Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation and Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Malawi Limited (IRC Matter Number 606 OF 2018) [2026] MWIRC 16 (21 May 2026)

sA REPUBLIC OF MALAWI IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF MALAWI PRINCIPAL REGISTRY IRC MATTER NUMBER 606 OF 2018 BETWEEN: GLADYS CHAMBA………………..……………………...………………………………...APPLICANT AND MALAWI BROADCASTING CORPORATION…………..………..……………….1ST RESPONDENT OLD MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY MALAWI LIMITED…………..2ND RESPONDENT CORAM: WYSON CHAMDIMBA NKHATA (DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON) Mr. Sepulo - of Counsel for the Applicant Mr. Lapukeni – Representative of the 1st Respondent Ms. Chitwanga - of Counsel for the 2nd Respondent Mr. Zakaria - Court Clerk and Official Interpreter RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS THE MATTER FOR BEING STATUTE-BARRED INTRODUCTION This ruling concerns the Respondents’ Notice of Motion to dismiss the Applicant’s claim on the ground that it is statute-barred. The motion is brought pursuant to Rule 16(1) and (2) of the Industrial Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 1999, as read with section 4 of the Limitation Act and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The application arises from a pension-related dispute in which the Applicant seeks an account of her terminal and pension benefits and payment of any pension benefits found due. The Respondents contend that the Applicant’s cause of action arose in or about March or April 2010, when she received pension benefits which she considered inadequate. Their position is that the proceedings before this Court were commenced in 2018, approximately eight years after the cause of action arose, and are therefore outside the six-year limitation period prescribed under section 4 of the Limitation Act. On that basis, they invite the Court to dismiss the matter without proceeding to a hearing on the merits. The Applicant opposes the motion. Her position is that the matter was not first commenced in 2018. She contends that she commenced proceedings in the High Court by Originating Summons filed on 10th January 2011 and issued on 12th January 2011, well within the six-year limitation period. She further contends that the proceedings now before this Court are a continuation of that earlier matter following the High Court’s judgment of 29th August 2018, by which the matter was transferred to the Industrial Relations Court and she was directed to comply with the procedure and practice obtaining in this Court. At the hearing of the motion, Counsel for the Respondents argued that filing proceedings in the High Court did not interrupt the running of time because the High Court was not the proper forum for the labour dispute. Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 1 Counsel submitted that the proceedings in the High Court were incompetent, that such incompetence could not be cured by referral or transfer to this Court, and that time continued to run until the Applicant filed IRC Form 1 in 2018. Counsel for the Applicant, while accepting that the cause of action arose around 2010, argued that the action was validly commenced in the High Court in 2011 and was later transferred to this Court. He submitted that the transfer did not create a fresh claim but preserved and continued the earlier proceedings. The issue for determination is therefore whether, for purposes of limitation, the Applicant’s action should be treated as having been commenced in 2011 when she filed the Originating Summons in the High Court, or in 2018 when she filed IRC Form 1 following the High Court’s direction. The answer to that question will determine whether the claim is statute-barred and whether the Respondents’ motion should succeed. THE RESPONDENTS’ CASE IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION The Respondents’ case is that the Applicant’s claim is statute-barred and should be dismissed at this stage. The motion was brought pursuant to Rule 16(1) and (2) of the Industrial Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 1999, as read with section 4 of the Limitation Act and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The First Respondent relies on the affidavit sworn by Valentine Lapukeni, its Legal and Compliance Officer, and on the oral and written submissions advanced in support of the motion. The First Respondent also adopts the Second Respondent’s affidavit and skeleton arguments in so far as they apply to it. In the affidavit in support, the First Respondent states that the Applicant’s cause of action is founded on events which occurred on or before March 2010. Its position is that, after the Applicant exited employment, she was paid all her terminal dues in accordance with the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation Pension Fund Rules applicable at the time. The First Respondent refers to its Statement of Reply, IRC Form 2, where it had pleaded that the Applicant received pension payments, including a withdrawal in July 1999, a refund in May 2004, compensation following the Ombudsman’s determination, and a further pension withdrawal in March 2010. The First Respondent therefore treats the March 2010 payment as the latest possible date from which the Applicant’s complaint about pension benefits could have arisen. The First Respondent further states that the Applicant commenced the present matter before this Court in October 2018, more than eight years after