Serwah and Another v Mirekua (SUIT NO.H1/104/25) [2026] GHACA 12 (28 May 2026)

JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL SEKONDI, 2026 CORAM SAMUEL OBENG-DIAWUO, J.A (PRESIDING) BARIMA YAW KODIE OPPONG, J.A FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A SUIT NO.H1/104/25 28TH MAY, 2026 1. JANET SERWAH 2. BENEDICTA ASANTE --------- PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS VERSUS ABENA MIREKU (SUBST. BY EFUA ATTA PANYIN) -------- DEFENDANT/APPELLANT JUDGMENT FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A: 1.0 General Overview This appeal emanates from the decision of the High Court delivered on 16/01/2025. At the heart of this case is the fundamental question: who owns the JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 2 two properties in contention? This Court has been summoned to determine which of the two opposing parties the evidence of ownership of the properties sway in their favour. Joseph L. Baron noted in his book, A Treasury of Jewish Quotations, 1956, that: “Where there is room for question, something is wrong” 2.1 Plaintiffs/Respondents’ Case (“Respondents”) Following a caveat filed by the Appellant in the Court below against the grant of letters of administration to the Respondents, the Respondents instituted an action against the Appellant claiming: “a. A declaration that House No. 222C, North Ola, Cape Coast and House Number/plots B.29 Siwdu Estate is the bonafide/personal property of the deceased Samuel Kwabena Asante. b. An order directed at the Defendant to account for all rent received from House No. 222C to the Plaintiffs. c. An order directed at the Lands Commission to expunge from their records any purported registration dated 9th December 1988 between Samuel K. Asante and Madam Abena Mirekuwa and a conveyance dated 28th October, 2017 between Madam Abena Mirekuwa and Madam Grace Asante. d. Recovery of possession of disputed houses. e. Perpetual injunctions restraining the Defendant, her agents, assigns, family members, privies from interfering with the disputed houses. f. Cost in instituting this action.” The Respondents are the surviving spouse and daughter of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. It is their case that the late Samuel Kwabena Asante died intestate on 15/06/2011 and left behind properties including a 0.74-acre land JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 3 situate at H/No. 222C North Ola, Cape Coast, on which a four (4) bedroom house stands (the “North Ola property”) and H/No. Block 19 Siwdu Estate, Cape Coast (the “Siwdu property”), which is a one-bedroom self-contained property. Upon the death of Samuel Kwabena Asante, the Respondents applied for letters of administration, but a caveat was entered by the Appellant, Abena Mirekuwa who was the late mother of Samuel Kwabena Asante, claiming the afore-mentioned properties as her personal property and family property respectively, and not the personal properties of the late Samuel KwabenaAsante. It is the case of the Respondents that after the first Respondent met the late Samuel Kwabena Asante sometime in 1974, they got married and had their first child in 1980. Subsequently, the Appellant brought into the marriage eight (8) children from different sources to live with them in their rented chamber-and-hall apartment situate at Master Sam area, Cape Coast. All the dependents were maintained by the first Respondent and her late husband. Due to the increased size of the family, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante purchased four (4) plots of land from one Kojo Abaka in 1983, which was duly registered at the Lands Commission as No. CCT 445 A/83. To avoid encroachments, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante went into effective occupation and control of the land by engaging a security man to watch over the acquired land. The deceased further procured a building permit in his own name. With financial assistance from the first Respondent, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante commenced the construction of a four-bedroom house on the land while the family continued to live in the rented apartment at Master Sam. The Respondents further averred that during the lifetime of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante, he was engaged in transport business and supplied building materials to PWD and other institutions. As the sole breadwinner of his extended JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 4 family, he maintained the Appellant, his siblings and their dependents. His numerous responsibilities drained his finances to the extent that he could no longer complete his four-bedroom house. Consequently, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante gave the uncompleted building to one Mr. Kwesi Edumadze Etrue to complete it. It was agreed that the cost incurred by Mr. Edumadze Etrue would be considered as rent. The said Mr. Edumadze Etrue therefore completed the property and occupied same, with his family, until his demise. According to the Respondents, after acquiring the North Ola property, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante was informed that one Isaac Tewell was disposing of his self-contained one-bedroom State Housing Company Limited property described as H/No. B 29 situate at Siwdu (Siwdu property). To reduce the congestion in their rented apartment at Master Sam , the first Respondent encouraged and supported the late Samuel Kwabena Asante to purchase the property so that the children could be relocated to occupy the said property. All eight children or dependents relocated to the property at Siwdu after the purchase. A search conducted at the Lands Commission in 2014 in respect of the North Ola property showed that the whole site was affected by a prior transaction, though particulars of that prior transaction were unclear due to faded records (Exhibit “D”). The Respondents therefore caused their lawyer to protest against the alleged fraudulent registration. However, the registration was effected in the Appellant’s name notwithstanding their protest, as a further search conducted on 08/02/2022 revealed that the site is affected by a conveyance dated 09/10/1988 between Samuel K. Asante and Madam Abena Mirekuwa and a portion marked A is attached by a conveyance da ted 28/10/2017 between Madam Abena Mirekuwa and Madam Grace Asante. The Respondents denied the claim of the Appellant and maintained that they are both the self-acquired properties of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante and therefore formed part of his estate. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 5 2.2 Defendant/Appellant’s Case (“Appellant”) The Appellant is the surviving mother of the deceased who died during the trial of this matter in the court below and was substituted by her customary successor and daughter, Efua Atta Panyin. She disputed the various claims by her sister-in- law and niece (the Respondents). According to her, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante was never the breadwinner for their mother, the late Abena Mirekuwa. The Appellant stated that her late brother worked in one of their mother’s two hardware shops at Zion Street, and therefore cannot be described as the ‘breadwinner’ of the family because it was his mother who owned and managed the business establishments that sustained the household. It was the case of the Appellant that her late mother, Abena Mirekuwa purchased the Siwdu Estate property from a man of Northern descent (a “Dagarti man”) at a time when the late Samuel Kwabena Asante, her brother, had been ejected from his rented accommodation at the Master Sam area, so he was permitted to temporarily occupy the said property. The Appellant added that Abena Mirekuwa, who was the mother of thirteen (13) children, had some of her children sleeping in an adjoining room at the Siwdu property which was originally a kitchen but subsequently converted into a bedroom while spending their days with their mother at her rented house near Zion Church. The Appellant emphasised that none of her mother’s children depended on the late Samuel Kwabena Asante for their upkeep. In respect of the North Ola property, the Appellant asserted that it was purchased and developed from the personal resources of the late Abena Mirekuwa with some assistance from all her children, including the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. At the time of acquisition, the documents were made in the name of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante because he was the eldest son and the most educated, so he held it in trust for her mother. To avoid any future litigation among the JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 6 siblings, the late Samuel Kwabena Asante transferred the property to her mother, the late Abena Mirekuwa, on 09/12/1988. The Appellant further stated that it was rather the late Abena Mirekuwa who gave the uncompleted property to Mr. Edumadze Etrue to develop in the year 2000. After the expiration of the rent, Mr. Edumadze Etrue executed a statutory declaration to depose to the agreement regarding the house. It was the Appellant’s case that her deceased mother, Abena Mirekuwa, thereupon took possession of the property by moving in until she died in 2021. The Appellant further asserted that the late Madam Abena Mirekuwa paid property rate in her name during her lifetime. In reply, the Respondents generally joined issue with the Appellant on her statement of claim. They, however, denied the assertion by the Appellant that their eight dependents were living with the late Abena Mirekuwa in her own house where the late Samuel Kwabena Asante had sought permission to live with the family. The Respondents maintained that out of the eight children living with them, four of them were store attendants working at Samuel Kwabena Asante’s plumbing shop, two were mechanic apprentices while one had formal education at a Technical Institute. 3.0 The Trial Court At the trial, the only issue which the trial court had to determine was whether the North Ola and Siwdu Estate properties were the bona fide properties of the deceased Samuel Kwabena Asante. The Appellant did not testify herself. By a power of attorney, she appointed her sister Abena Mansa to testify on her behalf. Abena Mansa tendered Exhibit 2A&2B which comprised a search report dated 31/03/2017 indicating that the JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 7 North Ola property was affected by a conveyance dated 09/12/1988 between the late Samuel Kwabena Asante and the late Abena Mirekuwa and registered with the Cape Coast Lands Commission. The property rate paid by the late Abena Mirekuwa in 2017 was produced as Exhibit 3. The statutory declaration executed by Mr. Edumadze Etrue was tendered as Exhibit 4. In the case of the Respondents, the second Respondent, Benedicta Asante testified for herself and on behalf of the first Respondent. She tendered in evidence the indenture dated 26/07/1983 between Kojo Abeka and the late Samuel Kwabena Asante registered at Cape Coast Lands Commission with registration No. CCT 445A/83 as Exhibit A. This was followed by Exhibit “B” Series in support of the payment of property rate in the name of the late Samuel Kwa bena Asante to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly in respect of the North Ola property between 2018 and 2022. The building permit dated 8/8/1983 obtained by the late Samuel Kwabena Asante in his name was tendered as Exhibit “C” Series. Exhibit D, dated 6/08/2014, pertained to the search conducted by the Respondents, which revealed that the entire site was affected by a transaction, but the particulars of the transaction were unclear due to the faded nature of the records. The Respondents’ lawyer’s letter dated 7/08/2014 to the Cape Coast Regional Lands Officer to prevent fraudulent registration regarding the property of the late Asante was produced as Exhibit E. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 8 Exhibit “F” Series dated 23/09/1983 was produced in support of documentation in respect of the Siwdu property in favour of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. Exhibit “G” Series was tendered in support of the payment of ground rents and property rates to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly in the name of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. Exhibit H dated 24/ 05/2012 was a confirmation letter issued by the then Zonal Director of State Housing Company Limited to the Commercial Manager of Electricity Company of Ghana at the time that the late Samuel Kwabena Asante had purchased House No. B. 29 Siwdu Estate from State Housing Company Limited. The second Respondent further produced Exhibit 1 series in support of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante’s company Samsant Construction Works and the payments of his tax liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service (now GRA). Kwabena Akoto, who was a neighbour of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante and Francis P. Addo, a professional plumber , both testified in favour of the Respondents. 4.0 Decision of the Court At the end of the trial, the High Court entered judgment in favour of the Respondents for all the reliefs except relief (b) since no evidence was adduced in respect of that relief. The Court held that the Plaintiffs had satisfactorily proven their case on the balance of probabilities. Accordingly, the North Ola and Siwdu properties were declared as the bona fide or personal properties of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante; therefore, upon the death intestate, the properties devolved onto the Respondents. The court ordered the Respondents to recover possession of the properties and perpetually restrained the Appellant, her agents, assigns, family JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 9 members and privies from interfering with the disputed properties in any way. Dissatisfied with the decision of the court below, the Appellant lodged this instant appeal based on the grounds detailed in the notice of appeal. 