Frimpong Boateng and Another v New Patriotic Party and Others (J1/5/2026) [2026] GHASC 61 (29 July 2026)

1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA - A.D. 2026 CORAM: BAFFOE-BONNIE CJ (PRESIDING) PWAMANG JSC AMADU JSC ASIEDU JSC GAEWU JSC DZAMEFE JSC SUURBAAREH JSC WRIT NO. J1/5/2026 29TH JULY, 2026 1. PROF. KWABENA FRIMPONG BOATENG ………….. 1ST PLAINTIFF 2. DR. NYAHO NYAHO-TAMAKLOE ………….. 2ND PLAINTIFF 3. DR. CHRISTINE AMOAKO-NUAMAH ………….. 3RD PLAINTIFF VRS 1. NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY …………… 1ST DEFENDANT 2. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS …………… 2ND DEFENDANT 3. CONVENTION PEOPLE'S PARTY ……………. 3RD DEFENDANT 4. ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF GHANA ……………. 4TH DEFENDANT 2 5. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL …………… 5TH DEFENDANT JUDGEMENT MAJORITY OPINION BAFFOE-BONNIE CJ: PLAINTIFFS’ CASE 1. By writ dated 26th January 2026, the Plaintiffs invoked the original jurisdiction of this Court seeking the following reliefs against the Defendants: i. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1(1) and (2), 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution the election of a political party’s presidential and parliamentary candidate(s) constitutes a cor e element of the party’s internal organisation within the meaning of Article 55(5) of the Constitution. ii. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1(1) and (2), 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, the internal organisation of a political party must be structured in a manner that ensures equal political participation and equal voting rights of its members in the selection of the party’s presidential and parliamentary candidate(s). iii. A declaration that, on a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42, 55(2), 55(5), 63 and 93 of the 1992 Constitution, democratic principles governing the internal organisation of political parties require political equality, meaningful and broad participation of members in decision -making, accountability of leadership to the membership, and substantially equal and direct 3 voting rights for members in good standing in the election of the party’s presidential and parliamentary candidates. iv. A declaration that the delegate -based Electoral College system established under Article 13 of the Constitution of the 1 st Defendant for the election of its presidential candidate, which confines or restricts voting to specified executives, office holders and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Pr eamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. v. A declaration that the Extraordinary Constituency Delegates Conference system established under Article 7 of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant for the selection or election of its parliamentary candidates, which confines voting to specified constituency executives, coordinators, polling station officers, elders, patrons and other delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. vi. A declaration that the Electoral College system established under Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of the 2 nd Defendant for the election of its presidential and parliamentary candidates, which confines or restricts voting to specified executives, office holders and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 33(5), 17, 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 4 vii. A declaration that the Constituency Branch Party Conference system and the National Delegates Congress system established under Articles 53, 96 and 77 of the Constitution of the 3rd Defendant for the election of its presidential and parliamentary candidate (s), which confines voting to specified executives, elders, officers and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. viii. A consequential order striking down and declaring unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect all provisions of the constitutions, rules, regulations or electoral arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, to the extent that they restrict or confine the election of their presidential and parliamentary candidates to limited Electoral Colleges, delegate bodies or similar structures, or otherwise exclude or materially disenfranchise members in good standing of the parties from voting in elections for their presidential candidates. ix. An order directing the 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd Defendants to amend their respective constitutions, rules and electoral arrangements to adopt procedures for the election of their presidential candidates or flagbearers that conform to the democratic principles required under Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and ensure the equal, direct and meaningful participation of members in good standing in such elections. x. An order directed at the 4th Defendant, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory mandate under the Constitution and Act 574, to ensure and enforce the 1st, 5 2nd, and 3 rd Defendant’s compliance with the Preamble and Article 55(5) of the Constitution and Section 9(a) of Act 574 in respect of their internal elections. xi. Such further or consequential orders as this Honourable Court may deem just. 2. The 1992 Constitution places a sacred duty upon every political party to ensure that its internal organization is democratic. It provides in Article 55(5) that “[t]he internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles and its actions and purposes shall not contravene or be inconsistent with this Constitution or any other law. ” The Plaintiffs are of the view that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants have failed to do this. 3. The basis of the Plaintiffs’ contention is that the constitutions of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants currently employ delegate -based systems for selecting their presidential and parliamentary candidates. And although the Defendants differ in the compositio n of their respective electoral bodies and in certain procedural details, the Plaintiffs contend that they all share one common characteristic: the final decision on who becomes each party's presidential or parliamentary candidate is made by a limited class of delega tes as opposed to the general membership of the party. 4. With respect to the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiffs state that Article 13 of its Constitution governs the nomination and election of the party's presidential candidate. While any eligible member may seek nomination, the final election is conducted through a body of delegates and not by the universal participation of all members. The delegates comprise specified categories of party officials and functionaries, including the party's national, regional, constituency and polling station executives, past national officers, Members of Parliament, members of the Council of Elders, founding members, patrons, recognised representatives of party organs, and other designated persons. According to the Plaintiffs, only these 6 delegates are entitled to vote, with the result that ordinary members who do not hold any designated office or delegate position, play no direct role in choosing the party's presidential candidate. 5. The Plaintiffs further state that the 1st Defendant adopts a similar approach in selecting parliamentary candidates. Under Article 7 of its Constitution, parliamentary candidates are elected at a Constituency Delegates Conference attended only by specified delegates, including constituency executives, electoral area coordinators, polling station executives, representatives of the Constituency Council of Elders, patrons and founding members. Ordinary party members who fall outside these categories are excluded from voting. 6. Regarding the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiffs explain that its constitutional arrangements have evolved over time. When the party's Constitution was first adopted in 1992, both presidential and parliamentary candidates were selected through delegate -based el ectoral colleges comprising national, regional and constituency executives, office holders, Members of Parliament, Ministers, members of the Council of Elders, founding members, representatives of affiliated organizations and other designated delegates. Vo ting rights were therefore confined to a limited body of party functionaries. The Plaintiffs state that this position changed in 2015 when the 2nd Defendant amended its Constitution to introduce universal suffrage for presidential primaries. Under the amended Article 44, every member registered in the party's biometric register became entitled to vote directly in the election of the party's presidential candidate. The amendment therefore replaced the delegate -based system with direct participation by the wider membership. 7. However, the party subsequently amended its constitution in 2019, through which the party abandoned universal suffrage and restored the delegate-based Electoral College. As matters presently stand, the Plaintiffs contend that the party has returned to a sy stem in which 7 presidential candidates are chosen by a restricted body of delegates rather than by all members. They further state that under Article 41 of the 2nd Defendant’s Constitution, the selection of parliamentary candidates likewise remains the responsibility of a delegate-based Electoral College composed of designated party officials and representatives. 