Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Another (Land Cause 104 of 2018; MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024) [2026] MWSC 6 (18 August 2026)

MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAWI SITTING AT BLANTYRE MSCA CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17 OF 2024 (Being an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Malawi, Civil Division, Lilongwe, in Land Cause No. 104 of 2018) BETWEEN: RAMESH THAKOR PATEL………………..................................… APPELLANT - and - RUTH M. LOURENCO .....................................................… 1ST RESPONDENT RICH LOURENCO .........................................................……. 2ND RESPONDENT MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 2 CORAM: Hon. Chief Justice R.R. Mzikamanda SC Hon. Deputy Chief Justice L.P. Chikopa SC Hon. Justice F.E. Kapanda SC, JA Hon. Justice H.S.B. Potani SC, JA Hon. Justice I. Chatha Kamanga SC, JA Hon. Justice M.C.C. Mkandawire SC, JA Hon. Justice S.A. Kalembera SC, JA Hon. Justice R. Mbvundula SC, JA Hon. Justice D. nyaKaunda Kamanga SC, JA J. Chiume, For the Appellant Mabutwa, for the Respondent W. Shaibu & J. Tchukambiri, Judicial Research Officers M. Mthunzi, C. Fundani & R. Chirundu, Court Clerks B. Pendame & E. Banda, Court Reporters Date of hearing: 5 May 2026 Date of Judgement: 18th August, 2026 MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 3 _____________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT _____________________________________________________________________ Justice FE Kapanda SC,JA: (with Hon. Chief Justice Mzikamanda SC; Hon. Deputy Chief Justice Chikopa SC; Hon. Justice Potani SC, JA; Hon. Justice Chatha Kamanga SC, JA ; Hon. Justice Mkandawire SC, JA ; Hon. Justice Kalembera SC, JA ; Hon. Justice Mbvundula SC, JA; Hon. Justice nyaKaunda Kamanga SC, JA concurring) INTRODUCTION This appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Malawi, Civil Division, sitting at Lilongwe, in Land Cause No. 104 of 2018. At the centre of the dispute is the former intimate relationship between the Appellant, Mr Ramesh Thakor Patel, and the 1st Respondent, Ms Ruth M. Lourenco. The dispute is not simply about a failed personal relationship. It concerns the legal and beneficial ownership of a number of immovable properties acquired, managed, or dealt with during and after that relationship. The properties were registered in the names of the Respondents or were otherwise claimed by them. The Appellant’s case, however, is that registration did not reflect the true beneficial ownership. He contends that, although legal title stood in the Respondents’ names, the circumstances of acquisition, the source of purchase funds, the subsequent management of the properties, and the conduct of the parties showed that the Respondents held the properties, or some of them, for his benefit. The 1st Respondent’s position was different. She asserted entitlement to the properties on the basis of registration, her own alleged financial capacity, and the nature of her relationship with the Appellant. The 2nd Respondent was joined because of an alleged interest in one of the properties, namely Title No. Bwaila 47/162. The High Court MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 4 accepted, in material respects, the Respondents’ position and made orders adverse to the Appellant. The appeal therefore requires this Court to consider whether the High Court properly evaluated the evidence and applied the correct legal principles. In particular, the Court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to raise a presumption of resulting trust, whether that presumption was rebutted by proof of payment or donative intention, and whether the orders made in favour of the Respondents were supported by the evidence properly before the Court. The central question is whether the Respondents were the true beneficial owners of the properties, as the High Court found, or whether they held them on resulting trust for the Appellant. That question cannot be answered by looking at registration alone. Registration establishes legal title, but the appeal is concerned with the deeper equitable question of beneficial ownership. The Appellant’s case is that the properties were acquired in circumstances which gave rise to a resulting trust. He says he provided the purchase money, remained in possession or practical control, managed the properties, dealt with tenants, paid outgoings, and treated the properties as his own. On that basis, he argues that the Respondents’ registered title did not carry with it full beneficial ownership, but was held for his benefit. The Respondents’ position is that registration reflected the true ownership of the properties. They relied on the 1st Respondent’s alleged financial capacity, the parties’ personal relationship, and the fact that title was placed in their names. The issue for this Court, therefore, is whether that evidence was sufficient to defeat the equitable inference arising from the Appellant’s alleged contribution and subsequent conduct. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 5 The appeal turns on the distinction between legal title and beneficial entitlement. If the evidence shows that the Appellant provided the purchase money and that the surrounding circumstances were inconsistent with an outright gift, equity may treat the registered holders as trustees for him. If, on the other hand, the Respondents proved that the 1st Respondent funded the acquisitions or that the Appellant intended to make the properties gifts, the High Court’s conclusion would stand. The question, therefore, is not simply whose names appeared on the title documents. It is whether, on the evidence as a whole, the Respondents held the properties for themselves or for the Appellant. The Appellant argues that the learned Judge fell into error both in law and on the facts. He says the resulting trust claim was wrongly rejected, that the personal relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent was treated as though it were suff icient proof of a gift, and that the burden of proof was wrongly approached. He also challenges the order made in favour of the 2nd Respondent over Title No. Bwaila 47/162, contending that no such order could properly be made when the 2nd Respondent placed no evidence before the Court to establish his entitlement. BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY The background may be stated shortly. The Appellant and the 1st Respondent were in an intimate relationship during the 1980s and early 1990s. During that period, several properties, including Alimaunde 10/386 and Alimaunde 10/387, were acquired and registered in the 1st Respondent’s name. The Appellant’s case was that registration in the 1st Respondent’s name did not reflect beneficial ownership, but was a matter of convenience or arrangement between the parties. The properties in issue included the Alimaunde plots and the Bwaila plots. The Appellant asserted that he funded the acquisition and development of the properties. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 6 The 1st Respondent asserted that she acquired and developed them with her own resources and that the Appellant’s involvement was either assistance arising from their relationship or later management while she was outside Malawi. In 1992, the Appellant purchased a lakeshore property in Salima from Mr Peter Bachu Patrick Bagwanji. The relevance of that transaction lies not only in the Salima property itself, but also in the evidence it provides concerning the Appellant’s capacity an d practice in relation to property acquisition during the relevant period. The relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent ended around 1993. Thereafter, the Appellant contended that he continued in possession and control of the properties, paid city rates, dealt with tenants, and managed the properties as beneficia l owner. The 1st Respondent’s position was that she remained the registered and beneficial proprietor, and that the Appellant merely managed the properties while she lived abroad. The dispute crystallised on or about 15 January 2018, when the 1st Respondent allegedly entered the properties, blocked access between plots, and asserted control. On 2 February 2018, the Appellant commenced proceedings by writ in the High Court. He sought possession, mesne profits, damages for trespass, and removal of cautions lodged against the titles. The 1st Respondent filed an amended defence and counterclaim in 2019. She asserted independent acquisition and alleged that transfers of title to the Appellant had been fraudulently procured around 2013. The Appellant filed an amended reply asserting that the properties were held on resulting trust because he had provided the purchase price and had retained beneficial control. The matter proceeded to trial before Hon. Justice Ruth Chinangwa. The High Court substantially accepted the Respondents’ case and entered judgment in favour of the 1st Respondent in respect of most of the properties and in favour of the 2nd Respondent in respect of Title No. Bwaila 47/162. The Appellant now appeals against that decision. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 7 THE GROUNDS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL The grounds of appeal, read fairly and without undue technicality, raise the following issues for determination: 1. whether the Respondents were properly before this Court having regard to the manner in which their skeleton arguments were filed; 2. whether the omission of certain exhibits from the record of appeal prevents this Court from conducting a proper rehearing; 3. whether the Appellant established that he provided the purchase price for the disputed properties so as to raise a presumption of resulting trust; 4. whether the intimate relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent gave rise to a presumption or inference of gift sufficient to displace a resulting trust; 5. whether the Respondents discharged the burden of rebutting any presumption of resulting trust by proving gift or independent acquisition; 6. whether the trial court properly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence; 7. whether the trial court was right to grant relief to the 2nd Respondent in relation to Title No. Bwaila 47/162; and 8. what consequential relief should follow. PRELIMINARY ISSUES Filing of skeleton arguments A preliminary complaint was raised concerning the Respondents’ skeleton arguments. The complaint was that the skeleton arguments were not properly filed in this Court, but were instead filed in the court below. That complaint cannot be treated as a mere technicality. It goes to the orderly conduct of appellate proceedings. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 8 Practice Direction No. 1 of 2010 was issued specifically to regulate the filing and use of skeleton arguments in the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal. It requires parties, in appeals and related matters before this Court, to file skeleton arguments with “the Court” within the prescribed time and to serve the opposing party within the same period. In substantive appeals, the appellant is required to file skeleton arguments within fourteen days after filing the appeal, and the respondent is required to file ske leton arguments within fourteen days after service of the appellant’s skeleton arguments. In interim or related applications, the prescribed period is seven days. The Practice Direction also provides that skeleton arguments must briefly set out the facts, the legal arguments, and the authorities on which counsel intends to rely. The purpose of these requirements is not ornamental 1. Appellate procedure exists to ensure that the Court, and the opposing party, know in advance the case that is to be advanced on appeal. Skeleton arguments are intended to identify the real issues, define the points of law and fact, disclose the authorities to be relied upon, and assist the Court in preparing for an efficient and focused hearing. Filing them in the court below does not satisfy that purpose. The appeal is before this Court, not the court whose decision is under challenge. It is this Court t hat must be placed in a position to consider the arguments, prepare for the hearing, and regulate the appeal. The point is therefore one of procedural discipline and fairness. A party who files skeleton arguments in the wrong forum deprives the appellate court of the assistance which the Practice Direction requires and may also place the opposing party at a procedural disadvantage. The Court’s directions on skeleton arguments are part of the machinery by which appellate justice is administered. They are not optional courtesies, nor are they matters of form without consequence. In the present matter, the Respondents did not properly file their skeleton arguments in this Court. No satisfactory explanation was placed before the Court for that default. Nor 1 Roads Authority and Another v Al-Abdulhadi Engineering Consultancy, Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023, where this Court stated that skeleton arguments should not be entertained until the record of appeal has been transmitted and the matter is properly before the Supreme Court of Appeal. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 9 was there a formal application seeking the Court’s indulgence, waiver, abridgement, or regularisation of the non -compliance. The consequence is governed by the Practice Direction itself. It provides that where a respondent fails to comply, the Court shall proceed to hear and determine the appeal or application, as the case may be, without hearing the respondent. The Court therefore upholds the preliminary complaint. The Respondents are not entitled, as of right, to be heard on the basis of skeleton arguments filed in the wrong court. To hold otherwise would reduce compliance with the Practice Direction to a matter of convenience and would undermine the very purpose for which skeleton arguments are required in this Court. Accordingly, the Court declines to hear the Respondents in this appeal. The appeal shall proceed on the basis of the record properly before this Court and the Appellant’s arguments. The Respondents’ purported skeleton arguments, having not been properly filed in this Court, are disregarded for purposes of the hearing. Further, as this Court emphasised in Dzinyemba t/a Tirza Enterprise v Total (Mw) Ltd, MSCA Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2013, the orderly formulation and prosecution of grounds of appeal is central to appellate discipline. An appeal is not a rehearing at large. It is a structured challenge to a decision of a lower court. For that reason, the grounds of appeal must identify, with reasonable precision, the particular errors of law, fact, principle, or procedure said to have vitiated the judgment appealed against. That approach is reinforced by Order III rule 2 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules, which requires grounds of appeal to be framed with sufficient clarity to disclose the real complaints placed before the Court. The rule is not a matter of drafting elegance. It serves a substantive procedural purpose. It enables the respondent to know the case it must meet. It enables the Court to identify the issues requiring determination. It also MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 10 prevents an appellant from converting the appeal into a roaming criticism of the judgment below, unsupported by properly formulated grounds. A ground of appeal must therefore do more than express dissatisfaction with the outcome. It must point to the alleged error. A ground which is vague, argumentative, repetitive, or framed in general terms does not assist the Court. Nor does it assist the opposing party. Such a ground obscures rather than clarifies the dispute. It imposes an unfair burden on the respondent and risks wasting judicial time by requiring the Court to search for a complaint which the appellant has not properly articulated. The discipline required by Dzinyemba t/a Tirza Enterprise v Total (Mw) Ltd , MSCA Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2013 and by Order III rule 2 is especially important in this Court because appellate adjudication depends on properly joined issues. The Court is entitled to expect that the notice of appeal will define the boundaries of the appeal, and that counsel’s skeleton arguments will develop those grounds rather than introduce fresh, uncertain, or unpleaded complaints. Skeleton arguments are not a substitute for proper grounds of appeal. They are intended to assist the Court by clarifying and advancing grounds already properly taken. Accordingly, where grounds of appeal are not framed with the necessary clarity, the Court may decline to entertain them, strike them out, or treat them as abandoned if they are not properly pursued. This is not a denial of the right of appeal. It is the enforcement of the procedural discipline by which that right is exercised fairly, efficiently, and in accordance with the Rules. That said, procedural rules exist to serve, and not to defeat, the administration of justice. Where the defect is curable, causes no real prejudice, and the Court is otherwise able to identify and determine the issues, the Court may hear the matter on its merits. In the circumstances of this appeal, and given that the parties were heard fully, we decline to dispose of the appeal on this preliminary point alone. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 11 ADEQUACY OF THE RECORD A further concern was raised about the adequacy of the record of appeal. It was submitted that the record did not contain all the exhibits that were before the court below. That concern is not insignificant. A record of appeal is the foundation upon which appellate review is conducted. Where an appeal turns substantially on documentary evidence, the record ought, as far as practicable, to contain the material documents, exhibits, pleadings, proceedings, and orders necessary to enable this Court to understand the case that was tried and the basis upon which the court below reached its decision. The importance of a proper record is reflected in the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules. Order III contains provisions regulating the preparation and filing of the record of appeal. In particular, rule 9 sets out requirements concerning the record of appeal, including its preparation and form. The same procedural framework also recognises that the appeal is to proceed on the materials properly brought before the appellate court, subject only to the Court’s statutory powers in appropriate cases to receive or direct the taking of further evidence. Section 22 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act confirms that where the Court gives instructions for the taking of further evidence, it must do so in a manner that secures an opportunity for the parties to be heard on that further evidence. The point, therefore, is one of both procedure and fairness. An appellate court does not try the case afresh in the abstract. It reviews the decision appealed from by reference to the record placed before it. If material exhibits are omitted, the Court may be deprived of the very evidence by which it is asked to test the findings of the court below. That may be particularly serious where the appeal challenges findings based on documents, ownership records, payments, correspondence, conveyancing instruments, or other exhibits central to the dispute. In such a case, the omission of material exhibits may impede the Court’s ability to conduct the appellate rehearing required of it. At the same time, not every omission from the record is fatal. The consequence depends on the nature of the omitted material, the issue raised on appeal, whether the omission was caused by the party now relying on it, whether the parties settled the record , and whether the Court can still determine the real controversy on the evidence properly before it. The Court must distinguish between an omission that merely leaves the record imperfect and an omission that disables the Court from fairly determining the appeal. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 12 The former may affect weight. The latter may affect competence or the ability of the Court to decide the matter safely. In the present case, the record was settled by consent of the parties in May 2024. That is an important procedural fact. A party who has consented to the settled record cannot lightly complain, at the hearing of the appeal, that the Court should proceed as though documents outside that record were before it. The Court must approach the appeal on the basis of the evidence properly included in the record and properly referred to in argument. Where a party relies on a document that is not before this Court, th e point founded on that document necessarily carries reduced weight. The Court cannot speculate as to the contents, effect, authenticity, or probative value of a document not forming part of the appellate record. That said, the omissions identified in this appeal do not render the appeal incapable of determination. The central issue is a legal and evidential one: whether the evidence accepted by the court below, or otherwise available on the record before this Court, was sufficient to raise and sustain a resulting trust. That question can be answered by examining the pleaded case, the findings made, the oral and documentary evidence actually contained in the record, and the legal principles applicable to resulting trusts. A resulting trust is not presumed from mere assertion. It must arise from proved facts, ordinarily showing a contribution to the purchase price or circumstances from which the law infers that the person in whose name the property stands was not intended to take the beneficial interest absolutely. Where the record contains sufficient material to test whether such facts were proved, the Court is not disabled from determining the issue merely because some exhibits are absent. The absence of documents may weaken the party who bears the burden of establishing the trust, but it does not necessarily prevent the Court from deciding whether, on the record as settled, that burden was discharged. The Court therefore treats the complaint about missing exhibits with due seriousness, but within proper limits. The record ought to have been complete. A complete record is especially important where documentary evidence is central to the appeal. However, the record having been settled by consent, and the omitted exhibits not being shown to be indispensable to the determination of the central issue, the Court will proceed on the evidence properly before it. To the extent that any party invites the Court to draw conclusions from documents not included in the record, that invitation is declined. The MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 13 appeal will be determined on the settled record, and the absence of any material exhibit will be weighed against the party whose case depends upon it. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES The law on resulting trusts is settled in broad outline. As stated in E H Burn and G J Virgo, Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008). where one person provides the purchase money for property but the property is conveyed or registered in the name of another, equity presumes, in the absence of contrary intention, that the registered holder does not take the beneficial interest absolutely. The beneficial interest is presumed to revert to the person who provided the purchase money. In considering the applicable legal principles, it is essential to recognise that the presumption of a resulting trust operates within the framework of both factual findings and equitable reasoning. The Court must scrutinise not only the documentary evidence and financial contributions, but also the circumstances surrounding the acquisition and registration of the property, always mindful that the evidential inference may be displaced by credible proof of a contrary intention. This nuanced approach ensures that the determination of beneficial ownership is grounded in the realities of the parties’ dealings and the evidence available, rather than in abstract legal presumptions or assumptions. The analysis therefore proceeds from the established facts and the settled record, with careful attention to the interplay between legal title, contribution, and intention, as elucidated in the authorities and the evidence presented. The presumption of a resulting trust is not an inflexible or automatic rule that dictates ownership. Rather, it operates as an evidential inference that arises when there is credible evidence of a contribution to the purchase price of property, viewed in light of all the relevant surrounding circumstances. This means that, while the law may presume that a person who contributed funds toward the purchase of property is entitled to a beneficial interest, that presumption is not absolute and can be displaced. For example, the presumption may be rebutted if there is reliable evidence showing that the person whocontributed actually intended to make a gift to the registered owner, or if it is established that the registered proprietor acquired the property using their own resources, independently of any contribution from the claimant. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 14 It is crucial to distinguish between legal title and beneficial ownership in this context. Legal title refers to the formal registration of property in the name of a particular individual, which is strong evidence of ownership but not always conclusive as to who truly benefits from the property. Beneficial ownership, on the other hand, may reside in someone other than the registered owner, especially where equity recognizes that the property is held on trust for the contributor. The decision in Solomon v Wa lton, 109 Cal.App.2d 381 (1952), although not binding, persuasively demonstrates this distinction. In that case, the court acknowledged that while legal title may be vested in one person, the equitable or beneficial interest may belong to another, depending on the circumstances and the intentions of the parties involved. This principle underscores that equitable considerations can override the appearance of ownership reflected in title documents, ensuring that property rights are allocated according to subs tantive contributions and intentions rather than merely formal arrangements. Allocation of Evidential Burden The evidential burden in cases involving resulting trusts operates in distinct stages, reflecting both the ordinary law of evidence and equitable principles. Initially, the claimant bears the responsibility of producing evidence that demonstrates a contribution to the purchase price of the property or circumstances from which such a contribution can reasonably be inferred. This first step is critical, as it establishes the factual foundation necessary to raise the presumption of a resulting trust. Once the claimant has met this threshold and sufficient evidence has been adduced, the burden then shifts to the registered proprietor. At this stage, it is incumbent upon the registered owner to rebut the presumption by presenting credible proof that no beneficial interest was intended to pass to the claimant. This may involve demonstrating a contrary intention or showing that the contribution was meant as a gift, rather than as an investment in the property. This staged allocation of the burden is consistent with the framework outlined in E H Burn and G J Virgo, Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008), which describes the equitable foundation of purchase-money resulting trusts. By adhering to these principles, the Court ensures that MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 15 both factual and equitable considerations are properly addressed, allowing for a fair determination of beneficial ownership based on the evidence presented. Legal Title Versus Beneficial Ownership Registration serves as important evidence of legal title to property. The presence of a registered title is a strong indication of formal ownership, but it does not provide a complete answer as to who holds the true beneficial interest in the property. Equ ity recognizes circumstances in which one individual may be the registered owner, yet hold the property for the benefit of another. The reasoning articulated in Solomon v Walton 109 Cal.App.2d 381 (1952)underscores this distinction. While title documents are authoritative in identifying the legal owner of a property, they are not determinative of beneficial ownership. The equitable question of who is entitled to the beneficial interest must be addressed s eparately, taking into account the intentions of the parties and the underlying circumstances. Thus, the registration of title, though significant, does not necessarily resolve all questions about the allocation of beneficial rights in the property. Intimate Relationships and Intention to Transfer Property The presence of an intimate relationship between parties may be a relevant factor when assessing their intentions regarding property ownership. However, such a relationship, by itself, does not constitute definitive proof that a gift of property was intended. Courts must exercise caution before inferring that acts of assistance, expressions of affection, cohabitation, or any romantic connection automatically indicate an intention to transfer valuable proprietary rights. The determination of whether a transfer of beneficial ownership was intended requires a careful analysis of several elements. The inquiry must focus on the actual intentions of the parties, the nature and extent of any financial contribution, the credibili ty of the evidence presented, and the documentary support available. It is not appropriate for courts to substitute moral sympathy or speculative reasoning in place of these concrete factors. Instead, the decision must rest on credible evidence and establi shed facts, ensuring that property rights are allocated according to substantive contributions and MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 16 genuine intentions, rather than assumptions derived from the existence of a close personal relationship. Appellate Court Review of Findings of Fact An appellate court generally exercises caution when considering whether to interfere with findings of fact made by a trial court. This restraint is especially pronounced when the findings are rooted in assessments of witness credibility. The trial judge, having had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses firsthand, is in a unique position to evaluate their reliability and demeanor. As a result, appellate courts are typically reluctant to substitute their own judgment for that of the trial judge in these matters. The governing principle for appellate intervention was recently reaffirmed by this Court in the case of Mutharika & Electoral Commission v Chilima & Chakwera , MSCA Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2020. According to this authority, an appellate court is justified in overturning factual findings only where it is demonstrated that the lower court based its decision on an incorrect principle, misapplied the law, failed to take into account material evidence, or reached a conclusion that is not reasonably supported by the record. In such circumstances, the appellate court has both the responsibility and the authority to intervene and correct the error. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE The Appellant’s evidence The Appellant’s case rested on financial contribution, possession and control, and documentary material suggesting transfer or acknowledgement by the 1st Respondent. PW1, Mr Peter Bachu Patrick Bagwanji, gave evidence that he sold the Salima lakeshore property to the Appellant around 1992 and that the Appellant fully paid for it. That evidence supported the Appellant’s case that he was an active purchaser of property at the relevant time and undermined any broad suggestion that the 1st Respondent alone was responsible for all property acquisition associated with the parties. PW2, Ms Irene Jussab , who worked with the Appellant over a long period, gave evidence concerning administration of the properties, payment of rates, correspondence, and dealings with tenants. Her evidence was important because it placed the Appellant MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 17 in continuous practical control of the properties and identified correspondence attributed to the 1st Respondent authorising or acknowledging transfer of property to the Appellant, including in relation to Alimaunde 10/386. It is correct that PW2 accepted under cross -examination that she had limited personal knowledge of some title documents. That concession affects the scope, but not the