Falcon Crestinvestment Ltd and Others v Klenam Construction Ltd (H1/130/2025) [2026] GHACA 3 (24 July 2026)

1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL ACCRA – GHANA AD - 2026 CORAM: MENSAH-HOMIAH, JA (MRS.) (PRESIDING) MYERS AHMED, JA (MRS.) ASEM, JA (MRS.) CIVIL APPEAL NO: H1/130/2025 DATE: 24 JULY 2026 KLENAM CONSTRUCTION LTD ………… PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT VERSUS 1. FALCON CRESTINVESTMENT LTD 2. SAMUEL KOFI DIAME 3. NUUMO ADJEI KWANKO II……… 1ST TO 3RD DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS 4. MR. ASHLEY JUDGMENT MENSAH-HOMIAH, JA. 2 Sometimes, the adversarial approach leaves us to wonder whether litigation really resolves disputes. We dare say that the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for matters which keep resurfacing in court but draped in different apparels , is mediation. Mediation presents a “win-win” outcome instead of the “winner takes it all” outcome in litigation. INTRODUCTION The 1st to 3rd defendants/appellants being aggrieved by the Judgment of the High Court, Accra delivered on 28 March 2024 have invoked the jurisdiction of this court by their Notice of Appeal filed on 4 April 2024. For ease of reference, we will hereafter retain the designations of 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd defendants/appellants; and plaintiff/respondent at the court below. We will also refer to the Record of Appeal as ROA. BACKGROUND On 5 February 2018, plaintiff commenced an action at the High Court (General Jurisdiction) Accra, against the defendants for following reliefs: a. Special damages: 1. Damage to fence wall valued at GH₵133,769.00 2. Damage to buildings valued at GH₵2,377,152.00 3. Damage to building materials GH₵51,298.00 TOTAL GH₵2,562,219.00 b. general damages for unlawful entry onto plaintiff’s estate. c. Interest on the sum claimed in (a) and (b) supra from 12 th January 2018 to date of final payment. d. An order for re-entry to the land described in paragraph 2 (of statement of claim) e. Costs. 3 The plaintiff alleged that at all material times to 12 January 2018, it was in actual possession of its parcel of land located at North East Airport measuring approximately 22.812 acres and more particularly described in paragraph 2 of its statement of claim. It was plaintiff’s case that while in possession, it openly constructed ten (10) units of storey buildings on the land, fenced the entire estate and mounted a security checkpoint. Also, plaintiff contended that it stocked several building materials on the land for purposes of the development. It was the further case of plaintiff that without prior notice or service of any court proceedings on the company, defendants, on 12 January 2018, while acting by themselves or per their representatives, wrongfully and illegally entered plaintiff’s land and pulled down all the structures thereon. Plaintiff alleged a breach of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice because as an entity in possession of the subject matter land, defendant was enjoined to serve plaintiff company with notice failing which the execution process becomes a nullity. As a result of the wrongful and illegal conduct of defendants, plaintiff a sserted that it suffered special damages totaling GH₵2,562,219.00. The defendants resisted plaintiff’s claims in their amended statement of defence and counterclaim filed on 28 July 2022 . Their contention was that, plaintiff has no interest in the disputed land as it claimed to have obtained it from Moufid El-Adas and his company called Sadac Builder Ltd, who had also acquired it from the Nungua Stool. They went on to state that 3rd defendant’s quarter and family has obtained several judgments over the disputed land situate at Okpoi Gonno against plaintiff’s grantors and listed same as follows: (i) Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society & 2 Ors, Civil Appeal No. J4/8/2015; (ii) Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society, Civil Appeal No. H1/2013/12; (iii) Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society & 2 Ors. Suit No. L 4 303/2001; and (iv) Ransford Addoquaye & 3 Ors vs. Falcon Crest Invest Ltd & 2 Ors, Suit No. LD/0424/2017. It was defendants’ case that Kle Musum Quarter and Tsie We lands are vested in 3 rd defendant in his capacity as the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo of Teshie who exercises ownership and that Kle Musum Quarter/Tsie We lands could only be granted by the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo of Teshie with the elders of Teshie We, as was held in Nii Mate Tesa & 5 Ors vs. Numo Nortey Adjeifio & 3 Ors, Suit No. 383/89 ; Emmanuel Adjei Mensah vs. Numo Adjei Kwanko & 2 Ors. (a High Court Ruling delivered on 15 November 2017) and affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. H1/231/2018 entitled Emmanuel Adjei Mensah vs. Numo Adjei Kwanko & 2 Ors. Defendants went on to state that any purported grant of the disputed land from Nii Nortey Adjeifio to plaintiff in 1999 was void ab initio, as 2nd defendant is the lawful owner of this land measuring 21.98 acres covered by Land certificate No. GA 56341 Vol. 46 Folio 271 based on a grant from 3 rd defendant’s family and has developed substantial part of this land. While plaintiff was in the process of obtaining its Land Title Certificate, 2nd defendant caused its lawyers to write letters to the Director, Land title division drawing his attention to the pendency of the case in respect of the land in dispute. Yet, the Lands Commission went ahead to issue the Land Title Certificate to plaintiff in breach of section 98(2) and (3) of the Lands Act, 2020 (Act 1036) , which makes the Land title Certificate null and void. Defendants stated further that the issuance of this Land Title Certificate has caused great hardship to defendants and their grantees. They also pleaded that a court of coordinate jurisdiction cannot question the validity or otherwise of the judgment or orders of another court of coordinate jurisdiction and counterclaimed for the following reliefs: a. An order to the Director, Land Title Division of the Lands Commission to cancel Land Certificate No. GA. 69426 Vol. 46 folio 367p dated the 22 nd day of June, 2022 5 in favour of plaintiff issued during the pendency of this suit as being illegal and void forthwith. b. Perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff from laying any claim to the land in dispute based on the Land Certificate No. GA 69426 Vo. 46 Folio 367p. c. Perpetual injunction restraining the Director, Land title Division of the Lands Commission from issuing Land Certificate based on the Land Certificate No. GA 69426 Vo. 46 Folio 367p. d. General damages. e. Cost inclusive of legal fees. FINDINGS AND DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT After a plenary trial, the court below made the following findings from which it drew its conclusions on the issues for determination: (i) On the question of whether the defendants are estopped from laying claim to the disputed land by reason of the judgment in “Sadac Builders Ltd & Nii Abraham Adjei Kwei vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors . Suit No FT (IV)/8/2003, the trial court found at page 1504 of the ROA vol. 4 that, per exhibit ‘D’, 3 rd Defendant’s