8. With respect to the 3rd Defendant, the Plaintiffs state that its Constitution also adopts a delegate-based approach to selecting candidates for public office. Under Article 96, the party's presidential candidate is elected by the National Delegates Congres s following a vetting process. The National Delegates Congress is the party's highest decision -making body and is composed of specified categories of party officials and representatives, including members of the National Executive Council, the Council of E lders, founding members, constituency officers and representatives from tertiary institutions and overseas branches. Only these delegates are entitled to vote in the presidential primary, while ordinary party members who do not hold any designated office or delegate position are excluded. 9. The Plaintiffs further state that the 3rd Defendant employs an equally restricted process for selecting parliamentary candidates. Under Article 53 of its Constitution, parliamentary candidates are elected by the Constituency Branch Party Conference, whose membership is limited to constituency executives and other designated representatives. The party's Central Committee retains an oversight role in approving the selected candidate. As with the presidential primary, ordinary members of the party do not vote directly in the selection of parliamentary candidates. 10. The plaintiffs contend that the delegates system is fundamentally inconsistent with democratic principles because it excludes the overwhelming majority of party members from directly participating in the selection of presidential and parliamentary candidat es. In their submission, democracy within a political party necessarily demands equal voting rights for 8 every member, arguing that universal adult suffrage is sacrosanct in our constitutional dispensation. DEFENDANTS’ CASE 1st Defendant 11. The 1st Defendant submits that its internal electoral arrangements fully comply with the democratic principles required by Article 55(5) of the Constitution. It argues that democratic principles should not be narrowly equated with universal suffrage or a s ystem in which every member of a political party votes directly in every internal election. In its view, democratic principles encompass broader values such as the rule of law, accountability, free and fair elections, transparency, representation and parti cipation, all of which, it contends, are reflected in its Constitution. 12. According to the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiffs' case is founded on the mistaken assumption that Article 55(5) constitutionally mandates direct democracy within political parties. It argues that democracy exists in different forms and that representative de mocracy is as legitimate a democratic model as direct democracy. It argues that representative democracy permits members to elect representatives who, in turn, make decisions on their behalf. It contends that this is the same model adopted by Ghana's const itutional system, where citizens elect Members of Parliament to legislate on their behalf, and that such a system has never been regarded as either undemocratic or unconstitutional. 13. The 1st Defendant explains that its internal organisational structure is itself representative and democratic. All members in good standing are entitled to participate in polling station elections, where they elect their polling station executives. Those executives subsequently elect representatives at successive levels of the party's hierarchy, culminating in the Electoral College responsible for electing the party's presidential and parliamentary candidates. It 9 therefore submits that every delegate ultimately derives his or her mandate from the party membership and that no member of the Electoral College assumes office by imposition or appointment outside this representative process. 14. The 1st Defendant further argues that article 55(5) must be interpreted purposively, in accordance with the well -established jurisprudence of this Court. It submits that constitutional provisions must be construed in light of their text, context, spirit an d underlying values rather than through a narrow or literal approach. Read within the broader framework of Chapter 7 of the Constitution, the Defendant contends that article 55(5) was intended to guarantee democratic governance within political parties while preserving their autonomy to determine how members participate in internal decision -making. It maintains that the Constitution deliberately refrains from prescribing any single model of internal democracy, thereby leaving political parties free to adopt structures suited to their own organisational needs, provided those structures remain democratic. 15. The 1st Defendant also contends that the interpretation advanced by the Plaintiffs would effectively compel every political party in Ghana to adopt direct democracy, thereby denying political parties the constitutional freedom to organise themselves in accordance with their own constitutions. It argues that such an approach would undermine the associational autonomy of political parties and would amount to the Court imposing one particular model of democracy in circumstances where Article 55(5) recognises a broader range of democratic arrangements. 16. The 1 st Defendant finally argues that the delegate system is itself an accepted form of representative democracy, promotes broad participation through elected representatives, preserves accountability to the membership, and therefore fully satisfies the constitut ional 10 requirement that the internal organisation of political parties conforms to democratic principles. It concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims should therefore be dismissed. 2nd Defendant 17. The 2nd Defendant substantially agrees with the Plaintiffs' challenge and concedes that its existing delegate -based system for electing presidential and parliamentary candidates is inconsistent with the democratic principles required by Article 55(5) of th e Constitution. It submits that universal adult suffrage and equal voting are indispensable features of Ghana's constitutional democracy and are essential to preserving the sovereign will of the people. In its view, a political party that restricts voting in its presidential and parliamentary primaries to a limited class of delegates undermines these constitutional values and acts contrary to both the letter and spirit of Article 55(5). It therefore agrees with the Plaintiffs that all members of the party i n good standing should be entitled to participate directly in the election of the party's presidential and parliamentary candidates. 18. Accordingly, it contends that Articles 43 and 44 of its Constitution, which establish the delegate-based electoral college for presidential and parliamentary primaries, are inconsistent with Article 55(5) of the Constitution, and asks this Court to so declare. 19. The 2nd Defendant nevertheless urges the Court not to invalidate or nullify the decisions previously taken under the impugned constitutional provisions. It submits that such an order would have serious consequences not only for the party but also for the governance of the country. It argues that a finding of constitutional inconsistency does not invariably render all actions taken under the impugned provisions null and void. On the contrary, the legal consequences of a constitutional breach depend on the language, purpose and context of the constitutional provision, as well as broader considerations of public policy. 11 3rd Defendant 20. The 3rd Defendant takes a rather interesting position on this matter. It accepts that Article 55(5) of the Constitution requires the internal organisation of political parties to conform to democratic principles and maintains that it has consistently sough t to organise its affairs in accordance with that constitutional obligation. It argues that the concept of “democratic principles” should be understood within Ghana's historical and constitutional context rather than by reference to a single prescribed model of internal democracy. 21. To support this position, the 3rd Defendant traces its own historical evolution. It explains that, during the struggle for independence between 1949 and 1951, it employed a system of direct participation under which all dues-paying branch members voted directly in internal elections. It further states that, between 1951 and 1966, during the period of national consolidation under the leadership of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, it adopted a delegate conference system based on the principle of democratic central ism, whereby delegates elected at lower levels constituted constituency, regional and national conferences. According to the 3rd Defendant, both systems were regarded by its founder as legitimate democratic methods suited to the particular historical circumstances of the time and reflected his broader conception of the Party as a vanguard organisation. 