
Reported judgment
Heroe v F.C.S.C. Ltd, 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73
Heroe v F.C.S.C. Ltd is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1972-73. Cite it as 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73. Search it by the party names, the citation 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 522 KB1972-73 ALR S.L. 73Reported judgment
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Heroe
v.
F.C.S.C. Ltd
1972-73 ALR S.L. 73
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
HEROE v. F.C.S.C. LTD., 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73
H.C.
trial was a nullity and that the convictions of the appellants and
the third accused were bad because the magistrate never had juris
diction to try the case summarily. In the circumstances, the
convictions of the appellants and the third accused are quashed
and they are accordingly discharged. 5
It follows therefore that the appellants and the third accused
have never been technically in peril and they could now be tried
again. But it is a matter for the Solicitor-General to decide whether
it would be desirable and in the interest of society to do so.
Appeal allowed. 10
HEROE v. F.C.S.C. LIMITED
High Court (Agnes Macaulay, J.): March 28th, 1972
(Civil Case No. 19/70) 15
(1] Evidence-burden of proof-negligence-employee prima facie liable for
loss of or damage to employer's property entrusted to his care-burden
on employee to show no negligence: Dismissal of an employee by his
employer is not wrongful if it can be justified by the employee's mis
conduct, as by his gross negligence in failing to take proper care of his
employer's property entrusted to him. In such circumstances the em- 20
ployee is prima facie liable for the loss of or damage to the property
and the burden of proving the absence of negligence lies on him (page 77,
lines 1-11, lines 29-33; page 78Iines 8-16, lines 31-33, lines 36-38).
[2] Employment-duties of employee-duty of care-duty to safeguard
employer's property entrusted to his care-prima facie liable for dam- 25
age or loss: See [ 1] above.
[ 3] Employment-tennination-summary detennination by employer-em
ployer's refusal by words or conduct to allow employee to fulfil contract
of employment constitutes dismissal: An employer dismisses his employee
by words or conduct amounting to a repudiation of the essential obliga-
tions placed on him by the contract of employment, as by refusing to 30
allow his employee to fulfil his contract (page 76, lines 35-41).
[ 4] Employment-tennination-wrongful dismissal-not wrongful if justified
by employee's misconduct: See [1] above.
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants in the
High Court for damages for wrongful dismissal, arrears of salary, 35
salary in lieu of notice and repayment of her contribution to a
pension scheme. The defendants counterclaimed for the value of
money alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff's negligence.
The plaintiff worked for the defendants as a cashier. Feeling
unwell, she decided to leave the office for a few minutes. She was 40
at that time in charge of cash amounting to about Le2,000 which
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
she put into a cash box, which she said she locked. She tried to
put the box in the safe but finding the safe difficult to close she
left the box under the table. She left no one on guard in the office
and did not warn the accountant that she was leaving. The office
door was made of wood and had only a wooden latch. When she
returned after 10 minutes the money was missing and she claimed
that there were signs that the cash box had been forced.
The plaintiff was dismissed immediately by the defendants and
charged with theft but was found n~t guilty by the Supreme Court
(as it then was). She then report~d for duty but the defendants
told her that she had been dismissed summarily at the date of the
incident and would not re-employ liler.
The plaintiff then brought the present proceedings contending
that she was entitled to arrears of salary on the ground that she
had merely been suspended from work at the date of the incident,
not dismissed, and that she was entitled to damages for wrongful
dismissal.
The defendants alleged that the plaintiff was dismissed at the
date of the incident and contended that the dismissal was not
wrongful but a valid summary dismissal for negligence. They
counterclaimed for the value of the money lost.
The plaintiff's claims were dismissed and she was ordered to
repay to the defendants the amount of money lost through her
negligence.
Case referred to:
(1) Travers & ~Sons Ltd. v. Cooper, [ 1915] 1 K.B. 73; (1915), 111 L.T.
1088, applied.
Mrs Awoonor-Renner for the plaintiff;
Gelaga-King for the defendants.
AGNES MACAULAY, J.:
The plaintiff's claim against the defendants is for damages for
wrongful dismissal and for salary payable to the plaintiff for
services rendered to the defendants in her capacity as cashier. The
plaintiff is also claiming as special damages: (1) arrears of salary
from April 1965 to December 13th, 1965 Le850; (2) six months'
salary in lieu of notice; (3) contribution to pension scheme Le30,
making a total of Le1 ,480 together with general damages. There is
also a counterclaim against the plaintiff for negligence and also for
an amount of Le2,081.04 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff
through her negligence.
According to the plaintiff she was employed by the defendants
74
HEROE v. F.C.S.C. LTD., 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73
H.C.
as a clerk in 1938. After working with the defendants' company
for some time she was made cashier and according to her she
became a senior member of staff with a salary of Le100 per month.
