
Criminal appeal
Richards and Others v R (WACA CR APP 6 of 1956) [1956] SLCA 3 (5 June 1956)
Richards and Others v R is a criminal appeal from Sierra Leone on 5 June 1956. Cite it as [1956] SLCA 3. Search it by the party names, the citation [1956] SLCA 3, or Sierra Leone criminal appeal.
Sierra Leone — Court of AppealPDF · 228 KB[1956] SLCA 3Criminal appeal
June 5, 1956
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Richards and Others
Appellant
v.
R
Respondent
WACA CR APP 6 of 1956
[1956] SLCA 3
Proceeding. Criminal appeal. Sierra Leone.
RICHARDS v. R., 1950-56 ALR S.L. 437
W.A.C.A.
RICHARDS, NORMAN and CUMMINGS-JOHN v. REGINAM
WEST AFRICAN CouRT oF APPEAL (Coussey, P., Korsah, C.J. (G.C.)
and Luke, J. (Sierra Leone)): June 5th, 1956
(W.A.C.A. Cr. App. No. 6/56) 5
[I] Criminal Law-libel-justification-burden on accused to prove truth
of defamatory statement and public benefit from publication: In
criminal libel a plea of justification, which is a special plea by virtue
of s.6 of the Libel Act, 1843, has the effect of shifting the evidential
burden on to the accused to establish that the matter alleged was
true and that publication was for the benefit of the public (page
439, line 36-page 440, line 5).
[2] Criminal Law-libel-justification-plea amounts to admission of
defamatory nature of matter charged: Under the special plea of
justification provided by s.6 of the Libel Act, 1843, the accused admits
publication of the libel charged and its defamatory nature; and the
court cannot therefore be called upon to find that the matter was
defamatory if. the accused fails to establish the truth of matter
charged or that it was published for the benefit cf the public (page
440, lines 9-41).
[3] Criminal Procedure-pleas-justification in libel proceedings-justifi
cation amounts to admission of defamatory nature of matter charged:
See [2] above.
[ 4] Criminal Procedure-pleas-justification in libel proceedings-justifi
cation shifts burden of proof to accused: See [1] above.
[5] Evidence-burden of proof-criminal cases-facts peculiarly within
knowledge of accused-justification in libel proceedings-burden on
accused: See [1] above.
The appellants were charged m the Supreme Court with pub
lishing a defamatory libel.
The complainant published several articles critical of an
organisation known as the Sierra Leone Women's Movement, of
·which the appellants were members, and also critical of the appel
lants themselves. The appellants then published matter concerning
the complainant, in which they alleged that he had approached
them before publication of the articles, threatened to destroy their
organisation and asked for money in return for which he would
tone down the articles. The appellants were charged with criminal
libel, pleaded not guilty and entered the special plea of justification
provided by s.6 of the Libel Act, 1843. At the trial the prosecution
proved publication by the appellants, but the appellants failed to
437
10
20
25
30
35
40
THE AFRiCAN LAW REPORTS
establish the truth of the matter published or that it was published
in the public interest. They were convicted and bound over to
keep the peace.
On their appeal against conviction, the West African Court of
5 Appeal considered the evidentiary effect of the special plea of
justification and whether, if it failed, the court still had to find
that the published matter was capable of a defamatory meaning.
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Case referred to:
(1) Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty (1882), 7 App. Cas. 741; 47 L.T.
662.
Legislation construed:
Libel Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict., c.96), s.6:
" ... [ 0 ]n the trial of any indictment or information for a defamatory
libel . . . the truth of the matters charged may be inquired into, but
shall not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that
the said matters charged should be published; and ... it shall be
necessary for the defendant . . . to allege the truth of the said matters
charged in the manner now required in pleading a justification to an
action for defamation ... ; and ... if after such plea the defendant shall
be convicted on such indictment or information it shall be competent
to the court, in pronouncing sentence, to consider whether the guilt
of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the said plea . . . Pro
vided always, that the truth of the matters charged in the alleged
libel complained of by such indictment or information shall in no
case be inquired into without such plea of justification: Provided
also, that in addition to such plea it shall be competent to the defendant
to plead a plea of not guilty . . . ."
Zizer for the appellants;
Smythe for the Crown.
COUSSEY, P. delivering the judgment of the court:
The three appellants were convicted in the Supreme Court of
Sierra Leone at the Freetown Criminal Sessions on February 27th,
1956 of criminal libel, and each was ordered to enter into a bond
of £10 to keep the peace, etc., for one year and to come up for
sentence if called upon within that period. They appealed against
their convictions and, after hearing Mr. Zizer on their behalf, we
dismissed the appeal without calling on counsel for the respondent
and intimated that our reasons would be filed. We now give the
reasons for dismissing the appeal.
