Nyindam v High Court (J5/13/2026) [2026] GHASC 45 (28 January 2026)

1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA – AD.2026 CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING) AMADU JSC KULENDI JSC ASIEDU JSC KWOFIE JSC CIVIL MOTION NO: J5/13/2026 28TH JANUARY, 2026 THE REPUBLIC VRS. HIGH COURT (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) TAMALE. …………… RESPONDENT EX PARTE: 1. MATHEW NYINDAM …………… APPLICANT 1. DANIEL NSALA WAKPAL …………… 1ST INTERESTED PARTY 2 2. THE ELECTORALCOMMISSION …………… 2ND INTERESTED PARTY 3. THE CLERK OF PARLIAMENT …………… 3RD INTERESTED PARTY RULING MAJORITY OPINION KULENDI JSC:- A. INTRODUCTION 1. Having regard to the many election petitions that flood our courts after each general election, one cannot help but agree with Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli in his book titled “The Prince” when he said; “The desire to acquire power is truly very natural and common; and men who succeed in doing so are always praised, not blamed.” (The Prince, 1532, ch. III) 2. However, in a constitutional democracy such as ours, the pursuit of political power is attained through the ballot box and persons who are aggrieved by the outcome or processes may have solace in the court of law. In other words, elections are the constitutional moment when the sovereignty of the people is not only affirmed in language but performed in practice. They are, in reality, the periodic renewal of the social contract in the Hobbesian, Lockean or Rousseauian sense and because elections are the clearest expression of collective self -government, disputes concerning them are, at their core, disputes about the conditions under which public authority becomes legitimate. 3 3. That is why the judicial role in electoral disputes is both delicate and indispensable. It is delicate, because courts must not displace the people as the ultimate authors of political authority; and indispensable, because courts must ensure that the peopl e’s choice is expressed through processes the Constitution recognises as lawful. 4. On this account, a judge who is privileged to adjudicate on an election petition must exercise an unwavering fidelity to the law and be deaf to the passions of the heart. The Court’s duty must be to protect the broader constitutional idea that the people’s will, when expressed through elections, is entitled to be counted honestly, transparently, and within law. 5. Our task therefore, is twofold. First, to be faithful to the democratic imperative that electoral outcomes should not be lightly unsettled. Second, to be faithful to the constitutional imperative that no public power, electoral or judicial, is immunised from law. The tension between these imperatives is part of the design of constitutional governance. The Court’s duty is to hold them in principled balance, ensuring that finality does not become injustice, and that correction does not become destabilisation. It is from this perspective that we consider the application before us. 6. This is an application which invokes the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court and seeks to quash the decision of the High Court, Tamale, delivered on 24 November 2025, in Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25, entitled Daniel Nsala Wakpal v. Matthew Nyindam & Anor. In that decision, the trial judge invalidated the results of the 2024 parliamentary election for the Kpandai Constituency and ordered a rerun. 7. The Applicant, Mr. Matthew Nyindam, challenges the jurisdiction of the High Court to have entertained the election petition in the first place. The issue before us is therefore narrow and purely jurisdictional: whether the High Court was clothed with 4 jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, having regard to the strict timelines that govern parliamentary election petitions. B. BACKGROUND 8. The said Applicant, Mr. Nyindam, and the 1st Interested Party, Mr. Wakpal, contested in the 7th December, 2024 Kpandai constituency parliamentary elections organized by the Electoral Commission of Ghana , the 2nd interested party , on the ticket of the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress respectively. 9. Mr. Nyindam states that polls were successfully conducted in all 152 polling stations in the Kpandai constituency and the results declared in the various polling stations. After collation, Mr. Nyindam was declared as winner of the Parliamentary Election and the election results were published in the Gazette No. 234 dated 24th December, 2024. The gazette notification of the parliamentary election results has been attached to Mr. Nyindam’s affidavit as “Exhibit MN”. 10. On 25th January, 2025, Mr. Wakpal filed an election petition at the High Court, Tamale disputing the outcome of the parliamentary elections and sought the following reliefs from the Court. a. A declaration that the Parliamentary Election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 was void by virtue of the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (Regulation 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty -two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency. 5 b. A declaration that the irregularities and inconsistencies contained in FORM 8A (Regulation 32(7) and 39(2) Statement of Polls for the Office of Member of Parliament (Pink Sheet) for Forty -one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty -two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency have so extensively prevailed and have reasonably affected the results of the election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024. c. A declaration that the non -compliance with Regulations 39 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) affected the parliamentary election results of Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024. d. A declaration that the non -compliance with Regulations 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) affected the entire results of the parliamentary election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thereby rendering the said results as void. e. An order setting aside the declaration of the parliamentary election results affecting the Forty -one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was given on the 7th of December, 2024. f. An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to conduct a rerun of the parliamentary elections in the affected Forty-one (41) polling stations out of a total of One hundred and fifty -two (152) polling stations in the Kpandai Constituency on a date determined by the court. 6 OR In the Alternative, a. an order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to re -collate the results in the affected Forty-one (41) polling stations on a date determined by the court. b. An order of interlocutory injunction directed at 4th Respondent restraining the 4th Respondent from swearing in the 1st Respondent as Member of Parliament of the Kpandai Constituency on the 5th of January 2025. c. An order setting aside the parliamentary elections results of the Kpandai Constituency for non-compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127). d. An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to conduct a rerun of the entire parliamentary elections in the Kpandai Constituency on account of the non-compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.I. 127) which rendered the entire results of the parliamentary elections in the Kpandai Constituency void. OR In the Alternative, a. An order directed at the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to re -collate the results in the Kpandai Constituency in compliance with Regulation 43 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 (C.1. 127). 7 b. An order of interlocutory injunction restraining and preventing the 1st Respondent from holding himself out as Member of Parliament elect for the Kpandai Constituency until the final determination of this suit. c. An order of interlocutory injunction restraining and preventing the 1st Respondent from having access to the Chamber of Parliament until the final determination of this suit. d. An order of Perpetual Injunction restraining and preventing 1st Respondent from having access to the Chamber of Parliament as Member of Parliament elect for the Kpandai Constituency. e. Any other order(s) that this Honorable Court may deem fit to make. 11. In November, 2025, the High Court, Tamale upheld the election petition and on the basis of various stated infractions, ordered a rerun of the parliamentary election for the Kpandai Constituency. 