Mugisha Benon v Mirembe Bosco (Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2022) [2026] UGHC 1223 (5 October 2026)

1 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA SITTING AT MPIGI CIVIL APPEAL NO. 23 OF 2022 MUGISHA BENON ====================================== APPELLANT VERSUS MIREMBE BOSCO======================================RESPONDENT JUDGMENT BEFORE ACTING LADY JUSTICE DEEPA VERMA Introduction 10 The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the judgment and orders of His Worship Watyekere George Wakubona, then Magistrate at the Chief Magistrate’s Court of Mpigi, sitting at Nsangi, in Civil Suit No. 016 of 2018, lodge d this appeal. The trial court dismissed the Appellant’s suit for recovery of money, including compensation and damages for wrongful detention, for want of prosecution and subsequently entered judgment in favour of the Respondent on his counterclaim. By th is appeal, the Appellant seeks to have the judgment and orders of the trial court set aside or quashed or, in the alternative, to be granted unconditional leave to appear and defend the counterclaim in Civil Suit No. 016 of 2018. The Appellant raised the following grounds of appeal; 1. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he failed to properly direct 20 himself on the legality of service of summons, and thereby wrongly dismissed Civil Suit No. 016 of 2018. 2. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he found that the Appellant owed the Respondent UGX 3,020,000/= (Uganda Shillings Three Million Twenty Thousand), thereby arriving at a wrong decision. 2 3. The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact when he failed to properly evaluate the evidence and misdirected himself on the law regarding the proof of triable issues on breach of contract, thereby reaching a wrong decision. 4. The trial Magistrate erred in law and fact when he awarded UGX 3,000,000/= (Uganda Shillings Three Million) as general damages to the Respondent. 30 5. The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact when he failed to determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. Background The Appellant was the Plaintiff in the trial court. His case, as pleaded in the plaint, was that the Respondent sold him a shop situated at Kimbejja -Buddo for UGX 3,700,000/= (Uganda Shillings Three Million Seven Hundred Thousand), of which he paid UGX 1,180,000/= (Uganda Shillings One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand), leaving a balance of UGX 2,520,000/= (Uganda Shillings Two Million Five Hundred Twenty Thousand). He stated that the parties had agreed that he would pay the outstanding balance on 2nd March 2018 pursuant to an agreement executed to that effect. He further 40 alleged that, before the agreed payment date, the Respondent caused his arrest on 6th January 2018, resulting in his detention at Budo Police Post for two days. He was arrested a second time on 22nd January 2018 and detained for one day at Bigodi Police Station in relation to the same matter. The Appellant contended that the arrests and detention were unlawful and wrongful and consequently claimed compensation and general damages. The Respondent filed a Written Statement of Defence denying the Appellant’s allegations. He admitted that he had sold the shop to the Appellant for UGX 3,700,000/= but disputed the amount paid, stating that the Appellant had paid only UGX 680,000/=, leaving an outstanding balance of UGX 3,020,000/= (Uganda Shillings Three Million Twenty 50 Thousand). He stated that the Appellant had agreed to pay part of the outstanding balance on 20th December 2018 and the remainder by February 2018, but failed to honour that arrangement. The Respondent further contended that the Appellant’s arrest arose from his failure to pay the outstanding balance. 3 In addition to his defence, the Respondent filed a counterclaim seeking recovery of the outstanding UGX 3,020,000/= together with gen eral damages and costs. The Appellant did not file a reply to the counterclaim. The matter was thereafter set down for hearing. The Appellant, having instituted the suit, failed to take the necessary steps to prosecute his claim and ceased participating in the proceedings. The Respondent consequently moved the trial court to proceed with the 60 matter. The Appellant’s suit was subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution. The dismissal of the main suit did not dispose of the Respondent’s counterclaim, which remained pending for determination. The Respondent thereafter proceeded with his counterclaim. An interlocutory judgment was entered in his favour upon the Appellant’s failure to file a defence to the counterclaim, and the matter was subsequently set down for formal proof. The Appellant was served with the hearing notice by substituted service through publication in the Daily Monitor. An affidavit of service was filed on the record confirming the service. At the formal proof hearing, the Respondent presente d two witnesses in support of the counterclaim. The evidence adduced concerned, among other matters, the sale of the 70 shop, the purchase price, the amount paid by the Appellant, and the outstanding balance claimed by the Respondent. Upon consideration of th e evidence, the trial court entered judgment in favour of the Respondent and awarded him UGX 3,020,000/= as the outstanding balance, UGX 3,000,000/= as general damages and the costs of the suit. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the dismissal of his s uit and the judgment entered on the Respondent’s counterclaim, lodged the present appeal seeking, inter alia, an order setting aside or quashing the decision of the lower court or, in the alternative, unconditional leave to appear and defend Civil Suit No. 016 of 2018. Representation Counsel Katamba represents the Appellant, while Counsel Asiimwe Brian represents the 80 Respondent. Duty of the First Appellate Court The duty of a first appellate court is well settled. In Banco Arabe Espanol v Bank of Uganda (Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1998) [1999] UGSC 1, the Supreme Court held that: 4 “…It is the duty of this court, as a first appellate court, to re-appraise the evidence and subject it to a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny, weighing the conflicting evidence and drawing its own inferences and conclusion from it. In so doing, however, the court has to bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should, therefore, make due allowance in that respect…” This Court is therefore enjoined to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence on record and 90 draw its own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses testify. I shall bear this duty in mind in resolving the grounds of appeal. Resolution. Ground 1: Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to properly direct himself on the legality of service of summons, thereby dismissing Civil Suit No. 016 of 2018. The Appellant contends that the learned trial Magistrate failed to prope rly address the legality of service of summons and that this failure resulted in the dismissal of his suit. Counsel for the Appellant, however, advanced submissions on a different issue 100 altogether. Rather than addressing the legality of service of summons, counsel’s submissions concerned the alleged failure to serve hearing notices and the Appellant’s right to natural justice and a fair hearing under Article 28 of the Constitution. Counsel submitted that the record does not disclose proof of service of hear ing notices and that no affidavit of service was filed. It was further argued that, in the absence of such proof, and considering that the matter had been referred to mediation, the Appellant was unaware of the subsequent proceedings and was thereby denied a fair hearing. It is necessary at the outset to clarify that Ground 1, as framed, challenges the legality of the service of summons, whereas the submissions advanced by counsel concern the subsequent service of hearing notices. These are distinct procedural processes, serving 110 different purposes and arising at different stages of the proceedings, and ought not to be conflated. The Court must therefore first determine whether any defect in the service of summons, which is the matter expressly raised in Ground 1, has been established. Upon careful perusal of the lower court record, I find that summons to file a defence were duly issued and served by the Appellant, as the Plaintiff in the suit, upon the 5 Defendant/Respondent. The Appellant was therefore the par ty who instituted the proceedings and caused the summons to be issued for service upon the Respondent. The record further shows that, upon service of the summons, the Respondent entered appearance and filed a Written Statement of Defence together with a co unterclaim. The Respondent’s subsequent participation in the proceedings is clear evidence that the 120 summons was duly served and that he was made aware of the suit and the nature of the claim brought against him. The purpose of service of summons is to brin g the institution and nature of the proceedings to the attention of the defendant and to allow him to enter appearance and respond to the claim. That purpose was fully achieved in the present case, as demonstrated by the Respondent’s appearance and filing of his defence and counterclaim. In the circumstances, I find no basis for the complaint that the service of summons was defective or that the learned trial Magistrate failed to properly direct himself on that issue. The record shows that the Appellant in stituted the suit and caused the summons to be served upon the Respondent. Upon service, the Respondent entered appearance and 130 filed a defence and counterclaim. The Respondent therefore participated in the proceedings without challenging the service of the summons. In those circumstances, the legality of the service of the summons does not arise as a genuine issue for