
Judgment
S v Jindu (114 of 2021) [2021] ZWSC 114 (14 October 2021)
S v Jindu is a judgment from Zimbabwe on 14 October 2021. Cite it as [2021] ZWSC 114. Search it by the party names, the citation [2021] ZWSC 114, or Zimbabwe judgment.
ZimbabwePDF · 71 KB[2021] ZWSC 114Judgment
October 14, 2021
ZIMBABWE
S
v.
Jindu
114 of 2021
[2021] ZWSC 114
Proceeding. Judgment. Zimbabwe.
Judgment No. SC 114/21
Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 1
DISTRIBUTABLE: (111)
TONGAI RODNEY JINDU
v
THE STATE
SUPREME COURT OF ZIMBABWE
GWAUNZA DCJ, MATHONSI JA & CHITAKUNYE JA
BULAWAYO, 21 JULY 2021 & 14 OCTOBER 2021
M. Mahaso with N. Sibanda, for the appellant
T.R. Takuva, for the respondent
CHITAKUNYE JA: This is an appeal against both conviction and sentence.
The appellant was convicted of two counts of murder with actual intent committed in
aggravating circumstances and sentenced to death by the High Court sitting at Bulawayo on
11 July 2018. At the conclusion of hearing of the appeal we dismissed the appeal against both
conviction and sentence. We indicated that reasons will follow in due course. These are our
reasons.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant was arraigned before the High Court (court a quo) sitting at
Bulawayo facing two counts of murder committed in contravention of s 47 of the Criminal
Law (Codification and Reform) Act [ Chapter 9:23], (hereinafter referred to as the Code) in
aggravating circumstances.
Judgment No. SC 114/21
Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 2
The allegations were that in January 2017, on two separate dates, the appellant
shot and killed Mboneli Joko Ncube and Cyprian Kadzurunga who were his friends. In the
first count, on 12 January 2017 the appellant picked up his neighbour Mboneli Joko Ncube
and one Terence Kajese outside Alasko Supermarket at the corner of Robert Mugabe Way
and 11 th Avenue in Bulawayo. The appellant was driving his Nissan Gloria motor vehicle
registration number ACV 8914. The appellant drove with the two to Burnside where he
dropped off Terence after which he drove to Hillside Shopping Centre with Mboneli. The two
thereafter drove to number 13 West Mount Road, Burnside Bulawayo where, upon arrival,
the appellant drew an Optima shotgun serial number 13752 from his motor vehicle, and shot
Mboneli Joko Ncube twice on the chest. The deceased died on the spot.
After gunning down the deceased, the appellant mutilated his body into various
parts before burying some of the dismembered parts in four different shallow graves at that
property. He took some of the parts away.
On the second count the allegations were that on 29 January 2017 in the
afternoon, the appellant visited the deceased at his home in Queenspark, Bulawayo. The two
then left that home on a walk as friends. As the two were walking along a footpath linking
Glengary and Queenspark East in Bulawayo, the appellant again armed with the same Optima
shotgun which he used to shoot Mboneli Joko Ncube, shot Cyprian Kadzurunga twice on the
head and abdomen causing his death. Thereafter, the appellant robbed the deceased of his
LG cell phone and Asus laptop which items he later tasked another individual to sell. The
appellant then ferried the body of the deceased in a wheelbarrow to his motor vehicle where
he bundled the body into the boot of his motor vehicle before driving to number 13 West
Mount Road Burnside Bulawayo. When he arrived there, he again buried the body at that
Judgment No. SC 114/21
Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 3
address after hiring two individuals to dig a shallow grave which he misled them to believe
was for other innocuous purposes. The appellant also took some body parts before burying
the body in the shallow grave.
The appellant’s defence was to the effect that when he killed both deceased
persons, he was drinking alcohol, injecting himself with heroine, and also taking crystal
meth. It was his defence that he was intoxicated during the commission of the offences. In the
first count, as he was in the company of the deceased he felt an urge to kill someone and he
was of the belief that if he did so he would get crazy. He also indicated that after committing
the second offence under the alleged intoxication he later became sad and regretful for what
he had done.
In its detailed analysis of the evidence the court a quo found that the appellant
had given contradictory testimony. In respect of the first count the account given in his
defence outline differed materially from the one he gave in his evidence in chief. In his
evidence in chief, he stated that he went to the shops to meet a drug dealer from whom he got
heroine and crystal meth. He wanted a convenient discreet place to take the drugs and the
deceased advised him to go to number 13 West Mount Road, Burnside, Bulawayo where he
claimed he then took the drugs and got high. He claimed that after taking the drugs he started
seeing “Lucifer” who then instructed him to kill the deceased, cut up the body, and consume
the liver. He went on to say that he did a number of things upon Lucifer’s command. It was
no longer his own desire to get crazy upon killing someone per his defence outline. Similar
contradictions were noted in respect of the second count. He now said he was working under
the command of Lucifer yet this was not in his defence outline.
