
Civil appeal
Palmer v Stooke & Anoter (WACA CIV APP 7 of 1953) [1953] SLCA 2 (26 August 1953)
Palmer v Stooke & Anoter is a civil appeal from Sierra Leone on 26 August 1953. Cite it as [1953] SLCA 2. Search it by the party names, the citation [1953] SLCA 2, or Sierra Leone civil appeal.
Sierra Leone — Court of AppealPDF · 311 KB[1953] SLCA 2Civil appeal
August 26, 1953
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Palmer
Appellant
v.
Stooke & Anoter
Respondent
WACA CIV APP 7 of 1953
[1953] SLCA 2
Proceeding. Civil appeal. Sierra Leone.
PALMER v. STOOKE. 1950-56 ALR S.L. 325
W.A.C.A.
PALMER v. STOOKE and ATTORNEY-GENERAL
WEST AFRICAN CoURT OF APPEAL (Foster-Sutton, P., Coussey, J.A.
and Kingsley, J. (Sierra Leone)): August 26th, 1953
(W.A.C.A. Civil App. No. 7 /53) 5
[I] British Commonwealth-legislative competence of King in Council
ultra vires and repugnancy-creation of Legislative Council for
Colony of Sierra Leone not ultra vires Sierra Leone (Legislative
Council) Order in Council, 1951: In the preamble and enacting
clause of the Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council,
1951, the general words "and of all other powers enabling Him in
that behalf' are not to be construed as being eiusdem generis the
preceding more specific words "the powers vested in Him by the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890" so as to restrict the authority of
His Majesty in Council to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, .1890; and
therefore the creation of a Legislative Council for the Colony of
Sierra Leone by the Order in Council is not ultra vires the legislative
competence of His Majesty in Council (page 328, line 32-page 329,
line 16).
[2] Civil Procedure-discontinuance and dismissal-Supreme Court has
inherent jurisdiction to stay action which must fail-jurisdiction
exercised only with great circumspection in clear cases: The Supreme
Court has inherent jurisdiction to stay an action which must fail,
though such jurisdiction is not exercised except with great circum
spection and unless it is perfectly clear that the action cannot
succeed (page 330, lines 12-16).
[3] Constitutional Law-Legislative Council-creation-constitution of
Council act of State over which courts have no jurisdiction: The
constitution of the Legislative Council set up under the provisions
of the Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951
is an act of State over which the courts have no jurisdiction (page
329, line 39-page 330, line 3).
[ 4] Constitutional Law-Legislative Council-creation-creation for
Colony of Sierra Leone not ultra vires Sierra Leone (Legislative
Council) Order in Council, 1951: See [1] above.
[5] Constitutional Law-Legislative Council-creation-intention of
Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951 to create
council for both Colony and Protectorate: In the interpretation of
legislation, the intention of the legislature must be gathered primarily
from a review of the whole enactment so as to give effect to its
paramount object; and therefore the Sierra Leone (Legislative
Council) Order in Council, 1951 must be deemed to create a Legis
lative Council for both the Colony and the Protectorate of Sierra
Leone, and not merely for the Protectorate (page 329, lines 17_-24).
325
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30
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
[6] Constitutional Law-royal prerogative-acts of State-Courts have
no jurisdiction to question acts of State-constitution of Legislative
Council act of State: See [3] above.
[7] Courts-jurisdiction-acts of State-courts have no jurisdiction to
5 question act of State: See [3] above.
[8] Courts-Supreme Court-jurisdiction-inherent jurisdiction-court
has inherent jurisdiction to stay action which must fail-jurisdiction
exercised only with great circumspection: See [2] above.
[9] Statutes-interpretation-intention of legislature-intention to be
10 derived from review of whole enactment: See [5] above.
[10] Statutes-ultra vires and repugnancy-creation of Legislative Coun
cil for Colony of Sierra Leone not ultra vires Sierra Leone (Legisla
tive Council) Order in Council, 1951: See [1] above.
15 The plaintiff (now the appellant) brought an action against the
defendants (now the respondents) in the Supreme Court for a
declaration of the invalidity of the Constitution and an injunction
restraining the first defendant from giving effect to it in the Colony
of Sierra Leone.