determination in this appeal. The real complaint raised by the Appellant concerns the subsequent service of hearing notices. To determine tha t complaint, it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which the matter proceeded after the parties had participated in the proceedings and the matter was referred to mediation. The Appellant thereafter took no further steps to prosecute his claim. The Respondent, having already filed a defence and counterclaim arising from the same transaction, was entitled to take steps to have the matter proceed 140 to hearing. The subsequent hearing notices were issued and served upon the Appellant by substituted service through publication in the Daily Monitor, pursuant to Order 5 Rule 18 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, S.I. 71-1. The record contains an affidavit of service sworn by Rwabiite Nobert of M/s M. Mugoya & Co. Advocates, confirming that the substituted service was effected by publication. Despite that service, the Appellant neither attended court on the scheduled hearing date nor took any steps to resume prosecution of his suit. His assertion that he was unaware of the subsequent proceedings is therefore not borne out by the record. The law recognizes that a plaintiff who invokes the jurisdiction of the court bears a 150 continuing obligation to diligently prosecute the claim. In Nilani v Patel & Others [1969] EA 340, Dickson J. stated: “It is trite law that in every suit, it is the plaintiff who is in pursuit of a remedy, and he should take all necessary steps to achieve an expeditious determination of his claim… when he fails to do so, the defendant is entitled to invoke the court’s process to bring the matter to a conclusion.” The principle underlying the decision is that a plaintiff cannot institute proceedings, thereafter cease taking the necessary steps to advance them, and at the same time expect the defendant to remain indefinitely exposed to unresolved litigation. The obligation to diligently prosecute a suit is a continuing one, and where a plaintiff fails to 160 discharge that obligation, the defendant is entitled to invoke the court’s procedural mechanisms to bring the proceedings to a conclusion. This p rinciple serves not only the interests of the defendant but also the broader interests of finality and the efficient administration of justice. The circumstances of the present case bring that principle into clear focus. The Appellant was the plaintiff who instituted the original suit. The Respondent entered appearance, filed a Written Statement of Defence and lodged a counterclaim arising from the same transaction. When the Appellant subsequently ceased participating in the proceedings and failed to prosec ute his own claim, the Respondent was not required to leave the matter indefinitely pending. He was entitled to invoke the court’s process to have the 170 Appellant’s suit proceed to determination or, where the circumstances warranted, be dismissed for want of prosecution. The Appellant’s failure to prosecute his own suit did not, moreover, extinguish or suspend the Respondent’s independent right to pursue his counterclaim. The counterclaim 7 constituted a distinct claim before the court, and the Respondent was entitled to take the necessary procedural steps for its determination. The subsequent progression of the counterclaim, including the entry of interlocutory judgment upon the Appellant’s failure to file a defence to it and its eventual setting down for formal proof, must therefore be viewed separately from the dismissal of the Appellant’s own suit for want of prosecution. The Appellant’s reliance on the right to a fair hearing under Article 28 of the Constitution 180 does not alter that position. The right to a fair hearing requires that a party be afforded a reasonable and lawful opportunity to participate in proceedings affecting his rights and interests. It does not, however, impose an obligation upon the court or the opposing party to keep proceedings indefini tely pending where a party has ceased to participate, particularly where reasonable steps have subsequently been taken to notify that party of the proceedings. In the present case, the record demonstrates that the Appellant was served with hearing notices through the prescribed mode of substituted service. An affidavit of service confirming the publication is on record. The Appellant nevertheless failed to attend court or take any steps to participate in the proceedings thereafter. There is therefore no basis 190 for concluding that he was shut out of the proceedings without notice or denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard. In these circumstances, the Appellant cannot properly rely upon his own failure to participate in the proceedings as a basis for impeac hing the subsequent proceedings. The Respondent invoked the court’s process only after the Appellant had failed to diligently prosecute his suit, and the Appellant was thereafter served through a mode of substituted service authorised by law. The record do es not support the contention that the proceedings proceeded against the Appellant without notice or in breach of the principles of natural justice. I therefore find that the service of summons upon the Appellant was duly effected, that 200 the subsequent subs tituted service of hearing notices was lawful and regular, and that the Appellant has not demonstrated any procedural defect or denial of a reasonable opportunity to be heard sufficient to impeach the proceedings or the resultant dismissal of his suit. Accordingly, Ground 1 fails. 