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 4
The court a quo also noted that under cross examination the appellant refused to
answer critical questions alleging that he had made a pact with Lucifer never to tell anyone.
The court a quo also noted that it was not in dispute that the appellant shot and
killed the two deceased persons. His only defence was that he did it upon the devil’s
instruction and he was under the influence of drugs hence his claim that he was mentally
unstable at the material time.
The insanity defence was thrown out on the basis that the appellant was examined
on 16 November 2017, at the instance of the court itself, and the medical practitioners who
examined him concluded that he was fully alert and oriented in all aspects; and that he was
mentally stable and fit to stand trial.
The court a quo threw out the appellant’s defence and found him guilty of murder
with actual intent. It found that the murders were committed in aggravating circumstances
that immensely outweighed the mitigatory circumstances. It sentenced him to death in terms
of s 47(4) of the Code as read with s 337 and 338 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Act [Chapter 9:07].
As regards his mental state at the time of the commission of the offences, the
court a quo held that the meticulous planning and execution of the crimes by the appellant
pointed to a person who was in full control of his mental faculties.
Aggrieved by the findings of the court a quo , the appellant lodged the present
appeal on a single ground alleging that the court a quo erred and seriously misdirected itself
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 5
in convicting him on two counts of murder when there was cogent evidence that he was
mentally incapacitated to appreciate the implications of his actions at the material time of
committing the said offences.
THE ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
Whether or not the court a quo erred and misdirected itself in not finding that the
appellant was mentally incapacitated at the time of commission of the offences.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
The issue of the appellant’s mental capacity to stand trial was determined by the
court a quo after ordering that he be examined. Both medical practitioners determined that he
was of sound mind. However, it was appellant’s submission on appeal that the court a quo
should have assessed whether he was mentally sound at the time of commission of the
offences and not whether he was mentally stable to stand trial. Counsel for the appellant
submitted that the circumstances in which the appellant caused the death of the two deceased
persons were out of the ordinary or expected human behaviour and as such show that he
suffered from mental incapacity at the time of commission of the crimes.
Per contra, counsel for the respondent submitted that the essential elements for
the offences were proven. Counsel further submitted that where one relies on the defence of
insanity, the burden rests on him/her to prove that he/she suffered from mental incapacity at
the relevant time in terms of the proviso to s 18(4) of the Code. In casu, Counsel submitted
that the appellant failed to place such evidence before the court a quo . Counsel contended
that a mere say so of one’s lack of mental capacity does not suffice and that in terms of the
proviso to s 225 of the Code, a verdict that a person was mentally disordered will not be
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 6
returned if the person’s mind was only temporarily disordered or disabled by the effects of
alcohol or a drug.
The record of proceedings shows that the court a quo ordered that the appellant’s
mental capacity be examined which resulted in the two medical reports that were placed
before it. The reports confirmed that the appellant was of sound mind and fit to stand trial.
Further to the medical reports, the court a quo made factual findings which supported the
position that the appellant was of sound mind when he committed the said crimes. It found
that after killing the first deceased, the appellant hid the body at the property after which he
drove about 15 kilometres to Glengary suburb, Bulawayo. He also went to the deceased’s
home to look for him so that he could throw off suspicion. He then sent an SMS
(text message) to the deceased’s relative using the deceased’s mobile phone number
pretending to be the deceased informing them that he was fleeing from the police to
South Africa. He did this again to distance himself from the crime. He dug graves to hide the
dismembered body parts showing that he was fully aware of his actions.
On count two, after killing his victim, the appellant drove all the way to town to
pick up two people to assist him to dig the grave and lied to them that he needed a dump pit.
Later, the appellant hired another person to fill up the pit and lied to him that the pit was
abandoned by plumbers who were working there. He then asked this individual to sell the
deceased’s laptop instead of selling it himself in order to distance himself from the offence.
He again sent an SMS to the second deceased’s mother pretending to be the second deceased
informing her that he was fleeing from members of the army who wanted to kill him because
of some sensitive information he had hence he was going to South Africa.
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 7
The act of sending messages to his victims’ relatives was aimed at ensuring that
the families of the deceased persons would not look for the deceased believing that they had
fled to South Africa. The appellant also lied to the police and misled them about his contact
with the second deceased. Before being charged with the crimes, the appellant attempted to
escape from police custody upon realising that his cover was about to be blown.
The above sequence of events shows that the appellant had planned to commit the
offences. He carefully chose his victims, led them to isolated places where he killed them and
buried parts of their remains that he had no use for at the same property where he was the
caretaker. He cannot be taken to have been mentally incapacitated in the circumstances. His
mental faculties were fully functional.