12. Mr. Nyindam, in the application before us, raises a jurisdictional objection, contending that the petition was filed outside the twenty -one (21) day period prescribed by law following the gazetting of the results. On that footing, he argues that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that its judgment was a nullity. Accordingly, Mr. Nyindam invokes the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and prays for an order of certiorari to quash the judgment of the High Court delivered on 24 November, 2025. CASE OF THE 1ST INTERESTED PARTY (MR. WAKPAL) 8 13. Mr. Wakpal opposes the application before this Court and in an affidavit running into eighty -four (84) paragraphs, he alleges, among other matters, that the Applicant engaged in fraud. He states that on 23rd December, 2024 he filed an election petition, Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25, challenging the declaration of Mr. Nyindam as the Member of Parliament –elect for the Kpandai Constituency. He further deposes that he paid the prescribed security for costs on 3rd January, 2025 in compliance with the statutory requirements. 14. According to Mr. Wakpal, upon being served, Mr. Nyindam entered a conditional appearance and filed a motion on notice seeking to dismiss the election petition on the ground that it had been filed prematurely. In that motion, Mr. Nyindam contended that the results of the parliamentary election conducted in the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 were gazetted on 6th January, 2025. A copy of that alleged Gazette notice was exhibited to the motion as “Exhibit JS 3.” 15. The Mr. Wakpal proceeds to state that. “The High Court, Kumasi and I believed and relied on the Applicant’s representation… about the said gazette of 6th January 2024.” 16. In fact, in paragraph 32(i) of the Affidavit in opposition, Mr. Wakpal deposes as follows. “That in reliance o n(sic) the depositions in the Applicant's Supplementary Affidavit that the 2nd Interested Party published the Election results in the Gazette on 6th January, 2025, I filed a Notice of Discontinuance and wholly discontinued the 23rd of December, 2024 Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25 and caused a fresh Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 to be filed on the 25th of January, 2025, since the Applicant had not filed an Answer to the Petition.” 9 37. I am advised by Counsel and verily believe same to be true that the Applicant's conduct is fraudulent because he induced me to act to my detriment to secure any unfair advantage before this Honourable Court by bringing an application for Judicial Revie w in the nature of Certiorari for an order of court quashing the judgment of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, as well as the proceedings and processes leading to the said judgment. 42. That the Applicant acquiesced to whatever alleged want of jurisdiction attended the Tamale High Court's judgment by his own conduct of having knowledge of a December, 2024 gazette, and yet accepting, consenting to, participating and relying on all proceedings of the Election Petition with suit number NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25 of the trial High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, leading to judgment. This Honourable Court ought to shut its doors of discretionary remedy of Certiorari to the Applicant as he cannot be allowed to file into court, rely on and seek to benefit from the gazette dated 24th December, 2024, in a Certiorari Application before this Honourable Court.” 17. In sum, Mr. Wakpal contends that Mr. Nyindam cannot be allowed to take inconsistent positions in the same matter. Put differently, he cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold” or, in the language of the law, to approbate and reprobate. 18. He further contends that Mr. Nyindam has already benefited from the High Court (Tamale)’s award of costs in the sum of Seven Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS 7,000), made following the discontinuance of the earlier election petition in Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/15/25. C. GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION 10 19. Mr. Nyindam anchors the present application on the following grounds; I. The learned High Court Judge committed a jurisdictional error when he wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024 after the expiration of statutory twenty -one (21) days from the date of the publication in the Gazette of the election results to which the petition relates. II. The trial Judge committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record when he proceeded to hear and give Judgment on the Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on the 25th day of January 2025 contrary to and in breach of section 18 of the Repre sentation of The People Law, 1992, P.N.D.C.L. 284 thereby rendering his Judgment dated 24th November, 2025 void and a nullity. D. RELIEFS SOUGHT: 20. On the basis of the said grounds, Mr. Nyindam seeks the following reliefs: I. A declaration that the Parliamentary Election Petition filed by the 1st Interested Party on 25th January, 2025, in respect of the Parliamentary Election held at the Kpandai Constituency on 7th December, 2024, thirty -two (32) days after the publication of the gazette notification of the Results to which the Petition related was invalid and same could not have properly invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, Commercial Division, Tamale, and that, any processes, proceedings and judgement or Order founded on same is void and of no effect. II. An Order of Certiorari by this Honourable Court quashing the Judgement of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart -Plange Brew sitting at the High Court, 11 Commercial Division, Tamale, dated 24th November, 2025, delivered pursuant to the said invalid Petition as well as any process and proceedings founded on the said invalid Petition. III. Any other Order(s) as the Court deem fit. E. EVALUATION: 21. Our supervisory jurisdiction has, in recent times, become one of the most frequently invoked jurisdictions of this Court. It is therefore not surprising that the authorities on its nature and scope are legion. This Court, speaking through Amadu Tanko JSC, in a judgment dated 22nd June, 2023, in Suit No. J5/54/2023, Republic v. High Court, Cape Coast; Ex parte Asiedu, stated as follows: “In the hierarchy of courts, only two courts, the Supreme Court and the High Court are vested with the jurisdiction to exercise supervisory powers over courts below them or adjudicating bodies. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is provided under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution…” 22. The effect of this statement is that the supervisory jurisdiction is an exceptional authority, vested in this Court to safeguard the integrity of our justice delivery system and to preserve the architecture of our democracy it is therefore not an ordinary jurisdiction and is exercised sparingly, and only in well -defined circumstances, particularly where the decision of the High Court or the Court of Appeal is shown to have been made without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in palpable error of law, or in breach of the rules of natural justice. This position has been reiterated in a long line of decisions and does not require any extended elaboration here. By way of illustration, in a ruling of this Court dated 14th October, 2020, in Civil Motion No. J5/62/2020, entitled Republic v. High Court (Land Division), Accra; Ex parte Kennedy Ohene Agyapong (Susan Bandoh, Interested Party) , which I had the 12 privilege of authoring on behalf of the Court, we reiterated the scope of our supervisory jurisdiction in the following terms: “The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is a great residual jurisdiction that allows this Court to streamline the activities of the lower courts. Our control is limited to three main areas: against want or excess of jurisdiction; against patent errors of law on the face of the record; and against breaches or denial of natural justice.” 23. Accordingly, our function, in proceedings such as this, is not to substitute our view for that of the court below, or to re -open contested factual issues, or to entertain dissatisfaction that properly belongs to the appellate structure. Rather, our task i s more fundamental: to determine whether the proceedings under challenge were undertaken without lawful authority, that is to say, whether the court below acted without the requisite jurisdiction. 24. Having determined that the present application falls within the jurisdictional limb of our supervisory jurisdiction, the central question is whether the learned trial judge of the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the election petition in the first place. 