the alleged cause of action arose. It asserts that the Applicant neither sought nor obtained leave of Court to bring the claim out of time. Nor, according to the First Respondent, did the Applicant plead any explanation capable of extending or suspending the limitation period. On that basis, the First Respondent’s position is that the action was commenced outside the statutory period and is therefore legally incompetent. Through the adoption of the Second Respondent’s affidavit and skeleton arguments, the First Respondent aligns itself with the argument that a pension-related claim of this nature is contractual in character and falls within section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Respondents submit that section 4 prescribes a six-year limitation period for actions founded on simple contract and that once the Applicant failed to commence competent proceedings within six years from March or April 2010, the right to pursue the claim through litigation became unenforceable. A central part of the Respondents’ case is that the proceedings filed in the High Court in 2011 did not save the Applicant from the operation of limitation. Counsel submitted that the High Court found that it did not possess original jurisdiction to hear the labour dispute as a court of first instance and that the matter ought to have been filed in the Industrial Relations Court from the beginning. The Respondents argue that the High Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 2 Court proceedings were therefore incompetent and could not be treated as proceedings which interrupted time for purposes of limitation. The Respondents further submit that the High Court judgment did not state that the matter, once brought before the Industrial Relations Court, would be treated as a continuation of competent High Court proceedings for purposes of limitation. Their position is that an action commenced in the wrong forum is invalid and incompetent. On that reasoning, an incompetent action cannot be transferred in a manner that cures the original defect or converts it into a valid action. The Respondents therefore argue that the filing of the Originating Summons in the High Court in 2011 did not stop time from running. The Respondents also submit that the Limitation Act itself provides specific circumstances in which time may be postponed, suspended, extended, or caused to run afresh, and that filing proceedings in a wrong forum is not one of them. They referred to the provisions of the Limitation Act which recognise limited circumstances in which the running of time may be affected, including disability, acknowledgment, part payment, fraud, and mistake. Their submission is that the Applicant’s situation does not fall within any recognised statutory exception. Consequently, time continued to run from March or April 2010 until the Applicant filed IRC Form 1 in this Court in 2018. The Respondents further place weight on the Applicant’s duty to act diligently. They submit that it was the Applicant’s responsibility, through her legal practitioners, to choose the proper forum. They argue that the Applicant cannot simply rely on the High Court proceedings to avoid limitation when the claim had been commenced before a court which, according to the Respondents, was not the competent court of first instance for labour matters. They emphasise that the Originating Summons was filed in 2011 and the High Court judgment was delivered only in 2018, leaving a substantial period during which the Applicant could have considered whether the claim had been properly instituted and taken steps to regularise the position. The Respondents also contend that delay has caused or is likely to cause prejudice. They submit that if the matter proceeds to trial after such delay, questions of prejudice, availability of records, faded recollection, currency devaluation, and the practical consequences of the lapse of time may arise. Their underlying position is that the delay supports dismissal because the action was brought outside the statutory period and no legally recognised basis has been shown to save it. The Respondents therefore characterise the claim as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process. In the affidavit, Mr Lapukeni states that the Applicant’s failure to commence the action within the statutory time limit undermines orderly conduct and management of proceedings and goes to the interests of justice. The Respondents’ prayer is that, since the matter was commenced outside the limitation period, without leave, justification, or a recognised statutory basis for extension, the Court should dismiss it without proceeding to the merits. In summary, the Respondents’ case is that the Applicant’s pension claim accrued no later than March or April 2010; that any action founded on that claim had to be brought within six years; that the filing of proceedings in the High Court in 2011 did not interrupt limitation because those proceedings were incompetent and instituted in the wrong forum; that the present proceedings were only properly commenced in this Court in 2018; and that the claim is consequently out of time. The Respondents therefore ask the Court to dismiss the matter as statute-barred. THE APPLICANT’S POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION The Applicant opposes the Respondents’ motion to dismiss the matter as statute-barred. Her position, as discerned from the affidavit in opposition sworn by Counsel Cassius Omar Chidothe, the