20 The British Settlements Act, 1887, as amended by the British
Settlements Act, 1945, authorised the King in Council to legislate
for settled colonies, one of which was the Colony of Sierra Leone,
being an entity apart from the Protectorate of Sierra Leone. The
Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951 was
25 passed by the King in Council to provide for a Legislative Council
in Sierra Leone constituted in accordance with the provisions of that
Order. The Order went on to provide what proportion of the
members of the Council should come from the Colony and the
Protectorate respectively. In the preamble and enacting clause of
30 the Order, it was stated under the heading "Foreign Jurisdiction"
that it was made by the King "by virtue and in exercise of the
powers vested in Him by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, and of
all other powers enabling Him in that behalf." The plaintiff
instituted the present proceedings to have the Order declared invalid
35 and to prevent the first defendant from giving effect to it.
The Supreme Court (Smith, C.J.), on a motion by the defendants
that the action be dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous and
vexatious, took the view that the whole of the plaintiff's claim was
hopeless and should not be allowed to proceed, and therefore
40 exercised its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the action.
On appeal by the plaintiff, it was contended that (a) since
326
PALMER v. STOOKE, 1950-56 ALR S.L. 325
W.A.C.A.
the specific Act mentioned in the preamble and enacting clause of the
Order did not exhaust the genus, the words "and of all other powers
enabling Him in that behalf" must be construed as meaning other
powers in respect of foreign jurisdiction, and therefore the Order
did not apply to the Colony of Sierra Leone and was ultra vires 5
insofar as it purported to so apply because the British Settlements
Act, 1887, as amended, was not mentioned; (b) with regard to the
proportion of members of the Legislative Council from the Colony
and Protectorate respectively, there was no Act or other authority
enabling the Crown to give the Protectorate a majority; and (c) on 10
a motion such as that filed by the defendants, it was not competent
for the court to deal with questions of law, and therefore the
correct procedure should have been to file a motion under O.XXI,
r.2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1947.
Legislation construed:
Supreme Court Rules, 1947 (P.N. No. 251 of 1947), O.XXI, r.2:
"Any party shall be entitled to raise by his pleading any point
of law, and any point so raised shall be disposed of by the judge
who tries the same at or after the trial, provided that by the consent
of the parties, or by order of the court on the application of either
party, the same may be set down for hearing and disposed of at any
time before the trial."
Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951 (No. 611),
Preamble:
The preamble to this order is set out at page 328, lines 16-27.
O.I.E. During, R.W. Beoku-Betts and Cole for the plaintiff-appellant;
M.C. Marke for the defendants-respondents.
15
20
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FOSTER-SUTTON, P.: 30
In this case the plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaration that the
Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951 is invalid,
and an injunction restraining the first defendant from continuing
to give effect to it in the Colony of Sierra Leone.
After the statements of claim and defence had been delivered, 35
a motion was filed by the defendants asking that the action be
dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous and vexatious. The
motion came on for hearing before Smith, C.J., who took the view
that the whole of the plaintiff's claim was hopeless and should not
be allowed to proceed, and, acting under the inherent jurisdiction 40
of the court, he summarily dismissed the action.
327
THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
The plaintiff then filed this appeal, which is confined to that
portion of the judgment which dismissed his claim for the declaration
and an injunction, to which I have already referred, and to the
court's action in summarily dismissing the claim on the motion
5 instead of allowing the case to go to trial.
The Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951
was made by His late Majesty the King in Council on April 9th, 1951.
It revokes the Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order in Council,
1924 and the Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order
10 in Council, 1939, and provides that there shall be a Legislative
Council in and for Sierra Leone which shall be constituted in
accordm--;ce with the provisions of the Order.