entirety, of her evidence. On the approach to credibility and inconsistency reflected in Karim v R (1966-68) 4 ALR (Mal) 601 and Sinder v R (1968-70) 5 ALR (Mal) 212, the Court must assess whether an inconsistency goes to the root of the issue or merely limits the weight to be attached to a witness on a particular point. In our view, PW2 remained a significant witness on administration, possession, rates, correspondence, and dealings with tenants. PW3, Mr Ibrahim Jussab, gave evidence of long association with the Appellant and of his involvement in rent collection, construction, maintenance, and management works relating to the properties. His evidence was strongest on operational control rather than on the original legal arrangements. Nevertheless, it corroborated the Appellant’s case that he exercised the ordinary incidents of beneficial ownership over a sustained period. Other witnesses called on behalf of the Appellant were relied upon as confirming transactions and dealings relating to the properties. Their evidence was broadly consistent with the Appellant’s case on financial involvement and management. The cumulative effect of the Appellant’s evidence was not merely that he assisted the 1st Respondent; it was that he funded, controlled, maintained, and dealt with the properties in a manner consistent with beneficial ownership. The Respondents’ evidence The Respondents’ case was that the 1st Respondent had independent means and personally acquired and developed the properties. Ms Regina Dassi gave evidence that the 1st Respondent operated businesses, including shops, a salon, a boutique, trucks and transport activities. That evidence, if accepted, showed that the 1st Respondent had some commercial activity and possible financial capacity. Financial capacity, however, is not the same as proof of actual payment for the specific properties in dispute. The issue was not whether the 1st Respondent could have acquired property. The issue was whether she did, in fact, provide the purchase money for these MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 18 properties or whether the Appellant did. On that central question, the Respondents’ evidence remained largely general and circumstantial. Mr Abel Chithope, a relative of the 1st Respondent, gave evidence that the 1st Respondent constructed houses gradually and that family members were involved in building works, including brick moulding. He also accepted matters demonstrating partiality. Applying the common -sense approach to interested testimony reflected in Karim v R (1966-68) 4 ALR (Mal) 601 and Sinder v R (1968-70) 5 ALR (Mal) 212, , such evidence was not to be rejected merely because he was related to the 1st Respondent; but it required ca reful scrutiny and, where possible, corroboration by independent documentary material. The 1st Respondent’s own evidence was central. She accepted that the Appellant financed some of her business activities, though she maintained that the properties were hers. Her evidence was challenged on the basis of alterations to sworn statements and inconsistencies on important matters. Raymond Emson, Evidence, is useful on the treatment of inconsistent testimony: inconsistencies are not all of equal forensic value; their significance depends on whether they affect the central issue, whether they are explained, and whether they are supported or contradicted by contemporaneous documents. Whether A Resulting Trust Was Established On the evidence taken as a whole, this Court is satisfied that the Appellant met the threshold required to raise a presumption of resulting trust. The evidence did not rest on a bare assertion of ownership. It included direct purchase, financial contributi on, continued possession, payment of property -related expenses, management of tenants, and correspondence pointing to transfer or acknowledgment of the Appellant’s interest. Taken together, those matters were sufficient to establish a prima facie case that , although legal title stood in the Respondents’ names, they held that title for the benefit of the Appellant. The High Court appears to have given decisive weight to registration and to the personal relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent. With respect, that analysis did not go far enough. Registration proved legal title, but it did not, by itself, settle the MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 19 question of beneficial ownership. As Solomon v Walton 109 Cal.App.2d 381 (1952) shows, equity may recognise a beneficial interest in a person other than the registered proprietor. Similarly, E H Burn and G J Virgo, Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) explains the settled principle that where one person provides the purchase money but title is placed in another’s name, a presumption of resulting trust may arise unless the evidence rebuts it. The Respondents did not provide sufficient evidence that the 1st Respondent paid the purchase price for the specific properties in dispute. It was relevant that she carried on business, but that fact alone did not prove that she funded these particular acquisitions. Nor did the Respondents establish that the Appellant intended the properties to be gifts. There were no clear words to that effect, no contemporaneous documents, and no reliable surrounding circumstances from which such an intention could safely be inferred. The proper conclusion, therefore, is that the presumption of resulting trust was raised and remained unrebutted. The Respondents accordingly held the disputed properties on resulting trust for the Appellant. The Relationship between the Parties and the Alleged gift The intimate relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent was an important feature of the case. It helps explain why their dealings were not recorded with the formality one would expect in an arm’s -length commercial transaction. It also explains why the Appellant may have allowed properties to be registered in the 1st Respondent’s name without immediately insisting on formal transfer. But the relationship, by itself, could not turn a resulting trust into a gift. Given the value and character of the properties, there had to be clear evidence that the Appellant intended to give them away outright. The authorities discussed above, particul arly E H Burn and G J Virgo, Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) on purchase-money resulting trusts, direct attention to contribution and intention. They do not support any automatic conclusion that where a man finances property registered in the name of a woman with whom he is in an intimate relationship, he must have intended an absolute gift. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 20 The learned Judge gave the personal relationship more legal weight than it could properly bear. The relationship was certainly relevant. It formed part of the background and helped explain how the parties conducted themselves. It may account for the informality of their dealings, the absence of detailed documentation, the degree of trust between them, and the Appellant’s willingness to allow properties to be registered in the 1st Respondent’s name without immediately insisting on formal transfer. But context is not proof. The fact of an intimate relationship did not resolve the central question: who was intended to enjoy the beneficial ownership of the properties? That question had to be answered by examining contribution, intention, conduct, and t he surrounding circumstances as a whole. A personal relationship may explain why the title was placed in a particular name. It does not, without more, prove that the person who funded the acquisition intended to part with the beneficial interest altogether. The difficulty with the judgment of the court below is that the relationship was allowed to overshadow the equitable inquiry. Registration established legal title. The relationship explained the parties’ dealings. But neither of those matters, separately or together, removed the need to consider whether the Appellant’s financial contribution raised a resulting trust and, if it did, whether that presumption was displaced by clear evidence of an intention to make a gift. In the absence of such evidence, the personal relationship could