Tsie We family has been held to have validly made the grant, and 1 st and 2nd defendants who are claiming through the 3 rd defendant are estopped from denying the title of Plaintiff to the disputed land. (ii) On the issue of whether it is the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo or Nii Nortey Adjeifio (plaintiff’s grantor) who has capacity to grant Kle Musum Quarter or Tsie We family land, the trial court found at page 1506 vol. 4 of ROA that although ordinarily the Osabu - Ayiku Wulomo, together with his elders, has the right/capacity to grant Kle Musum lands, in the particular circumstances of this case, the family is estopped f rom raising the issue of capacity in these proceedings because exhibit ‘D’ was not appealed and it is binding on them. 6 (iii) In determining whether per the decision in Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall Ltd vs. Boye Sowah (substituted by Samuel Nortey & Others (Civil Appeal No. J4/33/2018 dated 21 March 2019 , Exhibit F, defendants can claim ownership of the disputed land which forms part of Okpoi Gonno land, the court found that defendants cannot claim ownership because Okpoi Gonno land belongs to the Nungua Stool and not the Kle (sic) Kusum/Tsie We family of Teshie. The trial court explained that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s latest decision in exhibit “F” although the S upreme Court did not expressly state that it was departing from its previous decision on this particular matter of ownership. (iv) As regards the validity of plaintiff’s land Certificate , the trial court distinguished the instant case from the case of Numo Nortey Adjeifio (substituted by) Nii Adjei Sankuma & 6 Ors vs. Nii Mante Tesa (Substituted by) Daniel Markwei & 5 Ors. (Suit No. H1/9/12, dated 19 April 2012, CA. The Court observed that there was no pending dispute or dispute about registration and defendants had also not sought any declaration of title in respect of the disputed land. And, following the setting aside of the High Court Order which had set aside plaintiff’s Land Certificate No. GA 54109, plaintiff was restored to its previous position and the obvious thing to do was to apply to the Lands Commission to re -issue the Land Certificate. The trial court c oncluded that defendants could not demonstrate that plaintiff’s Land certificate No. GA 69426 Vol. 46 Folio 627p is void. (v) With respect to the question of compensation for the destruction of the plaintiff’s property, the court held that it was not in doubt that plaintiff had suffered damage, except that plaintiff could not prove same by credible evidence. The court rejected plaintiff’s claim for special damages but awarded GH₵500,000.00 in favour of plaintiff as general damages, for the damage 7 caused to its property by defendant and costs of GH₵100,000.00. The court made a further order for plaintiff to re-enter the land. In effect, the trial court granted plaintiff’s reliefs (b) and (d) but dismissed plaintiff’s reliefs (a) and (c) as well as defendants’ counterclaim as unproven. GROUNDS OF APPEAL a. The trial Judge erred in failing to holding (sic) that the plaintiff/respondent is bound by the judgments in Suit no. L303/2011 titled Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society & 2 Ors that ended at the Supreme Court; Suit No. FT(IV)/8/2003 entitled: Sadac Builders Ltd & Abraham Adjei Kwei vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors; and Suit no. LD/0424/17 entitled : Ransford Addo Quaye Addotey & 2 Ors vs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Ors , situate at Okpoi Gonno forms part of the Tsie We Family land but not Nungua Stool land. b. The trial Judge erred in relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in Civil Appeal No. (sic) entitled: Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Another vs. Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II & Ors, to hold that the land in dispute forms part of Nungua Stool land when 1st to 3rd defendants/appellants were not parties or privies to same. c. The trial Judge erred in failing to hold that plaintiff/respondent is estopped by sections 25 and 26 of Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) from denying that the land in dispute situate at Okpoi Gonno forms part of Tsie We family land by virtue of the recitals in plaintiff/respondent’s Deed of Assignment dated the 24 th day of May 2017 and the conduct of plaintiff/respondent director who testified at the trial court. d. The trial Judge erred in failing to vitiate the grant of Tsie We family land to the plaintiff/respondent for not emanating from the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo of Teshie, the head of the Tsie We family and the Kle Musum Quarter contrary to several judgments of all the Superior Courts of Ghana that it is only the Osabu -Ayiku 8 Wulomo whom the Tsie We family land is vested alone with elders of Tsie We who could validly grant same. e. The trial Judge erred in failing to order for forfeiture of plaintiff/respondent’s Assignment dated the 24th day of May 2017 for challenging or denying the title of the Tsie We family to the land in dispute when plaintiff/respondent’s assignment was based on a lease dated the 23rd day of December 1999 from the Tsie We family contrary to section 27 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323). f. The trial Judge erred in failing to invalidate plaintiff/respondent’s Deed of Assignment dated the 24 th day of May, 2017 as incomplete when same contained no site plan. g. The trial judge erred in failing to invalidate Land Certificate No. GA 69426 vol. 46 Folio 367p dated the 2 nd day of June 2022 obtained when the issue of title of the land in dispute was still pending in court to plaintiff/respondent’s knowledge. h. The Judgment is against the weight of evidence. SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL, ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL We comment on the formulation of the grounds of appeal. With the exception of the omnibus ground, we share the sentiments of plaintiff’s counsel that the other grounds are verbose, inelegant and fall short of the strict requirements of rules 8 (4) and (5) of the Court of Appeal Rules, C.I. 19. Indeed, the Supreme Court in cases like FKA Company Ltd. vs. Nii Tackie Amoah VI & Ors., Civil Appeal No/J4/2016 dated 13/4/2016 ; and Zabrama vs. Segbedzi [1991] GLR 221 at 226 CA, decried the practice of filing grounds of appeal which fall short of the procedural rules. Speaking through Akamba JSC, the Apex Court had this to say in the FKA Company case: 9 “It is important to stress that the adjudication process thrives upon law which defines the scope of its operation. It is trite to state for instance that, nobody has an inherent right of appeal. The appeal process is the creature of law. Any initiative within the context of the adjudication process must be guided by the appropriate relevant provision, be it substantive law or procedural law. As courts, if we fail to enforce compliance with the rules of court, we would by that lapse be enforcing the fai lure of the adjudication process which we have sworn by our judicial oaths to uphold”. See also: Ayikai v. Okaidja III (2011) SCGLR 205 In as much as we do not endorse this blatant disobedience