8 Grounds 2, 3 and 5: Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the Appellant owed the Respondent UGX 3,020,000/=, in failing to properly evaluate the evidence and in failing to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract. Grounds 2, 3 and 5 are closely related, as they all challenge the trial court’s determination 210 of the Respondent ’s counterclaim arising from the sale agreement and the amount allegedly outstanding thereunder. They shall therefore be considered together. I have carefully perused the lower court record and the judgment. At page 2 of his judgment, the learned trial Magistrate stated: “It is important to note that although the defendant to the counterclaim was s erved with the Written Statement of Defence and the counterclaim, he did not file a reply to the counterclaim as is required under the law. An interlocutory judgment in default was accordingly entered in favour of the counterclaimant, and the matter was fixed for formal proof.” The first question that arises, therefore, is whether the procedure adopted by the trial 220 court after the Appellant failed to file a defence to the counterclaim was proper in law. Order 9 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides: “Where the plaint is drawn with a claim for pecuniary damages only or for detention of goods with or without a claim for pecuniary damages, and the defendant fails or all defendants, if more than one, fail to file a defence on or before the day fixed in the summons, the plaintiff may, subject to rule 5 of this Order, enter an interlocutory judgment against the defendant or defendants and set down the suit for assessment by the court of the value of the goods and damages or the damages only, as the case may be, in respect of the amount found to be due in the course of the assessment.” 230 The scope of the above provision was explained by Evershed LJ in Abbey Panel & Sheet Metal Co Ltd Vs Barson Products (a firm) [1947] 2 All ER 809 as follows; “The intended scope and purpose of RSC, Ord 13, rr. 3–7 inclusive, appear to me to be reasonably plain. They provide that where a plaintiff has in his writ made a claim against a defendant for one or more of the following, viz, (a) a debt or 9 liquidated demand, (b) detinue, and (c) pecuniary damages, and such defendant, though properly served, does not choose to appear to the writ, then the plaintiff may, without having to take any further steps against that defendant, obtain judgment against him for his claim —in the case of a liquidated demand, a final judgment; in the other cases, an interlocutory judgment subject to assessment by 240 the court of the monetary amount he is entitled to recover.” The rationale behind the rule is that where a defendant, despite having been duly served, fails to defend a claim falling within the prescribed category, the plaintiff is not required to prove the defendant’s liability afresh as though the claim were being contested. The default has procedural consequences. Where the claim is one for a liqu idated sum, the court may enter judgment for the amount claimed, subject to the applicable rules. Where the claim involves damages requiring assessment, an interlocutory judgment may be entered and the matter proceeded with for assessment or formal proof of damages In the present case, the Respondent’s counterclaim was principally for recovery of UGX 3,020,000/=, being the alleged outstanding balance of the purchase price of the shop. 250 The claim was therefore for a specific and ascertainable monetary sum ar ising from the alleged sale transaction. The Respondent had pleaded the amount claimed and the basis upon which it was said to be due. The Appellant was served with the counterclaim but did not file a defence. In those circumstances, the Appellant’s failure to defend the counterclaim entitled the trial court to invoke the applicable provisions governing interlocutory judgment. The entry of interlocutory judgment was therefore not, in itself, an error on the part of the learned trial Magistrate. The subsequent setting down of the counterclaim for formal proof was equally proper, particularly in relation to those matters which remained to be established before judgment could be entered. 260 The fact that an interlocutory judgment had been entered did not, however, mean that the Respondent was automatically entitled to every sum claimed without the court considering the evidence placed before it. Formal proof serves the essential purpose of enabling the Court to ascertai n, on the basis of evidence, the amount properly recoverable and, where appropriate, to assess the damages payable. It follows that, notwithstanding the absence of a formal defence, the Court remained under a duty to 10 consider the evidence adduced by the Respondent and to satisfy itself that such evidence established, to the requisite standard, the entitlement to the reliefs sought.of That brings me to the evidence presented at the formal proof. As a first appellate court, I re -evaluated and independently co nsidered the evidence 270 before the trial court, bearing in mind that I did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses testify. During formal proof, the Respondent testified as PW1 that the shop was sold for UGX 3,700,000/=, that the Appellant paid UGX 680,000/=, and that the balance of UGX 3,020,000/= remained outstanding. He further testified that the outstanding balance was to be paid in installments but that the Appellant failed to honour the agreed payment arrangement. He also testified regarding the subsequent dealings with the shop. PW2, Byamukama Herbert, corroborated the Respondent’s evidence. He testified that he introduced the parties, was present during the negotiations and witnessed the execution of the agreement. His evidence therefore corr oborated the existence of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties. 280 The evidence adduced by the Respondent remained unchallenged. The Appellant did not file a defence to the counterclaim, did not participate in th e formal proof proceedings, called no witnesses and adduced no evidence to establish that he had paid UGX 1,180,000/= as alleged in his original plaint or otherwise to contradict the Respondent’s evidence that only UGX 680,000/= had been paid. I have considered the Appellant’s complaint regarding the evidential basis upon which the trial court determined the Respondent ’s counterclaim. The record shows that the Respondent gave direct evidence concerning the sale transaction, including the agreed purchase pri ce, the amounts paid by the Appellant and the balance alleged to have remained outstanding. That evidence was materially corroborated by PW2, who testified 290 to his involvement in introducing the parties, witnessing the negotiations and being present when the agreement was executed. The evidence concerning the transaction and the parties’ respective obligations thereunder was therefore before the trial court for its consideration and determination. More importantly, there was no evidence before the trial cour t contradicting the Respondent’s evidence on the amount paid and the amount outstanding. The Appellant had been served with the counterclaim, failed to defend it, and thereafter failed to 11 participate in the formal proof proceedings despite service. In thos e circumstances, the Respondent’s evidence stood unrebutted. I am therefore satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent established that the agreed purchase price was UGX 300 3,700,000/= and that UGX 680,000/= had been paid, leaving an outsta nding balance of UGX 3,020,000/=. The Appellant now seeks to rely upon the different figure of UGX 1,180,000/= allegedly paid by him. That assertion formed part of his case in the original suit, but the Appellant failed to prosecute that suit and did not d efend the Respondent’s counterclaim. He consequently did not place before the trial court evidence capable of establishing the alleged payment of UGX 1,180,000/=. An appellate court re -evaluates the evidence that was properly placed before the trial court; it is not ordinarily an opportunity for a party who failed to participate in the proceedings to introduce evidence that could and should have been presented at trial. 310 The Appellant’s prayer to adduce additional evidence on appeal must therefore be considered in that context. The admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage is not a matter of right. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the evidence he now seeks to introduce could not, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained and presented before the trial court, or that there are other exceptional circumstances justifying its admission. To permit the Appellant, after failing to defend the counterclaim and failing to participate in the formal proof, to introduce evidence intended to establi sh a different amount paid under the agreement would effectively allow him to reopen the case and cure the consequences of his failure to participate in the proceedings. Section 101 of the Evidence Act Cap 8 provides that whoever desires a court to give 320 judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent upon the existence of facts which he asserts must prove those facts. In the present case, the Respondent bore the burden of establishing the amount claimed in his