S v Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council (H1/68/2026) [2026] GHACA 5 (30 July 2026)

THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL ACCRA, 2026 CORAM JENNIFER A. DODOO, J.A (PRESIDING) STEPHEN OPPONG, J.A FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A SUIT NO: H1/68/2026 30TH JULY 2026 THE REPUBLIC VERSUS NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL ---------------- RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT EX PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE ------------- APPLICANT/RESPONDENT NII AMAAH KWAOFIO ------------ INTERESTED PARTY/APPELLANT JUDGMENT THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 2 FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A: 1.0 General Overview This appeal arises from the decision of the High Court (Human Rights Division) dated 13/05/2022. Statutory compliance is strictly non-negotiable. In the case of Network Computer System Ltd v. Intelsat Global Sales & Marketing Ltd [2012] 1 SCGLR 218, Atuguba, JSC delivered at 230 as follows: “A court cannot shut its eyes to the violation of a statute as that would be very contrary to its raison d'etre. If a court can suo motu take up the question of illegality even on mere public policy grounds, I do not see how it can fail to take up illegality arising from statutory infraction which has duly come to its notice.'' 2.1 Applicant/Respondent Case (“Respondent”) On 14/09/2021, the Respondent caused his lawyers to file a Motion on Notice seeking judicial review by way of certiorari of the decision by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council (the Respondent therein) electing Nii Amaah Kwaofio as Acting President, who is the Interested Party and Appellant in this case , on 06/07/2021. The Applicant prayed for a certiorari order to quash the decision on the following grounds: a. Excess or lack of jurisdiction. b. Error apparent on the face of the record. In the affidavit in support of the application filed on 14/09/2021 and supplementary affidavit in reply to the Appellant’s affidavit in opposition filed on 26/11/2021, which were both deposed to by the Respondent himself, Nii Aryeequaye VI Ngleshie Adadentam Mantse, he stated that he was installed as a Sub-Divisional Chief on 02/10/2004. He further deposed that he was gazetted and his name appeared in the National Register of Chiefs after approval on THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 3 16/07/2014. In contrast, the Appellant was enstooled ten (10) years after him on 23/10/2010, but he was gazetted, and his name also appeared on the National Register of Chiefs on 16/07/2014. The Respondent also says that he was inducted into the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council in 2011when it was established. At that time, the Appellant was not a member. According to him, by operation of law, he also became a Divisional Chief when Ngleshie Alata Division was elevated to the status of paramountcy. The Respondent asserted that, like the Appellant, the designation given him was “Mantse (Div Chief)” but in truth and in fact they both held the “Title of Office” of Sub -Divisional Chiefs which changed to Divisional Chiefs after the elevation in 2012. Subsequently, the then Paramount Chief gave him his present title as the Senior Divisional Mantse of Ngleshie Alata Traditional Area of James-Town but not as his “Title of Office.” He emphasised that relative to his date of enstoolment, he is senior to the Appellant by far. He recounted that Obrempong Kojo Ababio V, who was then Ngleshie Alata Traditional Mantse, became the Council’s first President when it was set up. Nii Hanson had always been the next chief in seniority but , due to his medical indisposition, he stopped attending Divisional Council meetings. Thus, when the Traditional Council was set up, he still could not attend meetings , hence Nii Ngleshie Addy who was next in seniority to Nii Hanson assumed the position of next in seniority to Nii Kojo Ababio V. When the latter died sometime in December 2017 and Nii Ngleshie Addy V, the Adontenhene of Ngleshie Alata Traditional Area became the Acting President of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council, there was no election because they followed the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) which provides that in the absence of the President, the next to the President in seniority on the Council shall preside. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 4 In June 2021, Nii Ngleshie Addy V, who was the Acting President of the Council, also died and therefore, a vacancy occurred in the Presidency. On 06/07/2021, members of the Council met to fill the vacancy and in attendance for the first time was the Appellant. When the attention of the Registrar from the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs, who doubled up as the Electoral Officer, was drawn to the provisions of Act 759 to allow the Respondent to preside as the next in seniority, he refused and proceeded to invite nominations and to hold elections, which resulted in the Appellant winning. Subsequently, petitions were sent to the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council and to the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs, Dodowa to take measures to overturn the elections. The opposition to the election of the Appellant has been ignored , and the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council continues to work closely with the Appellant and has recently issued a notice of meeting of the Council at his instance. The plaint of the Respondent is that pursuant to Act 759, he is the chief next in seniority to the deceased Acting President and the proper person to assume control of the office without elections. It is the case of the Respondent that the decision to hold elections to fill the vacancy of Acting President of Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council was made without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of Act 759, which error is apparent on the face of the record and that the said decision ought to be quashed. As an administrative body, the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council is bound to follow Act 759 and has no right to depart from the law as laid down; therefore, estoppel does not arise. 2.2 Interested Party/Respondent/Appellant Case (“Appellant”) In their Affidavit in Opposition filed on 04/10/2021, the Respondent therein (Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council) and the Appellant herein denied the Respondent’s claim that he is a Senior Divisional Mantse of Ngleshie Alata THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 5 Traditional Area of James Town since there is no such position within the Ngleshie Traditional Area as it is not one of the categories of chiefs identified in Act 759. They contended that the Respondent was installed as a Sub-Divisional Chief on 02/10/2011 and his position has not changed. Besides, he was gazetted as a Sub-Divisional Chief and not a Senior Divisional Chief. As such, the title of the Respondent, which appears in the National Register of Chiefs, is a Sub- Divisional Chief and not a Senior Divisional Chief. Nonetheless, both parties were ad idem that the status of the Ngleshie Alata was elevated to a Paramountcy. It is the case of Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council and the Appellant that the late Nii Ngleshie was elected during a meeting of the Traditional Council and not through seniority as claimed by the Applicant. The Appellant admitted that there was a meeting to fill the vacancy. However, the Respondent never raised any issues with the voting process, in which he voluntarily participated and got only two votes. Consequently, the Respondent is estopped from raising issues against the elections concluded since he willingly took part in all the processes which secured him only two votes. Therefore, his claims in paragraphs 12 and 13 cannot be maintained in law. The Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council and the Appellant stated that the issue before the Court is in respect of his acting because the occupant of the stool has died, but not in a situation where the Chief is alive but unable to attend meetings as contemplated in section 15 of Act 759. They further indicated that as a Divisional Chief, the Appellant is more senior to the Respondent, who is a Sub- Chief and remains as such. It was their case that the timeless custom and tradition for appointing an Acting President of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council has been by voting and that the Respondent has fully participated in all elections organised by the Council until he lost in the last election with only two votes. The Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council and the Appellant further asserted that the THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 6 number of years in a position will not change the status of a Sub-Divisional Chief to become higher than a Divisional Chief in the hierarchy of Chiefs in Ghana pursuant to Act 759. 