Her duties included receiving cash from customers and paying the
same into the bank. She said that on April 8th, 1965 she went to 5
work as usual. As she was not feeling quite well some time in the
afternoon, she decided to go upstairs to get some tablets. She said
that before leaving the office she put the cash which she had
collected into a cash box provided by the company. The cash on
that day could have been about Le2,000. She said she further 10
locked the cash box and locked the office door and went upstairs
for about 10 minutes. She claimed that on her return she discovered
that the latch on the door had been broken. She also said the cash
box had been prised open and the money in it stolen. A report was
made about the incident to the police and she was suspended by 15
the defendants on April 11th, 1965 and later on charged by the
police. On December 14th, 1965 she was found not guilty by the
Supreme Court and she reported for work, whereupon she was
told by the defendants that they were not pleased with the verdict
of the court and that her services were no longer required. She 20
alleged that the defendants refused to pay her any money and
that the last salary which she received from them was her salary at
the end of March 1965. Apart from this she also told the court
that she had been contributing to a pension provident fund at the
rate of Le5 a month and that she had paid for six months. 25
She denied in her evidence that she was negligent. She said that
the office where she worked had a wooden door and a wooden
latch. There was also a safe in the office but she said that it was
always difficult to open and close and the safest way she could
have kept the money was in the cash box. She also told the court 30
that at the end of the day she used to take the cash box up to the
accountant for safe·keeping. She finally said that the defendants
did not give her any notice but that she felt that she was entitled
to six months' salary in lieu of notice, her salary from April1965
to December 1965 and a refund of Le30, the contribution she had 35
made to the provident fund.
The plaintiff was later cross-examined by counsel for the defend·
ant and several questions were put to her. She again denied being
negligent and said that the cash box was placed underneath the
table in her office, and that she tried to put it in the safe but 40
found it difficult to close the safe when she had done so. She
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
further said that she would not have placed it there if she was
going away for long. She said also that the cash box had been
prised open; she claimed that this was so because she found it
open. I must at this stage say that the cash box had been tendered
5 in evidence before this court. She also agreed in cross-examination
that she left no-one in the office when she was going away and did
not use the intercom system to warn the accountant that she was
leaving as it was not working at the time. She also admitted that
the office door was a wooden door with a wooden latch. Finally
10 she agreed that defendants lost money on that day and that she
had not paid it back.
The Personnel Manager of the defendant's company gave evi
dence before this court on behalf of the defendants. He said that
he was in the office on the day of the alleged incident and in fact
15 went down himself to investigate when the plaintiff raised the
alarm that the money had been stolen. He said that he examined
the cash box and that as far as he knew over Le2 ,000 was missing
on that day, and that this amount had not been refunded by the
plaintiff or anyone else. He claimed that on the day in question
20 the intercom system was working and that the plaintiff could have
got a messenger to leave in the office if she wanted to. Mr. King
also said that as Personnel Manager he would have been informed
if the plaintiff had been suspended. He said they had direct rules
from the Employers' Federation that they should not suspend at
25 all and that on April 8th, 1965 he heard the General Manager
giving instructions that the plaintiff should be dismissed but he was
not in a position to say whether in fact this was done orally or in
writing as he himself did not deal with senior members of staff of
which the plaintiff was one.
30 The above is a gist of the evidence as adduced by the plaintiff
and the defendants. The plaintiff is first of all claiming damages
for wrongful dismissal. The defendants are contending that the
plaintiff was not wrongfully dismissed; they say that she was
summarily dismissed by them for negligence on April 8th, 1965.
35 What constitutes a dismissal is of course a question of fact: it
has been defined as such act or acts on the part of the master as to
amount to a repudiation by him of the essential obligations im
posed on him by the contract. Dismissal may be effected by
conduct as well as by words. A master may dismiss his servant if
40 he refuses by words or conduct to allow his servant to fulfil his
contract of employment: see Batt's Law of Master & Servant,
76
HEROE v. F.C.S.C. LTD .• 1972-73 ALR S.L. 73
H.C.
5th ed., at 270 (1967). However it cannot be said to be wrongful
if such dismissal can be justified. In this case the defendants are
contending that the plaintiff was summarily dismissed for negli
gence. The law allows a master to justify his dismissal of the
servant in an action for wrongful dismissal and what amounts to 5
justification for dismissal is always a question of fact and degree.
It is the duty of a servant to take proper care of such property of
the master as is entrusted to his care: 25 Halsbury 's Laws of
England, 3rd ed., at 462. A servant must exercise reasonable care
to safeguard his master's property otherwise he will be responsible 10
for its loss: Batt's Law of Master & Servant, 5th ed., at 207 (1967).