counterclaim. Upon re-evaluation of the evidence, I find that he discharged that burden on a balance of probabilities. The Appellant, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence capable of displacing the Respondent’s evidence or establishing that he had paid the higher amount alleged in his plaint. Accordingly, Grounds 2, 3 and 5 fail. 12 Ground 4: Whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding UGX 3,000,000/= as general damages. The general rule is that an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the exercise of 330 discretion by a trial court in the assessment of damages unless it is demonstrated that the trial court acted on a wrong principle of law, took into account an irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or that the award is so inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate of the loss suffered. In Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, Sir Charles Newbold P stated that a Court of Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion unless it is satisfied that the Judge, in exercising that discretion, misdirected himself or herself in some matter and, as a result, arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the Judge was clearly wrong in the exercise of th e discretion and that injustice resulted. 340 The award of general damages is, therefore, principally a matter of judicial discretion, which must nevertheless be exercised judiciously and upon the evidence before the court. General damages are intended to comp ensate for the loss, inconvenience and other consequences that naturally and reasonably flow from the wrong complained of. In James Fredrick Nsubuga v Attorney General , H.C.C.S No. 13 of 1993, the court recognised that general damages are presumed to be t he natural consequence of the defendant’s act or omission. In assessing the quantum, courts may have regard, among other considerations, to the value of the subject matter, the economic inconvenience occasioned to the claimant and the nature and extent of the breach. The position was further stated in Paul Mugalu v Manjeri Nabukenya, C.A. Civil Appeal 350 No. 19 of 2003, where the Court held that an appellate court will only interfere with an award of general damages where the award is illegal, is based on a w rong principle of law, or is manifestly excessive or inordinately low. Similarly, in Crown Beverages Ltd v Sendu, Civil Appeal No. 01 of 2005 [2006] UGSC 27, the Supreme Court affirmed that an appellate court should not interfere with an award merely becau se it might have arrived at a different figure, unless the trial court proceeded on a wrong principle or the award is so inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate. 13 I have considered the evidence that was before the learned trial Magist rate. The Respondent’s evidence was that the shop was sold to the Appellant for UGX 3,700,000/=, of which only UGX 680,000/= was paid, leaving a balance of UGX 3,020,000/=. The 360 Respondent further testified that the Appellant failed to complete payment in accordance with the agreement and that the shop was subsequently dealt with in circumstances that defeated the Respondent’s interest in the transaction. That evidence was not materially challenged during the formal proof proceedings. The learned trial Magistrate was therefore entitled, upon the evidence before him, to find that the Respondent had suffered inconvenience and other loss as a consequence of the Appellant’s breach of the contractual arrangement. The fact that the principal amount due under the co ntract was separately awarded does not, in itself, preclude an award of general damages where the evidence establishes additional loss or inconvenience naturally flowing from the breach. 370 I have also considered the amount awarded, namely UGX 3,000,000/=. Th e Appellant has not demonstrated that the learned trial Magistrate proceeded upon a wrong principle of law, took into account an irrelevant consideration, or failed to take into account a relevant consideration in arriving at that figure. Neither has the A ppellant demonstrated that the award was so inordinately high as to constitute an erroneous estimate of the loss suffered. In determining whether the award warrants appellate interference, I have considered the nature of the transaction, the agreed purchase price of UGX 3,700,000/=, the amount that remained outstanding, the circumstances surrounding the breach and the inconvenience occasioned to the Respondent. Viewed in that context, I am unable to conclude that an 380 award of UGX 3,000,000/= was so excessive as to warrant interference with the discretion exercised by the trial court. Accordingly, I find no sufficient basis upon which this Court can properly interfere with the award of general damages. Ground 4 therefore fails, and the award of UGX 3,000,000/= as general damages is upheld. Obiter Dictum 14 Before taking leave of this matter, I consider it necessary to make an observation