438
RICHARDS v. R., 1950-56 ALR S.L. 437 W.A.C.A.
Besides setting out the actual words of the defamatory matter
complained of, the indictment averred as innuendoes that the words
meant that the complainant was guilty of the offence of threatening
to publish with intent to extort and was guilty of dishonourable
conduct and/or of robbing the Women's Movement. After pleas 5
of not guilty had been taken, the appellants applied for, and were
granted, leave to add a plea of justification which they did in the
following terms :
"PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION.
Patience Richards, Clarice Norman and Constance Cum- 10
mings-John say they are not guilty, and for a further plea they
say that all the defamatory matters alleged in the indictment
are true.
PARTICULARS
1. On a day in October 1954, Bamikole Sawyerr called on 15
the defendants and other members of the Sierra Leone Women's
Movement at No. 3, George Street, Freetown, and informed
them that he had in his possession certain newspaper articles
handed to him by a certain Stella Ralph J ames for publication
in a newspaper called The Hurricane of which he was the 20
proprietor and editor.
2. The said Bamikole Sawyerr further said that the publica
tion of the said articles would destroy the goods of and break
the Sierra Leone Women's Movement and that he was prepared
to modify the articles if he was given monetary consideration. 25
This the accused refused to accede to.
3. And all the accused say it was for the public benefit
that the defamatory matters charged in the said indictment
should be published by reason of the fact that the Sierra Leone
Women's Movement is a body whose object is the promotion 30
of the welfare of all women in Sierra Leone and is open to
membership by all women, and by reason of the fact that
Bamikole Sawyerr had published and did publish in the said
Hurrioane articles derogatory of the accused and of the Sierra
Leone Women's Movement." 35
At the trial the prosecution proved the publication and then the
appellants assumed the burden of offering evidence in support of
the pleas of truth and publication in the public interest.
In criminal libel a plea of justification, which is a special plea
by virtue of s.6 of the Libel Act, 1843, has the effect of shifting 40
the evidential burden, since on that issue it is peculiarly within the
439
THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
power and knowledge of the accused to prove the truth of the matter
alleged in justification. As Archbold states in Criminal Pleading,
Evidence & Practice, 33rd ed. at 1332 (1954): "Where the prisoner
pleads justification, he virtually becomes the accuser and must
5 establish the truth of the accusation or be found guilty."
The appellants' evidence fell far short of establishing the truth
of the matter published or that it was published in the public
interest and they were convicted, as already stated.
In arguing the appeal, Mr. Zizer submitted that by this plea in
10 justification the appellants denied, or intended to deny, the innuen
does in the indictment set forth; alternatively, that if it could be
held that the plea of justification had the effect of admitting the
innuendoes, the court had still to find in law that the words were
capable of the defamatory meaning alleged in the innuendoes. He
15 referred to Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty (1). Mr. Zizer further
argued that even if the special plea of justification failed, the
appellants could still fall back on the general plea of not guilty,
and that the court was bound expressly to find that the words were
defamatory.
20 These submissions are based on a misconception of the effect
of a plea under the Libel Act. Under a plea of not guilty some
of the defences open to the accused are that the matter published
is not defamatory or that it does not bear the innuendo alleged.
Under the special plea, however, he admits the publication and that
25 it is defamatory, but sets out to prove the truth of the matter
charged. At common law the truth of a defamatory libel was no
defence. It is only the Libel Act, 1843 that accorded to the
accused the privilege of establishing, as a defence, the truth of the
publication. In this case the plea, in itself, admitted that the matter
30 charged was defamatory; it admitted the innuendoes charged in
the indictment; indeed, the words employed by the appellants are
"and for a further plea they say that all the defamatory matters
alleged in the indictment are true." The appellants cannot be
heard to say that they did not know what they were pleading to.
35 It follows that when the court, rightly in our opinion, found on
the evidence that it had not been proved that the words were true
or published for the public benefit, the court was not called upon
again to find that the very matter was defamatory, which the
defence, by the plea, had already admitted. In our opinion Mr.
40 Zizer' s is an untenable proposition. The appellants could not
re-open this issue.
440
RICHARDS v. R., 1950-56 ALR S.L. 4137
W.A.C.A.
The plea of justification in this case in fact precluded the
defendant from making a no case submission upon the bare proof
of publication of the defamatory matter.
When convicting the appellants, the learned Chief Justice
exercised a discretion under s.6 of the Libel Act in binding over 5
the appellants as he did. In our opinion the appellants would
have been well advised, in all the circumstances, not to re-open this
matter by way of appeal as they did.
Appeal dismissed.
441
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
