that there is no justification for departing from the general position that
costs follow the cause, I must dismiss the appeal with an accompanying order of costs.
28. Accordingly, I make the following order:
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The appeal is dismissed with costs.
GOWORA JA : I agree
BERE JA : (NO LONGER IN OFFICE)
Chinawa Law Chambers, appellant’s legal practitioners