Several authorities were referred to by both counsel for the
plaintiff and for the defendants and the facts of the case were
reviewed by both of them. At this stage one must look at the
evidence as adduced by both plaintiff and defendants to see 15
whether in fact the dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendants
was wrongful in this case. It is admitted on both sides that on the
day in question the plaintiff had the sum of about Le2,000 in her
possession and custody. It is also admitted on both sides that the
money was lost. The plaintiff is contending that the money was 20
stolen from her. She claims she placed it in a cash box which she
locked and then left her office for 10 minutes after closing the
door of the office, and that·on her return she noticed that the cash
box had been prised open and the money stolen. The cash box was
tendered in court and in cross-examination she told the court that 25
she only said it was prised open because she found it open. The
defendants' first witness said he saw no evidence that the box had
been prised open and this court did not see any evidence of this
either. One must at this stage see whether the plaintiff had been
amiss in her duty and negligent. It has been held that where goods 30
are damaged or lost while in a servant's custody he is prima facie
liable and it is for him to satisfy the court that he has not been ,
guilty of negligence: Travers & Sons Ltd. v. Cooper (1). Of course
it is also quite clear that it depends on the circumstances and the
gravity of the case. There we have the plaintiff saying that she 35
placed the money in question in the cash box and locked it and
placed it underneath the table but in cross-examination she said
she tried to put it in the safe but found it difficult to close and in
any case she put it there because she knew she was not going away
for long. One must at this stage ask why she felt it was necessary 40
to try to put it in the safe? She herself knew that it would be
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
unsafe to leave the amount of Le2,000 in a cash box which is
quite easy to carry around. She told the court that she left it in
the cash box because she felt she was not going away for long but
yet she admitted that she was away for 10 minutes. She also
5 admitted that she did not get someone to stay by the office when
she was leaving it even though she knew that the office only had a
wooden door and a wooden latch which she claimed she closed.
It is my considered view that, taking everything into consider
ation, the amount of money involved and the way in which the
10 plaintiff left the office after not making certain that the money
was properly locked up or leaving someone in the office, she was
grossly negligent and that the defendants were entitled to dismiss
her summarily as they did. I think she failed to exercise proper
care with regard to the defendants' property on the day in ques-
15 tion. In fact I hold that she was grossly negligent and that the
defendants were entitled to dismiss her summarily without notice.
I shall now deal with the plaintiff's particulars of special damage.
The plaintiff is claiming arrears of salary from April 1965 to
December 13th, 1965. The plaintiff is contending that she was
20 suspended from work on April 8th, and not dismissed as alleged.
She said that when she reported for duty in December 1965 she
was told that the defendants were not satisfied with the decision
given in the case against her and as such they were going to dismiss
her and that it was only then that she was dismissed. The defendants
25 deny this and I tend to accept their story. They said that they
summarily dismissed her on April 8th. I accept this. I see no
reason why the defendants should be telling an untruth. They had
accepted from the beginning that she had been dismissed sum
marily; whether this was justified or not did not bother them
30 under the circumstances. I do not feel that the plaintiff is entitled
to any salary for the months of April to December. Misconduct
justifying instant dismissal is a complete defence to any action for
wages falling due after the date of dismissal: Batt's Law of Master
& Servant, 5th ed., at 257 (1967). Having held that the defendants
35 were entitled to dismiss the plaintiff summarily, the claim for six
months' salary in lieu of notice must also fail. A master has every
right to dismiss a servant without notice in certain circumstances,
should the servant's conduct warrant this. As regards the third
item in the claim, the pension scheme contribution of Le30 a
40 month, no-one not even the plaintiff has been able to tell us what
the terms and conditions of repayment of such monies were. This
78
SECTION 12
ADMOR.-GEN. v. WILSON, 1972-73 ALR S.L. 79
H.C.
is a separate contract between the two parties and I think there
fore that the plaintiff can seek her remedies elsewhere as far as
this item is concerned. Finally, there is a counterclaim against the
plaintiff by the defendants in this action. It is admitted on all
sides that the defendants lost the amount in question and this was 5
the reason why the plaintiff was summarily dismissed. The first
witness for the defendants told us that the amount has not been
refunded either by the plaintiff or anyone else. He said, in answer
to certain questions, that the loss of money was determined at the
time at Le2,081.04 and that the amount has still not been paid. In 10
view of the conclusion which I have come to that the plaintiff was
negligent at the time I hold further still that the defendants are
entitled to recover the said sum of Le2,081.04, the amount of
money which the plain tiff lost by her negligence.
I hold therefore as follows: The plaintiff's claim against the 15
defendants is dismissed. The amount of Le2081.04 is to be paid
by the plaintiff to the defendants. Costs are to be taxed in favour
of the defendants.
Order accordingly.
ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL v. WILSON
High Court (During, J.): April 10th, 1972
(Civil Case No. 226/70)
[1] Succession-Administrator-General-right to maintain proceedings-must
20
obtain letters of administration before commencing declaratory action: 25
Before the Administrator-General can commence a declaratory action in
respect of property devolving upon him at the death of an intestate he
must obtain a grant of letters of administration, as required by s.lO of
the Administration of Estates Act (cap. 45) (page 81, line 24 - page 82,
line 4; page 82, lines 14-32). ,
The plaintiff sought a declaration that certain property formed 30
part of an intestate's estate, and all consequential orders and
directions.
At the hearing the plaintiff, the Administrator-General, admitted
that he had not applied for, nor been granted, letters of admin-
istration in respect of the intestate's estate which he was adminis- 35
tering. The defendant contended that the action was improperly
brought before the court since the plaintiff had not obtained
letters of administration before commencing his action as he was
required to do under s.1 0 of the Administration of Estates Act
(cap. 45). He maintained that while an executor derived his title 40
from the will of a testator and could therefore commence an
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