not be treated as decisive of beneficial ownership. It was part of the factual setting, but it was not the legal answer. POSSESSION, CONTROL AND RATES The evidence of possession and control gave strong support to the Appellant’s case. His witnesses did not merely speak in general terms about ownership. They described the Appellant’s practical dealings with the properties: managing tenants, collecting ren t, arranging construction or maintenance works, paying rates and other outgoings, and exercising day-to-day control. That evidence mattered because it was consistent with MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 21 the conduct of a person who regarded the properties as his own, and who was treated by others as having authority over them. Those matters are not, by themselves, conclusive. A person may manage property on behalf of another. A person may collect rent as an agent. A person may pay expenses for reasons that fall short of ownership. The Court must therefore be careful not to treat possession or management as automatically establishing beneficial title. But in this case, the evidence of possession and control did not stand alone. It sat alongside evidence of purchase-money contribution and other dealings consistent with the Appellant’s beneficial interest. When those strands are read together, they reinforce one another. The financial evidence explains why the Appellant would have an equitable interest. The evidence of possession and control shows how that interest was acted upon in practice. In that sense, possession and control were important badges of beneficial ownership. They supported the inference that, although legal title stood in the Respondents’ names, the Appellant continued to exercise the rights and responsibilities associated wit h ownership. The Respondents’ registration of title was therefore not, on its own, sufficient to displace the broader evidential picture. The practical reality of how the properties were controlled, managed, and treated over time pointed strongly towards the Appellant’s case. The Respondents said the Appellant managed the properties only because the 1st Respondent was outside Malawi. That explanation was not impossible. In an intimate or trusted relationship, one person may manage property for another, particularly where the registered owner is abroad or otherwise unable to attend to day-to-day matters. But the difficulty with that explanation is that it was not sufficiently supported by the evidence. The Appellant’s involvement was not shown to have been a temporary convenience, a limited agency, or an arrangement confined to looking after the MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 22 properties during the 1st Respondent’s absence. His control appeared to be sustained, open, and consistent. He dealt with tenants, received or supervised rent, attended to construction or maintenance issues, paid outgoings, and exercised practical authorit y over the properties in a manner more consistent with ownership than with casual management. The Respondents’ explanation also did not adequately account for the character and duration of that control. If the Appellant was merely managing property beneficially owned by the 1st Respondent, one would have expected clearer evidence of that arrangement: instructions from the 1st Respondent, records of remittances, accounts rendered to her, acknowledgments that he was acting on her behalf, or other conduct showing that his role was subordinate to her beneficial ownership. The absence of such evidence weakened the Respondents’ case. Viewed against the whole record, the more probable inference is that the Appellant was not acting as a gratuitous caretaker of another person’s property. His conduct bore the hallmarks of a person asserting and exercising beneficial ownership. The fact tha t the 1st Respondent may have been outside Malawi explains why someone had to attend to the properties. It does not, without more, explain why the Appellant exercised such sustained and practical control over them as though they were his own. The 2nd Respondent and Title No. Bwaila 47/162 A separate and more specific difficulty arises from the order made in favour of the 2nd Respondent in respect of Title No. Bwaila 47/162. The 2nd Respondent was joined because he was said to have an interest in that property. That, however, was only the starting point. Joinder merely brought him before the court so that any alleged interest could be ventilated. It did not prove that he had such an interest, nor did it relieve him of the ordinary obligation to place evidence before the court. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 23 The problem is that the 2nd Respondent did not take the necessary evidential steps to establish his entitlement. He filed no witness statement. He did not testify. He was not subjected to cross-examination. He produced no documentary evidence showing how, when, or on what basis he acquired an interest in Title No. Bwaila 47/162. In those circumstances, there was no evidential foundation upon which the court could safely make a substantive order in his favour. That distinction matters. A person may be joined to proceedings because the pleadings suggest that he may be affected by the outcome. But once joined, he must still prove any positive claim he advances. The Court cannot move from the fact of joinder to a finding of entitlement. Nor can it treat allegations made by other parties, or assumptions appearing from the pleadings, as a substitute for evidence from the party whose rights are being recognised. The principle in Dzinyemba t/a Tirza Enterprise v Total (Mw) Ltd MSCA Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2013 is apposite in this broader procedural sense. Litigation, whether at trial or on appeal, must be disciplined by properly pleaded, properly identified, and properly proved issues. Courts do not adjudicate on impressions, loose assertions, or untested claims. Where property rights are in issue, especially rights affecting registered land or beneficial ownership, the need for proof is even more acute. The order in favour of the 2nd Respondent therefore suffers from a basic evidential weakness. It was not enough that he was said to have an interest in the property. It was not enough that he was made a party to the proceedings. The Court required evidence capable of establishing the nature and extent of his interest. In the absence of such evidence, the order could not properly stand. The safer and legally sound approach would have been to decline relief in his favour, or at the very least to refrain from making any positive declaration affecting Title No. Bwaila 47/162 for his benefit. A court may only grant relief on a proved case. Here, the MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 24 2nd Respondent’s alleged entitlement remained unproved. The order made in his favour therefore went beyond the evidence and cannot be sustained. A party who seeks proprietary relief must prove the facts on which that relief depends. That is a basic requirement of adjudication. A court does not confer, declare, or recognise an interest in land merely because a party has been joined to the proceedings or because another party has referred to that interest. There must be evidence showing the nature of the claim, how the interest is said to have arisen, and why the court should give effect to it. That requirement is particularly important where the relief concerns land. Proprietary orders carry serious consequences. They may affect title, possession, beneficial ownership, transfer rights, and the interests of third parties. For that reason, the cou rt must be satisfied that the claim rests on proved facts, not assumption. Allegation is not evidence. Nor is joinder a substitute for proof. In this case, the 2nd Respondent did not place before the Court any evidence capable of establishing his entitlement. He did not file a witness statement. He did not testify. He produced no documents explaining the source, nature, or extent of his alleged interest in Title No. Bwaila 47/162. The Court was therefore left without a proper evidential basis on which to make a substantive order in his favour. The absence of evidence is not a minor procedural defect. It goes to the foundation of the relief granted. Without evidence from the 2nd Respondent, the Court could not safely determine whether he had any proprietary interest at all, whether that interest was legal or equitable, whether it was adverse to the Appellant’s claim, or whether it entitled him to the order ultimately made. The order therefore rested on an unproved premise. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 25 That part of the judgment cannot stand. It must be set aside on its own footing, independently of the broader resulting trust analysis between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent. Even if the Court were wrong on the resulting trust issue, the order in favour of the 2nd Respondent would still be unsustainable because it was not supported by evidence from him. A court may only grant proprietary relief on a proved case. Here, there was none. Prescription and Limitation The parties also made submissions on prescription and adverse possession. Those issues were fully argued, but they do not provide the necessary basis for the determination of this appeal. Having found that the Appellant succeeds on the basis of a resulting trust, the Court need not decide whether his claim could also have been sustained under prescription or adverse possession. That approach is deliberate. Courts should avoid deciding points that are unnecessary to the disposal of the appeal, particularly where the appeal can be resolved on a narrower and more direct legal basis. Here, the central question is not whether the Appe llant acquired rights against a true owner by long possession. The more immediate question is whether, from the outset or by reason of the circumstances of acquisition, the Respondents held the legal title for the Appellant’s benefit. That distinction matters. Prescription or adverse possession ordinarily proceeds on the footing that the claimant is asserting a possessory right against the registered or paper owner. A resulting trust proceeds differently. It asks whether, notwithstandin g the registration of title in another person’s name, the beneficial interest belongs to the person who provided the purchase money or otherwise established the equitable basis for ownership. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 26 For that reason, the Appellant’s claim could not properly be answered by saying only that the Respondents were the registered owners. Registration is important. It proves legal title. But where a trust is alleged, registration does not end the inquiry. The Court must still examine contribution, intention, conduct, and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether equity recognises a beneficial owner different from the registered proprietor. Nor would it be correct to approach the case as though the Appellant were a stranger to the properties throughout the relevant period. On the evidence accepted by this Court, he was not merely an outsider asserting a late claim against land belonging to others. His case was that he contributed to the acquisition of the properties, exercised possession and control, managed tenants, paid outgoings, and acted in a manner consistent with beneficial ownership. Those matters required an equitable analysis, not merely a limitation or prescription analysis. It is therefore sufficient to state that the prescription and adverse possession arguments do not alter the result. The appeal is resolved on the firmer footing of a resulting trust. Once that conclusion is reached, the Court need not decide whether the Appellant’s possession, taken by itself, would have satisfied the separate requirements of prescription or adverse possession. The decisive point is that the Respondent s’ legal title was burdened by the Appellant’s beneficial interest. The Appellant’s long possession and control are important, but their significance lies in the trust analysis rather than in prescription. The Court is not relying on possession alone as the basis upon which the Appellant acquired rights in the properties. Rather, his possession and control form part of the broader evidential picture. They support his case that the Respondents held the legal title subject to his beneficial interest. That distinction is important. Long possession may, in some cases, found a claim based on prescription or adverse possession. But here, the Appellant’s case is stronger and MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 27 more direct. He says that the properties were acquired in circumstances giving rise to a resulting trust, and that his subsequent conduct was consistent with that beneficial ownership. His possession, management of tenants, payment of outgoings, maintenance of the properties, and practical control therefore corroborate the trust claim. Those facts also weaken the Respondents’ position. If the Respondents were truly enjoying the properties as beneficial owners throughout, one would expect the evidence to show meaningful acts of ownership on their part. Instead, the Appellant’s continued and visible control points in the opposite direction. It suggests that, whatever the state of the registered title, the practical reality was that he dealt with the properties as the person beneficially entitled to them. The point, therefore, is not that possession by itself proves prescription. It is that possession and control help explain the true character of the parties’ relationship to the properties. They make it less likely that the Appellant was merely an outsider , a caretaker, or a gratuitous manager. They make it more likely that he was acting consistently with an existing beneficial interest. On that basis, his long possession and control reinforce, rather than replace, the resulting trust analysis. Whether the High Court Findings Can Stand The High Court’s findings cannot stand for three main reasons. First, once there was evidence that the Appellant contributed to the purchase of the properties and thereafter exercised continued possession, management, and control over them, the court was required to engage directly with the doctrine of resulting trust. It was not enough to stop at the fact of registration. Registration identified the holder of legal title, but it did not necessarily answer the separate equitable question of beneficial ownership. Where one person provides the purchase money and title is placed in the name of another, equity may presume that the registered holder does not take the beneficial interest absolutely. The court therefore had to ask who provided the purchase money, why title was taken in the Respondents’ names, what intention could properly be inferred from the MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 28 circumstances, and whether the Respondents had adduced evidence sufficient to rebut the resulting trust. That analysis was not undertaken with the necessary care. The equitable principles summarised in E H Burn and G J Virgo, Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) required attention to the substance of the transaction, not merely its outward form. The court ought to have examined the evidence of financial contribution together with the subsequent conduct of the parties, including possession, payment of outgoings, ma nagement of tenants, maintenance works, and correspondence consistent with recognition of the Appellant’s interest. Those matters were capable, taken together, of raising a presumption that the Respondents held legal title for the Appellant’s benefit. Once that presumption arose, the real question became whether it had been displaced by credible evidence of a contrary intention. The High Court did not sufficiently address that question. Secondly, the court gave the intimate relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent a significance it could not properly bear. The relationship was certainly relevant. It formed part of the factual setting and helped explain why the parties may have dealt with each other informally, without the documentation one would ordinarily expect in an arm’s -length commercial transaction. It may also explain why the Appellant permitted properties to be registered in the 1st Respondent’s name without immediately insisting on formal transfer. But the existence of an intimate relationship was not, by itself, proof of a gift. The law does not assume that valuable property acquired with one person’s money and placed in another’s name has been given away merely because the parties were in a personal relationship. The question remained one of intention, to be inferred from the evidence as a whole. Given the value and character of the properties, the court required clear evidence that the Appellant intended to confer an outright beneficial interest on the 1st Respondent. That evidence was not supplied. There were no clear words of gift, no contemporaneous documentation, and no reliable surrounding circumstances from which such an intention could safely be inferred. T he relationship explained the background. It did not resolve the question of beneficial ownership. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 29 Thirdly, the court did not subject the Respondents’ evidence to the level of scrutiny which the case required. The Respondents’ case depended not only on the fact of registration, but also on assertions that the 1st Respondent had the means to acquire the properties, that she paid for them, or that they were intended for her benefit. Those assertions required careful examination. Evidence that the 1st Respondent conducted business may have been relevant, but it did not, without more, prove that she paid the purchase price for the specific properties in dispute. Nor did general assertions from supporting witnesses establish the source of the purchase money or the Appellant’s alleged donative intention. The evidence also contained inconsistencies in the 1st Respondent’s account and testimony from witnesses whose interest, proximity, or alignment with her position required caution. The principles in Karim v R (1966-68) 4 ALR (Mal) 601 Sinder v R (1968-70) 5 ALR (Mal) 212, and the ordinary rules of evidential evaluation required the court to test such evidence carefully before accepting it as sufficient to defeat the Appellant’s claim. The court was required to consider whether the evidence was internally consistent, whether it was supported by independent documents, whether the witnesses had any interest in the outcome, and whether their accounts cohered with the objective facts. That scrutiny was particularly necessary because the Respondents were seeking to displace an eq uitable inference arising from purchase -money contribution and continued beneficial control. Taken together, these errors affected the foundation of the judgment. The High Court did not merely make findings with which this Court might have reached a different view. It approached the matter through an incomplete legal framework. It treated registration and personal relationship as carrying more weight than they could properly bear, while failing to apply the resulting trust analysis and failing to test the Respondents’ evidence with the required rigour. Once the correct approach is applied, the evid ence supports the Appellant’s case. The presumption of resulting trust was raised, and the Respondents did not rebut it. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 30 This is not a case in which appellate restraint prevents intervention. The general rule is clear enough. An appellate court is usually slow to interfere with findings of fact made by a trial court, especially where those findings depend on the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses who appeared before that court. That restraint exists for good reason. The trial judge has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, observing their manner, and assessing the evidence as it unfolds in the courtroom. But appellate restraint is not a rule of abdication. It does not require this Court to uphold a decision where the court below has proceeded on a wrong legal footing, failed to apply the correct principles, misunderstood the effect of the evidence, or draw n conclusions which the record cannot properly sustain. As this Court made clear in Mutharika & Electoral Commission v Chilima & Chakwera 2, deference to the court below gives way where there has been a misdirection in law, a misapprehension of the evidence, or findings unsupported by the material before the court. That is the position here. The errors were not mere differences of emphasis or minor disagreements over factual detail. They went to the heart of the decision. The High Court treated registration as carrying more weight than it could bear in a case founded on resulting trust. It gave the intimate relationship between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent a significance which was not supported by clear evidence of donative intention. It also failed to examine with sufficient care the Respondents’ evidence, including inconsistencies in the 1st Respondent’s account and the interested nature of supporting testimony. Those errors affected the legal lens through which the evidence was viewed. Once the wrong lens was used, the evaluation of the evidence was inevitably distorted. The real question was not simply who held legal title, nor whether the parties were in a personal relationship. The question was whether, on the evidence of contribution, intention, 2 MSCA Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 2020 MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 31 possession, control, and surrounding circumstances, the Respondents held the properties for the Appellant’s benefit. When the correct legal framework is applied, the conclusion follows. The Appellant adduced sufficient evidence to raise the presumption of a resulting trust. The Respondents did not rebut that presumption by proving either that the 1st Respondent funded the acquisitions or that the Appellant intended the properties as gifts. In those circumstances, appellate intervention is not only permissible; it is necessary to correct the legal and evidential errors in the judgment below. DISPOSITION For the reasons discussed above,t his Court is satisfied that the appeal must be allowed. The judgment of the High Court cannot stand. The learned Judge did not properly apply the equitable presumption of resulting trust to the evidence before the Court. Nor did he adequately address the evid ential burden that shifted to the Respondents once the Appellant had established a prima facie case based on purchase-money contribution and continued beneficial control. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Court makes the following orders: 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The judgment of the High Court of Malawi, Civil Division, Lilongwe, in Land Cause No. 104 of 2018 is set aside. 3. It is declared that the properties known as Title Nos. Alimaunde 10/386 and Alimaunde 10/387, Title Nos. Bwaila 47/132 and Bwaila 47/133, and Title No. Bwaila 47/162 are held by the Respondents on resulting trust for the Appellant. 4. The Respondents shall, within thirty days of this judgment, execute all documents necessary to transfer legal title in the said properties to the Appellant. 5. In default of compliance within that period, the Registrar of the High Court is authorised to execute all necessary documents on behalf of the defaulting Respondent or Respondents. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 32 6. All cautions, restrictions or encumbrances lodged by or on behalf of the Respondents against the said titles, insofar as they are inconsistent with this judgment, shall be removed. 7. The Appellant shall have the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in the court below, to be taxed if not agreed. Handed down in Open Court at the Supreme Court of Appeal, Blantyre this 18th day of August 2026. …………………………………… Hon. Chief Justice R.R. Mzikamanda SC …………………………………… Hon. Deputy Chief Justice L.P. Chikopa SC …………………………………… Hon. Justice F.E. Kapanda SC, JA …………………………………… Hon. Justice H.S.B. Potani SC, JA …………………………………… Hon. Justice I. Chatha Kamanga SC, JA MSCA Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2024: Ramesh Thakor Patel v Ruth M. Lourenco and Rich Lourenco | Draft Judgment 33 …………………………………… Hon. Justice M.C.C. Mkandawire SC, JA …………………………………… Hon. Justice S.A. Kalembera SC, JA …………………………………… Hon. Justice R. Mbvundula SC, JA …………………………………… Hon. Justice nyaKaunda Kamanga SC, JA