3.0 Decision of the Court The court granted the Respondent’s prayer for a certiorari order. In the ruling delivered on 13/05/2022, the court held as follows: “I hold and find that an order of certiorari will lie to quash the election held by the Respondent as Respondent acted in excess of its jurisdiction and contrary to section 15(3) of the Chieftaincy Act (Act 759). The chief next in seniority should be the acting President in accordance with the law and in the absence of a substantive President. The Court observes that both Applicant and the Interested Party were appointed divisional chiefs on the same date per the extract from the National House of Chiefs and so both are at par in terms of seniority. Application for certiorari is granted to the extent that the procedure adopted by the Respondent in electing the Interested party is wrong.” 4.0 Grounds of Appeal Aggrieved by the ruling above, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on18/05/2022 with the following grounds of appeal: “a. The ruling is against the weight of evidence. b. The learned trial judge erred in law when (sic) quashed the voting which was conducted by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council on the 2nd Day of August 2021(sic) to elect the Interested Party as the Acting President of the Traditional Council. PARTICULARS OF ERROR i) When the learned Trial Judge found that voting is not prescribed by the Chieftaincy Act of Ghana to elect the Acting President of the Traditional Council THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 7 but ruled that it is through seniority of the Chiefs within the Traditional Council ii) When the learned Trial Judge based her ruling on section 15 subsection 3 of the Chieftaincy Act of Ghana, which is specific on meetings of the Traditional Council, but did not prescribe any mode of appointing an Acting President of the Traditional Council upon the death of the Paramount Chief of the Traditional Area. (iii) When in this instance where the Applicant/Respondent and the Interested party had their names entered in the National Register of Chiefs on the same day which shows they are at par in seniority, the best mode of determining the Presidency of the Traditional Council in a well-respected Democratic Country like Ghana should be voting and nothing else. iv)That the Applicant/Respondent willfully participated in the voting and got only two votes and if he had won this situation of bringing the matter to court will not have arisen and therefore, he is estopped by conduct. v) When the overall effect of the ruling of the Learned Judge will mean the two parties who are equal in seniority should have been made joint presidents of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional council which is unprecedented. c. That the Registrar found out that the Applicant/Respondent and the Interested Party are at Par in seniority, so he rightly resorted to the option of voting, which is allowed under our laws. d. That since the application was filed without the certificates of Exhibits, the matter should have been considered without the Exhibits, especially when a Preliminary objection was raised by the Counsel of the Respondent therein. e. Further grounds of appeal will be filed upon receipt of the Records of Appeal.” 5. Applying the Law and Analysis My Lords, I shall commence my analysis with the preliminary legal objection filed by the Respondent’s counsel before dealing with the appeal. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 8 5.1 The Preliminary Objection With respect to the instant appeal, on 09/02/2026, counsel for the Respondent filed a notice of preliminary legal objection in apparent compliance with rule 16 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (CI 19) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) 1998 (CI 21) to wit: ‘a) That the current Appeal which is about which Chief is to act in the absence of a substantive Ngleshie Alata has become moot since a new Paramount Chief in the person of Obrempong Wetse Kojo the II known in private life as Dr Prince William Asharku Bruce-Quaye has been enstooled and gazetted as the Paramount Chief of Ngleshie Alata Stool and therefore there is no need for anyone to act since the said stool is no longer vacant.’ Counsel for the Respondent attached the extract from the National Register of Chiefs approved on 21/06/2024. He submitted that pursuant to section 59 (8) of the Chieftaincy Act 2008 (Act 759), which provides that the contents of the Register are prima facie evidence of the existence of facts or particulars stated in the Register, by operation of law, the production of the extract from the National Register of Chiefs serves as adequate evidence. Consequently, no useful purpose would be served in determining the issue as to who should act as between the Respondent and the Appellant since there is no vacancy, as same has already been filled, thus rendering the case nothing more than an academic exercise. In response, the Appellant’s counsel contended that the objection is misconceived in law and fact and ought to be dismissed. He submitted that the doct rine of mootness applies where a court decision will have no practical effect on the parties' rights. He cited the Supreme Court case of Asare v. Attorney General [2003-2004] SCGLR 823, which emphasised that courts do not engage in academic or hypothetical exercises but determine live controversies affecting THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 9 legal rights. He also referred to the celebrated case of Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex Parte Commission on Human Rights & Administrative Justice [2007-2008] SCGLR 213, where the Supreme Court held that where issues remain unsolved and the rights are affected, the matter cannot be dismissed as academic. He submitted that, since in the present matter the legitimacy of the processes leading to the alleged registration remains in challenge and the validity of the High Court-directed procedure is disputed, the matter is not moot. Therefore, a determination by this Honourable Court will directly affect the legal standing and customary authority at issue. Learned counsel proceeded to argue extensively on the validity of purported registration and its effect on this appeal. My Lords, in the case of Osei Bonsu II v. Mensah and Others [2003-2005] 1 GLR 141, a preliminary legal objection was pronounced by the Court of Appeal to be an objection based on an irregularity, default of a practice direction or procedure, which default or issue must be apparent by reference to the particular default or the irregularity complained of. Such legal objections are not predicated on the merits of the case but on stated legal, procedural or technical grounds , which must be argued with reference to only decided cases, rules of procedure, without more. The attempt by learned counsel for the Appellant in this case to argue the merits of the processes leading to the registration and the validity of High Court-directed procedure is of no consequence in the determination of the preliminary legal objection regarding the mootness of the appeal. In Osei Bonsu II (supra), the respondent in that case went to the extent of making a direct application to the court to allow fresh evidence to be led to determine the veracity of the contention in the preliminary objection. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 10 Mootness On the issue of mootness of the instant appeal, Acquah JSC (as he then was) in the case of Amidu v. President Kufour and Others [2001-2002] 2 SCGLR 86 at page 106 observed as follows: “… As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), an action is generally considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because issues involved have become academic or dead. This may happen when the matter in dispute has either been resolved already or and hence there is no need for intervention, or events happening thereafter have rendered the issue no longer live. In either situation, unless the issue is a recurring one and likely to be raised again between the parties, the courts would not entertain such a dead issue.” Does the registration of the new Paramount Chief render the current appeal moot, in the sense that no useful purpose would be served by continuing with the hearing of this appeal to decide whether the learned trial judge was right in granting the order of certiorari? Is the instant appeal nothing more than a mere academic exercise? My Lords, my terse answer is no. The registration of the new Paramount Chief does not in any way make the instant appeal moot. The submission on behalf of the Respondent that no useful purpose would be served in determining the issue as to who should act as between the Respondent and the Appellant since there is no vacancy, as same has already been filled, thus rendering the case nothing more than an academic exercise is erroneous. The landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney-General) [1989] I S.C.R. 342 established the modern legal test for mootness known as the Borowski Principles. The Plaintiff in this case challenged THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 11 the constitutionality of Canadian laws, but during the proceedings, the laws in question were repealed, thus rendering the case moot. In addressing the question of mootness, the court laid down the following principles. 1. Even if an issue becomes moot for the parties involved in the specific case, a court may still address the matter if a decision could have meaningful effects on related or future proceedings. 2. Although some legal issues are important, they are sometimes rendered moot before they reach a final decision. The court may, however, hear such cases to provide clarity for future similar disputes. 3. Courts must respect their role within the government, and therefore, the separation of powers, by not deciding on hypothetical or abstract questions unless necessary. As is evident, given that a new Paramount Chief ha s been enstooled, the Respondent who applied for the order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council electing as acting President the Appellant herein on grounds of excess or lack of jurisdiction and error apparent on the face of the record, is raising the issue of mootness of the instant appeal. The submission of learned counsel for the Respondent is devoid of merit because it turns to analyse the issues within a narrow compass. As Sophia A.B. Akuffo JSC (as she then was) held or observed in the case of Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice v. The Attorney General & Baba Kamara [2011] JELR 67971(SC): “Mootness must always be determined according to the peculiar circumstances of each case and even where the question at issue in a particular case might have THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 12 been overtaken by events and rendered moot, yet, the court may still proceed to determine the issue if it is anticipated that it is likely to be a recurring one. “ The court opined that first, there was the possibility of the matter between the parties recurring; thus, one could not conclude that it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. Second, the interpretation of a constitutional provision does not affect only the parties before the court or relate only to the case in which it arose, especially in a matter such as the one before the apex court , which involved the scope of the mandate of a constitutional body in the performance of one of its assigned functions. The note of caution by Kpegah JSC in Bilson v. Attorney General [1993-94] 1 GLR 104 at page 110 was re-echoed in the case of Human Rights and Administrative Justice v. The Attorney General & Baba Kamara (supra) as follows: “The judicial authority of which this court is the beneficiary or endowed with is essentially a jurisdiction to deal with real or substantial disputes which affect the legal rights or obligations of parties who appear before us, and whose interests are adverse to each other. These competing interests will necessarily call for specific reliefs through conclusive and certain judicial decree or decrees. In these circumstances, the matter could be said to be justiciable and not otherwise. The principle of justifiability precludes us from giving advisory opinions based on hypothetical facts which are not part of an existing controversy.” In the appeal before us, the Appellant is contesting the decision of the court below. In the minimum, this court is duty-bound to give satisfactory reasons to the Appellant even if the appeal is dismissed, and that duty will not merely be dispensed with because the subject of appeal has been circumvented by the installation and purported registration of a new Paramount Chief. The appeal before us still presents a justifiable controversy to the extent that the Appellant is THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 13 nettled by the decision pronounced by the trial court. The dispute over whether the election of the Appellant as Acting President was inconsistent with Act 759 remains relevant and a useful exercise. A resolution of the issues on appeal would provide a useful template not only for the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council but also for various other stakeholders. The case before us cannot be termed as a hypothetical one. There is a continuing, concerted and adversarial contest between the parties and the victorious party in the court below cannot waive the subject of mootness against the losing party whose appeal is before us, as a mere academic exercise. The endgame of litigation is not only about vindication of a party’s right. Most critically, it serves as a useful guide to future conduct , thereby optimising value recovery. 5.2 The Appeal My Lords, a critical assessment of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal shows that he is effectively arguing the omnibus ground of appeal. The third ground of appeal does not necessarily disclose a reasonable ground of appeal. It is vague, narrative and expressed in general terms without detailing the specific error made by the learned trial judge worthy of resolution contrary to Rule 8 (5), (6) and (7) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19), which empowers the court to strike out such offending grounds of appeal. Consequently, we hereby strike out as incompetent the ground of appeal, “That the Registrar found out that the Applicant/Respondent and the Interested Party are at Par in seniority, so he rightly resorted to the option of voting which is allowed under our laws.” See Ofosu-Addo v. Graphic Communication Group Ltd [2011] 1 SCGLR 355. It is to be observed that the Appellant’s fourth ground of appeal was not argued in his written address to this Court. It is therefore deemed abandoned and hereby accordingly struck out. See Owusu-Domena v. Amoah [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 790. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 14 This Court will seek to resolve the issue as to whether the learned trial judge erred in law when she quashed the election conducted by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council, which had the Appellant emerging as the Acting President of the said Council in respect of the two main grounds of appeal canvassed by the Appellant. I will, however, proceed to analyse the first ground and conclude by establishing whether the court below erred in its conclusion. By the omnibus ground of appeal, to wit, the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, the Appellant contends that the learned trial judge made some errors in evaluating the facts and evidence adduced at the trial. The Supreme Court per Akamba JSC elucidated on this subject in the case of Republic v. Central Regional House of Chiefs and Chieftaincy Secretariat; Ex Parte Nana Ehunabobrim Idun Gyan IX [2013] JELR 64727 (SC) as follows: “This court has time and again stated that when a party relies on the omnibus ground of appeal as above couched, it empowers us to rehear the matter, not in a literal manner, but to take another look at the evidence and to analyse the whole record of appeal before us. In so doing, we take into account the testimonies and documentary evidence at the trial and arrive at our own decision after satisfying ourselves on a preponderance of probabilities whether the conclusions of the trial judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence (See Tuakwa v. Bosom (2001-2002) SCGLR 61 @ 65).” In reiterating the principle of law governing the omnibus ground of appeal, Pwamang JSC in the case of Otoo and Another v. Dwamena [2018-2019] 1 GLR 23 observed at page 28 as follows: THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 15 “… the sole ground of appeal is that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence. This ground of appeal is an invitation to the Court to comb through the record that was placed before the lower Court and decide for ourselves whether, having regard to the evidence and the law relevant for a determination of the case, the lower Court was right in its findings and conclusions.” Pursuant to rule 8 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19), a civil appeal to this Court shall be by way of re-hearing. The duty cast on an appellate Court is thus to review the entire evidence on record and arrive at its own conclusions as to whether the findings of the court below on both the law and the facts of the case are legally supported. However, since the process in issue is an application for judicial review of an administrative decision under Order 55 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules C.I. 47, the evaluation will be done within a limited scope of the documentary evidence and the admissions by the parties before us to determine the legality of the decision taken by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council. Pursuant to Articles 132 and 141of the 1992 Constitution, the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court can be exercised over all lower courts. Section 39 of the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act 620) defines lower courts to include Circuit Courts; District Courts; Juvenile Courts; the National House of Chiefs, Regional House of Chiefs and every Traditional Council in respect of the jurisdiction of any House or Council to adjudicate over any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and such other lower Courts as Parliament may by law establish. The parameters within which the court’s judicial review powers may be exercised are set out by law. An applicant seeking to obtain an order for certiorari must clearly prove by his application that a respondent in reaching an impugned THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 16 decision either acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, breached principles of natural justice or that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. See Republic v. High Court, Sekondi, Ex parte Ampong Alias Akrufa Krukoko I [2011] SCGLR 716 and Republic v. Committee of Inquiry into Nungua Traditional Affairs, Ex Parte Odai IV and Others [1996-1997] SCGLR 401, holding 1. Simply put, administrative bodies purporting to discharge their functions in the face of want of jurisdiction or of excess of jurisdiction shall attract the order of certiorari. Where there happens to be an error on the face of the record, the order of certiorari will be granted to quash the decision. Under circumstances where there has been a denial of natural justice, certiorari will also issue to bring up the decision of such bodies to be quashed. In the case of The Republic v. Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice; Ex parte Richard Anane [2007-2008] 1SCGLR 340 at 365, the Court further observed as follows: “There is no denying the fact that the prerogative writ of certiorari is one of the means of checking wrongful assumption of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction. The courts of Ghana today recognise three broad grounds of judicial review in the nature of certiorari. These are illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety such as breaches of the rule of natural justice …” The two grounds, “Lack or Want of Jurisdiction” and “Exceeding Jurisdiction” sit alongside "breach of natural justice" and "error of law patent on the face of the record" as the four settled bases for certiorari, restated by Dotse JSC in Republic v. High Court, Kumasi; Ex Parte Bank of Ghana & O thers (Gyamfi & Others Interested Parties) (No.1) (Consolidated) [2013-14] 1 SCGLR 477 Certiorari lies on grounds of excess or want of jurisdiction, breach of natural THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 17 justice, or a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record. This formulation has been repeatedly applied in a litany of cases. However, "want" and "excess" of jurisdiction, though often stated together, are analytically distinct. Acting in want of jurisdiction arises where the court, tribunal, or public body never had the legal authority to enter upon the matter in the first place. It lacked the power from the outset, regardless of how it proceeded to decide the matter, since in Ghana, jurisdiction must be conferred by the Constitution or by substantive legislation. It is neither assumed, inferred from convenience, nor created by mere rules of procedure. A body purporting to act without such a conferred power is acting in a complete jurisdictional vacuum. As emphasised by Appau JSC, the Supreme Court in The Republic v. High Court (Human Rights Division), Accra; Attorney General (2017) DLSC 2517 , “Having no jurisdiction to entertain a matter is different from making erroneous orders or decisions within jurisdiction.” For instance, where the law requires a matter to be brought within a stipulated period, in a prescribed forum, or after satisfying a required procedural step, failure to do so means jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. The Supreme Court in The Republic v. High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale Ex parte Mathew Nyindam (Interested Parties: Daniel Nsala Wakpal & 2 Others) [2026] DLSC 18549 (Civil Motion No: J5/13/2026 dated 28/01/2026) held that once the election petition was filed outside the statutory time, the petition was incompetent and could not confer jurisdiction on the High Court. A body thus lacks jurisdiction when the law gives it no authority over the matter, the parties, the reliefs, the territory, or the statutory preconditions for invoking its power have not been met. By contrast, a body exceeds jurisdiction when it has authority to act in some respect but goes beyond the legal limits of that authority. Under both circumstances, the resulting decision is liable to be treated as a nullity. However, THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 18 where the body merely makes a wrong decision within its lawful mandate, the complaint is ordinarily one for appeal, not jurisdictional invalidity. The question to answer in this instant appeal turns on whether the High Court’s decision to dismiss the judicial review application was in accordance with the evidence on record. It is not a call for this court to assess the merits of the Council’s decision to choose an acting president by voting. In analysing the record and with due consideration of the grounds of appeal, this court is duty- bound to analyse whether the procedure adopted by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council conformed with the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759). The legality of the decision-making process is the paramount consideration in a judicial review application, not the merits of a decision. See The Republic v. Bank of Ghana; Ex parte HODA Holding Limited [2024] DLSC 17693 Section 16 of the Court Act, 1993 (Act 459) provides as follows: “In accordance with article 141 of the Constitution, the High Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts and a lower adjudicating authority, and may, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, issue orders and directions, including orders in the na ture of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.” The procedure to follow in an application for judicial review is spelt out under Order 55, rule 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004, CI 2004 as follows: “Order 55 rule 1: Cases appropriate for the application for judicial review. An application for, (a) an order in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or quo - warranto; or THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 19 (b) an injunction restraining a person from acting in any public office in which the person is not entitled to act; or (c) any other injunction. shall be made by way of an application for judicial review to the High Court.” My Lords, in the matter under appeal, the Respondent sought a certiorari order to quash the decision by the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council that elected the Appellant in this case as the Acting President on 06/07/2021. The Respondent articulated two grounds in support of his prayer for the quashing order to issue, to wit, excess or lack of jurisdiction and error apparent on the face of the record as the decision sinned against section 15 (3) of the Chieftaincy Act 2008, (Act 759), which provides for the next chief in seniority to the President to preside at a meeting of a Traditional Council when the President is unable to preside. A cursory reading of section 13 of the Chieftaincy Act 2008 (Act 759), which provides for the position of the President of a Traditional Council, shows that it is not by election but an incident of paramount stool occupancy. The section provides as follows: “13. - President of Traditional Councils: 13. (1) The paramount chief of the traditional area is automatically the President of the Traditional Council — or, in the Kumasi traditional area, the Asantehene.” 13. (2) In any other case, the presidency shall be held by the paramount chiefs in the traditional area on a two yearly rotational basis in alphabetical order of stool or skin or name.” Under Section 13(2): "In any other case", that is, where a traditional area has more than one paramount chief/stool, in which case no single automatic THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 20 paramount-chief-President can be sourced, the presidency is held by the paramount chiefs of the traditional area on a two -yearly rotational basis, in alphabetical order of stool or skin name. Therefore, the occupancy of the position of President of a Traditional Council in cases where a traditional area has more than one paramount chief, it is a fixed rotational formula, not a vote or election. The scenario created in the absence of a substantive President is also provided for under section 15 of Act 759 as follows: “15. – Meetings of Traditional Councils 15(1) Meetings of a Traditional Council shall be held at the times and in the places determined by the President of the Council but shall meet of sic at least twice in a year. (2) The President of a Traditional Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the Council at the request of not less than one-half of the members of the Council. (3) The President of a Traditional Council shall preside at meetings of the Council and where the President is unable to attend a meeting, the chief next to the President in seniority on the Council shall preside at the meeting. (4) Business except an adjournment shall not be transacted if less than one-half of the total number of members is present. (5) A Judicial Committee of a Traditional Council may be assisted by a lawyer appointed by the Committee.” The import of section 15 (3) of Act 759 suggests that the main function of the President of a Traditional Council is to preside at the meetings of the Council. Apart from presiding over meetings of the Council as detailed above, the other functions of the President are not explicitly stated in Act 759. Section 29, however, outlines the exclusive jurisdiction of the Council to hear and determine THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 21 local chieftaincy disputes through its Judicial Committee. The section provides as follows: “29. Jurisdiction of Traditional Council 29. (1) Subject to this Act, a Traditional Council has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area, not being one to which the Asantehene, a paramount chief is a party. (2) The jurisdiction of a Traditional Council shall be exercised by a Judicial Committee comprising three or five members appointed by the Council from their members. (3) A person aggrieved by a judgment or an order given or made by a Traditional Council in a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy may appeal to the relevant Regional House as of right against the judgment or order…” Section 15(3) therefore governs who presides when the President is unable to attend Council meetings, to wit, " the chief next to the President in seniority on the Council …" It is to be observed that Act 759 does not use the term "Acting President" for Traditional Councils specifically. The scenario is akin to how Act 759 handles the National House and Regional House of Chiefs under sections 1(5) and 7 (2) and (4). However, unlike the National and Regional Houses, the Traditional Council has no separate elected Vice-President office under the Act. The "chief next in seniority" simply steps in on an ad hoc, meeting-by-meeting basis, rather than holding a standing "Acting President" title. No “Acting President” title is warranted in this context because at any given time the chief next in seniority who may be presiding may also not be available at a particular meeting, and the chief next in seniority after him will have to automatically step into his shoes. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 22 Counsel for the Appellant was therefore misguided when he argued in his unpaginated written address that the issue before the court is about the Appellant who is acting because the occupant of the stool is deceased but not a situation where the chief is alive but unable to attend meetings as contemplated in Act 759 This same assertion was made by the Appellant in paragraph 16 of his Affidavit in Opposition at page 26 of the ROA to wit: “That the issue before the court is about the interested party who is acting because the occupant of the stool is passed but not a situation where the chief is alive but unable to attend meetings as contemplated in section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act of Ghana.” In the case before us, it is admitted that after the last paramount chief who served as the President in the person of Nii Kojo Ababio V died, no paramount chief has been installed for the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council. The able chief next in seniority to the departed Nii Kojo Ababio V, in the person of Nii Ngleshie Addy V, presided over the meetings of the Council as enshrined under section 15 (3) of Act 759, until his demise. He was not a paramount chief; he only stepped in on an ad hoc basis to fill the gap created by the demise of the last Paramount Chief, Nii Kojo Ababio V, until the installation of a paramount chief to automatically assume the position of President of the Council. It is my considered opinion that the phrase “unable to attend a meeting” under section 15 (3) of Act 759 contemplates a situation where a President of a Traditional Council is alive, but due to some constraints, including medical indisposition, he is unable to attend meetings or is dead. In both scenarios, the chief next in seniority only stands in as a stop-gap measure on an ad hoc basis until his resumption or until a new paramount chief has been installed to take up the position of President of the traditional area. In the case before us, this was the role of the late Nii Ngleshie Addy V until his demise. The latter case appears to give a semblance of an THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 23 “Acting President” position, but that is a wrong assumption. In that scenario where the President has gone to his village or is dead, the chief next in seniority again does not wear a strictu senso “Acting President” title until a new paramount chief has been installed because he may also be subject to the same constraints, including medical indisposition which a substantive President who is alive may be subject to. Therefore, save in the case of a Paramount Chief who sits as a de facto President of a Traditional Council, the