
Civil appeal
Steele & Ors v Attorney-General; Tejan-Sie v Koroma (CIVIL CASE 125 of 1966) [1967] SLSC 1245 (3 January 1967)
Steele & Ors v Attorney-General; Tejan-Sie v Koroma is a civil appeal from Sierra Leone on 3 January 1967. Cite it as [1967] SLSC 1245. Search it by the party names, the citation [1967] SLSC 1245, or Sierra Leone civil appeal.
Sierra Leone — Supreme CourtPDF · 551 KB[1967] SLSC 1245Civil appeal
January 3, 1967
IN THE SUPREME COURT
Steele & Ors
Appellant
v.
Attorney-General; Tejan-Sie
Respondent
CIVIL CASE 125 of 1966
[1967] SLSC 1245
Proceeding. Civil appeal. Sierra Leone.
STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. S.C.
sTEELE and OTHERS v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, TEJAN-SIE and
KOROMA
SuPREME CouRT (Cole, Ag. C.J.): January 3rd, 1967
(Civil Case No. 125/66)
[1] Constitutional Law-fundamental rights-enforcement-application for
redress-applicant must allege facts showing direct injury actually
sustained or immediately threatened: A person invoking the enforce
ment provisions laid down in s.24 of the Constitution must allege
facts which show that, as a result of the acts complained of, he has
sustained, or is sustaining, or is immediately in danger of sustaining,
a direct injury, and it is insufficient to allege facts which merely show
a likelihood that he will suffer in some indefinite way (page 13, lines
30-36; page 14, lines 8-13).
[2] Constitutional Law-fundamental rights-enforcement-application
for redress-applicant must allege facts showing special injury not
common to public: A person invoking the enforcement provisions
laid down in s.24 of the Constitution must allege facts which show,
as a result of the acts complained of, an injury to himself which is
not one of a general nature common to all members of the public, and
it is insufficient to allege facts which merely show that he will suffer
in common with other people (page 13, lines 30-36; page 14, lines
8-13).
[3] Constitutional Law - party system - parliamentary resolution that
Government consider introducing one-party system constitutional: A
resolution of Parliament that the Government give serious considera
tion to the introduction of a one-party system of government does
not contravene Part 2 of Chapter IV of the Constitution (page 11,
lines 7-9).
The defendants-applicants applied to strike out the plaintiffs
respondents' statement of claim and in the alternative for the points
of law raised in the defence to be heard and disposed of before the
trial.
By their writ of summons, the plaintiffs-respondents claimed,
"pursuant to s.24 of the Constitution," (a), a declaration that the
Government's appointment of a committee to report on a one-party
system for Sierra Leone was a threat to and an infringement of ss. 12
to 23 of the Constitution and was specifically in breach of s.22, and
was therefore void, and (b), an order restraining the committee from
meeting or proceeding and the second defendant from acting as its
chairman.
In their statement of claim, they quoted the committee's terms
of reference, viz.-"To collate and assess all views on the One
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Party System both in and out of Parliament and to make recom
mendations on the type of One Party System suitable for Sierra
Leone and the method by which it should be introduced." They
alleged that the committee, by reason of its restrictive terms of
5 reference, constituted a distinct and certain threat to the rights
entrenched by s.22 of the Constitution (which protects the freedoms
of assembly and association) and that their entrenched rights were
likely to be contravened in relation to them, the plaintiffs-respondents.
By their defence, the defendants-applicants denied these allega-
10 tions while admitting that the committee had been set up with the
terms of reference stated. They raised the objections in law (a), that
the appointment of the committee and the fixing of its terms of
reference were an exercise of the incidental power of the Government
to inform itself of public opinion before introducing a bill in Parlia-
15 ment, and (b), that the statement of claim was bad in law and
disclosed no cause of action because the invocation of the jurisdiction
of the court under s.24 of the Constitution was wrong. In support
of the latter objection, they contended that the plaintiffs-respondents
had alleged no facts showing that as a result of the setting-up of
20 the committee any of the provisions of ss. 12 to 23 of the Constitution
had been, was being or was likely to be contravened in relation to
them, the plaintiffs-respondents. Further, they alleged that the
committee had been set up following a resolution of Parliament
calling on the Government to give serious consideration to the
25 introduction of a one-party system of government. The plaintiffs
respondents filed no reply and this allegation was not disputed.
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Cases referred to :
(1) Att.-Gen. for Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd., [1914]
A.C. 237; (1913), 110 L.T. 707.
(2) Balewa v. Doherty, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 949; (1963), 107 Sol. Jo. 615.
(3) Ex p. Levitt, 302 U.S. 633; 58 S.Ct. 1 (1937), applied.
(4) Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447; 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923), applied.
(5) Olivier v. Buttigieg, [1967] 1 A.C. 115; [1966] 2 All E.R. 459.
Constitution and Rules construed:
Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1961 (No. 741, Second Schedule), s.24:
The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 12, line 3-
page 13, line 11.
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STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1
S.C.
S preme Court Rules (Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, cap. 7), O.II, r.l:
u "Every action in the Supreme Court unless otherwise expressly pro
vided for shall be commenced by a writ of summons, which shall be
indorsed with a statement of the nature of the claim made, or of the
relief or remedy required in the action."
o.XVI, r.5: "Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement
in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence
by which they are to be proved . . . ."
a .XXI, r.4 : "The court may order any pleading to be struck out, on the
ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or answer, and
in any such case or in the case of the action or defence being shown
by the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the court may order
the action to be stayed or dismissed, or judgment to be entered accord
ingly, as may be just."
B. Macaulay, Q.C., Att.-Gen., and Teian-Cole, Senior Crown Counsel, for
the defendants-applicants.
c. N. Rogers-Wright and Smythe for the plaintiffs-respondents.
COLE, Ag. C.J.:
Let me start by giving a resume of the history of this matter.
By their writ of summons dated April 29th, 1965, the plaintiffs
respondents instituted proceedings against the defendants-applicants.
The writ of summons was generally indorsed, and the indorsement
reads as follows :
"The plaintiffs claim pursuant to s.24 of the Constitution as
citizens of Sierra Leone against the Attorney-General of
Sierra Leone as representative of the Government of Sierra
Leone, and against the second defendant, the Hon. Banja
Tejan-Sie, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Sierra
Leone, appointed chairman of the committee hereinafter more
particularly described, for a declaration :
That the appointment of a one-party committee pro
posed by the Government of Sierra Leone constitutes and is
a threat to and an infringement of the constitutional
provisions contained in ss. 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the
Constitution and is specifically in breach of s.22 of the said
Constitution and is therefore null, void and of no effect;
and for an order:
(a) That the said proposed committee, being an infringe
ment as aforesaid of the undoubted and entrenched rights
of the plaintiffs, be perpetually restrained from meeting
or from proceeding in any form whatever.
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(b) That the second defendant, the Ron. Banja Tejan
Sie, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Sierra
Leone, be restrained perpetually from convening a meeting
of the said committee or from acting as chairman of the
5 said committee and for such further and other orders
as in the premises shall be just."
The statement of claim was delivered and filed on May 13th,
1966. It states :
[The learned Acting Chief Justice read the statement of claim
10 and continued: ]
On May 25th, 1966, upon application having been made to this
court by the plaintiffs-respondents and after listening to arguments,
I ordered that Mr. Abu Koroma be added as a defendant, and at
the same time I granted the plaintiffs-respondents an interim
15 injunction.
The defendants-applicants delivered and filed their statement of
defence on May 28th, 1966. It is as follows :
[The learned Acting Chief Justice read the defence and
continued : ]
20 On that same day, May 28th, 1966, the defendants-applicants
applied to move this court on June 2nd, 1966 for an order that the
point of law raised in para. 7 of their statement of defence be set
down for hearing and disposed of forthwith and before the trial of
the issues of fact in the action. This motion was abandoned and
25 another dated June 2nd, 1966, was filed. This motion applied to
move this court on June 6th, 1966-
"for an order that the plaintiffs' statement of claim be struck
out under the Supreme Court Rules, O.XXI, r.4 on the ground
that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and
30 vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court, and that
the defendants be at liberty to sign judgment herein for their
costs of defence and of this application; in the alternative,
for an order that the points of law raised by the defendants
in paras. 5 and 7 of their statement of defence be set down
35 for hearing and disposed of forthwith and before the trial of
the issues of fact in this action."
This motion was supported by the affidavit of Donald Marius
Allison Macaulay, Acting Solicitor-General, sworn on June 2nd, 1966
and filed. That is the motion which is the subject-matter of this
40 decision.
In the course of the hearing of the motion, in view of certain
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STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1
S.C.
rulings I made (including an order made by me on June 7th, 1966
that the points of law raised in paras. 5 and 7 of the statement of
defence would substantially dispose of the main action if decided in
favour of the defendants-appellants), the plaintiffs-respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeal. In consequence of a consent 5
order made by that court on July 8th, 1966 (which, inter alia, included
my order that the points of law raised in paras. 5 and 7 of the defence
do stand for argument and be disposed of before the trial), an
amended statement of claim and an amended statement of defence
were delivered and filed. The amended statement of claim was 10
delivered and filed on August 3rd, 1966, and it reads as follows :
"1. The plaintiffs are each of them citizens of and resident
in Sierra Leone. The first defendant is the Attorney-General
of Sierra Leone and is sued in his capacity as representative of
the Crown in Sierra Leone. The second defendant, the Hon. 15
Banja Tejan-Sie, is sued in his capacity as appointee of the
Crown to lead the proposed committee the main subject-matter
of these proceedings.
2. By Government Notice No. 347 M.P. C0/22/40/1 issued
out of the Cabinet Secretariat, dated April 22nd, 1966 and 20
published in the Sierra Leone Gazette (Extraordinary) Volume
XCVII, No. 32 of April 25th, 1966, the Government set up
a committee with the following terms of reference :
'To collate and assess all views on the One Party System
both in and out of Parliament and to make recom- 25
mendations on the type of One Party System suitable
for Sierra Leone and the method by which it should be
introduced.'
3. Representatives from certain bodies with the number of
delegates each was allowed was also decided in this said 30
Government Notice and the Hon. Banja Tejan-Sie, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, was nominated chairman.
4. The plaintiffs and each of them say that the proposed
committee according to its restrictive terms of reference con-
stitutes a distinct and certain threat to the rights entrenched 35
by s.22 of the Constitution.
5. The plaintiffs and each of them aver that they do not
consent to any hindrance being put on their right to assemble
freely and associate with other persons and in particular do not
consent to any curtailment of their respective freedom to 40
belong to respective political associations, unions or parties for
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the protection and advancement of their respective political
interest.
6. The plaintiffs further aver that the proceedings and recom
mendations of the said committee as is evidenced by the
definitive terms of reference made it clear that their entrenched
rights are likely to be contravened in relation to them.
7. The plaintiffs further say that no adequate means of redress
are available to them under any other law.
The plaintiffs' claim pursuant to s.24 of the Constitution
is as citizens of Sierra Leone against the Attorney-General of
Sierra Leone as representative of the Government of Sierra
Leone, and against the second defendant, the Hon. Banja
Tejan-Sie, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Sierra
Leone, appointed chairman of the committee hereinafter more
particularly described for a declaration :
That the appointment of a one-party committee pro
posed by the Government of Sierra Leone constitutes and
is a threat to and an infringement of the constitutional
provisions contained in ss. 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the
Constitution and is specifically in breach of s.22 of the
said Constitution and is therefore null, void and of no effect;
and for an order:
(a) that the said proposed committee, being an infringe
ment as aforesaid of the undoubted and entrenched rights
of the plaintiffs, be perpetually restrained from meeting or
from proceeding in any form whatever;
(b) that the said committee with its terms of reference as
set out in Government Notice No. 347 M.P. C0/22/40/1
published in the Sierra Leone Gazette (Extraordinary)
Volume XCVII, No. 32 of April 25th, 1966 constitute a
threat to the rights entrenched by s.22 of the Sierra
Leone Constitution and is unconstitutional and is null, void
and of no effect;
(c) that the second defendant, the Hon. Banja Tejan-Sie,
Speaker of the House of Representatives of Sierra Leone,
be restrained perpetually from convening a meeting of the
said committee or from acting as chairman of the said com
mittee;
and for such further and other orders as in the premises shall
be just."
6
STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1
S.C.
The amended statement of defence was delivered and filed on
July 11th, 1966, and reads as follows:
"1. In answer to para. 1 of the statement of claim, the
defendants are unable to admit or deny the allegations con-
tained therein except and in so far as such allegations concern 5
the first and second defendants, which allegations are admitted.
2. The defendants admit para. 2 of the statement of claim
and in addition state that on July 17th, 1966 the Government
issued a statement contained in a White Paper, as follows :
'GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER
on the Proposed Introduction of a
Democratic One Party System in
Sierra Leone
Parliament at its Fourth Session 1965-66 passed the
following resolution:
"That Government give serious consideration to the
introduction of a One Party System of government in
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2. The idea of a One Party System has come about as a
result of a genuine desire on the part of the Government
for national unity, solidarity and progress. It has not been
motivated by any thirst for power nor by any desire to
entrench the present Government perpetually in power by 25
undemocratic and unconstitutional means. There is no
intention whatsover on the part of the Government to
impose any system on the people of this country. Any
changes in our political system which are proposed, will
only be brought about if the people agree to them, after SO
being consulted by a method which is both constitutional
and popularly acceptable.