5.0 Grounds of Appeal The Notice of Appeal explicitly states the following grounds of appeal: “a. That the judgment is against the weight of the evidence on record b. That the trial judge erred when he gave greater weight to the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ Exhibit B Series procured recently for the purpose of the litigation and without regard to the Defendant/Appellant’s Exhibit 3 and declared ownership of House No. 222C, North Ola, Cape Coast to Samuel Kwabena Asante. c. The trial judge erred in expunging the registration of 2A and 2B from the records of the Lands Commission. d. That the trial judge erred in law when he declared that House No. 222C, North Ola, Cape Coast and House Number/plots B 29 Siwdu Estate devolved exclusively unto the Plaintiffs/Respondents upon the death intestate of Samuel Kwabena Asante without regard to the protected legal interest of the Defendant/Appellant (Abena Mirekuwa, mother) in the estate of Samuel Kwabena Asante under Intestate Succession Act 1985, ( PNDCL 111). e. Other grounds of appeal may be filed upon receipt of a copy of the record of proceedings. 6.0 Applying the Law and Analysis Grounds (a) and (b) will be analysed together. This would be followed by ground (d), which is on a point of law. We note that the particulars of error or nature of JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 10 the error committed by the trial judge in respect of ground (c): “The trial judge erred in expunging the registration of 2A and 2B from the records of the Lands Commission.” has not been spelt out by the Appellant. The rules mandatorily require that particulars of alleged errors and the type of error are provided . A ground of appeal fails the competency test if it raises no clear grievance capable of review by an appellate court. Rule 8 (4) and (6) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) provide as follows: “(4) “Where the grounds of an appeal allege misdirection or error in law, particulars of the misdirection or error shall be clearly stated. (6) No ground which is vague or general in terms or which discloses no reasonable ground of appeal shall be permitted, except the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence; and any ground of appeal or any part of the appeal which is not permitted under this rule may be struck out by the Court of its own motion or on application by the respondent.” Amadu JSC fortified by the decision in International Rom Ltd v. Vodafone Ghana Ltd & 2 Others [2016] DLSC 2791 which observed that the magnanimity shown by the courts over some of the lapses and the flagrant violation of the rules of engagement is often taken as a sign of weakness, followed the same precedent by striking out the offending grounds of appeal as incompetent when he pronounced in the case of Empire Builders Limited v. Topkins Enterprises Ltd & 4 Others [2020] JELR 92050 (SC) that: “The proper formulation of grounds of appeal assists the court to clearly identify and situate the point of law or fact which the judgment appealed against is assailed … It is for this reason that the rules of the court require clarity where an Appellant alleges a misdirection or any error on the part of a Trial or JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 11 Appellate court to set out particulars of the said allegation. A ground of appeal that is not compliant with the above rules is incompetent.” We therefore strike out the ground of appeal that the trial judge erred in expunging the registration of 2A and 2B from the records of the Lands Commission as incompetent. See also Republic v. Conduah; Ex parte Aaba (Substituted by Asmah) [2013-14] 2 SCGLR 1032. The fifth ground that: “Other grounds of appeal may be filed upon receipt of a copy of the record of proceedings” is clearly not a ground of appeal. It is a mere safety net in procedural terms. The Record of Appeal does not show that additional grounds of appeal were subsequently filed by the Appellant. 6.1 Grounds (a) and (b). The omnibus ground that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence invokes the jurisdiction of this court to independently but comprehensively examine the totality of evidence and to explore whether the conclusion reached by the court below was supported by the evidence on record as espoused in the case Djin v. Musah Baako [2007-2008] 1SCGLR 686. The Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court the tirade of evidence on record which was erroneously applied against a particular party. In the case of Republic v. Conduah; Ex parte Aaba (Substituted by Asmah) (supra), holding two page 1034) was pronounced by the Court as follows: “The effect of an appeal on the ground that “the judgment is against the weight of evidence” was to give jurisdiction to the appellate court to examine the totality of the evidence before it and come to its own decision on the admitted and undisputed facts. In the instant case, the appellant, by that ground of appeal, was implying that there were pieces of evidence on record which, if applied properly JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 12 or correctly, could have changed the decision in his favour; or that certain pieces of evidence had been wrongly applied against him. The onus in such an instance was on the appellant to clearly and properly demonstrate to the appellate court the lapses in the judgment being appealed against.” An appeal to this Court is by way of rehearing as an appellate court is duty-bound to review the entire record of appeal. In giving out the specificities, the Supreme Court admonished the appellate court in the case of Tuakwa v. Bosom [2001- 2002] SCGLR 61 that: “… It is incumbent upon the appellate court, in a civil case, to analyse the entire record of appeal, take into account the testimonies and all documentary evidence adduced at the trial before arriving at its decision, so as to satisfy itself that, on a preponderance of probabilities, the conclusions of the trial judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence.” Re-examination of both the facts and law is obligatory but with utmost respect to the court below to avoid an imposition of the appellate court’s preferences on the court below. In this case, both parties are ad idem and do not doubt the authenticity of the registered North Ola property and the unstamped indenture in respect of Siwdu Estate property in the name of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante dated 26/07/1983 and 23/07/1983 respectively as the Respondents’ Exhibits “A” and “F” showed. The disagreement regarding these properties is that Abena Mirekuwa claims she purchased them but allowed her late son Samuel Kwabena Asante’s name to be used on the document covering the properties. In the case of the North Ola property, the Appellant argues that all her children, including the deceased, contributed to its acquisition. The Appellant admits that Exhibit “C” Series, JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 13 which is the building permit dated 8/8/1983 in respect of that property , was obtained by the late Samuel Kwabena Asante in his name. The