25. Jurisdiction is, in its simplest sense, the legal authority of a court to hear and determine a cause or matter brought before it. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, any decision delivered or order made is a nullity. (See: Ghana Bar Association v. Attorney General [1995-96] 1 GLR 598 - 623], per Bamford Addo JSC; Edusei no.2 v. Attorney General [1998-1999] SCGLR 753). Jurisdiction is not assumed; it is conferred by law, whether by the Constitution or by statute. Accordingly, where a statute defines the nature, scope, and limits of a court’s jurisdiction, it is those provisions that govern the court’s competence. Any pr oceedings conducted in breach of those limits, however well-intended, may resulted in a nullity. 13 26. Further, in a ruling of this Court dated 1st February, 2023 , in Civil Motion No. J5/82/2022, Republic v. High Court (Commercial Division), Accra; Ex parte Yvonne Amponsah Brobbey, which I had the privilege of authoring on behalf of the Court, we cautioned in these terms: “We must reiterate the learning that the jurisdiction of a Court is one which is properly conferred and circumscribed by law. Therefore, no Court has the power, by judicial fiat, to assume jurisdiction that is not properly conferred or extend its jurisdict ion beyond the scope or remit granted it by law. The arrogation to itself of jurisdiction which is not conferred by law constitutes an error patent on the face of the record and which goes to jurisdiction. Needless to say, the purported exercise of same will not only occasion a want of jurisdiction but also a nullity.” 27. The point has also been ably captured with clarity by the venerable Adinyira JSC in Halle and Sonns A.S. v. Bank of Ghana and Warm Weather Enterprise Ltd [2011]1SCGLR378[2011] 1 SCGLR 378[2011]1SCGLR378, where the Her Ladyship observed that: “Our Courts have now come so far that any wrong step taken in legal proceedings should not have the effect of nullifying the Judgement or proceedings, except in those cases where the Court has no Jurisdiction.” 28. The message from these authorities is that where the defect allegedly goes to jurisdiction, the proceedings cannot stand, because the court had no lawful authority to embark on such a task, in the first place. PRELIMINARY COMMENT 14 29. By way of preliminary comment, we would be remiss in our duty if we failed to address the allegations of acquiescence and deceit raised by the 1st Interested Party in aid of his earnest prayer that this application be dismissed. 30. On his own showing, Mr. Wakpal contends that both he and the High Court were “induced” to act to his detriment by Mr. Nyindam. The substance of his complaint is that Mr. Nyindam represented to the High Court that the parliamentary election results for the Kpandai Constituency were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, and that this representation influenced him to discontinue the earlier petition filed on 23rd December, 2024 and to refile his subsequent petition, the subject matter of this application, on 25th January, 2025. He further contends that the Applicant, having participated in the proceedings from commencement to judgment, cannot now be heard to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. 31. We struggle to sympathize with Mr. Wakpal’s claim that he discontinued his first petition on the strength of Mr. Nyindam’s deposition before the High Court that the petition was premature because it was filed prior to the gazetting of the results. Apart from the Applicant’s say so, this is not directly born e out by the record. In any event and with respect, the responsibility for that decision to withdraw Mr. Wakpal’s 1st Petition cannot be laid at the doorsteps of Mr. Nyindam. 32. In the first place, it is the duty of a party who comes to court to vindicate his rights to ensure that he has properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction. Our system of adjudication being adversarial, it is, to say the least, regrettable for a litigant to contend that he relied on his opponent’s representation as the basis for withdrawing a case which, by his own assessment, he ought not to have withdrawn. 33. More importantly, Mr. Wakpal’s narrative, as framed, does not fully account for the legal position. Whether the operative gazette notice is taken to be 24th 15 December, 2024 or 6th January, 2025, the petition filed on 23rd December, 2024 was, on either view, filed prematurely. This is because Section 18(1) of The Representation of the People Law, 1992 PNDCL 284, the enabling statutory regime permits the commencement of a parliamentary election petition within twenty- one (21) days after the gazetting of the election results. A petition commenced before gazetting, is by that very fact, not in conformity with the statutory scheme. 34. In these circumstances, Mr. Wakpal’s objections cannot, without more, provide justification and/or a sound legal basis for shutting out a jurisdictional inquiry that this Court is otherwise bound to undertake. 35. On the issue of acquiescence, the fact that Mr. Nyindam participated in the proceedings at the High Court from start to finish, cannot cure a defect that goes to statutory compliance and jurisdiction. This Court has consistently held that estoppel, waiver or acquiescence is no answer to a breach of a mandatory statutory requirement. A party cannot, by consent or conduct, confer jurisdiction on a court where the law has withheld it, nor can participation in proceedings validate what the statute renders invalid. 36. Indeed, I have had occasion to caution, in a unanimous decision of this Court in Suit No. J1/07/2022, Justice Abdulai v. Attorney -General, that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court where none exists, and that an improper assumption or exercise of jurisdiction will, in most cases, render the resulting decision vulnerable to being set aside as a nullity. We stated, in plain terms, that: “…parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court where there is none and an improper exercise of jurisdiction may almost always lead to the resultant decision being susceptible to be set aside for nullity.” 16 37. Also, in a judgment of this Court dated 27 March 2024 , in Writ No. J1/18/2023, Francis Osei-Bonsu v. Attorney-General, which I had the privilege of delivering on behalf of the majority, this Court reiterated the point in the following terms: “It is trite learning that parties cannot by agreement or acquiescence, confer jurisdiction on a Court where the exercise of such jurisdiction is prohibited, or not provided for by law.” 38. In our view, therefore, the fact that Mr. Nyindam participated in the proceedings culminating in the impugned judgment does not, without more, foreclose a jurisdictional challenge. If it is ultimately established that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, participation by a party cannot validate proceedin gs that the law treats as void. The Court cannot decline an invitation to quash a decision merely because the applicant took part in the process that produced it, where the foundational complaint is that the entire proceedings were conducted without jurisdiction. 39. In any event, a litigant’s responsibility to ensure that a cause of action he/she seeks to ventilate before a court is duly accrued and vested, does not in any way derogate from the court’s gate -keeping duty to ensure that even where it clearly has substa ntive jurisdiction over such a cause of action, all procedural jurisdictional pre-conditions and/or pre-requisites are met before delving into an enquiry of the substantive matters implicated in the suit. QUESTION OF JURISDICTION: 40. As referenced in paragraph 33 supra, the timelines for invoking the High Court’s jurisdiction in parliamentary election petitions are prescribed by section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284), which provides as follows: 17 “18—Time for Presentation of Petition. (1) An election petition shall be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates, except that a petition questioning an election on an allegation of corrupt practice and specifically alleging a payment of money or other award to have been made on his behalf to his knowledge, may be presented within twenty-one days after the date of the alleged payment.” 