3. In order therefore to ascertain the wishes of the people
as a whole, it is the view of Government that the One Party
System should be introduced by means of a referendum. 35
Since there is no provision in the Constitution for such a
referendum, it will be necessary to amend the Constitution
to provide for it. The Committee which will be appointed
to study this question will however be free to consider
other methods of ascertaining the wishes of the people. 40
4. Government has repeatedly told the public that it has
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nothing to hide and it will be guided entirely by the will
of the people in its consideration of the One Party System.
Therefore the Prime Minister in a number of addresses to
party rallies has made it clear that the various questions
that arise in regard to the introduction of a One Party
System will be referred to a Committee for thorough study.
Government now takes the opportunity of setting down in
this White Paper its views on the subject. It is hoped
that these will form part of the basis or the starting point
from which the proposed Committee, when appointed, will
approach its work. These proposals are neither final nor
complete; and although they indicate the thinking of the
Government on the One Party System, they are not
intended to exclude other ideas and other suggestions which
may occur to members of the Committee and to members of
the public. There is therefore nothing absolute or unchange
able about them.
5. In a One Party System one of the qualifications for
election to Parliament should be membership of the Party.
This will not, however, interfere with all the other qualifi
cations which are at present provided for in the Constitution.
These other qualifications for membership shall stand;
e.g., it is laid down in the Constitution that all persons of
25 years and above, if otherwise qualified, should be eligible
to stand as candidates for election to Parliament.
6. In making these proposals Government will endeavour
to ensure that no person in Sierra Leone is deprived of
his fundamental rights to life, liberty, security of his person,
the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law, his
fundamental freedoms of conscience, of expression and of
assembly, and respect for his private and family life.
Government is particularly anxious to ensure that whatever
political system is adopted no person shall be deprived
of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law
in any of the cases specified in the Constitution.
7. With these general principles in mind Government has
decided to set up a Committee with the following terms of
reference:
"To collate and assess all views on the One Party
System both in and out of Parliament and to make
recommendations on the type of One Party System
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STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1
suitable for Sierra Leone and the method by which it
should be introduced."
In making this study the Committee may take into con
sideration any points that will help it in coming to a fair
S.C.
and reasonable conclusion. The Committee may also take 5
into consideration the above proposals of the Government
and the following specific points :
(a) the method and procedure to be adopted in general
elections under the One Party System;
(b) the safeguarding of freedom of speech under the 10
One Party System;
(c) the maintenance of the rule of law and the indepen
dence of the judiciary in a One Party System;
(d) the definition of a political party and how to ensure
adherence to the One Party System when introduced. 15
8. Government is of the view that the principles set out
above will allay fears that have been expressed about the
purpose and nature of the One Party System.'
3. The defendants admit para. 3 of the statement of claim.
4. The defendants deny para. 4 of the statement of claim. 20
5. The defendants will object in law and say that the appoint
ment of the committee referred to in the writ of summons and
the statement of claim is an incidental power of Government
and the Crown to make such enquiries as it thinks fit so as to
inform itself of the state of public opinion before intro- 25
clueing any bill in Parliament; that in the exercise of such a
power the Government and the Crown have an unqualified
right to state the terms of reference of any committee so
appointed, including the committee challenged in this action.
6. The defendants deny para. 6 of the statement of claim and 30
further say that the said para. 6 is speculative and is in
anticipation of the deliberations and decisions of the said
committee.
7. The defendants will object that the statement of claim is
bad in law and discloses no cause of action against them, on 35
the ground that the purported invocation of the jurisdiction
of the court under s.24 of the Constitution is wrong.
8. Save as is specifically admitted the defendants deny each
and every of the allegations contained in the statement of
claim.'' 40
The hearing of the motion then continued on the basis of the
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
indorsement on the writ of summons, the amended statement of
claim, the amended statement of defence and the affidavit of Donald
Marius Allison Macaulay to which I have already referred. It would,
perhaps, be better if I dealt with the alternative part of the motion
5 at this stage as I consider this to be of more (if not the utmost)
importance.