22. Against that historical background, the 3rd Defendant contends that its present National Delegates Congress system cannot, without more, be regarded as inconsistent with the democratic principles required by article 55(5). It argues that the Constitution d oes not prescribe any single electoral model for internal party democracy and that political parties enjoy considerable latitude in determining their own internal procedures. In its view, the Plaintiffs' invitation to the Court to prescribe a particular me thod of selecting party candidates risks intruding into the internal autonomy of political parties. 12 23. Notwithstanding those submissions, the 3rd Defendant adopts a conciliatory position. It states that it does not seek to contest the Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 55(5), nor does it oppose the reliefs sought against it. Rather, it states that it is prepared to implement whatever electoral model this Court ultimately determines to be consistent with the democratic principles required by the Constitution. 24. Accordingly, the 3rd Defendant requests that, should the Court grant the Plaintiffs' reliefs, it be afforded a reasonable transitional period of not less than twenty -four months within which to amend its Constitution, compile a credible national register o f members in good standing, and establish the technological and administrative systems necessary to implement any new electoral model, including direct universal suffrage if so ordered. 4th Defendant 25. The 4th Defendant does not advance any substantive arguments either in support of or in opposition to the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Its case is confined to an objection that no substantive relief has been sought against it in the Plaintiffs' wr it, nor has any specific claim been particularised against it in the Statement of Case. It accordingly contends that it has been improperly joined to the proceedings and prays that the action against it be dismissed. 5th Defendant 26. The 5th Defendant, the Attorney -General, supports the Plaintiffs' interpretation of Article 55(5) and contends that the internal elections of political parties must conform to the same democratic principles that govern the broader constitutional order. It argues that political parties are not merely private voluntary associations but public constitutional institutions through which public power is ultimately conferred. Because political parties perform the indispensable function of selecting candidates for the offices of President and Member of 13 Parliament, their internal elections are matters of public constitutional importance and must therefore comply with constitutional standards of democracy. 27. Proceeding from that premise, the 5th Defendant submits that every member in good standing of a political party is constitutionally entitled to participate in the election of the party's presidential and parliamentary candidates. Relying on Article 42 of the Constitution, it argues that the right to vote is a fundamental constitutional right which extends to all public elections. It further invokes Article 35(6)(d) of the Constitution, which obliges the State to afford citizens every possible opportunity to participate in decision-making at all levels of national life. According to the 5th Defendant, internal party elections constitute an important level of national decision -making because they determine who may ultimately contest for public office and exercise governmental power. Consequently, a delegate-based system that excludes the over whelming majority of party members from voting falls short of the constitutional commitment to participatory democracy and universal adult suffrage. 28. The 5th Defendant also draws support from the constitutional jurisprudence of Germany, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. It submits that these jurisdictions consistently recognise political parties as constitutional actors whose internal arrangements are su bject to constitutional regulation because they serve as the gateway through which citizens gain access to public office. 29. The 5th Defendant further relies on international and regional standards to illuminate the content of Article 55(5). It refers to the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 25, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. According to the 5th Defendant, these instruments consistently affirm that members of political parties should enjoy meaningful opportunities 14 to participate in selecting party leaders and candidates and that political processes should not be dominated by narrow groups to the exclusion of the wider membership. While acknowledging that these instruments are not themselves binding, the 5th Defendan t submits that they provide persuasive guidance consistent with this Court's established approach of interpreting the Constitution, where possible, in harmony with Ghana's international obligations. ISSUES 30. The parties have identified the following issues for determination: (1) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1(1), 1(2), 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42, 63 and 93, the delegate-based Electoral College established under Article 13 of the Constitu tion of the 1st Defendant for the election of its presidential candidate, which confines voting rights to specified categories of executives, office holders, Members of Parliament, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, past national officers, patrons, founding m embers and other designated delegates, and excludes members in good standing who do not fall within those categories, constitutes part of the "internal organisation" of the 1st Defendant and conforms to the "democratic principles" mandated by Article 55(5). (2) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 93, the Extraordinary Constituency Delegates Conference established under Article 7 of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant for the selection of its parliamentary candidates, which confines voting rights to Constituency Executive Committee members, Electoral Area Coordinators, Polling Station Executives, five members of the Constituency Council of Elde rs, five 15 Constituency Patrons and specified founding members, and excludes members in good standing of the constituency who do not fall within those categories, conforms to the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. (3) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 63, the Electoral College system established under Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of the 2nd Defendant for the election of its presidential candidate, which confines voting rights to a defined body of branch, constituency, regional and national executive committee members, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives, the Party's parliamentary group, members of the Council of Elders, founding members, ambassadors and other designated delegates, and excludes ordinary members in good standing from direct participation, conforms to the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. (4) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 93, the constituency electoral college established under Article 41 (as then framed) of the Constit ution of the 2nd Defendant for the election of its parliamentary candidates, which confines voting rights to branch, constituency and regional executives, serving and former public office holders and other designated functionaries who are members of a bran ch in the constituency, conforms to the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. (5) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 63, the election of the presidential candidate of the 3rd Defendant by the National Delegates Congr ess 16 constituted under Articles 77 and 96 of the Constitution of the 3rd Defendant, which confines voting rights to members of the National Executive Council, founding members, members of the Council of Elders, specified constituency officers, two representativ es from each constituency, tertiary institution branch representatives and approved overseas branch representatives, and excludes members in good standing at large, conforms to the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. (6) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, read with the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 93, the Constituency Branch Party Conference established under Articles 52 and 53 of the Constituti on of the 3rd Defendant for the election of its parliamentary candidates, which confines voting rights to members of the Constituency Branch Executive Committee, specified Polling Station and Electoral Area Branch Executive Committee members and tertiary institution branch representatives, and further subjects the outcome to approval by the Central Committee, conforms to the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. (7) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 17, 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, the delegate-based mechanisms adopted under Article 13 and Article 7 of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant, Articles 43, 44 and 41 of the Constitution of the 2nd Defendant, and Articles 77, 96, 52 and 53 of the Constitution of the 3rd Defendant for the selection of their presidential and parliamentary candidates, by conferring decisive voting power on defined classes of office holders and delegates while denying members in good standing any vote in those elections, operate as mechanisms of vote dilution inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of political equality and the democratic principles required of the internal organisation of a political party. 