
Reported judgment
Langley v Renner, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
Langley v Renner is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1920-36. Cite it as 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99. Search it by the party names, the citation 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 428 KB1920-36 ALR S.L. 99Reported judgment
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Langley
v.
Renner
1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
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LANGLEY v. RENNER, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
F.C.
what probably happened in this case, and it must be observed that
in the present case no question of goodwill or trade secrets arises.
It seems to me that all the defendant took with him when he went
into the Protectorate were, as described by Lord Shaw of
Dunfermline ([1916] 1 A.C. at 714; [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. at 5
313)- "a man's aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his manual or
mental ability - all those things which in sound philosophical
language are not objective, but subjective ... they are not his
master's property; they are his own property; they are himself."
For these reasons I have come to the conclusion that the restraints 10
sought to be imposed on this defendant were unreasonable and
bad in law and therefore void. I therefore dismiss the plaintiffs'
claim and give judgment for the defendant with costs.
Suit dismissed.
LANGLEYv. YEKINNY RENNER, WILLIAMS, TYJAN RENNER and
TIRURENNER
Full Court (McDonnell, Ag. C.J., Sawrey-Cookson and
Butler-Lloyd, JJ.): December 1st, 1924
[ 1] Civil Procedure - appeals - death of appellant - does not cancel final
leave but invalidates bond for costs- appellant's personal representative
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can continue appeal and respondent may request execution of new bond: 25 A personal representative may continue proceedings begun by the
deceased, but although the death of an appellant does not cancel final
leave to appeal already granted it invalidates his bond for the costs of the
appeal and the respondent may move the court to make the execution of
a new bond a condition of leave to the personal representative to
continue the proceedings (page 102, lines 1-7). 30
[2] Civil Procedure- costs- security for costs- bond for costs on appeal
nullified by death of appellant- respondent may request execution of
new bond as condition of leave to appellant's personal representative to
continue appeal: See [1] above.
[ 3] Ecclesiastical Law - conduct of religious services - irregularities - 3 5
celebrant not priest- court may grant injunction to prevent celebration
of services by person not a priest: When a religious trust imposes a duty
upon the trustees to permit only priests to conduct religious services in
their mosque, the court may grant an injunction to prevent the cele
bration of services by a person who is not a priest, despite earlier minor
breaches of trust by the trustees (page 103, lines 24-28; page 103, line 40
34- page 104, line 21; page 106, lines 15-18).
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[ 4] Ecclesiastical Law -discipline- enforcement- ecclesiastical authorities
may exclude persons from religious services on grounds of unacceptable
conduct: Ecclesiastical authorities are entitled to require certain
standards in matters of faith and conduct before allowing persons to
participate in religious services and the trustees of a mosque may there-
fore exclude members of the congregation on the grounds of their
unacceptable activities, such as pagan worship, indecorous dancing and
drinking alcohol, even though on the face of the trust deed the mosque
has been established for the use of all Muslims (page 104, lines 27-38;
page 105, line 8-page 106, line 4).
[ 5] Succession - executors and administrators - right to maintain pro-
10 ceedings - personal representative may continue proceedings begun by
deceased: See [1] above.
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[6] Succession - executors and administrators - right to maintain pro
ceedings - proceedings begun by last surviving trustee may be continued
by personal representative -personal representative takes his place until
new trustees appointed: On the death of a last surviving trustee his
personal representative takes his place and may continue proceedings
begun by him until new trustees are appointed (page 101, lines38-41),
[ 7] Trusts - trustees - death of trustee - death of last surviving trustee -
personal representative takes his place until new trustees appointed -
may continue proceedings begun by him: See [6] above.
The appellant brought an action in the Supreme Court seeking
an injunction to prevent the respondents from taking part in
religious services in the Fourah Bay Mosque.
The appellant was a trustee of the Fourah Bay Mosque. The
trust deed gave the trustees the right to appoint priests to the
mosque and provided that the mosque should be used by
"professors and adherents" of the Muslim faith and that services
should be conducted only by duly appointed priests. Although it
also provided that the number of trustees should never fall below
nine the machinery of the trust had fallen in to disuse and the
appellant was the sole surviving trustee.