to the rules of court, we are guided by the modern trend that strict adherence to form ought to give way to substance, as was espoused in the case of Bako-Alhassan vs AG (2013 -2014) 2 SCGLR 823 at 826 (holding 2). Moreso, where the pivotal issue for consideration can be inferred from the non-compliant ground of appeal, the need to do substantial justice must outweigh technicalities. We also instruct ourselves on the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in International Rom Ltd vs. Vodafone Ghana Ltd (2016) GHASC 62 (6 June 2016), where the Court proceeded to consider the core complaint raised in the appeal after striking out the non -compliant grounds. Then also, in Justice Gilbert Mensah Quaye v. Koiwah Investment Co. Ltd & Others, Civil Appeal No. J4/42/2018 dated 30 January 2018 , the Supreme Court amended the grounds of appeal found to be non -compliant with the procedural rules so as to deal with the real issues on appeal. We do not intend to be overly technical in our approach. We will not strike out the defendants’ grounds of appeal complained of. Instead, w e would consider the main complaints raised therein. 10 Going forward, we would consider the submission s of both Counsel, carry out our analysis and determine the core issues raised under each ground of appeal argued by counsel. GROUND A “The trial Judge erred in failing to holding (sic) that the plaintiff/respondent is bound by the judgments in Suit no. L303/2011 titled Numo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society & 2 Ors that ended at the Supreme Court; Suit No. FT(IV)/8/2003 entitled: Sadac Builders Ltd & Abraham Adjei Kwei vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors; and Suit no. LD/0424/17 entitled : Ransford Addo Quaye Addotey & 2 Ors vs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd & 2 Ors, situate at Okpoi Gonno forms part of the Tsie We Family land but not Nungua Stool land” Defendants’ plaint under this ground of appeal is that, the trial judge fai led to apply the Supreme Court decision and other cases which held that Okpoi Gonno forms part of Tsie We Family land but not Nungua Stool Land. Counsel for defendants relies mainly on the Exhibits 4 series in making his arguments , as well as plaintiff’s exhibit “D” which in his view favour’s the defendants’ case . He argues and states that plaintiff who now claims through the Nungua Stool is bound by the judgments in the Exhibit “4” series, particularly, exhibit “4c” and his own Exhibit “D” and cannot contend that Okpoi Gonno forms part of Nungua Stool land. Counsel for defendants argues further that prior to Exhibits 4 series and Exhibit “D’, several Judgments of Superior Courts had confirmed the ownership of Kle Musum Quarter and Tsie We family over their land, including Okpoi Gonno. Some of the Judgements which Counsel refers to are: (i) Komey vs. Onanka (1962) 1 GLR 52; Obadzen II vs. Onanka II (1982 -83) GLR 46 ; Kwarteng vs. Addow (1991) 1 GLR 274; Koranteng II & Others vs. Klu (1993 -94) 1 GLR 280 ; Suit No. L. 993/81Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Ibrahim Mensah Komietter, dated 7 February 1992; and Vicentia 11 Mensah, by her lawful attorneys Boniface Lumor and John Allen (substituted by : Beatrice Tsotso Adjetey vs. Numo Adjei Kwanko II, Civil Appeal No. J4/17/2016, SC. Counsel urges upon us to hold that the numerous Judgments in favour of 3rd defendant’s family is a clear indication of their possession and ownership of their land, including Okpoi Gonno. Counsel for plaintiff in his response to the above arguments states that the trial court committed no error by not relying on the Judgments stated in ground A of the appeal which defendants tendered as Exhibit 4 series. Counsel then walks the court through the Exhibit 4 series. He argues that the reliefs sought and issues set down for trial in exhibit 4 had nothing to do with ownership of lands at Okpoi Gonno. He adds that, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in exhibits 4a and 4b did not also deal with the question of ownership of Okpoi Gonno land. Turning to exhibit 4c, defendants’ counsel submits that on the strength of the Supreme Court decision in Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall Ltd vs. Boye Sowah, exhibit F, the trial Judge was bound to rely on that decision instead of relying on exhibit 4c which is a High Court Judgment. Counsel for defendants also argues that the trial Judge was bound by the operation of Article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution to hold that on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Anor vs. Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II & Ors, lands in Okpoi Gonno including the subject matter of the instant suit belong to the Nungua Stool. To put the foregoing arguments in perspective, we have identified the cases referred to in ground A of the appeal as per the Exhibit 4 series, which are: L. 303/01- Numo Adjei Kwanko II vs. Lebanon Society, dated 12 April 2011 (exhibit 4 at page 1075 of ROA vol. 4); Numo Adjei Kwanko II vs . Lebanon Society; Lands Commission; Land Title Registry dated 28 November 2013 (exhibit 4a at page 1090 of ROA vol. 4); Numo Adjei Kwanko II vs . Lebanon Society; Lands Commission; Land Title Registry dated 29 November 2016 (exhibit 4b at page 1110 of ROA vol. 4) ; and Ransford Addoquaye 12 Addotey & 2 Ors vs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd dated 8 November 2017, (exhibit 4c at page 1126 of ROA vol. 4). We would briefly touch on these cases. In Exhibit “4”, plaintiff therein sought a declaration of title over 15 acres of land situate and lying at Teshie, perpetual injunction restraining 1 st defendant therein from any further development on the land; perpetual injunction restraining 2nd and 3rd defendants therein from registering the land; and an order of cancellation of the registration made by 2nd defendant therein in favour of 1st defendant therein. The trial court observed that the grantor of 1 st defendant therein, Moufid El -Adas, derived his title f rom the Nungua Stool but had his grant confirmed by the Tsie We family of Teshie as owners of the land and that it was illogical for 1st defendant to insist on the validity of its title and certificate which ha d its root of title from Nungua. Having declared 1 st defendant’s title and Certificate invalid, the court entered judgment for plaintiff therein (Numo Adjei Kwanko II) on all his reliefs. Exhibit “4a” is the Judgment of the Court of appeal against the Judgment in “Exhibit 4”, lodged by 1st defendant/appellant therein, i.e. Lebanon Society. The Court of Appeal also confirmed the unchallenged evidence of the plaintiff/respondent therein that the land in dispute belongs to his family and the Tsie We of Teshie and the Nungua Stool had no authority to grant the same to 1st defendant/appellant’s grantor. In exhibit “4b”, which is the Judgment of the Supreme Court arising out of exhibit 4a, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the trial Court. In exhibit “4c”, the High Court (differently constituted) dismissed the action of plaintiff therein on grounds of estoppel per res judicata. In dismissing the action, the High Court said, inter alia, that: “… to the extend (sic) that the parties are talking about the same