The original Order in Council contains the words "Foreign
Jurisdiction" in the heading and its preamble and enacting clause
15 read as follows : -
"Whereas by the Sierra Leone (Legislative Council) Order
in Council, 1924, provision is made for the constitution and
powers of a Legislative Council for the Colony and Protectorate
of Sierra Leone (hereinafter together called 'Sierra Leone') : ·
20 And whereas it is expedient to make other provision for the
constitution and powers of a Legislative Council for Sierra
Leone:
Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of
the powers vested in Him by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act,
25 1890, and of all other powers enabling Him in that behalf, is
pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order,
and it is hereby ordered, as follows .... "
In the court below and at the hearing of this appeal, the
Attorney-General conceded that the Colony of Sierra Leone is a
30 British settlement, and the case was conducted by both sides on that
footing.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the Order in Council was
made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 to the exclusion of all
other powers, that the specific Act mentioned in the enacting clause
35 does not exhaust the genus as there is another such Act which was
enacted in the year 1913, that the words "and of all other powers
enabling Him in that behalf' must be construed as meaning other
powers of His Majesty in respect of foreign jurisdiction, applying,
as he submitted should be done in this case, the eiusdem generis
40 rule, and that the Order in Council insofar as it purports to legislate
for the Colony of Sierra Leone, as distinct from the Protectorate
328
PALMER v. STOOKE, 1950-56 ALR S.L. 325 W.A.C.A.
of Sierra Leone, is ultra vires and therefore invalid, because the
only Act which empowers His Majesty in Council to legislate for
a settled colony is the British Settlements Act, 1887, as amended
by the British Settlements Act, 1945, which is not mentioned in the
Order. In further support of this submission, he drew attention to 5
the heading of the Order-«Foreign Jurisdiction"-arguing that it
makes it abundantly clear that no other powers were invoked in
its making.
I, of course, accede to the well-settled principle that where there
are general words following particular and specific words of the 10
same nature, the general words are presumed to be restricted to
the same genus as the particular and specific words, but taking the
citation as a whole, which I think must be done, that is to say the
words "Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890," I cannot create a genus out
of them, and I am therefore unable to agree that the eiusdem generis 15
rule is applicable.
In any event I am of the opinion that the rule must be sub
ordinated to the more general principle of gathering the intention
from a review of the whole of the enactment and giving effect to its
paramount object. As I understand the eiusdem generis rule, its 20
object is to give effect to the assumed intention to an enactment, and
if the whole of the Order in Council is looked at I think it beyond
argument that the intention was to legislate both for the Colony and
the Protectorate of Sierra Leone.
It was not contended that the Order was invalid insofar as it 2.5
purports to legislate for the Protectorate. That being so, it seems to
me that the relevant question which requires to be answered in this
matter is whether His Majesty in Council had the power to legislate
for the Colony, and the answer to it is clearly in the affirmative. He
had such power under the British Settlements Act, 1887, and in my 30
view that Act must be held to have been contemplated by the words
«and of all other powers enabling Him in that behalf."
The Order in question provides for a larger number of members
of the Legislative Council from the Protectorate than from the
Colony, and the plaintiff's counsel submitted «that there is no Act 35
or authority which enables the Crown to give the Protectorate a
majority in the Legislative Council in the Colony of Sierra Leone."
This submission appears to me to ignore the fact that the Order in
Council provides for a joint legislature. Moreover the constitution
of the Legislative Council by the Order was, in my view, an act of 40
State over which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction. Of the
329
3 S.L.-111)
THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
propriety or justice of that act, neither the court below nor this
court have the means of forming, or the right of expressing if they
had formed, any opinion.
The only matter which remains to be dealt with is the sub-
5 mission made by counsel for the appellant that on a motion such as
that filed by the respondents it is not competent for the court to deal
with questions of law; that in the present case, there being no facts
in dispute, the correct procedure was to file a motion under O.XXI,
r.2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1947, which he submitted is the
10 procedure which should be followed when a dispute involves only
questions of law.
In my opinion there is no substance in the submission. It is
well settled that the court has inherent jurisdiction to stay an
action which must fail. It is the case that such jurisdiction is not
15 exercised except with great circumspection and unless it is perfectly
clear that the action cannot succeed. In the present case I concur
with the learned Chief Justice in thinking that the claim, if allowed
to proceed, would be bound to fail. This consideration satisfies
me that the order dismissing it ought to be sustained, not in pursu-
20 ance of any order or rule, but in virtue of the inherent jurisdiction
of the court to prevent abuse of its process.
For the reasons I have given I would dismiss this appeal with
costs to be taxed.
25 COUSSEY, J.A. and KINGSLEY, J. (Sierra Leone) concurred.
Appeal dismissed.
so
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330