What is more condemnatory or damning is the fact that the appellant executed the
offences and cover-ups over a number of days. He could not have been under the influence of
drugs at all material times. Assessed cumulatively, the appellant’s actions point to the fact
that he executed the offences with craftiness and precision. From taking the gun from his
mother’s place, hiding the bodies, hiring help, looking for the first deceased after killing him,
to sending messages to deceased’s relatives pretending to be the deceased persons all point to
meticulous planning by someone of sound mind. I am of the view that this illustrates the
point that the appellant was in full control of his senses when he executed the crimes. In that
light, the court a quo cannot be faulted for finding, in the face of such overwhelming
evidence before it, that the appellant was mentally stable at the time of committing the
crimes.
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 8
It is a settled position of the law that an appellate court will not interfere with
factual findings made by a lower court unless those findings were grossly unreasonable in the
sense that no reasonable tribunal applying its mind to the same facts would have arrived at
the same conclusion, or the lower court had taken leave of its senses or the decision is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic that no sensible person having applied his or her mind to
the question to be decided could have arrived at the decision. See ZINWA v Mwoyounotsva
SC 28/15. In casu, there was no such misdirection.
The appellant’s appeal also related to the sentence imposed by the court a quo .
The court a quo sentenced the appellant to death after considering the manner in which he
executed the crimes. In terms of s 47 (2) of the Code, it is an aggravating circumstance in
terms of which a court convicting an accused person may impose capital punishment, if the
murder was committed in the course of or in connection with or as a result of the commission
of a robbery. In the second count, the victim was robbed of his property thus aggravating his
case. Further, it is an aggravating circumstance if the murder was one of a series of two or
more murders committed by the accused over any period of time. In terms of s 47 (3) of the
Code, a court may also regard it as an aggravating circumstance with the same effect on
sentence if the murder was premeditated. In the Court’s view, all these circumstances exist in
the manner in which the two victims were killed underscoring the very serious nature of the
offences.
Two people were killed and their remains disposed of in similar circumstances
within a period of only seventeen days in January 2017 pointing to propensity to commit
murder. In fact, some of the victims’ body parts were carted away to an unknown place and
the appellant was not willing to disclose where the missing parts were taken to. Though the
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 9
appellant claimed to have consumed some of the parts, this was a bare assertion and, in any
case, there were still some parts he refused to account for. He showed no remorse by refusing
to explain what he did with those other missing parts stating that he had made a vow to
“Lucifer” not to speak about what happened. This bordered on arrogance as the medical
practitioners determined that he was of sound mind to stand trial. The appellant may have
killed the deceased for any other motives including harvesting of parts for nefarious ritual
purposes.
In Muhomba v The State SC 57/13 at p9, MALABA DCJ (as he then was)
reiterated that:-
“On the question of sentence, it has been said time and again, that sentencing is a
matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court would not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion merely on the ground that it would have
imposed a different sentence had it been sitting as a trial court. There has to be
evidence of a serious misdirection in the assessment of sentence by the trial court for
the appellate court to interfere with the sentence and assess it afresh. The allegation, in
this case, is that the sentence imposed is unduly harsh and induces a sense of shock.”
It is not enough for the Appellant to argue that the sentence imposed is too severe
because that alone is not misdirection and the appellate court would not interfere with a
sentence merely because it would have come up with a different sentence. In S v Nhumwa S-
40-88 (unreported) at p 5 of the cyclostyled judgment this court stated that:
“It is not for the court of appeal to interfere with the discretion of the sentencing court
merely on the ground that it might have passed a sentence somewhat different from that
imposed. If the sentence complies with the relevant principles, even if it is more severe
than one that the court would have imposed sitting as a court of first instance, this Court
will not interfere with the discretion of the sentencing court.”
In casu, the appellant has not shown that the court a quo did not exercise its
discretion judiciously. The court considered that the manner in which the appellant executed
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Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 10
the murders and covered them up pointed to someone who was in control of his mental
faculties. As such the penalty imposed upon him was proper in the circumstances. There is no
evidence of mental incapacity to warrant a special verdict. One does not create mental
incapacity by blaming the heinous crimes on ‘Lucifer’ and refusing to shed more light to
critical questions on how the crimes were committed and motives thereof. The court a quo
cannot be faulted for the sentence it imposed.
A point of concern is that upon finding the appellant guilty of murder with actual
intent on both counts of murder the court a quo passed one sentence of death. This is an
improper method of sentencing an offender with two or more counts of murder. A
complication would arise if for instance the appellant’s appeal was to succeed on one count
and fail on the other count. Where it is intended to impose a death sentence the proper
approach is to impose the death sentence on each count separately. See S v Dube 1992(1)
ZLR 234(S). In as far as the appeal as a whole has no merit no complication will arise
warranting resentencing the appellant.
The conviction and sentence in respect of both counts are hereby confirmed.
DISPOSITION
It was for the above reasons that we found that the appeal against both
convictions and sentence had no merit and dismissed the appeal.
GWAUNZA DCJ : I agree
Judgment No. SC 114/21
Criminal Appeal No. SCB 160/19 11
MATHONSI JA : I agree
Tanaka Law Chambers, appellants’ legal practitioners
National Prosecuting Authority, respondent’s legal practitioners
