
Criminal appeal
Wambua v Director of Public Prosecution (Criminal Revision E111 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 2026 (KLR) (17 February 2025) (Ruling)
Wambua v Director of Public Prosecution is a criminal appeal from Kenya in 2025. Cite it as [2025] KEHC 2026. Search it by the party names, the citation [2025] KEHC 2026, or Kenya criminal appeal.
KenyaPDF · 225 KB[2025] KEHC 2026Criminal appeal
KENYA
Wambua
Appellant
v.
Director of Public Prosecution
Respondent
Criminal Revision E111 of 2024
[2025] KEHC 2026
Proceeding. Criminal appeal. Kenya.
Wambua v Director of Public Prosecution (Criminal Revision
E111 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 2026 (KLR) (17 February 2025) (Ruling)
Neutral citation: [2025] KEHC 2026 (KLR)
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT AT MACHAKOS
CRIMINAL REVISION E111 OF 2024
NIO ADAGI, J
FEBRUARY 17, 2025
BETWEEN
JOHN NZOMO WAMBUA ..................................................................... APPLICANT
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION ...................................... RESPONDENT
RULING
1. The Applicant was charged with the oence of delement contrary to section 8 (1) as read with section
8(3) of the sexual offences Act No. 3 of 2006.
2. The Trial Magistrate convicted and sentenced the Applicant to serve twenty (20) years imprisonment.
3. The Applicant appealed against the sentence at the High Court at Machakos in Criminal Appeal No.
70 of 2017 where Judge D. K. Kemei, agreed with the trial court that the sentence imposed is the
minimum possible in law and saw no reason to interfere with it thus dismissed the appeal.
4. The Applicant has now led an undated Notice of Motion seeking the following orders, that:
a. A declaration that the Trial Court in not considering the applicant’s mitigation and sentencing
him by virtue of minimum mandatory sentences as provided for in the Sexual offences
Act violated his constitutional rights as enshrined under article 50(2)(p), 25 and 28 of the
Constitution’
b. That this honourable court seeks to review the sentence pursuant to section 216 of the
Criminal Procedure Code and the 2016 Judiciary Sentencing Policy Guidelines.
c. Any other orders that the court deems just under Article 23 of the Constitution or any other
enabling laws.
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5. The Applicant averred that the court has jurisdiction to determine the case and the court should nd
that he is entitled to a resentencing order. That the court declares that his constitutional rights as
indicated in the Constitution of Kenya under Articles 25, 28 and 50(2) have been violated pertaining
to a fair trial and mitigation vis a vis the minimum mandatory sentences as provided for in the Sexual
Offences Act.
6. That the court should nd that the applicant has the right to benet from the least severe sentence as
provided for under article 50(2) (p) of the Constitution.
7. He averred that if the court fails to order for the relief sought, he would suer irreparably as he will
end up serving a longer sentence.
8. The application was directed to be canvassed through written submissions. Both parties complied by
ling their respective submissions.
Analysis and Determination:
9. I have considered the application and written submissions led on behalf of the respective parties. The
issue for determination is whether the Court should review the sentence of 20 years imprisonment
imposed by the Trial Court.
10. This Court is guided by the principles in the Court of Appeal case of Bernard Kimani Gacheru vs.
Republic [2002] eKLR where it was stated as follows:
“ It is now settled law, following several authorities by this court and by the High Court, that
sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court. Similarly, sentence must
depend on the facts of each case. On appeal the appellate court will not easily interfere with
sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case, or that
the trial court overlooked some material factor or took into account some wrong material,
or acted on a wrong principle. Even if, the appellate court feels that the sentence is heavy
and that the appellate court might itself not have passed that sentence, these alone are not
sucient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless,
anyone of the matters already stated is shown to exist.”
11. The Court of appeal also rendered itself as follows on sentences in sexual oences in the case of Athanus
Lijodi vs. Republic [2021] eKLR
“ On the issue of sentence, we reiterate that the life sentence imposed by the trial magistrate
and armed by the High Court is not unconstitutional and can still be meted out
in deserving cases Muruatetu’s case (supra) notwithstanding. This Court has on many
occasions invoked the Muruatetu decision to reduce sentences that were hitherto deemed as
minimum sentences. (See for instance Evans Wanjala Wanyonyi v Republic [2019] eKLR).
Having said that however, we must hasten to add that this Court will uphold a sentence
prescribed by the Sexual Offences Act if upon proper exercise of sentencing discretion and
consideration of the facts of each case, such sentence is deserved or merited.”
12. The same court in the case of Dismas Wafula Kilwake Vs. Republic [2019] eKLR stated as follows;
“ Being so persuaded, we hold that the provisions of section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act
must be interpreted so as not to take away the discretion of the court in sentencing. Those
provisions are indicative of the seriousness with which the Legislature and the society take
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the oence of delement. In appropriate cases therefore, the court, freely exercising its
discretion in sentencing, should be able to impose any of the sentences prescribed, if the
circumstances of the case so demand. On the other hand, the court cannot be constrained
by section 8 to impose the provided sentences if the circumstances do not demand it.
The argument that mandatory sentences are justied because sometimes courts impose
unreasonable or lenient sentences which do not deter commission of the particular oences
is not convincing, granted the express right of appeal or revision available in the event of
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of discretion in sentencing.”