17 (8) Whether, upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 45 and 55 of the 1992 Constitution read with section 9(a) of the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), the 4th Defendant is under a continuing constitutional and statutory duty to vet, supervise a nd ensure that the constitutions, rules and internal electoral arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants conform to democratic principles, and whether the 4th Defendant has failed, refused or neglected properly to discharge that duty in respect of th e impugned provisions identified in Issues 1 to 6. (9) Whether it is within the province of this Honourable Court to intervene in the internal affairs of the 2nd Defendant (and by extension, the 1st and 3rd Defendants) in terms of the processes and procedures used in electing/selecting its presidential and parliamentary candidates. (10) Whether or not political parties are public (rather than private) interest organisations. (11) Whether every registered member in good standing of a political party is entitled to vote in internal elections of that party. RESOLUTION OF ISSUES 31. Despite the litany of issues that the parties have identified for determination, this Court thinks that only two issues are germane to the resolution of this case, namely: (1) Whether the delegates system, by which a relatively limited body of elected delegates selects presidential and parliamentary candidates on behalf of the wider membership of a political party, satisfies the constitutional command in article 55(5) that "the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles." 18 (2) Whether the Electoral Commission is under a continuing constitutional and statutory duty to vet, supervise and ensure that the constitutions, rules and internal electoral arrangements of political parties conform to the democratic principles required by Article 55(5) of the Constitution and, if so, whether it has discharged that duty in relation to the impugned provisions of the Constitutions of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. ISSUE 1: 32. This issue invites us to determine whether the delegates system, by which a relatively limited body of elected delegates selects presidential and parliamentary candidates on behalf of the wider membership of a political party, satisfies the constitutional command in article 55(5) that "the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles." 33. It is difficult to deny the force of either position in this case. The Plaintiffs are undoubtedly correct in asserting that the participation of all eligible voters lies at the heart of democratic governance. Equally, the 1 st and 3 rd Defendants are right to remind this Court that constitutional democracies throughout the world have long accepted representative systems of democracy as legitimate expressions of popular sovereignty. Indeed, constitutional scholarship has long recognised that democratic governance admits of multiple institutional forms. Direct democracy, representative democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, consociational democracy, and delegate democracy each represents different attempts to reconcile popular sovereignty with the practical demands of governing complex societies. None of these forms of democracy can properly be dismissed as undemocratic merely because it differs from another. 34. It is worth noting that our Constitution speaks of democracy in several respects. It proclaims Ghana to be a democratic State (Article 35(1)), vests sovereignty in the people (Article 1(1)), 19 guarantees political participation of all qualified citizens (Article 21(3)), protects the right to vote (Article 42), and commands that political parties organize themselves in accordance with democratic principles (Article 55(5)). Despite the frequency with which the Constitution invokes democracy or its ideals, it leaves the concept itself largely undefined. This case presents one of those occasions on which this Court is invited to define the content of a constitutional concept, in this case, democracy. 35. And so, we begin our analysis by first acknowledging that the delegates system is not, by its very nature, undemocratic. A contrary conclusion would accord with neither constitutional theory nor democratic practice across the world. Democracies speak in ma ny voices. Some permit citizens to participate directly in important political decisions; other models permit citizens to speak through mediated voices, such as the delegate system in issue in this case. Neither model is inherently superior to the other. The delegate system is no less democratic because it entrusts decision-making as regards who becomes a presidential or parliamentary candidate to those elected to act on behalf of the others. Democracy has long evolved beyond its earliest and simplest conce ption. It now accommodates a variety of institutional arrangements through which the people's will may be expressed. It would, therefore, be a mistake to conclude that the delegates system offends democratic principles merely because it does not embrace the elementary idea of one woman, one vote. 36. This broader understanding of democracy raises an important constitutional question concerning the role of party constitutions themselves. Political parties are voluntary associations governed by constitutions, as required by law. Article 55(7) of our Constitution requires that “For purposes of registration, a prospective political party shall furnish the Electoral Commission with a copy of its Constitution…”. These party constitutions regulate their internal affairs, including the selection of leaders and candidat es for elections. Those constitutions are not imposed upon members without their consent; they are adopted, 20 amended, and maintained through procedures accepted by the membership of the party. If party members, acting collectively and democratically, choose to adopt a constitution establishing a delegate system, can it truly be said that the resulting nomination process is undemocratic? 37. That the delegates system is democratic, however, is not the end of the matter. The primary issue before this Court is not so much whether the delegate system is capable of satisfying democratic ideals in the abstract. The real question is much narrower, b ut far more important. It is whether the Constitution of Ghana, properly understood, has chosen one democratic model in preference to another. 38. Constitutions are not textbooks in political philosophy. They do not seek to resolve every theoretical debate about democracy. Rather, they make practical constitutional choices about how democratic government should operate within a particular society. Th us, although several democratic models may each possess equal intellectual legitimacy, the Constitution may nevertheless adopt one as the organising principle of the State. The duty of this Court is, therefore, not to decide which model of democracy political scientists or philosophers find most attractive. Its duty is to discover the democratic vision that the framers embedded in our constitutional text. 39. To discover the model of democracy that the Constitution envisions, a reading of Article 55(5) in isolation would not do. As this Court has consistently held, the Constitution is sui generis and must be interpreted in such light as to ensure internal harmony, so that all of its provisions can work together as parts of a functioning whole. In so doing, every provision must be interpreted such as to be in perfect keeping with the fitness of the entire constitutional scheme. See: National Media Commission v Attorney General [1999-2000] 2 GLR 577, 585-586; and New Patriotic Party v Attorney General [1993-1994] 2 GLR 35, 78-79. 21 40. In that stead, when one reads the Constitution as a whole, a remarkably consistent pattern emerges. At every important point where political power is constituted, the Constitution places its confidence in the people themselves. It begins with the Preamble, where the people of Ghana proclaim their commitment to establish a constitutional order founded upon, among others, the principle of universal adult suffrage. That declaration is not a decorative or ornamental introduction. It is the constitutional philos ophy upon which the Fourth Republic rests. Indeed, this Court has had occasion to pronounce on the force of the Constitution’s preambular language. In Asare v Attorney -General [2015 -2016] 2 SCGLR 902, this Court noted that the Preamble to the Constitution gives us “ a full understanding of the philosophical underpinnings upon which the framers of the Constitution 1992 fashioned it.” 41. Thus, the Preamble tells us that political authority derives from the equal participation of citizens and that the legitimacy of public office rests upon the widest possible democratic mandate. This choice of political philosophy rests upon the idea expres sed in the opening article of the Constitution that “[t]he Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana”. Article 35(6)(d) also enjoins the government to afford “ all possible opportunities to the people to participate in decision -making at every level in national life and in government.” Taken together, these provisions inevitably enjoin us to embrace the constitutional vision that every eligible citizen is entitled to participate in constituting political power. 