Applicant’s Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 3 skeleton arguments, and the oral submissions made by Counsel Sepulo at the hearing, is that the Respondents’ application proceeds on a mistaken understanding of when the action was commenced. The Applicant accepts that the dispute arose from the pension payment made in or about April 2010, but denies that the action was first commenced in this Court in 2018. Her case is that the action was commenced in the High Court in January 2011, within the six-year limitation period, and that the proceedings before this Court are a continuation of those earlier proceedings. In the affidavit in opposition, the Applicant states that she ceased to be an employee of the First Respondent through retirement and that, in April 2010, she received from the First Respondent pension benefits in the sum of MK259,319.45, which the First Respondent said had been remitted by the Second Respondent. She was dissatisfied with that amount because, according to her, it did not represent pension benefits for the whole period of her service with the First Respondent. Her case is therefore not merely that payment was delayed, but that the amount paid was incomplete and that she was underpaid. The Applicant further states that, following that dissatisfaction, she commenced proceedings in the High Court by Originating Summons filed on 10 th January 2011 and issued on 12 th January 2011. In those proceedings, she sought orders requiring the First Respondent to provide a true account of her terminal benefits, including conditions of service and other relevant documents; an order requiring the Second Respondent to provide an account of her pension benefits; an order requiring the Respondents jointly or severally to pay pension benefits to be assessed; costs; and any further relief deemed fit by the Court. Those claims, according to the Applicant, are substantially the same claims that are now before this Court. The Applicant’s position is that the High Court proceedings were not abandoned, withdrawn, struck out, or dismissed. Rather, after hearing the Originating Summons, the High Court delivered judgment on 29 th August 2018 and determined that the matter had to proceed before the Industrial Relations Court. The High Court then ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the Industrial Relations Court and directed the Applicant to comply with the procedure and practice of this Court by 31st October 2018. The Applicant says she complied with that direction by filing IRC Form 1 in this Court on 31st October 2018. On that basis, the Applicant argues that the present proceedings should not be treated as a fresh action commenced in 2018. Instead, they are said to be a procedural continuation of the proceedings earlier commenced in the High Court in 2011. The Applicant contends that the relevant date for limitation purposes is therefore January 2011, not October 2018. Since the cause of action arose in 2010 and the High Court proceedings were commenced in 2011, the Applicant maintains that the claim was brought well within the six-year period prescribed by section 4 of the Limitation Act. Counsel Sepulo advanced the same position orally at the hearing. He submitted that it was not in contention that the cause of action arose around 2010. The real dispute, in his submission, was whether the action was statute-barred having regard to the prior High Court proceedings. He argued that the matter was originally instituted in the High Court in 2011, within time, and that the High Court later transferred the matter to this Court with directions as to the form the proceedings should take. Counsel submitted that such transfer did not create a new action but preserved the existing cause of action and moved it to the appropriate forum. The Applicant further contends that limitation was interrupted or, at the very least, should be treated as having been satisfied once the action was commenced in the High Court. The Applicant’s answer to the Respondents’ argument is that a party who has instituted proceedings within time before a court should not be treated as having slept on her rights merely because that court later directs that the matter proceed before another court. The mischief addressed by limitation statutes, according to the Applicant, is indolence or Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 4 failure to pursue a claim within the prescribed period. On her case, there was no such indolence because she acted within approximately one year of receiving the pension payment complained of. The Applicant also argues that the High Court proceedings were not a nullity. In her skeleton arguments, reliance is placed on the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 108(1) of the Constitution and the status of the Industrial Relations Court under section 110(2). The Applicant’s case is that the High Court is a superior court of record with unlimited original jurisdiction, and that proceedings commenced there are not automatically void merely because the dispute is labour-related and may more appropriately be heard by the Industrial Relations Court. The Applicant relies on authorities cited in her submissions for the proposition that labour matters filed in the High Court may be transferred to the Industrial Relations Court rather than dismissed as null proceedings. A substantial part of the Applicant’s legal position is that the Respondents’ argument treats the filing in the High Court as if it were legally meaningless. The Applicant rejects