I have already set out paras. 5 and 7 of the amended statement
of defence. For ease of reference I shall here set them out. They are:
"5. The defendants will object in law and say that the appoint-
10 ment of the committee referred to in the writ of summons and
the statement of claim is an incidental power of Government
and the Crown to make such enquiries as it thinks fit so as
to inform itself of the state of public opinion before introducing
any bill in Parliament; that in the exercise of such a power
15 the Government and the Crown have an unqualified right to
state the terms of reference of any committee so appointed,
including the committee challenged in this action."
"7. The defendants will object that the statement of claim is
bad in law and discloses no cause of action against them,
20 on the ground that the purported invocation of the jurisdiction
of the court under s.24 of the Constitution is wrong."
It will be recalled that in para. 2 of the amended statement of
claim it was alleged, and the allegation was admitted in para. 2 of
the amended statement of defence, that-
25 "By Government Notice No. 347 M.P. C0/22/40/1 issued
out of the Cabinet Secretariat, dated April 22nd, 1966 and
published in the Sierra Leone Gazette (Extraordinary) Volume
XCVII, No. 32 of April 25th, 1966 the Government set up a
committee with the following terms of reference :
30 'To collate and assess all views on the One Party System
both in and out of Parliament and to make recommenda
tions on the type of One Party System suitable for Sierra
Leone and the method by which it should be introduced.' "
The plaintiffs-respondents also allege in their statement of claim
35 that the proposed committee according to its restrictive terms of
reference constitutes a distinct and certain threat to the rights
entrenched by s.22 of the Constitution.
The plaintiffs-respondents have not denied the allegations in the
amended statement of defence, namely that the creation of the
10 committee the subject-matter of this action was the result of a
resolution of Parliament passed at its fourth session, 1965-66, to the
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STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1 S.C.
effect that Government give serious consideration to the introduction
of a one-party system of government in this country. There has been
no reply to the amended statement of defence nor has there been filed
any affidavit in opposition to that of Donald Marius Allison Macaulay
to which I have already referred. There has been no denial of this 5
very important allegation. In the circumstances I accept as a fact
that this is the case. It has not been contended that this resolution
is ultra vires Part 2 of Chapter IV of the Constitution. I hold that
the resolution does not contravene that part of the Constitution.
There is no evidence before me that the resolution contravened any 10
of the standing orders of Parliament. In the circumstances this
latter point does not arise for consideration. If the resolution is
constitutional, as I have already found, what are the duties of
Government in this regard? Surely it is to execute the resolution.
Has Government (meaning the executive) gone outside the resolution 15
in publishing the White Paper set out in para. 2 of the amended
statement of defence and setting up the committee (which I shall
hereafter refer to as "the one-party committee") with the terms of
reference already set out above? I do not think so. It is my
considered view that the steps taken by Government were quite 20
proper and lawful. I also consider the terms of reference of the
committee quite in place. It must not be overlooked that the
decision of Parliament was-"that Government give serious con
sideration to the introduction of a One Party System of government
in this country." Government in executing the duty cast upon it 25
by Parliament was bound to do so in accordance with the tenor and
spirit of Parliament's decision. I find no substance in this com-
plaint of the plaintiffs-respondents.
I now come to the point of law raised in para. 7 of the amended
statement of defence. This point of law, as I understand it, is : 30
Are there in the indorsement on the writ of summons and/ or in the
amended statement of claim any allegations of material facts showing
that as a result of the action complained of any of the provisions
of ss. 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the Constitution has been, is being or
is likely to be contravened in relation to the plaintiffs-respondents? 35
Sections 12 to 23 inclusive of the Constitution comprise what I
shall call the protected freedoms, that is to say, the fundamental
rights of individuals protected by the Constitution. Section 24 of the
Constitution sets out the provisions for the enforcement of these
rights in case of any contravention or the likelihood of any such 40
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THE AFIUCAN LAW REPORTS
contravention. It is a long section but I think it is necessary that I
set it out in full. The section states :
"24. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this
section, if any person alleges that any of the provisions of
5 sections 12 to 23 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been, is
being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then,
without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same
matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to
the Supreme Court for redress.
10 (2) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
(a) to hear and determine any application made by any
person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section; and
(b) to determine any question arising in the case of any
person which is referred to it in pursuance of subsection (3)
15 thereof,
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such
directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of
enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions
of the said sections 12 to 23 (inclusive) to the protection of
20 which the person concerned is entitled:
Provided that the Supreme Court shall not exercise its
powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate
means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have
been available to the person concerned under any other law.
25 (3) If in any proceedings in any court other than the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal any question arises
as to the contravention of any of the provisions of the said
sections 12 to 23 (inclusive), the person presiding in that court
may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests,
30 refer the question to the Supreme Court unless in his opinion
the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.
(4) Any person aggrieved by any determination of the
Supreme Court under this section may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeal.
35 (5) No appeal shall lie from any determination under this
section that any application or the raising of any question is
merely frivolous or vexatious.
(6) Parliament may make provision, or may authorise the
making of provision, with respect to the practice and procedure
40 of any court for the purposes of this section and may confer
upon that court such powers, or may authorise the conferment
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STEELE v. ATT.-GEN., 1967-68 ALR S.L. 1
thereon of such powers, in addition to those conferred by this
section as may appear to be necessary or desirable for the
purpose of enabling that court more effectively to exercise
the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section.
S.C.
(7) During the period of two years beginning with the 5
commencement of this Constitution, nothing contained in any
law made before that commencement shall be held to be incon-
sistent with any of the said sections 12 to 23 (inclusive); and
nothing done during that period under the authority of any
such law shall be held to be done in contravention of any of 10
those sections."
Let me say at once that sub-s.(7) does not apply to this matter.
By O.II, r.1 of our Supreme Court Rules, the indorsement on a
writ of summons should state the nature of the claim made or the
relief or the remedy required in the action. By O.XVI, r.5 of the 15
same rules every pleading (and this includes a statement of claim)
should contain a statement of the material facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defence.
In an action of this nature s.24 of the Constitution requires
that the plaintiffs-respondents must allege that one or other of the 20
provisions of the Constitution (namely ss. 12 to 23) has been, or
is being, or is likely to be, contravened in relation to them. Now,
what does s.24(1) of the Constitution mean? This question is
relevant because it is my view that on a proper reading of s.24(1)
of the Constitution and O.II, r.1 and O.XVI, r.5 of our Supreme 25
Court Rules, already referred to above, the plaintiffs-respondents
must allege material facts on which they rely to show that any of
the provisions of ss. 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the Constitution has been,
or is being, or is likely to be, contravened in relation to them. In
my considered opinion, what the section means is this: To entitle 30
a person to invoke the judicial power of this court, that person must
show by allegations of material fact in his pleadings that as a result of
the legislative or executive acts complained of he has sustained, or is
sustaining, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury,
and this injury is not one of a general nature common to all 35
members of the public.
In arriving at this opinion I am guided by a number of legal
authorities including the Australian case of Att.-Gen. for Australia v.
Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. (1) cited with approval by the
Privy Council in the Nigerian case of Balewa v. Doherty (2), the 40
Maltese case of Olivier v. Buttigieg (5) (another decision of the Privy
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20
25
30
35
40
THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Council) and two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
of America, namely, Massachusetts v. Mellon (4) and Ex p. Levitt (3).
All these authorities lay down what I consider to be a sound and
sensible proposition of law (and, in fairness to Mr. Smythe, he did
concede this in the course of his learned arguments). I have carefully
perused the indorsement on the writ of summons and the amended
statement of claim. Nowhere do I find any allegation which falls
within this requirement. In my view the possible threat alleged
in the amended statement of claim merely shows a likelihood of the
plaintiffs-respondents suffering as a result of the executive acts com
plained of in some indefinite way in common with other people
generally. This in law is insufficient to entitle the plaintiffs
respondents properly to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. I
therefore hold in the circumstances that the purported invocation
of the jurisdiction of the court under s.24 of the Constitution by
the plaintiffs-respondents is wrong.
The rulings I have made in this decision substantially dispose
of the main action. With regard to the first part of the motion,
suffice it to say that there were substantial points of law involved
requiring an interpretation of the Constitution.
The result is that the motion succeeds. The main action hereby
stands dismissed. The plaintiffs-respondents are hereby ordered to
pay to the defendants-applicants the costs of the motion and that of
the main action, such costs to be taxed.
Order accordingly.
MACAULAY v. MACAULAY
SuPREME CoURT (Cole, Ag. C.J.): January 4th, 1967
(Divorce Case No. 27 /66)
[1] Family Law-divorce-condonation-evidence-forgiveness, cohabi
tation and sexual intercourse: Where a matrimonial offence is forgiven
and remitted by the injured spouse and the parties cohabit and have
sexual intercourse, the offence is condoned (page 18, lines 32-39).
[2] Family Law-divorce-condonation-revival of condoned offence
-cruelty revived by great unkindness: Condoned cruelty may be
revived by an act or acts of great unkindness (page 19, lines 9-10).
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