42. The same philosophy runs through the operative provisions of the Constitution. Article 42 guarantees every citizen of age and sound mind the right to vote. On that, this Court has held in many instances that the right to vote is non -derogable, except in la wful circumstances. See: Tehn-Addy v Electoral Commissioner [1996-1997] SCGLR 589; Apaloo v Electoral Commission [2001-2002] SCGLR 1; Ahumah-Ocansey v Electoral Commission; 22 Centre for Human Rights and Civil Liberties (CHURCIL) v Attorney -General (Consolidated) [2010] SCGLR 575. 43. In Abu Ramadan v Electoral Commission , Consolidated Writs Nos. J1/11/2014 and J1/9/2014, this Court emphasized that “[e]lectoral justice is legitimately the most effective medium for the protection and preservation of the sovereign will of the people, a democratic principle explicitly captured in the preamble to the 1992 constitution and implicitly reinforced under its article (1). The critical role universal adult suffrage and equal voting play in the democratic process cannot therefore be overlooked (sic).” 44. Again, Article 63(2) requires that the President be elected through universal adult suffrage. Members of District Assemblies likewise derive their mandate from the direct votes of the people, under Article 242, through universal adult suffrage. 45. Clearly, therefore, whenever the Constitution addresses the creation of public authority, it returns to the same democratic instinct: political power should flow as directly as possible from the people themselves. This is not accidental. It reveals a const itutional preference for broad participation as the ordinary method through which democratic legitimacy is secured. 46. Political parties occupy a unique place within our constitutional architecture. While they may be private associations in form, they are public institutions in function. As this Court would have us understand in the Republic v Yebbi & Avalifo [1999-2000] 2 GLR 50, matters affecting political parties are matters of public interest, because they are “ an essential part of the framework of government.” It is through political parties that those who eventually govern the Republic are identified and presented to the electorate. For many constituencies, particularly within Ghana's dominant political parties, the decisive political contest often occurs long before the national election. The selection of a party's presidential or 23 parliamentary candidate may effectively determine who will ultimately hold public office. Internal party elections cannot, therefore, be viewed as matters of purely private concern. They form an integral part of the country's democratic process. 47. Seen from this perspective, Article 55(5) assumes greater significance. The framers could simply have guaranteed the freedom to establish political parties and left their internal affairs entirely to their members. They chose not to do so. Instead, they im posed a constitutional obligation that the internal organization of every political party shall conform to democratic principles. That command must mean something. It cannot be interpreted so broadly that every conceivable system of internal governance satisfies it, merely because some democratic theorist can defend it. The provision must instead be understood in light of the Constitution's own democratic commitments. If the Constitution repeatedly embraces universal participation whenever public authority is constituted, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the same constitutional philosophy should inform the internal processes through which parties select those who seek to exercise that authority. 48. Our conclusion may sit uneasily with the representative character of Ghana's constitutional democracy. It may be argued that, since Members of Parliament, for example, exercise legislative power on behalf of the people rather than the people exercising it themselves, the Constitution necessarily embraces representative democracy in the form of the delegate system, and not just the model of “one woman, one vote" to which we have referred. Indeed, the 1st Defendant impresses that argument upon us. 49. There is, in our respectful view, no inconsistency between representative democracy and universal adult suffrage. In our constitutional framework, they point, respectively, to who ultimately exercises public power and how those representatives derive their democratic mandate. There can be no dispute that the 1992 Constitution establishes a representative 24 democracy. The sovereign will of the people is ordinarily exercised through elected representatives and not through direct popular decision -making. But that does not answer the separate constitutional question of how those representatives are themselves to be chosen. On that question, the Constitution speaks with consistency, that representatives derive their mandate through the equal participation of all citizens constitutionally entitled to take part in the relevant electoral process, as we have demonstrated. 50. There is yet another consideration which, in our respectful view, deserves attention. The Supreme Court is not merely an interpreter of constitutional language. It is also the guardian of our constitutional democracy. In performing that responsibility, it cannot ignore the realities within which the Constitution operates. One of those realities is the growing influence of money in Ghanaian politics, particularly during internal party elections. This is no longer a matter of speculation. It has become part o f our national political conversation. Allegations of vote -buying, delegate inducements, and the commercialisation of party primaries have become recurring features of almost every major internal election, of which this Court takes judicial notice. See, for example: Kojo Asante and George Kunnath (eds), The Cost of Politics in Ghana (Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Westminster Foundation for Democracy 2018); William Nyarko, Understanding How Dirty Money Fuels Campaign Financing in Ghana: An Exploratory Study (Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Adam Smith International 2021). The latter study estimates that the average cost of contesting a parliamentary election in Ghana is approximately GHS 4 million, with nearly GHS 2 million spent at the party primary stage alone. That such enormous sums are expended in elections determined by a relatively small number of delegates suggests that the high cost of party primaries is driven, in significant measure, by the need for aspirants to influence a limited and identifiable pool of delegates. The concentration of voting power in a small number of individuals thus creates fertile conditions for the monetisation of internal party elections. 25 51. True, opening party primaries to every party member is no guarantee that money politics will disappear. Corruption is remarkably adaptable. It often changes its form rather than vanish altogether. Yet constitutional adjudication rarely offers perfect solut ions. The Court is often required to choose the course that best promotes constitutional values in imperfect circumstances. Concentrating decisive electoral power in a relatively small body of delegates inevitably increases the value of each delegate's vot e. It creates a smaller market, a more identifiable electorate, and therefore a more attractive environment for targeted inducements. A broader electorate may increase campaign costs, but it also disperses political power among thousands of ordinary member s, making it considerably more difficult for electoral outcomes to be shaped by a relatively small number of transactions. For that reason, this Court may legitimately conclude that, at this stage of Ghana's democratic development, fidelity to the Constitution requires political parties to embrac e the model of democracy that the Constitution itself consistently prefers for the purpose of constituting political authority. 52. Before concluding on this issue, we consider it necessary to address one matter that may arise as a consequence of our decision. While we do not purport to anticipate or resolve every practical implication that may flow from opening party primaries to all registered members of a political party, one concern that immediately presents itself is the possibility of gerrymandering, or what is known in American jurisprudence as “party raiding”. That is to say, it has the real possibility of occasioning the political strategy in which supporters of one political party deliberately register and participate in another party's nomination process to influence its outcome, usually by helping nominate a weaker or less electable candidate. While this possibility is a real one, it is not sufficient to displace the Constitution’s own ideal form of democracy. Besides, jurisdictions where primaries are open to all party members have confronted this challenge and responded by adopting measures to curb it, including 26 requiring individuals to have been members of a political party for a specified reasonable period of time before becoming eligible to participate in that party's primaries. The Supreme Court of the United States has held this to be constitutional, albeit t hat the set timeframes must be reasonable. 53. In Rosario et al. v. Rockefeller , 410 U.S. 752 (1973 ), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a New York election law requiring voters to enroll in a political party several months before a primary election in order to be eligible to participate in that party's primary. The plaint iffs contended that the requirement violated their constitutional rights to vote, to political association, and to equal protection by excluding otherwise qualified voters who had failed to enroll before the statutory deadline. The State, however, justified the requirement as a necessary safeguard against "party raiding”. 54. The Supreme Court upheld the legislation. It held that the enrollment requirement did not deny the right to vote but merely regulated the timing of the exercise of that right in the context of party primaries. The Court further held that the State had a le gitimate and substantial interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, protecting political parties from strategic manipulation, and promoting the orderly administration of primary elections. Since eligible voters remained free to enroll i n advance and participate in subsequent primaries, the Court concluded that the statute imposed a reasonable and constitutionally permissible regulation, and not an undue burden on the exercise of constitutional rights. 55. In contrast, in Kusper v. Pontikes , 414 U.S. 51 (1973), the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of an Illinois election law that prohibited a voter from participating in the primary of one political party if the voter had participated in another party's primary within the preceding twent y-three months. The plaintiff had voted in the 27 Republican primary in 1971 but later sought to participate in the Democratic primary in 1972. She challenged the statute on the ground that it impermissibly restricted her freedom of political association by effectively preventing her from changing her par ty affiliation and participating in the candidate-selection process of the political party she wished to support. 56. The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional. It held that the twenty -three- month timeframe imposed a substantial burden on the rights of political association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments by effectively confining voters to a prior party affiliation for an unreasonably prolonged period. Although the Court recognised that the State had a legitimate interest in preventing "party raiding" and preserving the integrity of party primaries, it concluded that the restriction was not sufficiently tailored to advance those objectives. Distinguishing its earlier decision in Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court observed that, unlike a reasonable advance enrollment requirement, the Illinois statute unnecessarily curtailed voters' ability to realign their political affiliations and participate meaningfully in the primary elections of the party of their choice. Accordingly, the Court held that the State's interest in safeguarding the integrity of the primary process could not justify a restriction that imposed an undue burden on fundamental associational freedoms. 57. We have discussed these highly persuasive decisions because, when applied to Ghana, the State, or political parties acting pursuant to their constitutions and electoral regulations, may legitimately prescribe minimum periods of party membership as a condit ion for participating in party primaries. Such requirements would serve the important objective of deterring opportunistic party switching and preventing external actors from influencing the candidate-selection processes of rival political parties. ISSUE 2: 28 58. The final issue concerns the role of the Electoral Commission in ensuring compliance with the constitutional requirement that the internal organisation of political parties conform to democratic principles. The Plaintiffs contend that the Electoral Commiss ion bears a continuing constitutional and statutory obligation to scrutinise , supervise and ensure that the constitutions and internal electoral arrangements of registered political parties comply with Article 55(5) of the Constitution. The Commission, on the other hand, rejects the claims of the Plaintiffs in their entirety and u rges this Court to find that it has been improperly joined to the suit. 59. In resolving this issue, we start by revisiting Article 55(5) of the Constitution, which commands that "the internal organisation of a political party shall conform to democratic principles." This provision is cast in mandatory language and imposes a constitutional obligation upon every political party registered under the Constitution. The question is whether the Electoral Commission bears any responsibility in ensuring continuing observance of that obligation. 60. In our view, the answer must be in the affirmative. Article 45 of the Constitution entrusts the Electoral Commission with the regulation and supervision of the electoral process, while Article 55 assigns to it the responsibility for registering political p arties. That constitutional mandate is reinforced by section 9(a) of the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), which requires the Commission to ensure that a political party's constitution and organisational arrangements comply with the Constitution and the laws of Ghana before registration is granted. It states that “ the Commission shall not register a political party under [the Political Parties] Act, unless (a) the internal organisation of the party conforms with democratic principles and its actions and purposes are not contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution”. That obligation is mandatory, by the Constitution’s use of the operative word “shall.” See Interpretation Act, 2009, (Act 792). Indeed, this Court has held that “the use of the word ‘shall’, invoke[s] a mandatory 29 obligation on the part of the applicable duty bearer to comply with the prescription of law. ” Gyedu Frimpong and Others v Joana Gyan Cudjoe [2024] DLSC 17894. 61. Having established that the Electoral Commission has an obligation to ensure that political parties are registered only if their internal arrangements conform to democratic principles, that obligation cannot reasonably be understood as arising only at the moment of registration. The constitutional requirement contained in Article 55(5) is a continuing one, and the Commission's supervisory responsibility must necessarily endure for as long as the political party remains registered. 62. To construe the Commission's role as exhausted upon registration would substantially undermine the effectiveness of Article 55(5). A political party could initially submit a constitution that conforms to democratic principles, secure registration, and ther eafter amend its constitution in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with those principles, without any constitutional oversight by the very body entrusted with regulating political parties. Such an interpretation would deprive Article 55(5) of much of its practical force and defeat its evident constitutional purpose. 63. This is not to suggest that the Electoral Commission may dictate the internal policies or political choices of political parties. Political parties retain considerable autonomy in determining their internal affairs. The Commission's supervisory function ex tends only to ensuring that those internal arrangements remain within the constitutional limits imposed by Article 55. It must be concerned here not with the wisdom of political choices but with their constitutional validity. 64. Accordingly, we answer Issue 2 in the affirmative. We hold that the Electoral Commission bears a continuing constitutional and statutory duty to supervise and ensure that the 30 constitutions, rules and internal electoral arrangements of registered political parties conform to the democratic principles mandated by Article 55(5) of the Constitution. Where those arrangements depart from that constitutional standard, the Commission i s under an obligation to take appropriate steps, consistent with its constitutional and statutory powers, to secure compliance. CONCLUSION 65. For the foregoing reasons, all the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs are granted. 