
Reported judgment
Newland v Savage, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 277
Newland v Savage is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1920-36. Cite it as 1920-36 ALR S.L. 277. Search it by the party names, the citation 1920-36 ALR S.L. 277, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 95 KB1920-36 ALR S.L. 277Reported judgment
Freetown
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Newland
v.
Savage
1920-36 ALR S.L. 277
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
NEWLAND u. SAVAGE, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 277
s.c.
I find, therefore, that the answer to the question propounded to
this court by the learned Chief Justice, viz. Whether he was right
in holding that on a correct interpretation of s. 180 (1) of the
Freetown Municipality Ordinance, 1927, the objection raised by
the defendants was not a special defence of which it was necessary 5
to give notice of his intention but that it was part of the plaintiff's
case to prove that he had given notice of his intention to commence
the action, is in the negative. The plaintiff is entitled to costs.
McROBERTS, Ag. C.J. (Sierra Leone) andSAWREY-COOKSON, J. (G.C.) 10
concurred.
Case stated answered in the negative.
NEWLAND v. SA V AGE
Supreme Court (McRoberts, Ag. C.J.): October 19th, 1931
( 1] Evidence - character - previous convictions - evidence of accused as to
previous conviction inadmissible except as provided in Criminal Evidence
Ordinance (cap. 44), s. 4(f) - otherwise reception fatal even though
court not influenced: By reason of the Criminal Evidence Ordinance
(cap. 44), s. 4(f) the evidence of an accused in cross-examination as to a
previous conviction is inadmissible, except in the circumstances stated in
the section, and its reception is fatal to the conviction even though it
does not influence the court (page 278, lines 10-23).
The appellant was charged in the Police Court, Freetown, with
assault.
It was alleged that the appellant assaulted the Imam in the
Mosque. He was asked in cross-examination whether he had not
been previously convicted of a similar offence and he answered
that he had. He was convicted and appealed to the Supreme
Court against his conviction on the ground that the evidence
about his previous conviction had been wrongly admitted in the
court below.
The court considered whether the evidence appealed against
might not have influenced the magistrates and whether, in any
event, the conviction should not be quashed having regard to the
provisions of s. 4(f) of the Criminal Evidence Ordinance (cap. 44).
The appeal was allowed.
Case referred to:
(1) Charnock v. Merchant, [1900] 1 Q.B. 474; (1900), 82 L.T. 89, applied.
277
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40
5
THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Legislation construed:
Criminal Evidence Ordinance (Laws of Sierra Leone, 1925, cap. 44), s. 4(f):
The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 278, lines 11-14.
Hyde for the appellant;
Nelson- Williams for the respondent.
McROBERTS, Ag. C.J.:
In this case there is only one point of substance, namely,
whether the evidence of the accused as to his previous conviction
10 was rightly admitted. It is clear that under the Criminal Evidence
Ordinance (cap. 44), s. 4(f)- "a person charged shall not be
asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer" any question
tending to show that he has been previously convicted of an
offence except in certain circumstances.
15 In the case before me the accused was asked, and answered,
that he had been previously convicted of an offence of exactly the
same kind f'S the one with which he was then charged, namely,
assaulting the Imam in the Mosque, and the case is without any of
those features which would enable such evidence to be given. It is
20 clear that this question should never have been asked or allowed
to be answered, and it is equally clear, on the authority of
Charnock v. Merchant (1), that the reception of such evidence is
fatal.
Although it is quite unnecessary to show that the justices were
25 influenced by the evidence, yet in this case I am by no means
certain that they were not, for there is some justification for the
suggestion that the appellant was turned out of the Mosque
because he was a dancing man, and that he was not the first
aggressor, and if the justices had any doubt as to which side to
30 believe the evidence now appealed against might well have turned
the scales. Be that as it may, however (and it is not a point which it
is necessary now to decide), it is certain that this evidence was
illegally admitted and is in consequence fatal to the conviction.
I allow this appeal with costs.
35 Appeal allowed.
40
278