of general professional concern regarding the manner in which this appeal was conducted. The legal profession is a noble and highly respected calling, and advocates are expected to approach their professional responsibilities with diligence, competence and fidelity to 390 the interests of their clients. The duty of an advocate extends beyond merely filing documents; it includes carefully examining the record, identifying the proper legal remedy, understanding the procedural history of the matter and presenting arguments that properly address the issues arising for determination. In the present case, I am concerned by the manner in which the Appellant ’s case was handled. The record shows that Counsel for the Appellant initially filed a Memorandum of Appeal on 5th November 2022 but thereafter took no apparent steps to diligently prosecute the appeal. It was only after the Court, on its own motion, fixed the appeal for hearing that Counsel subsequently filed another Memorandum of Appeal on 18 May 2026, more than three years after the filing of the original memorandum. Counsel thereafter filed 400 submissions seeking review in a matter before this Court which was properly before it as an appeal, and subsequently filed another set of submissions which were considered by the Court on 8 June 2026. This sequence of events raises serious concern s regarding counsel’s preparation and appreciation of the nature of the proceedings before the Court. An advocate appearing before an appellate court is expected to acquaint himself or herself fully with the record, the orders and proceedings of the Lower court , the applicable procedural framework and the jurisdiction of the court before which the matter is being argued. The filing of submissions seeking a remedy that is procedurally distinct from the jurisdiction being exercised by the Court suggests that sufficient attention was not given to these matters. 410 More importantly, the history of the proceedings demonstrates that the Appellant’s grievances largely arose from his failure to participate in and properly defend the proceedings before the trial court. The Appellant’s suit was dismissed for want of prosecution, while the Respondent’s counterclaim proceeded after the Appellant failed to 15 file a defence to it. In such circumstances, the proper procedural remedies available before the trial court ought to h ave been carefully considered before resorting to an appeal. Where a party has failed to participate in proceedings resulting in a default or interlocutory judgment, the question whether the judgment ought to be set aside, reviewed or otherwise challenged before the trial court may arise, depending upon the circumstances and the applicable law. An appeal is not necessarily a substitute for those 420 remedies. Had the procedural history of the matter been carefully examined at the outset, counsel would have appreciated that the Appellant’s principal grievances concerned the manner in which the proceedings before the trial court had progressed in his absence and that the appropriate remedy, if available in law, could have been pursued before that court in the first instance. This would have avoided presenting before this Court matters which, in substance, sought to reopen proceedings in which the Appellant had failed to participate. I make these observations not to disparage counsel, but to emphasise the professio nal responsibility owed by advocates to their clients and to the administration of justice. An advocate’s duty is not merely to file an appeal when a client is dissatisfied with a decision; 430 it is to identify the proper remedy, within the proper forum and within the proper procedural framework. Failure to do so may result in unnecessary delay, additional costs to the parties and the unnecessary use of judicial resources. The legal profession derives its dignity from the competence, diligence and integrity with which its members discharge their responsibilities. Advocates appearing before the courts are therefore expected to prepare their matters thoroughly, acquaint themselves with the record and ensure that the reliefs sought are legally and procedurally ava ilable. This is particularly important in appellate proceedings, where the Court is called upon to review the decision of a lower court on the basis of the record and the grounds properly placed before it. 440 I trust that this observation will be received in the spirit in which it is made, namely, as a reminder of the collective responsibility of all members of the legal profession to uphold its dignity, integrity and high standards of professional conduct 16 Accordingly, having resolved the grounds of appeal as set out above, I make the following orders: 1. The judgment and orders of the trial court are hereby upheld in their entirety. 2. The Respondent is awarded the costs of this appeal I so order. Dated and delivered at Mpigi on this 05th day of October 2026. 450 HON. LADY JUSTICE DEEPA VERMA ACTING JUDGE