The respondents were members of the Muslim faith but also
belonged to the Ogugu Society whose members were suspected of
pagan worship, drinking alcohol and indulging in indecorous
dancing. The priest of the mosque excluded the respondents from
religious services on the grounds of their membership of the
society, whereupon one of them, a layman, conducted several
religious services in the mosque in the role of priest.
The appellant then brought the present proceedings seeking an
injunction to prevent the respondents from taking part in religious
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LANGLEY v. RENNER, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
F.C.
services in the mosque. The Supreme Court (Purcell, C.J.) dis
missed the action on the grounds that - (a) the failure of the
appellant to appoint new trustees was a breach of trust which
disentitled him to equitable relief; and (b) the activities of the
members of the Ogugu Society had not been proved to be such as 5
would justify their exclusion from religious services.
The appellant obtained leave to appeal and executed a bond for
the costs of the appeal, but died before the appeal was heard. The
respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not
properly before the court since the trusteeship of the appellant 10
terminated on his death, which had also rendered the bond for
costs null and void.
The appellant's leg~ personal representative was allowed to
continue the appeal contending that the respondents had infringed
the right of the trustees to appoint priests to the mosque and that 15
an injunction should therefore be granted despite the failure of
the trustees to maintain their numbers.
In reply the respondents contended that as Muslims they were
entitled, by the terms of the trust deed, to take part in religious
services in the mosque and that the appellant committed a breach 20
of trust by allowing their exclusion.
The appeal was allowed.
Cases referred to:
(1) Banister v. Thompson, [ 1908] P. 362; (1908), 24 T.L.R. 841, applied. 25
(2) In re Routledge 's Trusts, [ 1909] 1 Ch. 280; (1909), 99 L.T. 919.
C.E. Wright for the appellant;
Beoku-Betts for the respondents.
McDONNELL, Ag. C.J.:
A preliminary objection was raised in this case to the effect that
the appellant having died since final leave to appeal was given this
appeal was not properly before the court, the trusteeship of the
appellant having terminated on his death and the bond for the
costs of the appeal having become null and void through the death
of the appellant.
As to the first point I can find no authority distinguishing in
this regard charitable trusts and, in consequence, I feel bound by
In re Routledge 's Trusts (2), which is authority for saying that the
legal personal representative of a last surviving trustee steps into
his shoes until new trustees are appointed.
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On the second point, I hold that the failure of the bond does
not cancel the final leave to appeal. The bond for costs is required
merely by a rule of practice to secure respondents against frivolous
and vexatious appeals, and it was open to the respondents on the
5 death of the appellant to move the court to make the execution of
a new bond a condition of leave to the appellant's personal repre
sentative to continue the appeal.
For these reasons the preliminary objection must fail.
The case for the appellant is that the rights which he enjoyed
10 under the trust deed as sole surviving trustee of appointing priests
in the Fourah Bay Mosque have been infringed by the acts of the
respondents in respect of the performance of acts of religious
worship in and about the mosque connected with two burials and
one marriage. If those rights have been infringed it is urged that an
15 injunction must be granted as of course to prevent a recurrence of
the violation.
It is said by the respondents, and the learned Chief Justice in
the court below adopted the argument, that the failure of the
appellant to appoint new trustees or to carry out the trust by
20 summoning a meeting for the election of the annual assembly is a
breach of trust which disentitles the appellant to the equitable
relief which he requires, because he has not come into court with
clean hands.
Let us at this point look into the deed a little more closely and
25 see what exactly is what the learned Chief Justice has aptly called
"the machinery of the trust."
If we look at p. 7 of the deed we shall find that the trustees have
power to fill up gaps in their ranks, always keeping them up to not
less than nine, but new trustees must be approved by an annual
30 assembly, such approval being testified under the hand of the
chairman.
Now the annual assembly, by p.4 of the instrument, are 12
nominees of the trustees who hold office for 12 months and can
be re-appointed. Vacancies in the annual assembly are to be filled
35 by the trustees or, failing them, by the remaining members of the
assembly or, failing them, by the priest.