13. The provision of section 8(1) as read together with provisions of section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences
Act No 3 2006 and legislation that was in force before commencement of the Constitution of Kenya
2010 must be considered with adaptation, qualication and exception when it comes to the mandatory
minimum sentence and in particular when the said sentences do not take into account the dignity
of the individual as mandated under article 27 of the Constitution and as appreciated in the Francis
Muruatetu case and applied by courts in several cases
14. In Francis Karioki Muruatetu & Another vs Republic the Supreme Court did provide guidelines and
mitigating factors in re-hearing of sentence. The Judiciary sentencing policy guidelines list the objective
of Sentencing At. Paragraph 4.1 they include the gravity of the oence, the threat of violence against
the victim, the nature and type of weapon used by the applicants to inict harm.
15. In Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 others (Amicus Curiae)
(Petition E018 of 2023) the Supreme Court on Whether minimum sentences as prescribed in the
Sexual Offences Act are unconstitutional and (iv) whether courts have discretion to impose sentences
below minimum those prescribed by the Sexual Offences Act held as follows
63. Returning to the issue of the constitutionality or otherwise of minimum sentences under the
Sexual Offences Act and discretion to mete out sentences under the said Act, we note that the
Court of Appeal failed to identify with precision the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act it was
declaring unconstitutional, left its declaration of unconstitutionality ambiguous, vague and
bereft of specicity. We nd this approach problematic in the realm of criminal law because
such a declaration would have grave eect on other convicted and sentenced persons who were
charged with the same oence. Inconsistency in sentences for the same oences would also
create mistrust and unfairness in the criminal justice system. Yet the fundamental issue of the
constitutionality of the minimum sentence may not have been properly led and fully argued
before the superior courts below.
64. The proper procedure before reaching such a manifestly far-reaching nding would have been
for there to have been a specic plea for unconstitutionality raised before the appropriate court.
This plea must also be precise to a section or sections of a denite statute. The court must then
juxtapose the impugned provision against the Constitution before nding it unconstitutional
and must also specify the reasons for nding such impugned provision unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeal in the present appeal did not declare any particular provision of the Sexual
Offences Act unconstitutional, failing to refer even to the particular Section 8 that would have
been relevant to the Respondent’s case.
65. We also note that the Court of Appeal concluded its decision in this present matter by reducing
the Respondent’s sentence from the minimum of 20 years to 15 years. In doing so, the Court
of Appeal did not clarify the considerations that went into its decision to reduce the sentence.
The reasoning behind the court's decision is called into question by this omission as sentencing
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is a matter of fact unless an Appellate Court is dealing with a blatantly illegal sentence which
was not the case in the present matter.
66. We must also rearm that, although sentencing is an exercise of judicial discretion, it is
Parliament and not the Judiciary that sets the parameters of sentencing for each crime in
statute. As such, striking down a sentence provided for in Statute, must be based not only on
evidence and sound legal principles but on an in-depth consideration of public interest and
the principles of public law that informed the making of that specic law. A judicial decision
of that nature cannot be based on private opinions, sentiments, sympathy or benevolence. It
ought not to be arbitrary, whimsical or capricious. However, where a sentence is set in Statute,
the Legislature has already determined the course, unless it is declared unconstitutional,
based on sound principles and clear guidelines, upon which the Legislature should then act.
Suce to say, where Parliament enacts legislation, the Judicial arm should adjudicate disputes
based on the provisions of the law. However, in the special circumstances of a declaration of
unconstitutionality, the process is reversed.
67. This is why, even in the Muruatetu case, this Court was keen to still defer to the Legislature
as the proper body mandated to legislate. While the courts have the mandate to interpret the
law and where necessary strike out a law for being unconstitutional, this mandate does not
extend to legislation or repeal of statutory provisions. In that regard, we echo with approval
the words of the High Court in the case of Trusted Society of Human Rights v Attorney-
General and others ,High Court Petition No 229 of 2012; [2012] eKLR, at paragraphs 63-64
where it held as follows:“Although the Kenyan Constitution contains no explicit clause on
separation of powers, the Montesquieuian inuence is palpable throughout the foundational
document, the Constitution, regarding the necessity of separating the Governmental functions.
the Constitution consciously delegates the sovereign power under it to the three branches
of Government and expects that each will carry out those functions assigned to it without
interference from the other two.”We reiterate the above exposition of the law and the answer
to the two questions under consideration is that, unless a proper case is led and the matter
escalated to us in the manner stated above, a declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be made
in the manner the Court of Appeal did in the present case.
16. Having considered the sentence meted out and circumstances of this case as well as guided by the
above precedents and also having considered that the said Section 8(2) of the sexual offences Act No. 3
of 2006 fettered the courts discretion in sentencing, I do nd that the sentence was reasonable given
proportionality between the sentence passed and the crime committed.
17. I have also considered that this court and the High Court in Criminal appeal No. 70 of 2020, John
Nzomo Wambua v Republic hold the same jurisdiction and therefore this court cannot overturn the
judgment and ndings of an equal jurisdiction. That would amount to this court determining an
appeal on its own decision. The Applicant has not exhausted all his avenues of appeal in this matter.
18. Accordingly, the application lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
It is so ordered.
JUDGMENT WRITTEN, DATED & SIGNED AT MACHAKOS THIS 17TH FEBRUARY 2025
NOEL I. ADAGI
JUDGE
DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT MACHAKOS THIS 17TH FEBRUARY 2025
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In the presence of :
In person............. for Appellant
Ms Agatha............................. for Respondent
Milly Grace................. Court Assistant
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