lands at Okpoi Gonno which lands have been adjudged to belong to Kle Musum quarter of Teshie by so many subsisting 13 judgments of the Superior Courts, Plaintiffs action, which calls into issue whether the land in dispute is Teshie Lands or Nungua Lands which issue happens to be the main issue in this case but which issue has been determined by Superior Courts of the lan d all in favour of Kle Musum Quarter of Teshie, is caught by estoppel per res judicata…” Exhibit “D” which is at page 1000 of the ROA, vol. 3, is the Judgment titled Sadac Builders Ltd & Anor vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors, Suit No. (FT)/IV/8/200 5; and Exhibit “E” at page 1026 of the ROA, vol. 3, titled: Sadac Builders Ltd & Anor vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors. AND Numo Adjei Kwanko II, Suit No. (FT)/IV/8/2003, is the ruling of the High Court (differently constituted) refusing to set aside the Judgment in “D” on an application filed by Numo Adjei Kwanko II. From the record before us, there is no indication that the Judgment in exhibit “D” has been reversed on appeal. In exhibit “D ” delivered on 13 October 2017, the High Court (differently constituted) reviewed the evidence before the court in its entirety as well as Judgments of the Supreme Court such as Kwantreng & Ors vs. Klu (1991) 2 GLR 93; and Re Ashalley Botwe Lands: Adjetey Agbosu & Ors. vs. Kotey & Ors. (2003-2004) SCGLR 420, and satisfied itself that the land subject matter of the dispute, Okpoi Gonno land, forms part of the co-plaintiff’s land. The court declared the co -plaintiff as the allodial owner and further declared that the lease of the land in dispute had been granted by the Tsie We family to the plaintiff therein. The Court then entered Judgment in favour of the plaintiff and co -plaintiff therein. So, one can say that the Judgment in Sadac Builders Ltd & Anor vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors, Suit No. (FT)/IV/8/2005 is still subsisting. It therefore does not come as a surprise when the High Court (differently constituted) dismissed the plaintiff’s suit in Ransford Addoquaye Addotey & 2 Ors vs. Falcon Crest Investment Ltd dated 8 November 2017, exhibit 4c, on the basis that the issue of ownership of Okpoi Gonno land had already been determined in several suit s. One would have thought that these 14 decisions would put ownership of Okpoi Gonno land to rest. Somehow, the issue resurfaced in another suit which also travelled all the way to the Supreme Court. This is the case of Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall Ltd vs. Boye Sowah (substituted by Samuel Nortey & Others (Civil Appeal No. J4/33/2018 dated 21 March 2019 (Exhibit F). Whereas the Supreme Court Judgment in the Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall vs. Boye Sowah case, exhibit F, was delivered on 21 March 2019, the High Court Judgment which is on appeal before us was delivered on 28 March 2024. In exhibit F, the Supreme Court speaking through Pwamang JSC clarified that Okpoi Gonno lan ds are not part of Kle Musu Quarter lands and that defendants therein are estopped from laying claim to Okpoi Gono lands. This Supreme Court decision is also binding on all courts below. It appears to us that Exhibit “F” conflicts with the Supreme Court decision recited in plaintiff’s deed of assignment. The second recital in the deed of assignment dated 24 May 2017 reads: “By a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on 19th April 1994 between Nii Amar Koranteng II & Ors v Numo Adjei Nkpa Klu, the Tsie - We family of Teshie was declared the true owners of all that land and as a result of that judgment, SADAC BU ILDERS LIMITED attorned tenancy to the Tsie -We family to confirm the original lease with the Nungua Stool dated 2 nd December 1999.” We observe that the Supreme Court in exhibit “F” did not expressly depart from its earlier pronouncements/decisions as regards ownership of Okpoi Gonno Lands. In other words, the Supreme Court on this occasion did not exercise its constitutional mandate pursuant to Article 129(3) of the 1992 Constitution which states that: “The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decisions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it appear to it right to do so; and all other courts shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law” 15 It must be pointed out that the Supreme Court being the apex court of the land, and by its constitutional mandate, is not bound to follow the decisions of any other court , it has the freedom to devel op new case law in response to changing circumstances. See: S.K. Date-Bah Reflections on the Supreme Court of Ghana , Willy Simmons & Hill (2015) page 1. Caught at the cross-roads, the trial High Court Judge seems to have applied the principle that the latter Supreme Court decision is deemed to have modified its earlier decisions as regards ownership of Okpoi Gonno lands. After a careful consideration of the rival arguments made before us under this ground of appeal, we tend to agree with plaintiff’s counsel that the trial High Court did not run into any reversible error by its failure to hold that plaintiff is bound by the judgments in the exhibit 4 series. We find no merit in Ground A of the appeal and it accordingly fails. GROUND B “The trial Judge erred in relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in Civil Appeal No. (sic) entitled: Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Another vs. Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II & Ors, to hold that the land in dispute forms part of Nungua Stool land when the 1 st to 3 rd defendants/appellants were not parties or privies to same” Here is a summary of the arguments put forth by defendants Counsel: i. In spite of the numerous Judgments in the exhibits 4 series and exhibit ‘D’ which are binding on the Nungua Stool, the High Court relied on the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Mrs. Agnes Ahadzi & Anor vs. Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II & Ors. which held that Okpoi Gonno land forms part of Nungua Stool land and operates as estoppel against the defendants. 16 ii. The Supreme Court in the Ahadzi case, per Pwamang JSC, held that, 3 rd Appellant’s predecessor (Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II), the then Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo- head of the Kle Musum quarter and the Tsie We Family was not a party to that case at the SC and was not entitled to be heard [page 3 of exhibit ‘F’ – 1038 ROA Vol. 3]. iii. The High Court in the Agnes Ahadzi case held that the predecessor of 3 rd defendant herein, Nuumo Adjei Kwanko II, had no capacity to defendant that action. Counsel submits that the Judgment could not be binding on a party who had no capacity to defend the same. iv. Nii Nortey Adjeifio who was 2nd Defendant in the Agnes Ahadzi case and who was fighting on the issue of headship of the Tsie We Family died during the pendency of the suit and was not substituted- page 1476 vol. 5 ROA. v. The High Court could not have proceeded against the deceased 2 nd defendant in his purported representative capacity as head of the Tsie We family when no substitution was done. vi. Attempts to execute the Judgment in the Agnes Ahadzi case against 3 