The trustees have imposed upon them the duty of appointing
the priests who can be removed for immorality or neglect of duty
by what may be called a joint session of the trustees and the
40 annual assembly. The whole of these elaborate provisions have
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LANGLEY v. RENNER, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
F.C.
been allowed to fall into disuse, the ranks of the trustees have
been depleted till the last survivor dies; there is no evidence of
the persistence of any annual assembly, although one witness,
Abu Bokari Savage, says: "Daddy Ghewa, Alpha Legally Savage
and others appointed me a member of the committee of the 5
mosque. This is about six years ago." Alpha Legally Savage, who
was, I gather, this witness's father, was the priest at that time, but
there is nothing to show that he or Daddy Ghewa were trustees,
that "the committee" was the annual assembly, or that the
appointment made six years ago was ever renewed at the close of 10
any of the succeeding years.
It is said by the respondents' counsel that there is no evidence
that the annual assembly had ceased to exist. All I can say is that,
as I have already remarked, there is no evidence of its persistence.
Counsel for the appellant urges that the failure of the last surviving 15
trustee to appoint eight colleagues is not a breach of trust, and
that the learned Chief Justice erred in ordering the plaintiff to
carry out the trust by summoning a meeting for the election of an
annual assembly. I am with counsel for the appellant on the last
point: all that the surviving trustee could do was either himself, as 20
such, to appoint an assembly or, in the first place, to fill the ranks
of trustees till they were nine in number, and let them then
proceed to appoint the assembly.
On the point as to whether his omission to fill the ranks was a
breach of trust I need not decide, because I am satisfied that even 25
if this negligence was a breach of trust it was not tainted by such
illegality or fraud, such depravity in a legal as well as a moral
sense as to disentitle the party concerned to equitable relief.
It seems to me clear that the surviving trustee was never asked
to fill the ranks of his colleagues, because those who were opposed 30
to him were certain that were he so requested he could nominate
those who saw eye to eye with him and so would entrench himself
more strongly than ever in opposition to them.
For the respondents it is urged that the trust deed vests the
mosque for the use of all Muslims; the words in the deed are: 35
"[A] nd upon further trust from time to time and at all times
hereafter to permit and suffer the said mosque or other place
of religious worship with the appurtenances to be used
occupied and enjoyed as and for a place of religious worship
by such of the professors and adherents of the faith of the 40
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religious sect called Mohametans as are now or may hereafter
be residing in Sierra Leone aforesaid and by other persons
attending religious service therein and for the purposes afore
said to permit and suffer such person or persons only as are
5 hereinafter mentioned and called priest or priests to conduct
and perform all usual acts and ordinances of religious worship
therein (that is to say) such person or persons as may be the
said trustees for the time being from time to time be there
unto appointed."
10 Now we have it in evidence that the respondents are members
of the Ogugu Society and that, being refused the ministrations of
their religion, one of their number, in view of that refusal by the
priest, on several occasions performed religious exercises as priest
in the mosque. It is urged that the refusal of religious rites was a
15 breach of trust and that the appellant connived at such breach.
The respondents certainly flouted the authority of the priest in
the religious exercises conducted by a layman, and the appellant,
had he assented to this, would have been guilty of breach of that
part of the deed which directs that he should "permit and suffer
20 such person or persons only as are called priests to conduct and
perform all usual acts and exercises of religious worship."
In addition to this, as I have said before, the respondents are
members of the Ogugu Society.
I cannot agree with the learned Chief Justice that the evidence
25 of Dr. Abayomi Cole taken with the rest of the evidence entirely
whitewashes, if I may use a popular expression, the members of
that society. The society is of pagan origin, originally associated
with ancestor worship and the sacrifice to such ancestors of fowls,
with certain secret meeting places to which outsiders are not
30 admitted. Its membership is not confined to Muslims, as one
would expect from its origin, and pagans and Christians alike are
included among its members. It indulges in dances, which it is
suggested are indecorous, and we have it in evidence that strong
palm wine, which is an alcoholic drink, is used for the refreshment
35 of its members.