Respondents, however, argue that both properties were funded by the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. Under Ghanaian jurisprudence, a party asserting ownership or title may only succeed in establishing the facts as to the root of title, mode of acquisition and acts of possession exercised over the subject matter of litigation on the balance of probabilities. See the cases of Mondial Veneer (Gh) Ltd v. Amuah Gyebu XV [2011] SCGLR 466, Akoto v. Kavege (1985) JELR 69286 (CA) and Tetteh & Another v. Hayford (Substd. by Larbi & Decker) [2012] 1 SCGLR 417. Ownership of land in Ghana is thus established through valid grants, conveyances and registration under the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036). Property rate receipts may be used as corroborative evidence to establish ownership. Payment of property rates, utility bills and the like strengthen claims of possession and recognition by the local assembly and authorities, but they do not by themselves establish legal title which requires a higher degree of proof. Claimants must therefore produce valid title documents. The kernel of the Appellant’s case as argued by her lawyer in his address to the court below at page 168 of the Record of Appeal (ROA) is that: “… Samuel Kwabena Asante held the North Ola property as a trustee for his mother, Abena Mirekuwa, the original defendant in this suit.” The Appellant contends that Abena Mirekuwa bought the land and built the property from her own resources as well as the support from all her children, including the Appellant’s lawful attorney and their late brother, Samuel Kwabena Asante. The rules of evidence put the primary burden on the one asserting a fact to prove that fact by adducing cogent evidence in support of the facts alleged. Pursuant to JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 14 section 14 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), this burden is not static or fixed; therefore, a party asserting a contrary position will be tasked to adduce evidence in support of that position even if that party does not have a counterclaim. This has been enunciated in the case of Bank of West Africa Ltd v Ackum [1963]1GLR 179. In, In re Ashalley Botwe Lands; Adjetey Agbosu v. Kotey [2003-2004] SCGLR 420, it was held in holding (5) that: “It is trite learning that by the statutory provisions of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323), the burden of producing evidence in any given case is not fixed, but shifts from party to party at various stages of the trial, depending on the issues asserted”. Section 12 of NRCD 323 establishes the standard of proof in civil cases, which is proof by a preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, once the Plaintiff can adduce evidence to meet his primary burden, the burden shifts to the Defendant to disprove the assertions made against him to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the claims by the Plaintiff. In determining the weight of documentary evidence as against oral evidence, the courts have stated in numerous cases such as Republic v. Nana Akuamoah Boateng II, Ex parte Dansoah [1982-83] 2 GLR 913, Akosua Dufie & Anor v. Amma Fosua & Anor [2009] SCGLR 310 and Atadi v. Ladzekpo [1981] GLR 218 that documentary evidence should prevail over oral evidence. In the case of Guardian Assurance v. Kyat Trading Store [1972] 2 GLR 48 at 55, Amissah J.A. held that: “… the supportive evidence of an opponent is as strong as the documentary evidence of the other party in proof of the latter’s case.” JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 15 In this case, the Respondents posited that Samuel Kwabena Asante was a well- educated man who started his career as a principal teacher, then became a civil engineer and a contractor. He was wealthy and the breadwinner of his family. This fact was admitted by the Appellant’s witness under cross-examination that his brother was the most educated among the siblings. The second Respondent produced Exhibit 1 series in support of their assertions. Exhibit 1 series showed the late Samuel Kwabena Asante’s business, Samsant Construction Works and the payments of his tax liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service (now GRA). Samuel Kwabena Asante registered his business as a sole proprietor in 1988, as the date of commencement of the business was given as 19/08/1988. The nature of the business was building construction, plumbing and civil works. Evidence that he was a contractor whose business was awarded contracts from time to time was clear in a letter dated 30/09/2005 by the Cape Coast Regional Engineer addressed to him as the ‘Managing Director’ of Samsant Construction Works and two other recipients. However, there is no evidence on record to show that Samuel Kwabena Asante at a point converted his business into a limited liability company. There is also in that bundle of evidence an unsigned letter dated 25/07/1990 showing that his business, which was registered with the Ministry of Works and Housing, solicited for contract works within its stated classification from PWD. In 1997, his business was classified as General Building Contractors to the Government of Ghana in category “D”; the company’s financial class for that year was “D3” with a stated range from “₵150M to 500M”. (See ROA 102) This financial range fell in the year 2001. (See ROA 103). This Exhibit was admitted without any challenge. Appellant’s counsel failed to cross-examine the second Respondent in respect of this Exhibit. Counsel chose to focus on the alleged impoverished state of Samuel Kwabena Asante at the time of acquisition of the North Ola Property in 1983 , which the witness denied JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 16 emphatically. Under cross-examination by Counsel for the Appellant at page 109 -110 of the ROA, the following ensued: “Q: The land at Ola was financed by Samuel Kwabena Asante himself (sic) but rather his mother, Abena Mirekuwa? A: Not true Q: Are you aware that your father worked with his mother in hardware business in Cape Coast here? A: Not true. My father dealt with plumbing materials. He was a Civil Engineer and a Contractor. The construction firm is known as Samsant Construction Ltd. Q: I am putting it to you that before you were born, your father worked with his mother in the Hardware business? A: Not true … Q: Your father worked with his mother because of his educational background to assist in the clerical works? A: Not true. He was a principal teacher first.” The Respondents’ lawyer rather sought to cross-examine the Appellant’s attorney on Exhibit 1 series. This is what ensued under cross-examination (pages 125-126 of the ROA): “Q: You will recall during (sic) the life of your deceased brother Kwabena Asante he was into transport business and supply of building materials to Government Trust Advocate individuals? A: He is not the only one; there were four (4) who were doing the business. Managing Director Samuel Kwabena Asante, Directors – F.A. Ansah, Daniel Bekye and Emmanuel Agyekum … JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 17 Q: You also recall that during the existence of your brother Kwabena Asante, he registered a company (sic) Samsant Construction Works? A: Yes. They were four (4) boys which belong to our mother. Q: Your answer that it was formed by four (4) boys is false? A: It is true.” Indeed, the answer that Samsant Construction Works is a limited liability company formed by four (4) persons is not supported by the evidence. The Appellant failed to adduce evidence in support that the late Samuel Kwabena Asante was a man of straw, who could not acquire any property in his lifetime without the support of Abena Mirekuwa, his late mother. Furthermore, Kwabena Akoto, who was a neighbour of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante and had known him since 1983, also served as the Respondents’ witness. He testified that the deceased used to engage him as a worker anytime he secured a sub-contract for the construction of buildings. According to him, the deceased was an affluent man who operated transport businesses, owned trading stores and was also a contractor. He reiterated that he was not working for his mother and that he did not know the said mother. Kwabena Akoto’s evidence was not controverted under cross-examination by the Appellant’s counsel. At pages 115- 116 of the Record of Appeal, he was cross-examined as follows: Q: You got to know Samuel Kwabena Asante during his childhood, is that correct? A: No. I got to know him in 1983 when he came to live at Satellite 91 Q: At the time you met Kwabena Asante he was working with his mother at the hardware shop at Kotokraba near Zion Church, is that so? A: I don’t know his mother, I only knew Mr. Asante. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 18 Q: I am putting it to you that as at 1983 when you first met Kwabena Asante, the said Kwabena Asante was working in his mother’s hardware shop near Zion Church, Kotokraba? A: I only knew Mr. Asante was settling items but I don’t know the mother. Q: I further put it to you that Kwabena Asante’s mother, Abena Mirekuwa was the owner of the Hardware shop and she was selling plumbing materials where Kwabena Asante worked? A: I don’t know his mother, I know Mr. Asante was the only one who dealt in Hardware”. At page 118 of the ROA the cross -examination of Kwamina Akoto by the Appellant’s counsel continued: Q: I put it to you that the deceased Kwabena Asante was not a wealthy man as you have told the Court? A: I know he is a wealthy man. Mr. Kwabena Asante had two (2) urban buses. He was also a contractor. He had a lot of money.” (Emphasis mine) When the evidential burden fell on the Appellant, she could not produce any witness apart from her attorney and her sister to rebut the evidence that Samuel Kwabena Asante was a man of straw who was dependent on his late mother; consequently, he could not have acquired the properties in dispute. At page 9 of the Record of Appeal, the Appellant partly admitted paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim that after the birth of their first child, Abena Mirekuwa brought into their marriage children from different sources to live with them at their rented chamber and hall apartment in the Master Sam area in Cape Coast. In response to the said paragraph 8, the Appellant explicitly stated that: “… some of the children mentioned were the children of the deceased defendant and the children were working for Abena Mirekuwa in her hardware stores but JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 19 slept in Abena Mirekuwa’s own house where the 1st Plaintiff’s husband had sought permission to live in with the family.” (Emphasis mine) The debasing of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante by his own family is either telling, or perhaps the Appellant got the issues confused. Is the Appellant suggesting that Samuel Kwabena Asante’s rented chamber and hall apartment at Master Sam area was also financed by her late mother, Abena Mirekua? The Respondents contended in paragraph 8 of their Statement of Claim (ROA page 4), that early in their marriage, the deceased Appellant ( Abena Mirekuwa) brought into the said marriage children from different sources to live with them at their chamber and hall rented apartment at Master Sam area. This averment was partly admitted by the Appellant at paragraph 5 of her Statement of Defence (ROA page 9) and specifically responded to at paragraph 6 that some of the children were that of Abena Mirekuwa and that, they were working for her in her stores “but slept in Abena Mirekuwa’s own house where the 1 st plaintiff’s husband had sought permission to live in with the family.” The referenced apartment is the one situate at Master Sam Area, which the Appellant contends that it is rather Samuel Kwabena Asante, who sought permission to live there with the family. However, when the Respondents contended at paragraph 10 of their Statement of Claim (page 4 of ROA) that the eight children of Abena Mirekuwa namely, “Yaw Nkrumah, Kofi Boakye, Kofi Akodi, Kwabena Ampaw, Kwabena Mensah, Kwesi Owusu, Yaw Oteng and Kwesi Nti” (Emphasis mine) were all dependent on the 1st Respondent and her husband Samuel Kwabena Asante, a different response was proffered. The Appellant responded at paragraph 8 of her Statement of Defence (page 10 of ROA) that it was only at the time when Samuel Kwabena Asante was ejected from his rented room at Master Sam that Abena Mirekuwa permitted him to move into the Swidu property. This is an admission that the JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 20 apartment at Master Sam Area was indeed rented by the 1st Respondent and her husband, Samuel Kwabena Asante. At page 118 of the ROA is the further cross-examination of Kwamina Akoto by the Appellant’s counsel who was quizzed as follows: “Q: I finally put it to you that because Abena Mirekuwa was the beneficiary owner that is why her children occupied the building at Siwdu with Kwabena Asante? (Emphasis mine) A: The names I mentioned, they were brought in by Kwabena Asante. He catered for them.” If being a beneficiary owner, qualifies you to bring any person to stay with the person you have put in occupation of your property, then Samuel Kwabena Asante had a very big heart to have accommodated and cared for all eight (8) children brought in by her mother, Abena Mirekua to live with his young family in his rented room at Master Sam area, a fact admitted by the Appellant. Counsel for the Appellant bemoaned in his address to this Court (see pages 9-10, paragraph 26) that the learned trial judge spent a lot of time discussing resulting trust due to the Appellant’s pleadings and quoted the trial judge’s exposition on it extensively, arguing as follows at paragraph 28: “ … it is our contention that the learned trial judge misdirected himself by discussing resulting trust and holding that the defendant relied on resulting trust to claim ownership of House number 222C, North OLA, Cape Coast. In fact, the defendant did not only rely on resulting trust but a positive act of transfer of the ownership of House number 222C, North