41. The twenty -one (21) day timeline is therefore an express statutory prescription governing the invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction in parliamentary election petitions. The statute does not provide any dispensation and/or discretion by which the Court may extend time beyond the mandatory period. The words, “shall be presented within twenty -one days” , are cast in unmistakably mandatory terms. Accordingly, the High Court must act strictly within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by law, and it has no authority to entertain an election petition filed outside the prescribed twenty-one days. Needless to say, courts of law cannot, by adjudication, validate or excuse a breach of statute or law.. 42. It is worth underscoring that t he High Court’s jurisdiction in election petitions is not an inherent jurisdiction. It is a express jurisdiction conferred by Article 99(1)(a) of the Constitution and specifically regulated by PNDCL 284. The requirements in section 18(1) impose a mandatory pre -condition to the assumption of the jurisdiction. In other words, compliance with section 18(1) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a proper invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction. 43. Given this express statutory command, the High Court’s general power to extend time under its procedural rules, including C.I. 47, is necessarily displaced. As this Court held in Yeboah v. Mensah (JH) [1998 − 99]𝑆𝐶𝐺𝐿𝑅492, the twenty-one-day 18 period is a jurisdictional “statute of repose”, a legislative choice designed to ensure that electoral disputes are initiated timeously or not at all. This is particularly important in a representative democracy such as ours w here the mandate of elected officials are term bound. Electoral outcomes under this Constitutional architecture cannot be kept permanently open to contestation without undermining the legitimate will of the people. 44. Indeed, across constitutional democracies, legal systems insist on strict filing windows and compressed decision periods not out of fetish for procedure, but because democratic term bound electoral outcomes require closure to ensure the certainty and stability of the electoral process. 45. The effect, therefore, of proceedings commenced in clear breach of a mandatory statutory requirement is to render the proceedings a nullity. Such a breach goes to the very foundation of the court’s authority, and any step taken in contravention of the sta tute is legally ineffective. This Court reinforced the principle in Gaizie Hughes & Co. v. Loders Crocklaan BV [2012]1𝑆𝐶𝐺𝐿𝑅363,368 − 369, where it stated: “Proceedings commenced in clear violation of mandatory statutory requirements might not escape the scrutiny of the law. It seems to us that this is a useful tool in the hands of the court by which we are enabled to strike down proceedings even though the default in complying with mandatory requirements might have escaped notice in the courts below. It is a weapon that enables us to uphold the rule of law as to do otherwise would have the effect of condoning breaches of statute.” DATE OF GAZETTE: 46. In resolving the jurisdictional objection, it is necessary first to determine the operative Gazette publication date for the parliamentary election results for the 19 Kpandai Constituency. That is, whether the results were published in the Gazette on 24th December, 2024 or on 6th January, 2025. 47. This question matters because section 18(1) of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) aforesaid makes the Gazette publication the event that triggers the High Court’s jurisdiction. If the Kpandai results were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, then the petition filed on 25th January, 2025 would, on the face of it, have been presented within time, and the High Court would have been properly seized of jurisdiction. If, however, the results were gazetted on 24th December, 2024, then the petition filed on 25th January, 2025 would plainly have been filed outside the statutory twenty-one (21) days and would not have properly invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction, at all. 48. In addressing this dilemma, we have not proceeded on a blank slate. We have had regard to the ruling of this Court in Civil Motion No. J5/37/2025, The Republic v. High Court 3, Koforidua; Ex parte Ernest Yaw Kumi , where a differently constituted panel had occasion to resolve the same factual controversy as between the 24th December, 2024 Gazette and the 6th January, 2025 Gazette. 49. As the apex Court, and a policy Court in every meaningful sense, our fidelity to judicial consistency is central to the integrity of adjudication. We are enjoined by Article 129(3) to treat our prior decisions as binding, and to depart only where compelling reasons make it right so to do. Accordingly, where this Court has previously pronounced on the propriety, validity, or legal effect of the competing Gazettes, we must acknowledge that decision and either apply it or if we are minded to depart, do so with clear and cogent reasons. 20 50. In Ex parte Ernest Yaw Kumi (supra) , this Court, confronted with the same contest between the two Gazettes, stated in terms that: “From the affidavit evidence before this Court, it was established that the Gazette notification No. 234 dated 24th December 2024 was the valid one. We therefore had no difficulty finding that the results … were gazetted on 24th December 2024 and not 6th January 2025.” 51. The situation before us is materially indistinguishable. Once again, we are presented with a Gazette dated 24th December, 2024 , and another dated 6th January, 2025. Again, the results of the Kpandai parliamentary election appear in both publications. 52. In our view, the Gazette publication of 24th December, 2024 constitutes the relevant publication for purposes of Article 99 of the Constitution and section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 . That Gazette has not been alleged, let alone proved, to be fraudulent, irregular or not emanating from the proper authority mandated by law to publish such notices. In the absence of such proof, this Court must treat it as the operative publication of the Kpandai election results which are stated therein at a page marked 8123 . For after all, an official duty is presumed to be regularly performed unless the contrary is proven (See; section 37 of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323). 53. At most, the Gazette dated 6th January, 2025 may fairly be regarded as a later republication, either of the earlier results already published together with four (4) additional constituencies, the election results of which had not been resolved as at the 24th of December, 2024 . However, there is no jurisprudential gymnastics by which this later republication can, without doing violence to the statutory scheme, be construed as resetting the jurisdictional clock. 21 54. To compute the statutory period from 6th January, 2025 instead of 24th December, 2024 would lead to an untenable result. It would mean that a republication of results in the Gazette automatically renews or restarts the statutory time limit under section 18(1). Taken to its logical end, this approach would imply that whenever there is an in itial Gazette publication and a later Gazette publication, the later publication restarts time and potentially destabilizes legal steps already taken on the strength of the first publication. That would confer an undue and dangerous power on political actors and public institutions to affect the administration of electoral justice by manipulating Gazette publications. The law cannot be read to permit such manipulation. 55. We also note from the record of proceedings of the very first petition filed on the 23rd of December, 2024, that the fact of a Gazette publication on 24th December, 2024 was not unknown to Mr. Wakpal. Indeed, on his own affidavit evidence, when Mr. Nyindam sought to terminate the earlier petition on the basis that the results were gazetted on 6th January, 2025, Mr. Wakpal opposed that contention and maintained that the results had been officially gazetted on 24th December, 2024. In paragraph 9 of an affidavit in opposition filed on his behalf, exhibited as Exhibit DNW4, he stated: “That … as at the 24th of December, 2024, [the Electoral Commission] had officially gazetted the parliamentary election results … including the Kpandai Constituency…” 56. This affidavit was filed before he discontinued the earlier petition. The unavoidable conclusion is that Mr. Wakpal knew, or at the very least ought to have known, that the Kpandai Const ituency Parliamentary elections results had been gazetted on 24th December, 2024. 