chief next in seniority who steps into his shoes in his absence does so on a meeting-by-meeting basis. It is only the de facto President whose position is of a permanent nature. The question of election of the chief next in seniority to a President to preside at meetings of the Council in the absence of the substantive President is not provided for under Act 759. Therefore, in the matter before us, the next chief in seniority after the late Nii Ngleshie Addy V was to preside at the meeting until the next Paramount Chief to replace the late Nii Kojo Ababio V had been installed to take up the substantive role of the President of the Council as envisaged under section 13 (1) of Act 759: “paramount chief of the traditional area is automatically the President of the Traditional Council …” The modus operandi by which the traditional kingmakers and queen mothers, in accordance with customary law and usage of that specific traditional area, will nominate, elect, select and install the next paramount chief who can take up the position of President of the Ngleshie Traditional Council is not one for this court to determine. A thorough review of Exhibit NAK 2 shows that the election on 06/07/2021 was not in search of a Paramount Chief to serve as President of the Ngleshie Traditional Council but rather, a search for an Acting President. However, the Council is bereft of any mandate to appoint a Paramount Chief. To put it mildly, the Ngleshie Traditional Council was oblivious of the fact that the appointment of the next Paramount Chief to replace the late Nii Kojo Ababio V as President THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 24 of the Council was the most critical consideration since that chief will automatically assume the role of the President. This is revealed by the opening remarks of the Registrar of the Ngleshie Traditional Council when he stated at page 32 of the ROA that: “There are kingmakers who enstool Chiefs and they enstool the Paramount Chiefs, whoever the kingmakers present to the Acting President that’s (sic) he should work with whether it is in his interest or not in his interest.” Consequently, the meeting proceeded to embark on a search for an “Acting President”, which position, whether in substance or form, is not provided for under Act 759. My Lords, I have combed through Act 759 to ascertain whether there is any provision in the said Act for the election of an acting President of a Traditional Council. I found none. Counsel for the Respondent nailed it when he submitted at paragraph 43.0 of his written submission as follows: “There is no provision in the Chieftaincy Act for the appointment of an Ag President. All it provided for in Section 15 (3) is for (sic) Traditional Council to get the chief next in seniority to act as President to preside over Traditional Council meetings not an Ag President.” The meeting and the election that took place on 06/07/2021, Exhibit NAK 2, was merely aimed at finding a replacement for the late Nii Ngleshi Addy V, which was in contravention of section 15 (3) of Act 759, regardless of whether or not the same election method was resorted to in the past, as the Appellant counsel suggested at page 45 of the ROA. A precedent which was in flagrant violation of the law cannot be perpetuated in the eyes of any court. It is well settled that Ghanaian courts would not lend their support to parties who engage in illegality. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 25 Such conduct by a court will clearly be against public policy, since the court's primary duty is to uphold the law and sanction parties who fall foul of it. In this case, it is observed that the Registrar from the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (GARHC) initially guided the meeting appropriately in respect of the term “Acting President” which surfaced at the meeting when he remarked in answer to a question posed by one of the chiefs that Act 759 does not provide for the position of an acting President. See page 34 of the Record of Appeal (ROA). The chiefs did not appreciate the guidance from him. To compound the situation, the said Registrar also failed to abide by his own caution, resulting in this muddle. Their discourse at the Exhibit NAK 2 meeting proceeded as follows: “2.1. Nii Kwashie Gborlor IV, Ngleshie Amanfro Mantse: The senior Chief to take the Acting President position is bedridden. 2.2. Mr. Enoch Addo, Registrar GARHC: We have law, the spirit of the law and its practice. The Act does not make provision for Acting President but there is a need for someone to head the Traditional Council . When a Chief is incapacitated or bedridden he cannot lead the Traditional Council. 2.3. Nii Tetteh Okpe I, Amamole Mantse: We do not have a leader for the Traditional Council since the Acting President has passed on, therefore we should get a new Acting President today for the work to continue. 2.4. Naa Tekeorkor I, Glefe Manye: I nominate Nii Asroy Hanson I, Afienaa Mantse … 2.6. Nii Boafo Daanyina Nse I, Weija Dzasetse: I opposed (sic) to the nomination of Nii Asroy Hanson I because he is bedridden and we will not accept.” 2.7. Mr. Enoch Addo, Registrar GARHC: The Acting President position comes with duties and if the person is incapacitated then the person cannot be the Acting President. He asked the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council, Ms. Jessie Okpoti if all the members the letters for the meeting … THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 26 4.3. Mr. Enoch Addo, Registrar GARHC: We have two nominees for Acting President position. 4.4. Ms. Jessie Okpoti, Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council: We have two nominees, Nii Aryeequaye VI, Adentaa Mantse and Nii Armaah Kwaofio, Armaahman Mantse and they are all Divisional Chiefs and gazetted …” 4.7. Mr. Enoch Addo, Registrar GARHC: He advised the new Acting President to stay out of the installation of Paramount Chiefs added that after two years he will be reviewed if no Paramount Chief has been installed.” As the trial judge rightfully noted, it was the Registrar of the Regional House of Chiefs who called for elections in the absence of a President to elect an Acting President of the Traditional Council in the full glare of the Respondent therein, the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council, thereby acting without jurisdiction and contrary to section 15 of Act 759. See page 232 of the ROA. My Lords, in my considered opinion, the provisions of Act 759 do not support elections to determine who should preside over a meeting of a Traditional Council when the President is unable to attend a meeting and therefore, the trial judge was not in error. Election or voting is indeed a democratic way of making an appointment. However, it must be properly contextualised, not to contravene any statute. Where words used in a statute are unambiguous, the ordinary meaning is applied, and there is no requirement under law to import other words to make it clear and meaningful. See Attorney-General (No. 2) v. Tsatsu Tsikata (No. 2) [2001- 2002] SCGLR 620. Under section 15 (3) of Act 759, the chief who is next in seniority to the President who is unable to attend a meeting is the one the law has mandated to preside over the meeting of the Council. Simply put, the chief immediately assumes the presiding role without any elections to forestall any void, but this procedure was shelved. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 27 In the matter before us, who called and presided over the Exhibit NAK 2 meeting? It is admitted from the submissions of both parties that the Registrar called the said meeting. This action by the Registrar flies in the face of section 15 (1) of Act 759, which provides that the meetings of the Council shall be held at the times and places determined by the President of the Council. In the absence of a President, the chief next to that President in seniority on the Council must step in swiftly to determine and direct the times and places where the meetings of the Traditional Council are to be held. It is unclear who presided over the Exhibit NAK 2 meeting, but a perusal of the minutes shows that it was not a chief. It appears the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council presided over the meeting because after the opening prayer, she introduced the Registrar from the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (GARHC) and his entourage to the meeting. The latter took over the meeting with the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council. The Appellant’s name appears with the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council as if he chaired the meeting with the Registrar ostensibly as secretary. His name was placed there merely because he won the elections and therefore, he would be presiding over the next meeting, but that was inappropriate. Besides, and most critically, unlike the Registrar, his signature is missing from Exhibit NAK 2. The statement made by counsel for the Appellant in his unpaginated written submission to this Court that: “The problem faced by the Ngleshie Alata Council was not about who chairs a meeting, but who was to act as the Acting president to succeed the later Acting president Nii Ngleshie Addy? (sic)” was legally deficient. At its core, the contravention of section 15 (3) of Act 759 relates to the proper person to preside at a meeting of the Traditional Council when the substantive President is unable to attend a meeting. The Council therefore lacked jurisdiction when it called for the meeting with no chief next to the demised THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 28 President in seniority on the Council presiding at the meeting. The decision taken at the meeting to elect the “Acting President” in the person of the Appellant herein was therefore ultra vires as it exceeded its legal mandate. The trial judge was therefore not in error when she failed to prescribe any mode of appointing an “Acting President” of the Traditional Council upon the death of the Paramount Chief of the traditional Area because no such position exists under Act 759. In spelling out the particulars of error (iii), counsel for the Appellant stated that both Nii Aryeequaye VI, Adadentan Mantse and Nii Armaah Kwaofio, Armaahman Mantse were at par in seniority; therefore, an election was needed to settle on one of them. This submission was reiterated in his unpaginated written submission when he asserted that, given that the two most senior members of the Council were at par, “then the only democratic way to select the Acting president was through voting.” As indicated earlier, it is not the duty of this Court to determine the merits of the Council’s decision to hold the elections. Doing so would amount to an error of law patent on the face of the record, as the court’s jurisdiction is to determine whether the judicial review application ought to have succeeded. The Court however observes that the reason proffered for the elections flies in the face of the earlier stance by the Appellant in paragraphs 17 and 20 of his Affidavit in Opposition (see ROA page 26) where he claimed that as a Divisional Chief, he was more senior to the Respondent who is a sub-chief and remains as such and that the number of years in a position will not change the status of a Sub-Divisional Chief to become higher than a Divisional Chief in the hierarchy of chiefs in Ghana pursuant to Act 759. At page 36 of the ROA, the Registrar of the Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council stated that both the Appellant and the Respondent were Divisional Chiefs who had been gazetted. Contrary to the claims by counsel for the Appellant, on the record, Exhibit NAK 2 fails to reveal that the Registrar put the two candidates to a vote because they are at par in seniority. Had the Registrar adverted her mind to the statutory provision, she THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 29 would have realised that the said section 15 (3) of Act 759 admits of no election when determining the chief next to the President in seniority on the Council to preside at a meeting of the Traditional Council when the President is unable to attend a meeting. The critical yardstick for determining seniority of a chief next to the President, who is unable to attend a meeting, did not feature in the deliberations of the meeting. The finding by the court below that both the Appellant and the Respondent were appointed divisional chiefs on the same date per the extract from the National House of Chiefs, therefore both are at par in terms of seniority, was erroneous. In my view, that was a question of both fact and law. In any case, that finding was not necessary in the determination of the certiorari application before the court. It bears noting that priority between an enstooled-but-ungazetted chief and a later-enstooled chief, where both are later gazetted simultaneously, turns on the distinction between becoming a chief as a matter of status, and being recognised or registered for purposes of performing chiefly functions. Section 57 of Act 759 regarding the definition of a chief is decisive in this regard. Section 57 provides that: “A chief is a person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned, or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.” Status as chief is thus conferred by a valid customary process, not by gazetting. Section 57 (5), however states that: "A person shall not be considered to be a chief for the performance of a function under this Act or any other enactment, unless that person has been registered for the performance of that function in the National Register of Chiefs and that person's name has been published in the Chieftaincy Bulletin." THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 30 The above provisions therefore present us with two separate questions, to wit, a customary law question as to who is validly a chief and a registration or publication question regarding who may be recognised as chief for statutory purposes. The case Republic v. National House of Chiefs, Kumasi and Another Ex Parte Kusi-Apea [1984-86] 2 GLR 90 established the key constitutional principle that entry of a name in the National Register of Chiefs is no longer a condition precedent for one to be a chief. This reflected a shift away from the old "government recognition" regime under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971, Act (370) to the 1979/1992 constitutional definition, under which chiefly status flows from valid customary enstoolment. Under the repealed Act 370, a person was only legally recognised as a chief if he had been validly nominated, elected, and installed under customary law, and his name appeared in the National Register of Chiefs, with ministerial recognition published in the Local Government Bulletin. Under Article 181 of the 1979 Constitution and later the PNDC Proclamation, 1981 (as amended by PNDC Law 42), the definition of a chief changed. Now, chiefly status flowed directly from valid customary nomination, election, and enstoolment, without the need for government recognition or prior entry in the Register. The Court stated in the Ex Parte Kusi- Apea (supra) that: “It is remarkable that the question of the entry of his name in the national register of chiefs and the recognition by the Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs are now no more conditions precedent for the validity under law of the status of a chief.” Thus, registration remained a mandatory administrative duty of the National House of Chiefs under section 48 (2) of Act 759; nonetheless, failure to register did not detract from the status of the incumbent qua chief , nor did it confer seniority status on a chief. In In re Stool Affairs: Sramangyedua III & Others v. Nketia [2011] 2 SCGLR 1024, the Supreme Court held that Article 277 requirements under the 1992 Constitution comprising nomination, THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 31 election/selection, and enstoolment/enskinment/installation in accordance with customary law are what make a person a chief. Applying this to the matter at hand, given that the Respondent and the Appellant were both validly enstooled as chiefs in 2004 and 2010 respectively but they were both concurrently gazetted and their names appeared in the National Register of Chiefs after approval on 16/07/2014, the Respondent would be considered a senior, because his enstoolment was first in time based on the admitted facts and the documentary evidence on record. As earlier highlighted, gazetting or registration is not what makes either person a chief; neither does it confer seniority. Pursuant to section 57 (5), registration or gazetting is a downstream administrative recognition step that makes it a precondition to exercising statutory functions as a chief, not to being a chief. Such statutory functions include presiding over Traditional Councils, which is strictly distinct from performing a customary role as a chief. Moreover, Article 270(3) (b) of the 1992 Constitution (mirrored in the Act) frames the Gazette/Bulletin mechanism as a "procedure for the registration of chiefs and the public notification in the Gazette or otherwise of the status of persons as chiefs in Ghana." It is a notice function, not a status-determining one as was held in Ex parte Kusi-Apea (supra). What is required to be satisfied is what is stated in Article 277 of the 1992 Constitution and section 57(1) of Act 759. The entry of a chief’s name in the Gazette/Bulletin does not determine seniority or chiefly status. It is merely evidentiary and administrative, not constitutive. Section 59 (8) of Act 759 notes that the contents of the Register are prima facie evidence of the existence of facts or particulars stated in the Register, thus raising rebuttable evidence, not conclusive proof. Seniority within a Traditional Council, by contrast, is a matter of customary law/hierarchy, not gazette date. Th is is explicit in the Act's own structural provisions such as the section in contention, THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 32 to wit 15(3) of Act 759, which provides for "the chief next to the President in seniority" presiding in the President's absence. Section 19 of Act 759 similarly provides for the presidency of a Divisional Council to be held by "the most senior chief." Seniority in both cases is a customary or traditional hierarchy concept the Act assumes. It is not derived from gazette dates. Similarly, section 7(3) of Act 759 states that eligibility for regional house leadership is regulated "having regard to the principles of the traditional hierarchy of the region." Gazetting or registration affects a chief's capacity to function, but it does not affect the underlying status or customary seniority. The Council therefore lacked jurisdiction when it called for the meeting with no chief next to the demised President in seniority on the Council to preside over the meeting pursuant to Act 759. The decision taken at the meeting to elect the “Acting President” in the person of the Appellant herein was also flawed. The meeting was contrary to Act 759; thus, it was null and void from the beginning. Accordingly, the Council exceeded its jurisdiction when it embarked on that impugned meeting and the decision thereto to hold elections for an “Acting President”. Act 759 mandated a particular procedure and that procedure ought to have been followed. Thus, the failure to follow the said procedure was fatal. The law is settled: mandatory provisions of statutes must be complied with. Estoppel by election raised by counsel for the Respondent Council and the Appellant will therefore not operate under these circumstances. The Respondent’s presence at the meeting and his participation in the impugned elections cannot validate an act prohibited by statute. The contention by the Appellant that if the Respondent had won the elections, he would not have instituted the action on appeal is legally deficient. The court below did not err in the finding that the violation of Act 759 does not validate the election conducted by the Registrar. THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 33 In the case of Tularley v. Abaidoo [1962] 1 GLR 411, the Supreme Court held that: “The law is settled that where an enactment has prescribed a special procedure by which something is to be done, it is that procedure alone that is to be followed.” Furthermore, the point must be reiterated that no court has the power to grant a waiver of compliance with an Act of Parliament. In Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division) Accra; Ex-parte National Lottery Authority (Ghana Lotto Operators Association & Others Interested Parties) [2009] SCGLR 390, His Lordship Justice Date-Bah at page 402, the learned Judge in an exposition of the law on this principle opined as follows: “No judge has authority to grant immunity to a party from consequences of breaching an Act of Parliament… The judicial oath enjoins judges to uphold the law rather than condoning breaches of Acts of Parliament by their orders.” Again, in the case of Boyefio v. NTHC Properties Ltd. [1997-98] 1 GLR 768 at 782, the Supreme Court also held “… where a person ignores the internal tribunal and comes to court in respect of any such internal dispute, the courts would invariably order him to go back to the internal tribunal…For the law is clear that, where an enactment has prescribed a special procedure by which something is to be done, it is the procedure alone that is to be followed.” In the case of Kwabena Obeng & Eric Akwasi Prempeh v. Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) and Kojo Bonsu [2017] DLSC 2596, the court sounded a little note of caution as follows: “The principle of law which is clearly discernible from the above cases is that unless the provisions in the statute are manifestly and incurably bad, no judge or THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 34 court for that matter has a right or authority to grant immunity to a party from the consequences of the breach of an Act of Parliament or disable the enforcement of the provisions of the Act of Parliament.” Accordingly, the submission by counsel for the Appellant that the Respondent cannot be heard to be complaining about the election that took place, given that he voluntarily participated in it without raising any objection, is erroneous. The right of “the chief next to the President in seniority on the Council” to preside at the meeting when the President is unable to attend a meeting, conferred under section 15 (3) of Act 759, an Act of Parliament, cannot be waived by a party. The Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council therefore acted unlawfully. This Court also observes that the trial judge resolved the preliminary issue raised by counsel for the Appellant in the court below. Counsel contended in the court below that certiorari applications are only limited to inferior adjudicatory bodies and that, in chieftaincy-related matters, certiorari is only applicable to the Judicial Committees and not to the Traditional Council’s decisions. Although in the appeal before us that issue was not stated as a ground of ap peal, both parties waded into making submissions in respect of it. This Court will disregard the said submissions as the Appellant failed to obtain leave of the Court to amend or file additional grounds as per the rules of engagement: See Rule 8 (7) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) which prohibits an Appellant from being heard in support of any ground of objection not explicitly mentioned in the Notice of Appeal without the permission of the Court. The jurisdiction of lower bodies in legal systems is limited by the statute granting them. When such lower bodies act outside their jurisdictional scope, they are deemed to have exceeded their jurisdiction, and their decisions are susceptible to judicial review orders. Statutory compliance is strictly non-negotiable. The Ngleshie Alata Traditional Council’s decision to meet and hold elections to fill THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 35 the vacancy of Acting President of the said Council was made without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of Act 759, which error is apparent on the face of the record. In the main, the learned trial judge did not err in granting the certiorari order. 6. Disposition For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails, and same is dismissed. SGD ……………………………………… FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) I agree SGD JENNIFER A. DODOO (MRS) (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) I also agree SGD STEPHEN OPPONG (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) COUNSEL: BEN SEVOR FOR INTERESTED PARTY/APPELLANT HON. J. AYIKOI OTOO APPLICANT/RESPONDENT THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 36 THE REPUBLIC V. NGLESHIE ALATA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL, EX-PARTE NII ARYEEQUAYE VI: NGLESHIE ADADENTAN MANTSE - JUDGMENT pg. 37