rd defendant’s family and their grantees was refused by the High Court on 30 July 2021- Civil Appeal No. H1/117/2022; and affirmed by the CA in Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie & Anor vs. Nuumo Adjei Kwanko III (2023) DLCA 15147. vii. The subsequent Supreme Court Judgment in the Agnes Ahadzi case would not have the effect of overruling the H igh Court Judgment in exhibits 4c and 4d against the Nungua Stool and its grantees that Okpoi Gonno belongs to the Tsie We family but not Nungua Stool. Counsel for defendants then concludes that the H igh Court erred in relying on the Supreme Court Judgment in the Agnes Ahadzi case as estopping 3rd defendant’s Tsie We family and Kle Musum Quarter from laying claim to Okpoi Gonno land. 17 In response to the above arguments, Counsel for plaintiff also submits that: a. The Judgment of the Supreme Court was against the Tsie We/Kle Musum family as an entity and not personally against individual members of the family. Whether or not Numo Adjei Kwanko was a party to the appeal was of no moment. b. The Supreme Court rejected Numo Adjei Kwanko at the hearing of the appeal because Numo Adjei Kwanko failed to contest the dismissal of his case by the High Court at the Court of Appeal. Since the appeal before the Supreme Court was against the Court of Appeal Judgment which Numo Adjei Kwanko was not a party to, he could not purport to participate in the appeal before the Supreme Court. c. Defendants’ attack on the trial court for relying on the Supreme Court decision in the Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie case, exhibit “F”, is in bad faith for two reasons: (i) in paragraph 5 of their original statement of defence filed on 8 March 2018 (pages 26- 29 of ROA, vol. 1), they placed reliance on the Court of Appeal decision in the Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie case by forcefully asserting that by operation of the said Judgment the lands in Okpoi Gonno belong to the Kle Musum family of Teshie and not Nungua Stool. So, defendants relied on this Judgment although Numo Adjei Kwanko was not a party to the appeal before this Court; (ii) when the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal, defendants amended their statement of defence by deleting paragraph 5. d. After the deletion of paragraph 5 of the original statement of defence, defendants turned around to argue that because Numo Adjei Kwanko was not a party to the Supreme Court decision, the Kle Musum/Tsie We family was not bound by this Judgment. Defendants then turned their attention to the exhibits 4 series to buttress their position that Okpoi Gonno lands belong to the Kle Musum/Tsie We family of Teshie and not the Nungua Stool. 18 Continuing, Counsel for plaintiff submits that in the unlikely event that this court finds that the trial court erred in relying on exhibit “F”, then the principle that a purchaser of land is not affected by a judgment adverse to his vendor in proceedings commenced subsequent to the acquisition of his title should avail the plaintiff. We have given a careful thought to the submissions made by both counsel in the light of the ROA before us and the position of the law. We note that Numo Adjei Kwanko was not a party to the case which culminated in exhibit “F”. It is also true that Nii Nortey Adjeifio who was 2nd Defendant in the Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie case was not substituted after he passed on. It appears to us that the appeal to the Supreme Court which culminated in Exhibit “F” was between Mrs. Agnes Ahadzie, Pioneer Mall and Boye Sowah (substituted by Samuel Nortey). Counsel for defendants herein has however not stated that the said Boye Sowah has no connection to the subject matter of the dispute which resulted in Exhibit “F”. We are of the candid opinion that the Supreme Court would not have proceeded to hear the appeal on the merits if there was no proper defendant before them. What is more, defendants herein who had earlier on grounded their defence on the Court of Appeal decision in the Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall would certainly not have raised a finger if the Su preme Court decision had gone in their favour. We think defendants herein were somehow disingenuous when they amended their statement of defence in the instant case by taking out their paragraph 5 wherein they had relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall case after the Supreme Court decision turned against them. By their own showing, defendants cannot turn around to say that the Kle Musum/Tsie We family had no knowledge of the Agnes Ahadzie & Pioneer Mall litigation. And, in any case, the Supreme Court’s orders were not directed at specific individuals within the Kle Musum/Tsie We family. The Supreme Court in finding that Okpoi Gonno Lands are not part of Kle Musum Quarter lands was guided by exhibit 9 tendered by the defendants therein. Again, the Kle Musum/Tse We family cannot claim 19 ignorance of the existence of that Judgment which the Supreme Court in the Agnes Ahadzie case duly analysed to arrive at its conclusion that Okpoi Gonno Lands are not part of Kle Musum Quarter lands. We hold that the Supreme Court Judgment which declared the status of Okpoi Gonno Lands is a judgment in rem which is binding on the Kle Musum/Tsie We family. It is trite law that the High Court is bound to follow the relevant precedents of the Supreme Court. This is exactly what the trial High Court did by its reliance on exhibit “F”. The Court of Appeal is also bound to follow decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law. We fail to see how the trial High Court erred in its reliance on Exhibit “F”. Counsel for plaintiff also introduced useful arguments as regards the effect of an adverse Judgment against a vendor or grantor in proceedings commenced after the sale. We agree with the above submission so made by plaintiff’s counsel as the same accords with settled law. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the case of Attram v. Aryee (1965) GLR 341 approved of the principle that, a prior purchaser of land cannot be estopped as being privy in estate by a judgment against the vendor commenced after the purchase. This principle was applied in John Klu vs. Konadu Apraku & Anor (2009) SCGLR 741, where the apex court upheld the decision of the High Court that, a purchaser is not estopped or affected by a judgment adverse to his vendor or grantor in proceedings commenced subsequent to acquisition of his title. In Buildaf vs. Catholic Church (2017 -2020) 1 SCGLR 1143 , the Supreme Court again observed that: “Third party rights acquired before the commencement of proceedings that resulted in the decision against the vendor were not extinguished by the judgment”. Therefore, even if exhibit “F” were found to be non -binding on the Kle Musum/Tsie We family, the above stated principle would have operated in plaintiff’s favour. It is so 20 because the plaintiff’s grantor obtained his grant from the Nungua Stool in 1994 before the suits in the Exhibit 4 series were commenced and Judgments subsequently delivered. Ground B of this appeal is unmeritorious and we dismiss same. GROUND C “The trial Judge erred in failing to hold that plaintiff/respondent is estopped by sections 25 and 26 of Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) from denying that the land in dispute situate at Okpoi Gonno forms part of Tsie We family land by virtue of the recitals in plaintiff/respondent’s Deed of Assignment dated the 24th day of May 2017 and the conduct of plaintiff/respondent director who testified at the trial court” We would set out sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) as the alleged failure of the trial court to apply these provisions is the defendants’ plaint in this ground of appeal. “Section 25. Facts recited in written instrument (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, the facts recited in a written document are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties to the document, or their successors in interest. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the recital of consideration.” “Section 26. Estoppel by own statement or conduct Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity , when a party has, by that party’s own statement, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, the truth of the thing shall be conclusively presumed against that party or the successors in interest of that party in proceedings between 21 (a) that party or the successors in interest of that party, and (b) the relying person or successors in interest of that person.” Counsel for defendants submits that from the deed of assignment, exhibit ‘C’, plaintiff company and its assignor, SADAC Builders Ltd, all admit that the land in dispute situate at Okpoi Gonno belongs to the Kle Musum Quarter or Tsie We family. Counsel furt her submits that the recitals in exhibit ‘C’ are conclusively presumed to be true and plaintiff is statutorily estopped from denying the said recital. Counsel maintains that plaintiff is estopped by sections 25 and 26 of NRCD 323 from now alleging that Okpoi Gonno lands form part of Nungua Stool land. On his part, counsel for plaintiff argues that sections 25 and 26 of NRCD 323 have limitations to their application, i.e. they are subject to law and rules of equity. Therefore, so argues counsel, where there is a conflict between sections 25 and 26 of NRCD 323 and an existing law or rules of equity, the existing law or rules of equity would prevail. It is true, as counsel for defendants has urged upon us, that sections 25 and 26 of NRCD 323 create irrebuttable presumptions. However, it appears to us that counsel for defendants failed to avert his mind to the fact that the se irrebuttable presumptions are subject to some exceptions i.e. statutory or rules of equity. Th us, specific statutes or legislative provisions can override a conclusive presumption under sections 25 or 26 of NRCD 323, supra. As sections 25 and 26 of NRCD 323 explicitly recognise rules of equity, a court will not bind a party to their statement or recital where the application or treatment of a recital as conclusively true would yield an inequitable outcome or would be unconscionable in the peculiar circumstances of a case. A genuine question which we are confronted with at this time is whether or not any of the exceptions discussed above is applicable here. We have looked at the recitals in the 22 deed of assignment between plaintiff and his grantor (See: page 977 of the ROA, vol.) For the purpose of this discussion, we find the following recitals very relevant: 1. By a lease (hereafter called ‘the Lease’) made on 21 st March 1994 between NUNGUA STOOL as lessor acting through its lawful representative Nuumo Borketey Larweh, The Gborbu Wulomo and Head of Nungua Stool and Nii Bortrabi Obroni II, Mankralo, AND SADAC BUILDERS LIMITED the Assignor herein as lessee acting through its lawful representative MOUFID EL-ADAS and registered on 28 February, 1995 at the Land Title Registry in Accra, all that property described in the schedule hereto (hereinafter called ‘the Property’) was leased to the Assignor herein for a term of 99 years from Twenty -first day of July, 1994, subject to the rent reserved and the covenants, conditions and stipulations therein contained. 2. “By a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court on 19 th April 1994 between Nii Amar Koranteng II & Ors. v Numo Adjei Nkpa Klu, the Tsie- We family of Teshie was declared the true owners of all that land and as a result of that judgment, SADAC B UILDERS LIMITED attorned tenancy to the Tsie -We family to confirm the original lease with the Nungua Stool dated 2nd December 1999.” 3. By a lease (hereafter called the ‘Lease’) made on the Twenty -third day of December , One thousand nine hundred and ninety nine between Tsie We family of the one part and the assignor herein as lessee of the other part and registered as GA 12369 at the Land title Registry in Accra, the property described in the schedule hereto (hereinafter called ‘the Property) was leased to the Assignor herein for a term of 99 years from Twenty-first day of July, 1994 subject to the rent reserved and the covenants, conditions and stipulations therein contained…” In the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is our candid opinion that it would be unconscionable to bind plaintiff to the recital in the deed of assignment, exhibit “C”, which recognises the Tsie -We family of Teshie as true owners of the property in 23 dispute. Exhibit “F”, the Supreme Court decision which is later in time , settles the issue of ownership of Okpoi Gonno Lands. The land subject matter of the defendants’ counterclaim is at Okpoi Gonno. If per Exhibit “F” Okpoi Gonno lands belong to Nungua Stool, then it would certainly be inequitable to say that the plaintiff whose vendor had obtained the same piece of land from the Nungua Stool in 1994, and ha d attorned tenancy to the Tsie We Stool by virtue of another Supreme Court Judgment, is estopped by the 2nd recital in Exhibit “C”. In the present case, we think the rules of equity would override the irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions in issue. We therefore fail to see how the trial Judge fell into any kind of error by failing to hold that plaintiff is estopped from denying that the land in dispute is situate at Okpoi Gonno and forms part of Tsie We family land. Ground “C” of the appeal also fails. GROUND “D” “The trial Judge erred in failing to vitiate the grant of Tsie We family land to the plaintiff/respondent for not emanating from the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo of Teshie, the head of the Tsie We family and the Kle Musum Quarter contrary to several judgments of all the Superior Courts of Ghana that it is only the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo whom the Tsie We family land is vested alone with elders of Tsie We who could validly grant same.” The contention of defendants’ Counsel under this ground of appeal is that in view of the Supreme Court decision to the effect that Tsie We and Kle Musum Quarter land is vested in the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo and he has the capacity to grant Tsie We land, any purported grant by Nii Adjeifio to the plaintiff’s grantor and purported assignment to plaintiff as well as Land Certificate based on same, are void ab initio and ought to be declared as such. Counsel refers to cases such as Kwantreng vs. Klu (1991) 1 GLR 272; Koranteng II vs. Klu (1993-94) 1 GLR 280 at 281, 290-92, 295] in support of this argument. 