that approach. She submits that the High Court itself did not treat the matter as a nullity, because it did not dismiss or strike out the Originating Summons. It instead ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the Industrial Relations Court and required the Applicant to comply with the procedural requirements of this Court. The Applicant argues that this procedural direction is inconsistent with the Respondents’ contention that the High Court proceedings were wholly void and incapable of preserving the claim. The Applicant further submits that the Respondents’ approach would produce an unjust result. Counsel Sepulo argued that section 4 of the Limitation Act should not be applied mechanistically so as to deprive the Applicant of substantive relief where she had already commenced proceedings within time. He submitted that the purpose of limitation law should not be stretched to punish a claimant who placed her claim before a court within the statutory period and then waited for the Court to determine the proper forum. The Applicant’s position is that the delay between 2011 and 2018 was not a period during which she did nothing. The matter was pending before the High Court during that time. The Applicant also relies on the principle of substantive justice. Her skeleton arguments contend that pension benefits are deferred employment benefits earned through service and that courts should be slow to defeat such claims on technical procedural grounds where the claimant took steps within time. The Applicant argues that dismissing the matter would elevate procedural form over substantive justice, especially because the Respondents were aware of the claim from 2011 and cannot properly claim surprise arising from the 2018 filing in this Court. The Applicant also answers the Respondents’ argument on prejudice. Her position is that any prejudice flowing from the lapse of time must be considered against the fact that the Respondents knew of the claim from the High Court proceedings. The Applicant maintains that the Respondents were not confronted with the claim for the first time in 2018. The dispute had already been raised in 2011, and the Second Respondent participated by filing an affidavit in opposition in the High Court proceedings. On that reasoning, the Respondents’ prejudice argument cannot override the fact that the claim was pursued within time. The Applicant’s position is that any procedural error in the initial choice of forum should not defeat a claim which was placed before a court within the limitation period, particularly where the High Court did not dismiss the proceedings but transferred them to this Court. In essence, the Applicant’s opposition rests on five propositions. First, the cause of action may have arisen in 2010, but proceedings were commenced in the High Court in January 2011. Secondly, those proceedings were commenced within six years and therefore satisfied section 4 of the Limitation Act. Thirdly, the High Court proceedings were not null proceedings, because the High Court did not dismiss them but transferred them to this Court. Fourthly, Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 5 filing IRC Form 1 in 2018 was compliance with the High Court’s procedural direction, not the commencement of a new claim. Fifthly, it would be unjust and contrary to substantive justice to dismiss a pension claim on limitation grounds where the Applicant had pursued the claim in court within time and the Respondents had notice of it from 2011. The Applicant therefore prays that the Respondents’ motion be dismissed and that the matter proceed to determination on its merits. THE APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES The Court’s procedural mandate to entertain an application for dismissal on limitation grounds is found in Rule 16(1) and (2) of the Industrial Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 1999. Rule 16(1) provides that an interlocutory application, or any other application incidental to pending proceedings for which no procedure is provided by the Labour Relations Act or the Rules, shall be brought by notice of motion, as near as possible in the form set out in IRC Form 3. Rule 16(2) requires such application to be supported by affidavit, subject to the exceptions stated in the Rule. The Rule therefore provides the procedural route by which a party may place before the Court a motion seeking dismissal of proceedings on the ground that they are barred by statute. The substantive law is found in the Limitation Act. Limitation law requires proceedings to be brought within a prescribed period after the cause of action has accrued. Its purpose is to promote legal certainty, encourage diligence, protect parties from stale claims, and reduce the risk of injustice caused by lost documents, unavailable witnesses, faded memories, or changed circumstances. Section 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Act provides that actions founded on simple contract or tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action arose. The section also bars an action for an account in respect of any matter which arose more than six years before commencement of the action. Limitation provisions must be applied according to law. A clear limitation bar may found an application for dismissal. In Ronnex Properties Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1953] 1 QB 398, the Court of Appeal held that where a limitation defence is apparent on the face of the proceedings, a defendant may apply to