OLA, Cape Coast to the deceased defendant, Abena Mirekuwa.” (Emphasis mine) JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 21 To the extent that Counsel for Appellant admits that the Appellant relied partly on resulting trust, we will spend some time examining the scope of this principle of law and whether a settlor, in this case Abena Mirekuwa, was required by law to repurchase her own property at the extortionate price of thirty thousand cedis (₵30,000) from Samuel Kwabena Asante, her trustee , as evidenced by the Appellant’s exhibit 2A and 2B. The learned trial judge did not misdirect himself by discussing the presumption of resulting trust. The facts of this case called for a discussion of this presumption. Generally, a private express trust can only be validly created in law if three conditions are simultaneously present and met, to wit: certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter and certainty of objects. In the locus classicus case of Knight v Knight [1840] 49 ER 58, Lord Langdale MR identified these three certainties which must be satisfied before a court will acknowledge that a private express trust exists. He explained these as certainty of intention to create a trust, certainty as to the subject of the trust , and certainty as to the objectives (beneficiaries or purposes) of the trust. The concept of resulting trust only comes into play where a trust is not validly declared or created. It is regarded as arising from the presumed unexpressed or implied intention of the settlor or the true purchaser. It may arise in several situations. For instance, where one person purchases property in the name of another, where an express trust fails or is invalidly constituted, or where one person is induced to expend money on the property of another without intending a loan or gift. The learned author Yaw D. Oppong in his book “Contemporary Trends in the Law of Immovable Property in Ghana ” published by Black Mask Ltd, 2022 JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 22 (second edn), chapter 6 part V page 700 explained the principle of resulting trust citing Jamie Glister. “Is There a Presumption of Advancement” Sydney Law Review 33 (2011) at 39 as follows: “It is argued that generally when a donor purchases property in the name of a recipient, or transfers property to a recipient, equity usually applies a presumption of resulting trust. It presupposes that the default position involves the recipient holding property in trust for the donor. In some instances, the relationship of the parties means that a presumption of advancement applies and he is assumed to be the full legal owner rather than a trustee.” He further quoted Professor Chambers’ explanation of resulting trust at page 708 that: “A resulting trust arises when a person makes …a disposition of property under circumstances that raise the inference that he or she did not intend to give the transferee the beneficial interest in the property.” See Robert Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 19-27. Therefore, to rebut the presumption, the recipient must show that the transferor did, in fact, intend to benefit them. He referred to the rationale behind the principles of advancement and resulting trust as elucidated by Lord Upjohn in the English case of Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] AC 777 at 816 that: “ … these presumptions were invented because that represented the common sense of the matter and what the parties, had they thought about it, would have intended.” At pages 701-702 the learned author further explains that the presumption of resulting trust can be rebutted by contrary evidence. Quoting Alysia Blackham, ‘The Presumption of Advancement: A Lingering Shadow in UK Law?’ Trusts & Trustees 21, No. 7 (2015): 786-801, he noted: “… Thus it is best regarded as a JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 23 rule of evidence that shifts the burden of proof in certain cases: it is a circumstance of evidence which may rebut the presumption of resulting trust.” (Emphasis mine) Thus, where property is purchased in the name of another person, as in this case, there is a resulting trust in favour of the one who paid the purchase price, unless it was intended as an advancement, a gift or a loan. See Dyer v. Dyer [1788] EWHC Exch. 58, In Re Sasu (Deceased); Sasu v. Twum [1976] 1 GLR 23 and Akufo-Addo v. Cathline [1992] 1 GLR 377. The Supreme Court in the case of In Re Koranteng (Dec’d): Addo v. Koranteng & Ors. [2005-2006] SCGLR 1039, held in holding (3) of the headnotes that: “In essence a resulting trust was a legal presumption made by the law to the effect that where a person had bought property in the name of another, that other person would be deemed to hold the property in trust for the true purchaser. It was a trust implied by equity in favour of the true purchaser… Thus for a resulting trust to be established there had to be proof that the purchase money for the disputed property had been advanced by the beneficiary of the resulting trust.” (Mine emphasis) See also BJ da Rocha & CHK Lodoh’s Ghana Land Law and Conveyancing (2nd Edn). (Mine emphasis) In the case before us, the Respondents provided both documentary and oral testimonies to show that Samuel Kwabena Asante was in a position to have acquired the disputed properties as discussed above. The Appellant failed to discharge the burden of persuasion that Abena Mirekuwa advanced monies to Samuel Kwabena Asante for the purchase of the disputed properties. The Appellant in this case could not disprove the assertions made by the Respondents’ witnesses. None of the purported signatories to the Appellant’s Exhibit 4 (statutory declaration) testified on her behalf in respect of the North Ola property. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 24 As the Supreme Court held in the case of Akosua Dufie & Anor v. Amma Fosua & Anor (supra), credible documentary evidence and overt acts of ownership have greater weight over conflicting and uncorroborated oral evidence. I find the Appellant in great want on both scores. Throwing the purported Exhibit 4 in evidence without more is insufficient to make one’s case in this context. The record does not support a finding that the purchase prices of the properties were advanced by Abena Mirekuwa. It bears noting that the Appellant could not, in the whole of Cape Coast, where the late Abena Mirekuwa settled with her husband and birthed the late Samuel Kwabena Asante, could not find a single witness in the form of neigbour, relative s, friend or worker to rebut the Respondents’ claims apart from the testimony of DWI (the attorney), who was also the alleged sister of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante that their mother, Abena Mirekuwa was the rich hardware dealer who advanced the purchase prices of the properties. Having failed to produce relevant evidence that the purchase money for the disputed properties was advanced by the Appellant, the principle of resulting trust was not established in this case. The learned trial Judge did not therefore err when he concluded that both properties were the personal properties of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. The Appellant further contends that the trial court was in error in giving greater weight to the Respondents’ Exhibit B series, which was procured recently for litigation and without regard to the Appellant’s Exhibit 3 and declared ownership of the North Ola property to Samuel Kwabena Asante. The Respondents’ Exhibit “B” Series was the payment of property rate in the name of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly in respect of the North Ola property between 2018 and 2022. The Appellant’s Exhibit “3” was property rate paid by the late Abena Mirekuwa in 2012. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 25 As explained, payment of property rates is not a substitute for the official and mandatory registration of land ownership through the appropriate institutions in Ghana. It only assists in substantiating ownership claims, particularly when the payment requests are issued in the name of the bona fide owner. Payment of property rates is often used as evidence of occupation or possession, but it is not conclusive proof of ownership of land or property. The courts have consistently held that while property rate receipts can support a claim of possession and in some cases ownership, they do not by themselves establish legal title since Assemblies usually collect rates from occupiers, not necessarily owners. Nonetheless, in practice, a Municipal or District Assembly would not by law merely grant a building permit when the developer has not demonstrated ownership of the land in question. In any case, having issued the permit, by section 37 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), the law presumes regularity with official acts. Thus, the law presumes that the issuing authority complied with the law and omitted no procedure in the issuance of the permit to the owner of the property. In this case, the trial court found that the property rates tendered in evidence by the Respondents as Exhibit B series revealed that the late Samuel Kwabena Asante never made any payment of property rates in his lifetime in respect of the two properties in contention. All the payments regarding property rates were made after his demise in 2011. However, the evidence established that every bill relating to property rates regarding the two properties was issued in his name and addressed to him. All these findings were supported by the evidence on record. In further proof of their assertions, at page 66 of the ROA, the Respondents procured a letter signed by the Metropolitan Coordinator Director, Simon Gavor, on behalf of the Metropolitan Chief Executive, confirming that per the Assembly’s records, bills on both disputed properties have always been addressed to Samuel Kwabena Asante. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 26 Juxtaposing this with the Appellant’s Exhibit 3, which refers to the one-off payment of property rate in the name of Abena Mirekuwa for the year 2012 in respect of only the North Ola property, which side will the weight of persuasion fall? When D.W.1 was quizzed under cross-examination, she explained at page 131of the Record of Appeal as follows: “Q: You have attached Exhibit 3 being a property rate, a receipt from Abena Mirekuwa. Were you given a bill before you went to pay for the property? A: I am not the one who paid for the bills. It was my father who lived in the house who was paying for the bills. I went through my mother’s things to get it.” Exhibits 2A and 2B comprise a search report dated 31/03/2017 indicating that the North Ola property is affected by a deed of conveyance dated 09/12/1988 between the late Samuel Kwabena Asante and the late Abena Mirekuwa and registered with the Cape Coast Lands Commission evidencing the conveyance of the property to Abena Mirekuwa for the valuable consideration of thirty thousand cedis (₵30,000). Exhibit “2B” in particular had two indentures: a typed copy of the indenture and a purported original indenture executed between Samuel Kwabena Asante as vendor and Abena Mirekuwa as purchaser. The trial court correctly found that the recitals in the two instruments were poles apart; hence, the typed copy could not be a replica of the purported original copy inserted in the said Exhibit 2B. Additionally, the court rightfully made the following findings using the principles and the evidence on record as follows: - The purported registration was effected based on the typed copy. - Although the typed copy was submitted to the Lands Commission in 2016 for stamping and registration, the purported original is not stamped, nor does it bear the stamp of the Land Registry of Cape Coast, and therefore JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 27 the purported original instrument embedded in the stamped “typed copy” is inadmissible. - Exhibit 2B had no signature or mark contained therein and would not pass for stamping and registration, as the absence of the signature of the transferor, particularly, is key. - Under section 20 (c) of the repealed Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), the law applicable to the registration of deeds at the time the documents were presented to the Lands Commission, the Registrar had the discretion to refuse registration of an instrument affecting land, if the instrument flouted the law, or was null and void by virtue of any enactment as in this case. (currently section 223 (c) of the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036) - The purported original did not also have the recitals in the typed copy , including the deed of conveyance dated 08/05/1957 and the deed of exchange dated 10/10/1963. - The court, cognisant of the wrongful registration, “cannot allow same to stand. The registration on the basis of the typed copy was clearly done in error and ought to be expunged.” The principle is that registration confers indefeasible title, but it is not absolute. Fundamental defects can justify cancellation of a certificate. Such fundamental defects include fraud or misrepresentation, mistake or error in registration due to prior notice of ownership or possession and lack of a valid root of title may lead to the land title certificate being set aside and invalidated. In Ghana, although a Land Title Certificate issued under the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152) and now governed by the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036) is strong evidence of ownership, it can still be successfully challenged and expunged, cancelled or set aside by the courts or the Lands Commission in limited circumstances. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 28 Thus, the concept of indefeasibility of title (via land title certificate) is not even absolute and is subject to the equitable doctrines as well as other considerations as spelt out above. A number of Supreme Court decisions support this principle: Amuzu v. Oklikah [1998-99] SCGLR 141, Western Hardwood Enterprises Ltd. v. West African Enterprises Ltd. [1997-1998] 1 GLR 645, Brown v. Quarshigah [2003-2004] SCGLR 930 and Rosina Aryee v. Shell Ghana Ltd. (2015) JELR 68960 SC. The trial court was right in expunging the registration of exhibits “2A” and “2B” from the records of the Lands Commission given the findings made as enumerated above. The Courts exist to balance the principle of indefeasibility with equity and justice. In respect of the Siwdu property, the trial judge further made the following correct findings: - The court rejected the Respondents’ Exhibit F2 (of the Exhibit F series) which was an indenture dated 23/07/1983 between Isaac Tewell and Samuel Kwabena Asante as inadmissible on the basis that it failed to comply with section 14 (5) of the repealed Stamp Act, 1965 ( Act 310) in force at the time. - Exhibit F, which is a letter signed by E.A. Kyei, the Regional Manager for the State Housing Corporation and addressed to the late Samuel K. Asante confirmed that the said property registered in the name of Isaac Tewell has been transferred to Samuel Kwabena Asante. - The receipt evidencing part payment made by Samuel Kwabena Asante in respect of the property exhibited as F6. - Exhibits G5, G6, G7 and G8 9 further establish that during and after the lifetime of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante, bills for ground rents were issued in his name as the owner of the property. - On the balance of probabilities, the property was self-acquired by Samuel Kwabena Asante. JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 29 These findings are supported both in evidence and in law. At page 116 of the ROA, the cross-examination of the Respondents’ witness, Kwamina Akoto by the Appellant’s counsel was unimpeached: “Q: I further put it to you that the acquisition of the Siwdu property that Kwame lived in his lifetime was financed by Abena Mirekuwa his mother? A: I don’t know the mother, but Mr. Asante informed me he has bought a property at Siwdu. I was one of them who constructed the kitchen and toilet.” 6.2 Grounds (d) The Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in law when he declared that the North Ola and Siwdu Estate properties devolved exclusively unto the Plaintiffs/Respondents upon the death intestate of Samuel Kwabena Asante without regard to the protected legal interest of the Defendant/Appellant (Abena Mirekuwa, mother) in the estate of Samuel Kwabena Asante under the Intestate Succession Act 1985 (PNDCL 111). At page 188 of the ROA, the holding by the trial judge in his judgment was as follows: “On the totality of the evidence, the Plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven their case on the balance of probabilities. Judgment is accordingly entered in favour of the Plaintiffs for all reliefs sought save relief (b) as no evidence was adduced in that regard to merit such order. House No. 222C, North Ola, Cape Coast and House Number/plots B 29 Siwdu Estate are hereby declared as the bona fide or personal properties of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. “Upon his death intestate, these properties accordingly devolved onto the Plaintiffs .”(His emphasis) JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 30 Counsel for the Appellant argues that the conclusion reached by the learned Judge is not the correct position of the law, given that on the death intestate of a person, the devolution of the intestate properties has been statutorily prescribed under the Intestate Succession Act, 1985 (PNDCL 111). Therefore, Samuel Kwabena Asante, having predeceased his late mother, the deceased Appellant had an interest in the residue of his estate. The trial judge was therefore in error in ordering that the Respondents should recover possession of both properties. The above statement made by the trial judge in his holding was needless, and it is hereby set aside. However, to be fair, the Appellant has taken the statement out of context. In any case, on what basis was the trial judge expected to wade into the devolution of the properties of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante when it was not one of the triable issues before the court? The sole issue or question before the court at page 13 of the ROA was whether the property PLT 445/83 with House number 222 C North Ola, Cape Coast and House Number Plots B 29 Siwdu Estate were the bona fide or personal properties of the deceased Samuel Kwabena Asante. Lawyers must settle issues for trial in a way that admits of no ambiguity or vagueness. In this case, the issue before the court was so broad that it could have called for an examination of the devolution of the properties since both parties admitted that Samuel Kwabena Asante died intestate. However, this ambiguity could have been avoided by the parties by simply adding a suffix as follows: “during his lifetime or at the time of his death” Under the circumstances, the trial judge would have erred by opening the Pandora Box on the devolution of properties if he had used the word “exclusively,” but he did not. The recovery of possession of the properties lay at the heart of the claims by the Respondents since the Appellant, as a caveatrix, had successfully caused the removal of the two properties from the inventory of the assets of the deceased JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 31 in the application of the Letters of administration of the estate of the late Samuel Kwabena Asante. Having held that the Respondents had proven their case on the balance of probabilities, the court was right in granting the Respondents that relief, but without more. Upon our review of the entire record of appeal and having duly considered the submissions of both counsel, we are not persuaded that the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court warrant any interference by this Court. We are in agreement with the findings and conclusions arrived at by the trial court. The trial court applied the principles regarding the evaluation of evidence and attached the correct probative value to the evidence adduced in relation to the party carrying the statutory burden of proof. The statement made by the trial judge that “Upon his death intestate, these properties accordingly devolved onto the Plaintiffs” is hereby set aside. Apart from setting aside this statement, the reliefs as granted by the trial court stand, and they are hereby affirmed. 7.0 Disposition The appeal is dismissed. We set aside the statement made by the trial judge that “Upon his death intestate, these properties accordingly devolved onto the Plaintiffs.” We award costs of GHC 20,000.00 against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents. SGD FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) I AGREE SGD SAMUEL OBENG-DIAWUO (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) JANET SERWAH & ANOR V. ABENA MIREKUA (SUBSTITUTED BY AFUA ATTA PANYIN) - JUDGMENT pg. 32 I ALSO AGREE SGD BARIMA YAW KODIE OPPONG (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) COUNSEL: MANASIA ADU WILSON FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SALOME ERICA ABEKA FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTS