
Reported judgment
Turay v Garbee, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 189
Turay v Garbee is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1920-36. Cite it as 1920-36 ALR S.L. 189. Search it by the party names, the citation 1920-36 ALR S.L. 189, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 131 KB1920-36 ALR S.L. 189Reported judgment
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Turay
v.
Garbee
1920-36 ALR S.L. 189
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
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TURA Y v. GARBEE, 1920--36 ALR S.L. 189
s.c.
would be the imposition of a less severe punishment. I do not
believe, though I cannot find an authority on this point, and
probably the question has never arisen, that a court of general or
quarter sessions in England has ever interpreted in that sense its
power to modify a decision.
Where the power to correct an illegal sentence is given it must
be given in no uncertain terms, as in s.4 of the Summary Review
Ordinance (cap. 203) which confers upon the Chief Justice or
Circuit Judge, when dealing with the monthly list of criminal
cases, the power "to reverse or amend any judgment which shall
have been given contrary to law."
The conviction is quashed and the fine must be refunded to
the appellant.
Appeal allowed.
TURAY v. GARBEE
Supreme Court (Tew, C.J.): April 7th, 1930
[ 1] Administrative Law - public officers - appointment - acting in public
office is evidence of due appointment: All public officers who are proved
to have acted as such are presumed to have been duly appointed to the
office until the contrary is shown: a person who disputes the authority
of one who acts as a tribal ruler must therefore prove that he was not
properly appointed (page 191, lines 3-16).
[2] Constitutional Law - chiefs - tribal ruler - appointment -acting in
capacity of tribal ruler is evidence of due appointment - person dis
puting authority of tribal ruler must prove non-appointment: See [1]
above.
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[ 3] Evidence - presumptions - presumptions of law - omnia praesumuntur 30
rite esse acta - acting in public office is evidence of due appointment -
person disputing authority must prove non-appointment: See [1] above.
The respondent was charged in the police magistrate's court
with failing to pay a fine imposed upon him by the appellant in
his capacity of Acting Tribal Ruler of the Mandingo tribe. 35
The appellant imposed a fine upon the respondent for breach of
rules made under s.4(1) of the Tribal Administration (Colony)
Ordinance, 1924. The respondent failed to pay the fine and was
summoned to appear before the police magistrate "on a charge of
failing to pay a fine .... "The respondent argued that he should not 40
be compelled to pay the fine since the appellant had not properly
189
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
been appointed to the office of Tribal Ruler and therefore had no
authority to impose the penalty. The magistrate held that the onus
was on the appellant to prove that he had been duly appointed
and, in the absence of such proof, dismissed the summons.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the appellant contended that
the fact that he had acted in the capacity of Tribal Ruler created a
presumption that he had been duly appointed, so that the onus
was on the respondent to disprove such appointment, and in the
absence of such proof he should be compelled to pay the fine
imposed upon him.
The appeal was allowed.
Cases referred to:
(1) Faulkner v. Johnson (1843), 11 M. & W. 581; 152 E.R. 937.
15 (2) 1\l'Gahey v. Alston (1836), 2 M. & W. 206; 150 E.R. 731, dicta of Parke,
B. applied.
TEW,C.J.:
The respondent was summoned to appear before the police
magistrate on a charge of failing to pay a fine imposed upon him
20 by the Acting Tribal Ruler of the Mandingo tribe in Freetown for
breach of rules made under s.4(1) of the Tribal Administration
(Colony) Ordinance (cap. 217). It may be noted incidentally that
s.6 of the said Ordinance provides that a defaulter may be
summoned "to show cause why he should not be compelled to
25 pay any fine," and that consequently the summons was wrongly
worded.
The only question raised by this appeal is whether it was
incumbent on the appellant to prove that he had been properly
appointed to act as Tribal Ruler, or whether the fact that he did
30 so act created a presumption in favour of an appointment
according to law, so that the onus was on the respondent to dis
prove such appointment.
Section 16A of cap. 217, inserted by the Tribal Administration
(Colony) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1926, provides that in certain
35 cases "the Governor may appoint one of the headmen or represen
tatives of the sections of the tribe as acting tribal ruler," and it was
proved that the appointment of the appellant as "Acting Tribal
Ruler of the Mandingos in Freetown" was notified in the Gazette
of November 16th, 1929.
40 The learned magistrate held that the onus was on the com-
plainant to prove that he had actually been appointed by the
190
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TURAY v. GARBEE, 192o--36 ALR S.L. 189
s.c.
Governor and, in the absence of such proof, dismissed the
summons.
In my opinion the magistrate's decision was wrong. In 13
Halsbury 's Laws of England, 1st ed., at 443 (1910) it is stated that
- "acting in a public office is evidence of due appointment" and
the same principle is laid down in slightly different language in
Broom's Legal Maxims, 8th ed., at 740 (1911).
In M'Gahey v. Alston the rule was stated by Parke, B. in the
same clear terms (2 M. & W. at 211; 150 E.R. at 733):
"[T] he rule is, that all public officers who are proved to have
acted as such, are presumed to have been duly appointed to
the office, until the contrary is shewn."
Again in Faulkner v. Johnson (1) it was held that, where a
defendant had challenged the authority of a person who had
acted as sheriff, it was incumbent upon him to prove the non
appointment of that person as sheriff.
The appeal must be allowed and the magistrate's decision set
aside. The case is remitted to the magistrate for hearing on the
merits. The appellant will have the costs of the appeal.
Order accordingly.
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