strike out the action without waiting for trial. The same approach appears in Manyungwa v Stagecoach (Malawi) Ltd [1997] 2 MLR 23, where the Court recognised that, where limitation is pleaded, a defendant may seek determination of the limitation issue and, in a clear case, dismissal of the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, unless the claim is saved by an extension or other recognised answer to limitation. The principle is that a court is not required to put parties through a full trial where the statutory bar is clear and no legally recognised answer to it has been shown. The Court must nevertheless be satisfied that the limitation bar has been established. The party raising limitation must show that the claim falls within the statutory category relied upon, that the cause of action accrued on an ascertainable date, and that the action was brought after expiry of the prescribed period. Once that is shown, the party resisting the bar must identify and prove a lawful basis upon which time was postponed, suspended, extended, interrupted, or caused to run afresh. The Limitation Act recognises limited circumstances such as acknowledgment, part payment, fraud, mistake, disability, and other statutory grounds. In Dungate v Dungate [1965] 1 WLR 1477, the Court held that an acknowledgment must recognise the debt or liability in question. Neutral correspondence, discussion of figures, or denial of liability will not ordinarily suffice. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION The motion raises the question whether the Applicant’s claim is statute-barred under section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Respondents’ position is that the cause of action arose in or about March or April 2010 Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 6 when the Applicant received the pension payment which she considered inadequate, and that the matter was only commenced before this Court on 31st October 2018. On that computation, the claim would have been brought more than six years after the cause of action arose. The Applicant’s answer is that the matter was not first commenced in 2018. She contends that the same dispute was commenced in the High Court by Originating Summons filed on 10th January 2011 and issued on 12th January 2011, well within the six-year period, and that the proceedings before this Court are the continuation of proceedings transferred by the High Court judgment delivered on 29th August 2018. The Court begins with the nature of the claim and the relevant dates. The claim concerns an account of terminal and pension benefits, an account from the pension administrator, payment of any pension benefits found due, costs, and further relief. It arises from the Applicant’s former employment relationship, the pension fund arrangements, and her complaint that the pension benefits paid to her did not reflect the full period of her service. The claim therefore falls within the broad category of employment-benefits claims, with an associated prayer for an account. Section 4 of the Limitation Act is engaged because it applies to actions founded on simple contract and also bars an action for an account in respect of matters arising more than six years before commencement of the action. The Court proceeds on the footing, as the parties substantially accepted, that the cause of action arose in or about March or April 2010. If the only relevant commencement date is 31st October 2018, the matter is out of time. If the relevant commencement date is January 2011, the matter is within time. The Respondents’ first major argument is jurisdictional. They submit that the Industrial Relations Court has original jurisdiction over labour-related disputes and pension disputes arising from employment, while the High Court’s role in such matters is appellate. They rely on section 64 of the Labour Relations Act, which gives this Court original jurisdiction to hear and determine labour disputes, and section 65 of the same Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court. They also rely on section 83 of the repealed Pensions Act, 2011, which recognised this Court’s jurisdiction over labour-related disputes arising under that Act. Their submission is that the Applicant was required to commence the matter in this Court from the beginning and could not choose the High Court as a court of first instance merely because the High Court has broad civil jurisdiction under section 108(1) of the Constitution. That submission has considerable force. The High Court judgment itself supports it. The High Court recognised that, although it has original jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters generally, there exists a specialised Industrial Relations Court with jurisdiction to handle labour and employment matters. It observed that the Labour Relations Act provides the High Court with appellate jurisdiction in labour-related disputes arising from this Court, and stated that it was irregular for the Plaintiff to sidestep the specialised tribunal and commence the matter in the High Court. The High Court then made the important finding that the Originating Summons filed before it was incompetent for having been commenced in the wrong forum. This Court must give full effect to that finding. It is not open to this Court, being lower in the judicial hierarchy, to sit on appeal over the High Court or to dilute a finding which has not been set aside. The Respondents further argue that a proceeding commenced in a wrong forum is incompetent and a nullity, and that a nullity cannot interrupt time. They rely on Mary Kaunde v Malawi Telecommunications Ltd, High Court Civil Cause No. 687 of 2001, for the proposition that the High Court should recognise the jurisdiction of specialised or subordinate courts and decline jurisdiction where such courts have been given jurisdiction, unless exceptional circumstances require High Court intervention. They also rely on Abragim Makalani v National Bank of Malawi , Civil Cause No. 1491 of 2001, where the High Court expressed misgivings about transferring proceedings which had been defectively commenced and considered dismissal of the Originating Summons to be the proper order. In addition, they refer to Verijina v Village Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 7 Headman Kagwera, Land Cause No. 213 of 2022, for the general proposition that proceedings commenced in the wrong forum may be dismissed where a statute has provided a specialised tribunal. Those authorities support the Respondents’ caution that forum is not a matter of convenience only. Where the law assigns original jurisdiction to a specialist forum, a party who commences proceedings elsewhere may face serious procedural consequences. The Respondents’ point is not merely technical. If litigants were free to commence labour disputes in the High Court, wait for several years, and then rely on those proceedings to avoid limitation when the matter eventually reaches this Court, the statutory structure of labour dispute resolution would be undermined. The Respondents are also right that limitation statutes serve legal certainty and finality, and that the Limitation Act identifies recognised circumstances in which time may be affected, including disability, acknowledgment, part payment, fraud, and mistake. Filing in the wrong forum is not expressly listed as one of those statutory exceptions. The Court accepts that it cannot create a free-standing exception to limitation merely because a party acted in good faith or because the result of applying the statute appears harsh. The Respondents also rely on Benuik v Leamington (Municipality), 2019 ONSC 1830, a Canadian decision. The case is not binding on this Court, but it is relevant to the argument advanced. The principle drawn from it is that filing a claim in the wrong court or tribunal does not, without more, stop time from running for limitation purposes. The Court accepts the value of that principle at a general level. A litigant who files in a forum with no authority over the matter cannot ordinarily rely on that filing as a suspension of time. The limitation period is not paused merely because a claimant is mistaken about where to sue. That approach is consistent with the statutory nature of limitation periods and with the need for diligence in choosing the proper forum. The Respondents further submit that the Court has no residual or inherent jurisdiction to extend a limitation period fixed by statute. They rely on The State (Roads Authority) v The Office of the Ombudsman, Judicial Review Cause No. 29 of 2025, for the proposition that courts may extend time prescribed by statute only where the relevant statute permits such extension. The Court accepts that principle. Inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to defeat an express statutory bar. If a claim is truly out of time and no statutory exception applies, this Court cannot revive it by appealing to substantial justice, sympathy, hardship, or the fact that pension rights are involved. The Court’s equitable instincts must remain within the statute. The Respondents also contend that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of proceedings. They rely on General Alliance Insurance Company Limited v Levi Jumbe and another, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2023, and Mbale v Maganga , Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2013, [2015] MWSC 1, for the principle that jurisdiction goes to the power and authority of a court and may be raised before trial, during trial, on appeal, or by the court on its own motion. The Court accepts that proposition. It also accords with what happened before the High Court. The fact that jurisdiction was raised late did not prevent the High Court from considering it. Once the High Court found the matter to be labour-related and the Originating Summons to have been commenced in the wrong forum, that finding had legal consequence. These arguments by the Respondents are substantial and must be weighed fully. They show that the Applicant cannot succeed merely by saying that she filed something in the High Court in 2011. The Court must go further and ask whether the 2011 High Court proceedings, in light of the High Court judgment, had legal effect for limitation purposes. A mere filing in a wrong forum, without more, would not be enough. A proceeding dismissed as a nullity would not preserve time. A court’s general desire to do substantial justice would not permit revival of a claim which had died by operation of statute. Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 8 The decisive feature of the present matter, however, is the actual order made by the High Court. The High Court judgment must be read as a whole. It contains both a finding of incompetence and an order of transfer. After finding that the Originating Summons was incompetent for having been commenced in the wrong forum, the High Court did not dismiss it. It did not strike it out. It did not say that there was nothing before it capable of further legal consequence. Instead, by reference to Chilemba v MHC [2008] MLLR 136, the High Court ordered that “these proceedings be transferred to the Industrial Relation Court” and directed the Plaintiff to comply with the procedure and practice obtaining in this Court by 31st October 2018. That is the order which binds this Court. The Respondents invite this Court to treat the High Court proceedings as a nullity incapable of transfer. That submission is understandable given the High Court’s use of the word “incompetent.” But it asks this Court to give one part of the High Court judgment full effect while depriving the operative order of practical effect. The High Court could have dismissed the Originating Summons, as was done in Abragim Makalani. It did not. It chose transfer. That distinction is not cosmetic. It is the difference between a proceeding terminated in the wrong forum and a proceeding preserved by a superior court and sent to the proper forum for regularisation. The Court therefore does not accept that the High Court judgment can be treated as a pure nullity decision. The finding of incompetence must be respected, but so must the transfer order. The better reading is that the High Court found the Originating Summons incompetent as a method of prosecuting a labour-related dispute in the High Court, but then dealt with that incompetence by transferring the proceedings to the court it considered competent and by requiring the Plaintiff to conform to this Court’s procedure. The filing of IRC Form 1 was therefore not an independent attempt to start a new action after limitation had expired. It was the procedural step directed by the High Court for the regularisation of the transferred proceedings. The Court’s conclusion is not that the Originating Summons was competent for trial in the High Court. The conclusion is narrower. Once the High Court transferred the same proceedings rather than dismissing them, this Court must treat the filing of IRC Form 1 as procedural regularisation of transferred proceedings, not as the institution of a new claim. That approach gives effect to both parts of the High Court judgment: the finding that the High Court was the wrong forum and the order that the proceedings be transferred to this Court. This reading does not create a general rule that filing in a wrong forum always interrupts limitation. It is narrower than that. The Court is not holding that every incompetent proceeding filed in the wrong forum suspends time. Nor is the Court holding that a party may choose any forum and later rely on good faith if limitation expires. The finding is limited to the effect of a specific High Court judgment which, after identifying the wrong forum, expressly ordered transfer of “these proceedings” and directed compliance with the procedure of this Court within a stated period. Giving effect to that order means treating the proceedings before this Court as the continuation of the transferred proceedings, not as a wholly fresh action. The Respondents’ reliance on Benuik v Leamington (Municipality) is therefore distinguishable. In Benuik, the principle was that filing in the wrong forum does not itself pause limitation. The present matter involves an additional and controlling feature: a superior court made an express transfer order in respect of the same proceedings. The issue is not whether the Applicant’s unilateral filing in the High Court automatically stopped time. The issue is whether this Court, after a High Court transfer order, should treat the transferred matter as if it were newly commenced only upon compliance with this Court’s procedural forms. To do so would fail to give full effect to the High Court’s order. Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 9 The Respondents’ reliance on The State (Roads Authority) v The Office of the Ombudsman is also not decisive. The Court is not extending time. It is not purporting to exercise an inherent power to enlarge a statutory limitation period. It is determining the commencement point of proceedings that were brought within time in the High Court and then transferred by High Court order. Once the matter is properly characterised as a transferred proceeding, the question of extension does not arise in the same way. The Applicant does not need the Court to extend limitation if the proceedings are treated as having commenced in January 2011. The Respondents’ argument based on statutory exceptions under the Limitation Act is likewise answered by the same point. It is correct that the Applicant has not relied on disability, acknowledgment, part payment, fraud, or mistake. It is also correct that the record does not establish any acknowledgment of liability or further payment capable of restarting time. But those exceptions are relevant where a claim is first brought outside the limitation period and the claimant seeks to avoid the bar by showing that time was postponed, suspended, or restarted. The Applicant’s primary case is different. She says the claim was brought within time in January 2011 and was later transferred. If that position is accepted, the absence of acknowledgment, part payment, disability, fraud, or mistake is not fatal. The argument on jurisdiction being raisable at any time also does not change the result. The High Court did raise and determine jurisdiction. This Court gives effect to that determination by accepting that the High Court was not the forum in which the matter should have proceeded and that the Originating Summons