I can well understand an orthodox Muslim deprecating member
ship of such a society by Muslims of Y oruba descent, not many
generations removed from paganism. The temptation to drink; the
association with other members who are still pagans and who, ex
40 hypothesi, would not be averse to adding pagan worship, for
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LANGLEY v. RENNER, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 99
F.C.
which the society originally arose, to the possibly harmless
pastime of dancing; the secret meetings where such rites may be
suspected of being carried on, are all factors which would arouse
disapproval. Alpha Billa and Alpha Tijan, the Imam and the Nahib,
in other words the two priests, of another important mosque 5
which is situated in Foulah Town, say that they refuse the
religious rites of Islam to members of the Ogugu.
The disciplinary powers to excommunicate or refuse the sacra
ments to members of the great Christian Churches have been
evolved through centuries of canon law. In this connection, I wish 10
to quote from a judgment of Sir Lewis Dibdin, the Dean of the
Arches, in the case of Banister v. Thompson (1), where there was a
refusal by an English clergyman of the sacrament of Communion
to a person who had married his deceased wife's sister ([1908] P.
at 379; 24 T.L.R. at 846): 15
"The exclusion of a member of the Christian Church from
participation in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was very
early recognized as a necessary and potent weapon of
ecclesiastical discipline. In the centuries which followed the
apostolic age the penitential system developed by slow 20
degrees into a settled organization. A member of the Church
charged with sin, if he denied the charge, or if, while
admitting it, he refused to submit himself to discipline, was
arraigned before the bishop or the bishop's judicial delegate,
and, if his guilt was established, was sentenced to 25
excommunication -i.e., either (1.) loss of Church privileges
(including that of Holy Communion) until he should make
submission; or (2.), in rare cases, absolute expulsion from the
Church of Christ. Exclusion from Holy Communion was part
of a judicial sentence. But if the accused person admitted his 30
wrong-doing, expressed sorrow, and asked to be admitted to
the discipline of repentance, he was dealt with as a penitent."
Can it, I ask, be reasonably said that the exclusion of a member
of the Muslim faith from participation in the rites of Islam is not
to be recognised as a necessary weapon of discipline? I would note 35
here in passing that we have it in evidence that former members of
the Ogugu who have dropped their membership are not denied
religious ministrations in the Fourah Bay mosque.
A religious congregation is a voluntary association of persons
worshipping according to the same belief under the ministration of 40
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their priest, and I hold that the ecclesiastical authorities are
entitled to demand a certain standard in matters of faith and
conduct before they will allow persons to participate in the
religious exercises which they perform.
Finally it has been said in this court that the appointment of
Alhaji Saidu was a breach of trust as he was appointed by the sole
surviving trustee alone. Of this we have no evidence, although his
appointment in 1921 suggests the probability that there were not
nine trustees then surviving. On this I hold that the respondents,
not having put this appointment in issue in the court below and
having in their defence referred to him as "the duly appointed
priest," are debarred from raising that point now.
For these reasons I hold that the judgment of the learned Chief
Justice should be set aside.
I hold that this court should grant an injunction to restrain the
respondents from either doing any of the acts set forth in the
statement of claim or from inciting any other person or persons
to do all or any of them.
The court will order the appointment of new trustees for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the trust deed and in
that behalf will give the necessary directions with liberty to
apply, the respondents to pay the costs of claim and counterclaim
both in this court and in the court below.
SAWREY-COOKSON, J. and BUTLER-LLOYD, J. concurred.
Order accordingly.
SCHUMACHER AND STRAUMANN v. JEMAL AND GALLIZIA
Full Court (McDonnell, Ag. C.J., Sawrey-Cookson and
Butler-Lloyd, JJ.): December 1st, 1924
[ 1] Contract - misrepresentation - meaning of representation - simplex
commendatio cannot amount to actionable misrepresentation: A simplex
commendatio, that is a seller's praise of his goods in general terms
cannot amount to an actionable representation (page 111, lines 1-3).
[2] Contract - misrepresentation - representations outside contract - in
absence of fraud, oral representations of quality not embodied in written
contract not binding - applies despite seller's knowledge of defects if
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