24 In the view of defendants’ counsel, exhibit “E”, at pages 1028 to 1035 ROA vol. 3, which is a judgment of the High Court in Sadac Builders Ltd & Nii Abraham Adjei Kwei vs. Regimanuel Gray Ltd & 5 Ors dated 26 April 2018 which purportedly affirmed grants by Nii Nortey Adjeifio to respondent’s assignor, was determined per incuriam the Court of Appeal and SC decisions on Kle Musum Quarter and Tsie We family lands. Counsel therefore urges upon this court to disregard exhibit “E” and vitiate the grant from Nii Nortey Adjeifio, who has never been the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo, to the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s Counsel takes his turn and argues that 3rd defendant’s family is estopped from laying claim to the disputed land by reason of the atonement of tenancy to 3rd defendant’s family by plaintiff’s grantor which led to the execution of exhibit 14. He continues to argue and states that, even if Nii Nortey Adjeifio who executed exhibit 14 was not the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo, this fact alone does not automatically invalidate the grant in view of the settled position of the law that the decision to nullify the grant of family land without the head of family would depend on the facts of each case; and that the family ought to act timeously in se tting aside the transaction. He grounds this argument on Malm vs. Lutterodt (1963) 1 GLR 1; Nartey vs. Mechanical Lloyd Assembly Plant Limited (1987 -88) 2 GLR 314 and Boateng vs. McKeown Investment Limited, Civil Appeal No. J4/12/2009 (2020) GHASC (5 February 2020). Having instructed himself on the principles stated in the above authorities, counsel submits that even if the grant of the land in dispute to plaintiff’s grantor was without the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo, time would serve as a bar against 3 rd defendant’s family from challenging the sale. In particular, Counsel stresses that 3rd defendant’s family was aware of their exhibit 14 but failed to take any step to have it set aside since 1999. Counsel finally submits on this point that the trial court did not err by not vitiating the grant of the disputed land to plaintiff’s grantor which did not emanate from the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo. 25 The fact of the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo as the person with capacity to grant Tsie We/Kle Musum Quarter lands was settled in a plethora of cases. However, with the 2019 Supreme Court decision (Exhibit “F”) which clarified that Okpoi Gonno lands belong to the Nungua Stool but not the Kle Musum/Tsie We family of Teshie, the defendants’ invitation to the court to vitiate the grant made without the Osabu -Ayiku Wulomo cannot see the light of the day. The trial High Court was bound by Exhibit “F” which seems to have modified earlier Supreme Court decisions on ownership of Okpoi Gonno lands. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Kle Musum/Tsie We family of Teshie own Okpoi Gonno land (i.e. prior to Exhibit “F”), and that the 1994 grant made to plaintiff’s vendor and subsequently confirmed by Nii Nortey Adjeifio acting on behalf of 3rd defendant’s family (Exhibit “14”), was on the blind side of the Osabu-Ayiku Wulomo, the record before us does not show that 3rd defendant’s family acted timeously to have the transaction set aside. The settled position of the law is that an alienation of family land without the consent and concurrence of the principal members of the family is voidable and not void as defendants have urged upon us. This ground of appeal should not engage our attention any further as it lacks merit GROUND E “The trial Judge erred in failing to order for forfeiture of plaintiff/respondent’s Assignment dated the 24th day of May 2017 for challenging or denying the title of the Tsie We family to the land in dispute when plaintiff/respondent’s assignment was based on a lease dated the 23 rd day of December 1999 from the Tsie We family contrary to section 27 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323)” 26 The pivotal issue s which arise from this ground of appeal are: (i) whether the plaintiff forfeited its lease by challenging the title of the Tsie We family of Teshie ; (ii) and, if so, whether the proper procedure has been followed in exercising a right of re -entry or forfeiture by the land lord? The core argument advanced on behalf of the 3 rd defendant by his Counsel is that, the plaintiff who claims to have obtained an assignment based on a 99 -year leasehold grant of Okpoi Gonno land purportedly from the 3 rd defendant’s Tsie We Family is now challenging the title o f Tsie We Family to Okpoi Gonno land that same belongs to the Nungua Stool. In considering the two issues raised above, we direct our minds to the submission of plaintiff’s counsel that the issue of forfeiture was not part of defendants’ case at the trial court. This submission is crucial and so we would examine defendants amended statement of defence to satisfy ourselves as to whether forfeiture of plaintiff’s lease was part of the defendants’ case. On a thorough reading of defendants amended statement of defence and counterclaim which can be found at pages 670 to 678 of the ROA, vol. 3, we note that there is no mention of plaintiff’s liability for forfeiture. We would however throw more light on liability for forfeiture generally. Most leases or tenancies, as the case may be, include forfeiture clauses. A right of re-entry or forfeiture is exercised where a lessee breache s a covenant or condition contained in a lease agreement. The general rule is that a tenant (or lessee) who denies his landlord’s title is liable to forfeit his lease. However, this implied right of the lessor or landlord to recover the leased property is subject to restrictions. Section 57 of the Land Act, 2020 (Act 1036) provides for restrictions on re -entry and forfeiture. Subsection 1 reads: 27 “57. (1) A right of re -entry or forfeiture under a provision in a lease for a breach of covenant, condition or agreement in the lease is not enforceable by court action or any other means, unless: a. The lessor has served on the lessee notice i. Specifying the particular breach complained of, ii. Requiring the lessee to remedy the breach, if the breach is capable of remedy, and iii. Requiring the lessee to make reasonable compensation in money for the breach, except where the breach consists of non-payment of money. b. The lessee has knowledge of the fact that the notice has been served, and c. The lessee fails, within a reasonable time after service of the notice under paragraph (a), to remedy the breach, if that breach is capable of remedy, or to pay compensation to the satisfaction of the lessor, for the breach or in case of non-payment of rent, to pay the rent and interest on the rent at the prevailing bank rate…” The essence of giving notice of the breach complained of to the lessee is to enable the lessee remedy the breach or apply for relief against forfeiture in an action commenced by the lessor to enforce the right of re -entry. The relevant provision is section 58 (1) of Act 1036 which provides that: “Where a lessor is proceeding by action or otherwise to enforce a right of re -entry or forfeiture under any provision in a lease, or for non-payment of rent, the lessee of the property and also a sublessee of the property comprised in the lease or any part of the lease may, either in the lessor’s action or in an action brought by the lessee or sublessee for that purpose, apply for relief.” Even if the plaintiff herein were liable for forfeiture as 3 rd defendant contends, our view is that there is nothing in the ROA which shows that the lessor complied with section 57(1) of Act 1036 to enable him exercise this right. 