was incompetent for that purpose. But the consequence selected by the High Court was transfer, not dismissal. Jurisdictional error may lead to different procedural consequences depending on the order made. Here, the order made by the superior court preserved the proceedings and sent them to the proper court. This Court must implement that order rather than recast it. The Applicant’s authorities are useful only to the extent that they support that conclusion. Malawi Telecommunications Limited v Malawi Posts and Telecommunications Workers Union cautions against treating the Industrial Relations Court’s jurisdiction as automatically annihilating all High Court proceedings in labour matters without careful attention to the statutory framework and the order made. Mary Kaunde v Malawi Telecommunications Ltd, High Court Civil Cause No. 687 of 2001, demonstrates that labour-related proceedings wrongly commenced in the High Court may, in an appropriate case, be directed to proceed before this Court. Those authorities do not override the High Court judgment in this matter. Rather, they assist in understanding why the High Court could find the forum wrong and still transfer the proceedings. The Court has also considered the broader authorities relied upon on the Applicant’s side, including Allen v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 543, Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, and Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313. These authorities do not create an exception to limitation and must not be overstated. Their relevance is limited to the need to avoid a mechanistic procedural approach where a claim has been actively pursued and a superior court has preserved proceedings by transfer. Similarly, Grant Bvumbwe v Africa (Leaf) Malawi Ltd, MSCA Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2013, does not permit the Court to ignore limitation. It reminds the Court that, within the law, labour disputes should be handled with regard to substance and not defeated by unnecessary technicality. The Court also takes the point that prejudice and delay remain real concerns. The matter is old. The pension payment complained of was made in or about 2010. Long delay may affect documents, witnesses, recollection, and the practical conduct of the trial. But the Respondents were not confronted with this claim for the first time in 2018. The dispute had been placed before the High Court in 2011, and the Second Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 10 Respondent participated in those proceedings. Any prejudice arising from the passage of time may be relevant to proof, case management, and the merits. It does not, in the face of the High Court transfer order, justify treating the transferred proceedings as a fresh claim commenced only in 2018. The Court is alive to the practical hardship that may arise where a litigant takes steps within time but later discovers that the proceedings were commenced in the wrong forum. The Court is equally alive to the Respondents’ concern that limitation law should not be weakened by allowing parties to rely on proceedings filed before the wrong court. Both concerns are legitimate. The proper balance is achieved by giving full effect to the High Court judgment. That means respecting the finding that the High Court was the wrong forum and that the Originating Summons was incompetent for that purpose. It also means respecting the order that the proceedings be transferred to this Court and regularised by compliance with this Court’s procedure. For these reasons, the Court finds that the filing of IRC Form 1 on 31st October 2018 was not, for limitation purposes, the commencement of a fresh action. It was the procedural compliance directed by the High Court in respect of proceedings commenced in January 2011 and transferred to this Court. Since the cause of action arose in or about March or April 2010, and the proceedings were commenced in January 2011, the claim was brought within the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 4 of the Limitation Act. CONCLUSION For the reasons given, the Court finds that the Applicant’s claim was first commenced in the High Court by Originating Summons filed on 10th January 2011 and issued on 12 th January 2011, within six years of the cause of action which arose in or about March or April 2010. Although the High Court found that the matter had been commenced in the wrong forum, it did not dismiss or strike out the proceedings. It ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the Industrial Relations Court and directed the Applicant to comply with this Court’s procedure and practice by 31st October 2018. The filing of IRC Form 1 on that date was therefore compliance with the High Court’s transfer order and not the commencement of a wholly fresh action for purposes of limitation. The Respondents have therefore not established that the matter is statute-barred under section 4 of the Limitation Act. The motion to dismiss the matter on limitation grounds is dismissed. The matter shall proceed to determination on the merits. There shall be no order as to costs, this being a labour matter before the Industrial Relations Court and no exceptional basis for costs having been established. It is so ordered. DELIVERED THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY 2026 WYSON CHAMDIMBA NKHATA DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON Gladys Chamba v Malawi Broadcasting Corporation & Another, IRC Matter No. 606 of 2018 Page 11