
Reported judgment
Khoury v P.C. Banya, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 338
Khoury v P.C. Banya is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1920-36. Cite it as 1920-36 ALR S.L. 338. Search it by the party names, the citation 1920-36 ALR S.L. 338, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 156 KB1920-36 ALR S.L. 338Reported judgment
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Khoury
v.
P.C. Banya
1920-36 ALR S.L. 338
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
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KHOURY v. P.C. BANYA (ON BEHALF OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY)
Circuit Court (Macquarrie, J.): December 22nd, 1932
[ 1] Landlord and Tenant - determination of tenancy -summary ejectment
proceedings - no proceedings under Summary Ejectment (Protectorate)
Ordinance, 1927, s. 5 until tenancy duly determined - ejectment pro
ceedings not equivalent to re-entry determining tenancy: While it is
generally accepted that a landlord's bringing an action for possession
against his tenant is equivalent to re-entry and re-entry determines the
lease between them, the Summary Ejectment (Protectorate) Ordinance,
1927, s. 5 requires that a tenancy granted to a non-native by a tribal
authority must be "duly determined" before any action can be brought
against the tenant, and in such a case the action itself cannot therefore
determine the tenancy (page 339, line 27-page 340, line 14).
[ 2] Landlord and Tenant - possession - re-entry - landlord's action to
recover possession normally equivalent to re-entry - proceedings under
Summary Ejectment (Protectorate) Ordinance, 1927, s. 5 exception to
normal rule: See [1] above.
The respondent brought an action against the appellant in the
District Commissioner's Court, Kailahun to secure the summary
ejectment of the appellant from premises leased to him by the
respondent.
The respondent, the Paramount Chief of the Luawa Chiefdom,
instituted proceedings against the appellant, on behalf of the
Tribal Authority, under the Summary Ejectment (Protectorate)
Ordinance, 1927, s. 5 for the non-payment of rent. A proviso in
the lease between them stipulated that if any part of the rent was
in arrears for 21 days, whether demanded or not, and a written
statement to that effect had been deposited with the District
Commissioner, it would be lawful for the Tribal Authority to
re-enter the premises, whereupon the tenancy would determine.
The District Commissioner gave judgment for the respondent by
ordering the ejectment of the appellant and awarded the respon
dent damages and costs.
On appeal to the Circuit Court the appellant contended that,
under the Summary Ejectment (Protectorate) Ordinance, 1927,
s. 5, the tenancy must be "duly determined" - in this case by
re-entry - and there was no evidence that this had taken place;
and that since the tenancy had not been duly determined, no
action could be brought against him. The respondent contended
that the bringing of an action for possession was itself sufficient
as a re-entry.
The appeal was allowed.
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KHOURY v. P.C. BANYA, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 338
c.c.
Case referred to:
(1) Moore u. Ullcoats Mining Co. Ltd., [ 1908] 1 Ch. 575; (1907), 97 L.T.
845.
Legislation construed:
Summary Ejectment (Protectorate) Ordinance, 1927 (No. 17 of 1927), s. 5:
The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 339, lines 17-23.
C.E. Wright for the appellant;
Kempson for the respondent.
MACQUARRIE, J.:
This is an appeal against a judgment of the District Com
missioner's Court, Kailahun, ordering ejectment of the appellant
within 14 days from premises leased to him by the respondent
and awarding the respondent £10 damages and costs.
The proceedings were taken by the respondent under the
Summary Ejectment (Protectorate) Ordinance, 1927, s. 5 of
which, so far as relevant, provides that where a non-native holds
land of a tribal authority on a tenancy "and such tenancy has
been duly determined by notice to quit or otherwise," if the
tenant refuses to give up possession, the tribal authority may
obtain an order for summary ejectment by carrying out the
provisions laid down by the Ordinance.
The main ground of appeal, and the one on which the appeal
must succeed, is that there is no evidence that the tenancy was
duly determined.
The terms of the tenancy are contained in a formal lease
between the parties for a term of seven years at a rental of £10 a
year which contains a provision which reads as follows:
"Provided always that if any part of the rent hereby reserved
shall be in arrears for twenty-one days (whether demanded or
not) or if any covenant or stipulation on the tenant's part
herein contained shall not be performed or observed and a
written statement to that effect has been deposited with the
District Commissioner then and in any of the said cases it
shall be lawful for the tribal authority at any time thereafter
to re-enter upon any part of the demised premises in the
name of the whole and thereupon this demise shall deter
mine".
Mr. Wright for the appellant argued, on the authority of Moore
v. Ullcoats Mining Co. Ltd. (1) that a re-entry by the lessor was
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necessary before the demise would determine. There appears to be
no answer to this and the question then arises -has the tribal
authority re-entered? For it is under this proviso as to non
payment of rent that the respondent is claiming ejectment.
Now it is clear on the authorities that an action for possession
by a lessor is the equivalent of a "re-entry," and Mr. Kempson for
the respondent urged that this very action itself is sufficient as a
re-entry. Mr. Wright, however, pointed out that these proceedings
could not be brought by the respondent until the tenancy had
been "duly determined." This is clearly laid down as indicated.
I can see no answer to Mr. Wright's contention from which it
follows that the condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the
District Commissioner to hear and determine the matter has not
been fulfilled. The judgment of the court below is therefore
reversed.
As the appeal has succeeded on a point not urged by the
appellant in the court below, there will be no order as to costs in
this court.
Appeal allowed.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC LANDS ORDINANCE (CAP.174)
and IN THE MATTER OF CERTAIN LANDS AT AND ABOUT THE
GRASSFIELDS, WELLINGTON and JACKSON
25 Supreme Court (Macquarrie, Ag. C.J.): April 12th, 1933
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[ 1] Administrative Law - public officers - Curator of Intestate Estates -
not agent of Crown but only a type of ordinary administrator - payment
of commission and fees into general revenue not evidence of agency for
Crown: The Curator of Intestate Estates is merely an administrator,
whose rights and duties are governed by the laws applicable to admin
istrators of intestate estates, and not a representative of the Government;
and the fact that he takes a commission and fees on all money collected
by him and pays them into the general revenue of the country is an
incidental duty which does not clothe him with the rights and immun
ities of an agent of the Crown (page 345, lines 4-24).
[ 2] Civil Procedure - judgments and orders - effect - judgment not bind
ing on person not party to proceedings: A judgment may affect, but does
not bind, a person who is not a party to the proceedings (page 346, lines
29-31).
[ 3] Land Law - adverse possession - claim of Curator not in possession of
intestate estate defeated by adverse possession throughout limitation
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