22 57. In the circumstances, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the results of the Kpandai parliamentary election were gazetted on 24th December, 2024. The statutory twenty -one (21) day period therefore began to run from that date. On any fair computation, a petition challenging that election , other than on the specific corrupt practice exception stated in section 18(1) , ought to have been presented no later than 14th January, 2025. 58. The petition that initiated the proceedings culminating in the judgment now under review was filed on 25th January, 2025 , that is, thirty-two (32) days after the Gazette publication of 24th December, 2024. It was, therefore, filed out of time, in clear breach of section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 . This Court cannot lend judicial approval to a violation of the express terms of Statute. 59. In the result, we are unable to uphold the proceedings before the High Court since to do that will be to sanction a statutory breach. Jurisdiction is the foundation of adjudication; where it is absent, the court’s most conscientious effort cannot supply it, and the most persuasive merits cannot redeem it. The statutory twenty- one (21) day period prescribed by section 18 of PNDCL 284 is therefore not an inconvenient technicality to be relaxed in hard cases. It is a deliberate legislative command, rooted in the need for certainty, stability and the timely settlement of electoral disputes. To treat it otherwise would be to replace law with discretion, and to divine a regime where jurisdiction depends not on statute, but on sympathy. 60. For these reasons, we hold that the High Court was not clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the election petition filed on 25th January, 2025. The judgment delivered on 24th November, 2025 is consequently a nullity. 23 CONCLUSION: 61. Accordingly, let the parliamentary election petition filed by the 1st Interested Party, Mr. Daniel Nsala Wakpal , on 25th January, 2025 , in respect of the parliamentary election held in the Kpandai Constituency on 7 December 2024 , together with all proceedings, rulings, and judgments founded upon it, including the judgment of His Lordship Justice Emmanuel Bart -Plange Brew, sitting at the High Court (Commercial Division), Tamale, delivered on 24th November, 2025, be brought up to this Court for the purpose of being quash ed and same is hereby quashed for nullity. (SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) CONCURRING OPINION TANKO AMADU JSC:- INTRODUCTION 1. On the 28 th day of January 2026, I was part of the majority of four which granted an application for judicial review in the nature of certiorari at the instance of the Applicant herein. I now proceed to give reasons for my position. 2. In that application, the Applicant whose membership of Parliament for the Kpandai Constituency was challenged by the 1 st Interested Party and upheld, invited this court to quash the judgment of the High Court, (Commercial Division) 24 Tamale, per Bart-Plange Brew J. dated 24th November 2025, which had annulled the Applicant’s election as Member of Parliament (MP) and ordered a parliamentary by-election. 3. The central contention of the Applicant is that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the underlying election petition because it was commenced outside the strict statutory time limit. The Applicant further contends that the petition was incurably incompetent and that, in any event, the allegations of irregularities in forty-one (41) polling stations were insufficient to affect the overall outcome of the election. 4. The 1st Interested Party, being the original petitioner and the losing candidate, opposed the application and alleged, inter alia , that the Applicant acted fraudulently by presenting inconsistent dates as the official Gazette publication of the Parliamentary Election results. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 5. On 7th December 2024, General Parliamentary Elections were conducted nationwide, including in the Kpandai Constituency in the Northern Region. The Applicant contested the election on the ticket of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), while the 1st Interested Party, Daniel Nsala Wakpal, stood as the candidate of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) . Following the polls, votes from all one hundred and fifty-two (152) polling stations in the Constituency were duly counted and collated, upon which the Applicant was declared the winner of the Parliamentary Election. The Electoral Commission , the 2nd Interested Party herein, officially gazetted the Kpandai Parliamentary Election results, among others, on 24th December 2024, in accordance with law. The Applicant was 25 subsequently sworn into office as the Member of Parliament for Kpandai in January 2025. 6. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the 1st Interested Party initially filed an Election Petition in the High Court on 23rd December 2024, even before the Gazette publication of the results. That earlier petition was apparently withdrawn or discontinued by the 1st Interested Party, who then filed a fresh Election Petition on 25th January 2025 in the High Court, Tamale. In that Petition, (Suit No. NR/TL/HC/E13/22/25), the 1st Interested Party challenged the Applicant’s election on grounds of alleged irregularities in 41 Polling Stations out of the 152 polling stations in the constituency. 7. The 1st Interested Party sought various reliefs, including a declaration that the Kpandai Parliamentary Election held on 7th December 2024 was void by reason of the alleged irregularities. The 1st Interested Party further prayed for an order for a rerun of the election, whether in whole or in part, or alternatively for a re -collation of the results. In addition, the Petition sought injunctive reliefs restraining the Applicant from being sworn in or from holding himself out as the duly elected Member of Parliament. Notably, the Petition averred that the irregularities and inconsistencies affecting the results from the forty -one (41) polling stations— “have so extensively prevailed and have reasonably affected the result of the election” in the Constituency. 8. The Applicant was named as the 1st Respondent in the said High Court petition. He promptly raised a preliminary objection that the petition had been filed out of time and failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements governing election petitions. In particular, the Applicant ( then Respondent) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for non -compliance with article 99(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution and section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 26 (PNDCL 284), being the law applicable to parliamentary election disputes, on the ground that the petition was presented outside the stipulated twenty-one (21) day period after publication in the Gazette and without the provision of security for costs within that period. 9. This objection on limitation raised a jurisdictional issue, as section 18 of PNDCL 284 prescribes a strict time limit within which election results may be challenged. The 1st Interested Party opposed the application for dismissal, contending that the petition was not statute -barred. It was argued, inter alia, that the Electoral Commission issued a second Gazette on 6 January 2025 , which purportedly superseded the Gazette of 24 December 2024, thereby rendering the filing of the petition on 25 January 2025 proper. 10. The 1st Interested Party further argued that, the Applicant had not raised the issue of statutory time limit in his pleadings at the trial and further alleged that, the Applicant misled him about the proper gazette date, an issue which later morphed into a n allegation of fraud against the Applicant in the instant certiorari proceedings. 11. The High Court, Tamale, nevertheless proceeded to hear the petition on its merits. On 24th November 2025, the High Court, per Plange -Brew J., delivered judgment in favour of the Petitioner (1st Interested Party). The Court annulled the entire Parliamentary Election in the Kpandai Constituency and declared the results void, having accepted that the irregularities alleged in the forty-one (41) polling stations compromised the integrity of the election as a whole. The High Court consequently ordered the Electoral Commission to conduct a fresh election in the Constituency within thirty (30) days of the judgment. As a result, 27 the Applicant’s status as the duly elected Member of Parliament was nullified by the said decision, and steps were anticipated towards the conduct of a by - election. 12. Aggrieved by the High Court’s assumption of jurisdiction and the eventual decision, the Applicant invoked the supervisory jurisdiction by this Court for certiorari to lie against the judgment of the High Court. The Applicant contended that, the High Court committed a jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record by entertaining a petition that was a legal nullity, having been filed 32 days after the gazette notification of the results of the election. THE APPLICANT’S CASE 13. The Applicant contended that such an invalid petition could not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court, thereby rendering the entire proceedings and any resultant judgment void. The Applicant further maintained that, even if jurisdiction were properly v ested, the substantive claims in the petition were without merit, as irregularities in forty-one polling stations, even if established, could not have materially affected the overall result from the one hundred and fifty-two polling stations. THE CASE OF 1ST INTERESTED PARTY 14. The 1st Interested Party, on the other hand, contended that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction. He argued that the question of compliance with the 21- day rule involved factual determinations, which were not suitable for summary dismissal or for review by way of certiorari. He further alleged that the Applicant engaged in fraudulent conduct, asserting that the Applicant had initially represented a lat er gazette date —allegedly inducing the 1st Interested Party to abandon his first petition of 23rd December 2024 and to refile on 25th 28 January 2025—only to later rely on the earlier date of 24th December 2024 in this Court. According to the 1st Interested Party, the Applicant’s inconsistent positions constituted a fraud on the Court and should disentitle him from the equitable remedy of certiorari. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 15. From the parties’ arguments and the record, I have identified the following principal issues for determination: i. What was the operative date of the Gazette publication of the Kpandai Election result, and what are the implications under Section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284)? ii. Whether the 1st Interested Party filed the Election Petition within the 21 - day statutory period (and furnished the required security for costs within the same period)? If not, did the failure render the petition incompetent, thereby depriving the High Court of jurisdiction to hear it? iii. Whether the alleged irregularities and inconsistencies in 41 polling stations (out of a total of 152 polling stations), even if taken as proven, were sufficient to materially affect the outcome of the parliamentary election? iv. Whether the 1st Interested Party’s allegation of fraud on the part of the Applicant, premised on the Applicant’s presentation of inconsistent dates for the Gazette publication rendered the instant application meritless? 16. I proceed to analyze each of these issues within the context of the applicable statute, the Constitution, and precedents of this Court and other Superior Courts in our jurisdiction. 29 ANALYSIS 17. It is not in dispute that, under the statute regulating Parliamentary Elections, the publication of election results in the Gazette triggers a short window within which any challenge to a Parliamentary Election must be initiated. Section 18 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284 ), regulates the time for the presentation of a Parliamentary Election Petition. Section 18(1) provides as follows: “ An Election Petition shall be presented within twenty -one days after the date of the publication in the Gazette of the result of the election to which it relates ,” except in certain limited cases of alleged corrupt practices, which are not relevant to the instant proceedings. 18. Furthermore, section 18(2) of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) stipulates that a petition shall not be deemed to have been validly presented unless the petitioner, within the same twenty -one (21) day period, furnishes security for costs in an amount as determined by the High Court. The law is emphatic that; “the time limit provided by this section for the presentation of an Election Petition shall not be extended.” 19. These provisions are mandatory and were enacted to secure the expeditious resolution of electoral disputes and to bar stale or belated claims. They embody the public policy that the outcome of elections should not be held in suspense indefinitely; accordingly, any challenge must be mounted promptly or not at all. 20. Our election jurisprudence is replete with decided cases forming part of our body of case law, which are binding on the High Court. In REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT, SUNYANI; EX -PARTE ALHAJI COLLINS DAUDA (No. J5/12/2009), dated 8 April 2009, this Court, speaking through Date -Bah JSC, emphasised that an election petition may only be brought after the official 30 declaration of results. Even where a petition is founded on allegations of corrupt practices, the Court, upon a combined reading of the provisions of PNDCL 284, concluded that any challenge must await the declaration and gazetting of the results by the Electoral Commission. An undeclared election was thus deemed “inchoate or incomplete ”. Consequently, the twenty -one (21) day limitation period begins to run only upon gazetting of the results. This Court further held that, “our interpretation of Section 18 of PNDCL 284 as impliedly requiring the declaration of the election result, even in the case of an allegation of corrupt practice, is buttressed by the provisions in Sections 19 and 20 of the Law. The language of Section 1 9 impliedly asserts that an Election Petition can be brought only after a candidate has been declared elected. It is in the following terms: “19. After the hearing of an election petition the High Court may make any of the following orders: a. declare that the election to which the petition relates is void; b. declare that a candidate other than the member whose election is questioned was duly elected, or c. dismiss the petition and declare that the member whose election is questioned as duly elected.” The reason why we consider that this provision assumes that an election petition may be brought only after a declaration of the results is that an election can hardly be declared void, under paragraph (a) above, if it has not been completed and declared by the Electoral Commission. It can be cogently argued that an election whose results have not yet been declared is an inchoate or incomplete election, rather than an election. Section 19(b) contains the expression “member whose election is questioned”. This expression, in our view, implies that the member’s results have been declared. Section 19(c) also contains the expression: “member whose election is questioned” which, to us, again implies that the member’s results have been declared. Similarly, Section 20 of the Law assumes that a candidate has been 31 declared elected and gives the High Court power to declare the election void on the grounds set out in its subsections. Accordingly, our conclusion from reading these provisions of PNDCL 284 together is that, even in the case of an allegation of a corrupt practice, an Election Petition may only be brought after the Electoral Commission has declared a result in relation to t he election. This means that the interested party’s petition before the Sunyani High Court was premature and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to enter into its merits.” Date Bah JSC (as he then was) 21. In a more intricate development, the Court of Appeal, constituted as a panel, in RICHARD AKUOKO ADIYA & ANOTHER v. AKWASI ADUSEI & ANOTHER, No. HI/46/2014, dated 29th May 2014—where I had the opportunity to deliver the lead judgment —squarely addressed the legal consequences of non-compliance with the statutory 21-day timeline. In that case, a Parliamentary Election Petition challenging the December 2012 results for the Ahafo Ano North Constituency was filed within the prescribed period. However, the Petitioner failed to have the security for costs determined and paid within twenty-one (21) days after gazette. Notwithstanding this default, the High Court proceeded to hear the matt er and even purported to extend the time for compliance by recourse to other statutory provisions. On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned that approach and dismissed the petition outright for non - compliance. The Court held that, once the statutory preco nditions were not satisfied within the stipulated 21 days, the High Court was divested of jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Accordingly, the petition and all proceedings founded upon it were declared null and void. The appellate court emphatically rejected the trial judge’s attempt to relax the timeline, holding that section 18(3) expressly barred any extension whatsoever. 32 22. In the present case, the Electoral Commission (EC) officially gazetted the Kpandai Constituency Parliamentary Election results on 24th December 2024. This fact is evidenced by the Gazette notification ( Exhibit “MN” in the Applicant’s affidavit) and is not seriously disputed by the parties. Indeed, the Applicant asserts that the gazette date was 24th December 2024, a fact which the 1st Interested Party ultimately conceded, acknowledging that a Gazette notice was issued on that date (albeit conte nding that it was later superseded). Computing twenty-one days from 24th December 2024, the statutory timeline for filing any election petition expired on 14th January 2025. It is undisputed that the 1st Interested Party’s election petition was filed on 25 th January 2025, well outside the prescribed timeline. By that date, thirty -two (32) days had elapsed since the gazette publication, exceeding the legally permissible period by eleven (11) days. 23. In consequence of the petition having been filed out of time, the required security for costs was necessarily not furnished within the stipulated 21 -day window either, the security typically being provided at the time of, or immediately after, filing. The Applicant contended—and it stands to reason — that, having filed the petition late on 25th January 2025, the 1st Interested Party could not have satisfied the mandatory security requirement by the 14th January 2025 deadline. Indeed, even where a petition is filed within time, failure to provide security for costs within the same period renders the petition invalid ab initio. Thus, on the face of the timeline, the 1st Interested Party’s petition violated both limbs of section 18 of PNDC Law 284 , having been presented out of time and without the requisite security as required by law. 24. The 1st Interested Party, however, contends that the operative “date of publication in the Gazette” was not 24th December 2024. He argues that the EC 33 issued a second Gazette Notice on 6th January 2025, and that this later publication ought to be treated as the relevant date for the purposes of computing the 21 days. 25. It is asserted that the 6th January 2025 Gazette “ superseded” or replaced the earlier publication, perhaps because the earlier one might have been provisional or incomplete. I have examined the record and submissions on this point. The Applicant strongly refutes the existence of any valid “ second Gazette ” that could reset the clock. He maintains that the only legally recognized Gazette publication of the Kpandai Parliamentary Election result was on 24th December 2024, and that any subsequent notice (if it existed) did not nullify the first. 26. From the affidavit and attachments before the Court, I do not find any statutory or factual basis for the 1st Interested Party's claim that a later gazette replaced the earlier one. As a general principle, once an election result is gazetted , the time for challenging it begins to run from that date. A subsequent republication or correction, absent clear legal authority, would not ordinarily invalidate the initial publication for limitation purposes —particularly where the petitioner was evidently aware of the result and had, in fact, attempted a challenge earlier (on 23rd December). The contention by the 1st Interested Party that the time for filing the Parliamentary Election Petition began to run from 6th January 2025 , rather than 24th December 2024, is therefore wholly untenable. 27. The Applicant’s motion to dismiss the petition before the High Court was premised on a fundamental misrepresentation of fact, namely that the relevant Gazette Notice was published on 6th January 2025. That assertion is plainly erroneous. The Gazette Notice lawfully affirmed for the purposes of computing time is the Gazette Notice published on 24th December 2024. 34 28. That Gazette Notice constitutes a statutory instrument duly issued pursuant to law and was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Kumi as legally binding in respect of all constituencies contained therein, including Kpandai. It is, therefore, the operative Gazette Notice, and not any purported publication dated 6th January 2025, nor any deposition by a party asserting that the applicable Gazette Notice is that of 6th January 2025 rather than 24th December 2024. 29. In the circumstances, the High Court is deemed to take judicial notice of a Gazette Notice published in accordance with the law regulating the functions of the Electoral Commission and ought not to have been swayed by a factual misrepresentation advanced by the Applicant. 30. The constitutional framework buttresses this conclusion. Article 99(1)(a) of the 1992 Constitution vests jurisdiction in the High Court to hear “ any question whether a person has been validly elected as a member of Parliament ,” but this jurisdiction is “subject to” the law. Section 16 of PNDCL 284 reiterates that an MP’s election may be questioned only by petition presented to the High Court, while Section 18 imposes the time limitation. Consequently, a petition that is not brought within 21 days of gazettement is a nullity and does not properly invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction. Our law has consistently treated such time limits in election petitions as imp erative and jurisdictional. As this Court stated in JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION & NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO (No. J1/05/2021) dated 4th March 2021, a court must not assume jurisdiction where issues of limitation have been raised and proven; if a claim is time-barred, the court ought not to delve into the merits. The duty of the court is first to ensure that a case 35 before it is properly and timeously brought, for jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be conferred by consent or ignored for convenience. 31. Having established the relevant dates, I find that the Election Petition in the instant case was presented outside the statutory period prescribed by Section 18(1) of PNDCL 284 and, ipso facto , the statutory security for costs was not provided within the prescribed time. On Issue 1, I find that the operative Gazette publication date was 24th December 2024, and, having failed to file the Petition by 14th January 2025 and provide security within that period, the 1st Interested Party fell foul of Section 18 of PNDC Law 284 . The 21 -day rule is an absolute statutory condition precedent to a valid petition; no extension or indulgence is permitted. What then is the implication of this finding on the jurisdiction of the High Court? ISSUE 2: ON THE EFFECT OF LATE FILING 32. In view of the finding that the petition was not presented within the mandatory timeframe, the necessary legal consequence is that the petition is incompetent ab initio. A court’s jurisdiction to hear an election petition is invoked only by a valid petition that meets the statutory prerequisites. Where those prerequisites, such as the timing and security requirements, are not satisfied, the petition is a nullity and cannot confer jurisdiction on the High Court. In the words of the Applicant’s counsel, the petition in this case was “ ineffective and impotent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court.” I agree with that characterization. 33. The High Court ought to have declined jurisdiction once it became apparent that the petition had been presented out of time. Jurisdiction is a threshold, or gateway, issue that courts are obliged to consider, even if the parties do not raise it. In this ca se, the issue was indeed raised by the Applicant by way of a 36 preliminary objection and in an application to dismiss the petition for non - compliance. The High Court, however, proceeded to hear the case on its merits, effectively overlooking or overruling the time -bar objection. In doing so, the High Court committed a fundamental error of law. 34. A rich line of judicial authority from this Court establishes that where a lower court assumes jurisdiction when it has none, or where it wrongfully declines to recognize a clear lack of jurisdiction, its decision is a nullity and is amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. 35. In REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX -PARTE APPIAH (2000) SCGLR 389, this Court held that, an order of certiorari will issue where a lower court’s decision was made without jurisdiction, whether because the court exceeded its jurisdiction or lacked jurisdiction altogether. Ampiah JSC noted as follows: An order of certiorari would be made where the order sought to be quashed has been made, inter alia, without jurisdiction either because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction or lacks jurisdiction. It is also said that a court having jurisdiction may lose that jurisdiction if its decision is made in bad faith, if it has failed in the course of the inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice; or if it had refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account or it might have based its decision on a matter it has no right to take into account. See ANISMINIC LTD. VS. FOREIGN COMPENSATION COMMISSION [1969] 2 AC 147 AT 171, HL. The list cannot be said to be exhaustive. However, where the court has jurisdiction to enter tain the action, its judgment or ruling cannot be impeached on the mere ground that its decision is wrong. Under those circumstances the proper thing to do is to 37 appeal against that decision. Where however upon the face of the proceedings themselves it appears that the decision of the court is wrong in law, certiorari to quash it will be granted. See R VS. NORTHUMBERLAND COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL; EX -PARTE SHAW [1952] 1 KB 338.” 36. Similarly, in BIMPONG-BUTA VS. GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL [2003- 2004] SCGLR 1200, this Court emphasized that, jurisdiction is so fundamental that even if not questioned by the parties, a court must be mindful of it to ensure a valid outcome. In the words of Akuffo JSC; (as she then was). “Jurisdiction is always a fundamental issue in every matter that comes before any court and, even if it is not questioned by any of the parties, it is crucial for a court to advert its mind to it to assure a valid outcome.” 37. Applying those principles to the instant case, once the petition was filed out of time, the High Court lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis (by reason of the elapsed time) to entertain it. Any proceedings founded on that petition were therefore void. The rule, as established in McFoy v. United African Company Ltd. (1961) 3 All ER 1169, is that one cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stand. The petition being a nullity, all orders flowing from it, including the High Court’s judgment and the consequential orders for a rerun of the election, are equally nullities. I therefore hold that the learned High Court Judge erred in law and acted in excess of jurisdiction by hearing and determining the time -barred petition. The resulting judgment dated 24th November 2025 was delivered when the court was bereft of jurisdiction, and is therefore void ab initio. 38. The 1st Interested Party’s counsel argued that the question of whether the petition was time -barred was a mixed question of fact and law, which should have been determined by the High Court rather than by the Supreme Court on 38 certiorari. He contended that the Applicant ought to have raised the issue of limitation in his Answer to the petition at trial (pursuant to Order 11, Rule 8 of the High Court Rules), and that by failing to do so, the Applicant “ acquiesced” to the High Court’s jurisdiction or waived the point. I find little merit in that argument, which, with all due respect, is bereft of legal learning. The law is clear: no party to an action can, by his acts or omissions, confer on a court a jurisdiction that is conferred solely by statute. 39. Indeed from the processes before us, the Applicant did in fact raise the issue in limine by a motion to dismiss the petition on 21st January 2025 (even before filing a substantive Answer). There was thus no acquiescence; rather, the issue was squarely joined. 40. Second, even if the Applicant had failed to raise it, as aforesaid, a jurisdictional limitation of this kind cannot be waived by conduct. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by default or estoppel. A statutory time-limit for instituting an election petition is not akin to an ordinary procedural timeline that can be extended or overlooked; it is a condition attached to the right of action itself. Since the timeline is a statutory precondition, defences founded on estoppel or acquiescence are clearly untenable, for estoppel is not, and cannot operate to suspend or override, the prescriptions of statutes—in this instance, Article 99 of the 1992 Constitution vis -à-vis PNDCL 284. In ABABIO AND OTHERS VS. KARIKARI AND ANOTHER [2001 -2002] 1 GLR 381, it was held that: “Estoppel of all kinds was subject to the general rule that it could not override the laws of the land, i.e. where a particular formality was required by statute, no estoppel could cure the defect nor give jurisdiction to a court where statute denied it”. 39 41. And as has been entrenched in our jurisprudence, the courts are servants of the legislature. The courts cannot grant immunity to violations of statutes, especially in the midst of the interplay of substantive rights. In KWABENA OBENG & ANOTHER VS. KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY & ANOTHER CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/53/2016 DATED 14 TH JUNE 2017, this Court re-echoed its caution in THE REPUBLIC VS. HIGH COURT (FAST TRACK DIVISION ACCRA, EX-PARTE NATIONAL LOTTERY AUTHORITY (GHANA LOTTO OPERATORS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS INTERESTED PARTIES) [2009] SCGLR 390 and REPUBLIC VS. MICHAEL CONDUAH, EX -PARTE GEORGE SUPI ASMAH UNREPORTED JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. J4/28/12 DATED 15TH AUGUST 2013 and held that: “The principle of law which is clearly discernible from the above cases is that unless the provisions in the statute are so manifestly and incurably bad, no Judge or court for that matter has the right or authority to grant immunity to a party from the consequences of the breach of an Act of Parliament or disable the enforcement of the provisions of an Act of Parliament”. 42. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 99 and PNDCL 284 is contingent upon a petition being presented in accordance with the law. Where this condition is not satisfied, the High Court lacks the authority to “assume jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.” Indeed, Yeboah C.J. stated in the 2021 case of JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION & NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO -ADDO (No. J1/05/2021), decided on 4th March 2021, that a court must refrain from assuming jurisdiction where, among other things, a limitation period has expired. His Lordship eruditely stated: “it is always the duty of a court not to assume jurisdiction over a suit where the court had no jurisdiction over either the subject matter of the suit, the parties to the action or where a party to the suit 40 is not clothed with capacity regarding the subject matter in issue. Again, a court may not assume jurisdiction over a case where issues of limitation, estoppel per rem judicata are raised, and proved as preliminary points. In the circumstances of any of the above being applicable the court ought not to assume jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case before it.” 43. I note from the 1st Interested Party’s submission the contention that the issue of the precise Gazette date is a factual matter requiring evidence, suggesting that the High Court was the proper forum to resolve it. I am not persuaded by this argument. The date of Gazette publication is an objective fact, easily verified from the official Gazette itself, which was exhibited. The 1st Interested Party never truly disputed that a Gazette notice was issued on 24th December 2024; rather, he contended that a later notice supplanted it. Determining which date governs the limitation period is primarily a question of law, arising from the interpretation of Section 18 in the context of potentially multiple Gazette notices. In my view, there was no factual ambiguity requiring a High Court trial for clarification. 44. In sum, on Issue 2, I hold that the 1st Interested Party’s failure to meet the 21-day statutory deadline (and the concomitant security requirement) rendered the election petition incompetent, such that the High Court never had a valid cause before it. Consequently, the High Court’s jurisdiction was not properly invoked, and its judgment was delivered in disregard of the clear provisions of Section 18 of PNDCL 284. 45. Having decided the application primarily on this jurisdictional ground, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to pronounce on the other issues relating to the merits of the petition. This is particularly so because certiorari is concerned not