66. All political parties registered with the 4th Defendant are hereby ordered to desist from selecting Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates through any form of electoral college system and shall, not later than one year from today, establish a system for selecting Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates that enables all registered members of the party in good standing, as determined by the party’s Constitution, to directly vote for the Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates. 67. Meanwhile, having found that the impugned internal arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants are inconsistent with the 1992 Constitution and are therefore void to the extent of their inconsistency, this Court is impelled to determine the effect of th at declaration on decisions previously taken pursuant to those arrangements. 68. The Court is mindful that constitutional supremacy demands that unconstitutional provisions cannot be permitted to remain operative. Equally, the Court cannot ignore the practical reality that the affairs of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants have, over a per iod of time, been conducted on the footing that the impugned provisions were valid. To invalidate, retrospectively, every decision taken under those provisions would not only unsettle vested rights and legitimate expectations, but may also occasion considerable uncertainty in the 31 administration of the affairs of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants and affect the broader public interest. We are of the view that a declaration of constitutional invalidity does not invariably require the nullification of every act previously performed unde r the impugned internal arrangements of the Defendants. Indeed, this Court’s position has long been that the declaration of unconstitutionality of an action or omission does not automatically lead to the nullification of that action or omission. See Justice Dery v Tiger Eye PI and Others [2015 - 2016] 2 SCGLR 812 and In Re Presidential Election Petition; Akufo -Addo and Others v Mahama and Others [2013] SCGLR (Special Edition) 73. Thus, notwithstanding our decision herein, all decisions, appointments, elections, directives and other official acts lawfully undertaken in good faith pursuant to the impugned internal arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants before the date of this judgment shall remain valid and shall not be invalidated solely by reason of this judgment. ORDERS OF THE COURT True, opening party primaries to every party member is no guarantee that money politics will disappear. Corruption is remarkably adaptable. It often changes its form rather than vanish altogether. Yet constitutional adjudication rarely offers perfect solut ions. The Court is often required to choose the course that best promotes constitutional values in imperfect circumstances. Concentrating decisive electoral power in a relatively small body of delegates inevitably increases the value of each delegate's vot e. It creates a smaller market, a more identifiable electorate, and therefore a more attractive environment for targeted inducements. A broader electorate may increase campaign costs, but it also disperses political power among thousands of ordinary member s, making it considerably more difficult for electoral outcomes to be shaped by a relatively small number of transactions. For that reason, this Court may legitimately conclude that, at this stage of Ghana's democratic development, fidelity to the Constitu tion requires political parties to embrace the model of 32 democracy that the Constitution itself consistently prefers for the purpose of constituting political authority. Accordingly, we answer Issue 2 in the affirmative. We hold that the Electoral Commission bears a continuing constitutional and statutory duty to supervise and ensure that the constitutions, rules and internal electoral arrangements of registered political parties conform to the democratic principles mandated by Article 55(5) of the Constitution. Where those arrangements depart from that constitutional standard, the Commission is under an obligation to take appropriate steps, consistent with its constitution al and statutory powers to secure compliance. For the reasons outlined in the full judgment, all the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs are hereby granted. It is hereby ordered that all political parties registered with the 4th Defendant are restrained from selecting Presidential and Parliamentary Candi dates through any form of electoral college system and shall, not later than one year from today, establish a system for selecting Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates that enables all registered members of the party in good standing, as determined by the party's Constitution, to directly vote for the Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates. Notwithstanding our decision herein, all decisions, appointments, elections, directives and other official acts lawfully undertaken in good faith pursuant to the impugned internal arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants before the date of this judgment shall remain valid and shall not be invalidated solely by reason of this judgment. (SGD.) P. BAFFOE-BONNIE (CHIEF JUSTICE) 33 (SGD.) G. PWAMANG (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) S. DZAMEFE (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) G. S. SUURBAAREH (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) CONCURRING OPINION 34 TANKO AMADU JSC: PREAMBLE 1. I have read in draft the opinion of my Lord the Honourable Chief Justice, and taken into account the positions of my two distinguished brothers in the minority who refused to grant the reliefs the Plaintiffs seek. I agree with the orders made by the Honourable Chief Justice and with the reasoning by which His Lordship reaches them. I shall also grant all the reliefs in the terms he has set out. B ut I add an opinion of my own, and hereby articulate my reasons. 2. Article 55(5) of the Constitution, 1992 provides that the internal organisation of a political party shall conform to democratic principles . Those two words, or words indistinguishable from them, have been part of our fundamental law since 1979. In all the years since, through several general elections under this Republic and the whole life of our political party system, no court has been asked what they mean. We are asked now, and we are the first. Whatever we say will stand until this Court unsays it, and it will bind not only the three parties who are Defendants in this action but every political party in Ghana and every political party yet to be formed. A provision that comes before this Court once in a generation deserves more than one mind brought to bear upon it. 3. What the case is about should not be lost in the language of the pleadings before the court. Somewhere in this country there is a man and woman who have carried their party cards for several years. They have paid their dues. They have sat through branch meetings in the heat, walked their neighbourhood at election time, defended their party to neighbours who had no patience for it, and turned out on every polling day it has asked of them. When the party comes to choose the man or woman it will put forward to govern the Republic, or to represent their constituency in Parliament, they have no vote. 35 Others vote in their names. They learn the result as the rest of the country and the world learn it. The question in this case is whether, the Constitution permits that, and I do not think the question is a casual and inconsequential one. 4. It is neither casual nor inconsequential because of what political parties are under the 1992 Constitution. By article 55(3) of the Constitution, 1992, they are the gates through which nearly every elective office in the land is reached. In a great many of our constituencies the contest that matters is not the one held in December but the one held months earlier within a party, and by the time the ballot papers are printed the real choice has been made. To decide how a party may make that choice is to decid e a good deal about how Ghana is governed. I would not wish this question decided in a single voice. That is why I add my own to the opinion ably articulated by the Honourable Chief Justice on behalf of the majority. 5. Further, this action did not come to us in the ordinary adversarial way. Of the five Defendants, only one fought it to the end. Two supported the Plaintiffs. One stood aside. And the Attorney-General, who had filed a case supporting the Plaintiffs, at the hearing through the Honourable Deputy Attorney -General in addressing the court, submitted that, the delegate system is not unconstitutional after all, and that what he sought was a choice of policy between two lawful courses. When a Court is urged by nearly everyone before it to do a p articular thing, the danger is not that it will be argued into error. It is that, it will not be argued with at all. What the Bar has not supplied, the Bench must. 6. That danger is not lessened by the fact that, we are divided. It is sharpened. Two of my very revered brothers refused to grant all the reliefs, and they have given reasons of real weight. With all due respect, I have taken the contrary view and I shall explain why in detail, shortly. A judicial outcome of a majority of five to two on the meaning of a constitutional provision requires a n exhaustive reasoning . Numbers do not settle 36 constitutional questions; reasons do. An opinion carried by a majority but resting on one statement of grounds is more fragile than one whose grounds have been arrived at diversely and set down separately, and it ought to be. So I have not passed the minor ity by. Their reasoning will not persuade me to qualify my own and I have explained why. In my view, the best case against this judgment has been made from inside this Court, and a judgment on a question of this order should be able to meet it. 7. Let me sound one caution more. What we decide today is not written for the parties alone. It will be read in all party offices, in the Electoral Commission, in Parliament, and by citizens who will want to know what has become of their rights. We are requiring institutions to change arrangements they have lived by for more than thirty years. Those who must comply are entitled to understand not merely what is asked of them, but why. That is easier to convey when the reasons are given in more than one voice. 8. I therefore set out my own reasons in full, and I have not avoided any ground my Lord the Honourable Chief Justice has covered. Where I repeat it, it is because the argument needs it; where I go further, or take another route, I have said so with conviction having fully subscribed to the lead judgment of the court which is the judgment of my Lord the Honourable Chief Justice and of the majority. INTRODUCTION 9. My Lords, the key question for our determination in this action is deceptively simple to state, yet, uncommonly difficult to answer. Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution provides 37 that the internal organisation of a political party shall conform to democratic principles. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants each choose their Presidential and Parliamentary Candidates not by a vote of their members at large but through electoral colleges made up of officeholders and de legates. The Plaintiffs’ grievance is that, such an arrangement cannot conform to democratic principles, and that the Constitution requires that every member of political parties in good standing be entitled to vote. 10. While the 2nd Defendant National Democratic Congress, (NDC) and the 5th Defendant (Attorney General) substantially concede the Plaintiffs’ claims, the 3rd Defendant Convention Peoples’ Party, (CPP) took an indifferent position to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs, urging the court to grant if it may, the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs subject to any consequential directions the court may deem fit to order. In effect, only the 1st Defendant New Patriotic Party, (NPP) contested the Plaintiffs’ action contending that, the 1992 Constitution prescribes no method of selection at all, and therefore, leaves the matter wholly to each political party. 11. The Plaintiffs are three prominent citizens of Ghana and of admirable long public service. The 1st Plaintiff is a cardiothoracic surgeon, founding Chief Executive of the National Cardiothoracic Centre and a former Minister of State. The 2nd Plaintiff is a medical practitioner and a former Ambassado r. The 3rd Plaintiff is a scientist and public administrator who has held several senior ministerial offices. The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs are members of the 1st Defendant; the 3rd Plaintiff is a member of the 2nd Defendant. They sue both in their personal capacities and in the public interest under Article 2(1) of the 1992 Constitution. Their standing has not been contested, and upon TUFFUOR VS. ATTORNEY- GENERAL [1980] GLR 637 and the settled learning since, it could not usefully have been. 38 12. The grievance which prompted this action is neither novel nor confined to the Plaintiffs. It is that, the choice of those who will govern the Republic has come to rest with a body small enough to be canvassed and, it is said, small enough to be bought; whi le the member who pays his dues, carries the party's message and bears its fortunes at the polls is a spectator at the moment when the decision is taken in his name. Further that, a party governed by the few, will in time deliver a Republic governed by th e few. The question provoked for our answer therefore becomes: whether a party which selects its candidates in that manner has an internal organisation which conforms to democratic principles? 13. It must be observed from the outset that, this matter is not a case about whether the one member, one vote formula would improve the quality of our politics or reduce the influence of money and other items of value to influence the electoral colleges. Upon those questions reasonable citizens differ, and this Court has no special competence to resolve them. The question is narrower and harder: Whether the arrangements complained of by the Plaintiffs truly fall below the standard which Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution imposes ?. II. THE BACKGROUND 14. By writ issued on 23rd January 2026, invoking the original jurisdiction of this court under Articles 2(1) and (2) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution and Rule 45 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16), the Plaintiffs seek eleven reliefs set out as follows: i. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1(1) and (2), 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution the election of a political party’s presidential and parliamentary candidate(s) constitutes a cor e element of the party’s internal organisation within the meaning of Article 55(5) of the Constitution. 39 ii. A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1(1) and (2), 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution, the internal organisation of a political party must be structured in a manner that ensures equal political participation and equal voting rights of its members in the selection of the party’s presidential and parliamentary candidate(s). iii. A declaration that, on a true and proper interpretation of the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42, 55(2), 55(5), 63 and 93 of the 1992 Constitution, democratic principles governing the internal organisation of political parties require political equality, meaningful and broad participation of members in decision -making, accountability of leadership to the membership, and substantially equal and direct voting rights for members in good standing in the electio n of the party’s presidential and parliamentary candidates. iv. A declaration that the delegate -based Electoral College system established under Article 13 of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant for the election of its presidential candidate, which confines or restricts voting to specified executives, office holders and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. v. A declaration that the Extraordinary Constituency Delegates Conference system established under Article 7 of the Constitution of the 1st Defendant for the selection or election of its parliamentary candidates, which confines voting to specified constituenc y executives, coordinators, polling station officers, elders, patrons and other delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) o f the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 40 vi. A declaration that the Electoral College system established under Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of the 2nd Defendant for the election of its presidential and parliamentary candidate, which confines or restricts voting to specified executives, offi ce holders and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 33(5), 17, 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. vii. A declaration that the Constituency Branch Party Conference system and the National Delegates Congress system established under Articles 53, 96 and 77 of the Constitution of the 3rd Defendant for the election of its presidential and parliamentary candidate (s), which confines voting to specified executives, elders, officers and delegates to the exclusion or material disenfranchisement of members in good standing of the party, contravenes the Preamble and Articles 1, 17, 33(5), 35(6)(d), 42 and 55(5) of the 1 992 Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. viii. A consequential order striking down and declaring unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect all provisions of the constitutions, rules, regulations or electoral arrangements of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, to the extent that they restrict or confin e the election of their presidential and parliamentary candidates to limited Electoral Colleges, delegate bodies or similar structures, or otherwise exclude or materially disenfranchise members in good standing of the parties from voting in elections for their presidential candidates. ix. An order directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants to amend their respective constitutions, rules and electoral arrangements to adopt procedures for the election of their presidential candidates or flagbearers that conform to the democratic principles req uired under Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and ensure the equal, direct and meaningful participation of members in good standing in such elections.