28 Our conclusion on this ground of appeal is that the trial High Court Judge did not err in failing to order forfeiture of plaintiff’s Assignment dated 24 May 2017 as there was no basis to do so. We accordingly dismiss Ground E of the appeal. GROUND F “The trial Judge erred in failing to invalidate plaintiff/respondent’s Deed of Assignment dated the 24th day of May, 2017 as incomplete when same contained no site plan.” The substance of the argument of Counsel for defendants is that the trial court ought to have invalidated plaintiff’s deed of assignment because it does not contain a site plan and therefore incomplete and legally invalid . He cites and relies on two cases, namely: (i) Buildaf v s. Catholic Church (2017 -2020) 1 SCGLR 1143 at 1164 and (ii) Charles Blankson-Hemans & Anor vs. Peter Enti, Civil Appeal No. H1/97/2023, dated 23 November 2023. In responding to this submission, Counsel for plaintiff argues that the validity of the plaintiff’s deed of assignment was never an issue at the trial court , and defendants did not also seek a relief for invalidation of this deed of assignment in their counterclaim. He also questions the locus of defendants as strangers to the deed of assignment to challenge its validity . He then submits that in the unlikely event that this court accedes to defendants’ argument to set aside the assignment on the basis of absence of a site plan, this should not lead to plaintiff losing its land. At best, counsel argues, plaintiff would 29 have an equitable interest in the disputed land on the basis of section 36(2) of the Lands Act, 2020 (Act 1036). We have looked at the Buildaf vs Catholic Church case which defendants’ counsel graciously referred to us and indeed, the Supreme Court observed that a deed of assignment cannot be complete without a site plan and it is legally invalid without due execution. In the Blankson-Hemans case, this Court (differently constituted) relied on the above statement in the Buildaf case and stated thus: “…Exhibit C lacks validity as to convey interest in the land to respondents. That is to say that Exhibit C can be said to be without a valid site plan and so it cannot vest title in the respondents. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held in the case of Buildaf vs. Catholic Church (2017- 2020) 1 SCGLR 1143 at 1164 that a deed of assignment of land cannot be complete without a site plan and it is legally invalid.” On the basis of the foregoing, it is right to say that defendants’ counsel did state the correct position of the law as regards the effect of non -inclusion of a valid site plan in a deed of assignment of land. However, this case can be distinguished on the basis that defendants did not challenge the validity of plaintiff’s deed of assignment in their amended statement of defence to enable plaintiff to respond to the same. A cursory look at the issues for trial contained in defendants’ application for directions which can be found at page 652 of the ROA vol. 2; and the additional issues filed by the plaintiff which can be found at pages 915 to 916 of the ROA vol. 3 reveals that the validity of the plaintiff’s deed of assignment was not one of the numerous issues which both parties invited the trial court to determine. The validity of the said deed of assignment on the basis that it does not contain a site plan is also not an issue arising from the pleadings. Also, defendants’ counterclaim was for the cancellation of plaintiff’s Land Certificate No. GA. 69426 Vol. 46 folio 367p dated 22 June, 2022; perpetual injunction and general 30 damages. It is gathered from the ROA that the basis for this counterclaim was that the Land Certificate was issued during the pendency of a suit challenging plaintiff’s ownership of the disputed land. We observe that defendants’ lawyer posed questions on the absence of a site plan in the deed of assignment to plaintiff’s representative in cross -examination. But then, this line of questioning per se was not an invitation to the court to declare that the deed of assignment is invalid. If this relief was not expressly sought by defendants, we fail to appreciate how the trial court could be attacked for not making an order invalidating the plaintiff’s Deed of Assignment dated 24 May, 2017 for the reasons stated by defendants’ counsel. Ground F of the appeal also fails. GROUND G “The trial judge erred in failing to invalidate Land Certificate No. GA 69426 vol. 46 Folio 367p dated the 2 nd day of June 2022 obtained when the issue of title of the land in dispute was still pending in court to plaintiff/respondent’s knowledge.” Under this ground of appeal, we are called upon to determine the validity of plaintiff’s Land Certificate No. GA 69426 vol. 46 Folio 367p issued on 2 June 2022. The trial court assessed the evidence together with the submissions made by counsel and came to the conclusion that there was no pending suit about declaration of title at the time the Land Certificate complained of was issued to plaintiff. The court explained that with the setting aside of the High Court order setting aside the plaintiff’s said Land Certificate No. GA 54109, plaintiff was restored to its previous position and the obvious thing to do was to apply to the Lands Commission to be re -issued with the Land Certificate wrongly set aside. The trial court accepted plaintiff’s position that in the circumstances of this case, the defendants could not call into force section 98 of Act 1036 which only applies when 31 a dispute arises in the course of registration. In coming to this conclusion, the trial court distinguished the case of Numo Nortey Adjeifio (substituted by) Nii Adjei Sankuma & 6 Ors. vs. Nii Mante Tesa (substituted by) Daniel Markwei & 5 Ors. Civil Appeal No. H1/9/12 dated 19 April 2012 . The trial court was quick to point out that at the time the Land Certificate under attack was issued, there was no pending suit or dispute about registration and defendants had also not sought any declaration of title in respect of the land in dispute. In this appeal, counsel for defendants submits that plaintiff had no valid assignment and could not be issued any such Land Certificate. So, any Land Certificate issued to plaintiff is void. Counsel continues to argue that there were subsisting Land Certificates which had not been cancelled by any court or der. He refers to Land Certificate No. GA 14112 dated 7 August 1998 issued in favour of 3rd defendant’s family (Exhibits “3a”); and Land Certificates issued in favour of 1 st and 2nd defendants (Exhibits “9, 9a and 9b). Counsel also directs our minds to various letters written by 2nd defendant’s lawyer objecting to the issuance of the Land Certificate which is now in issue (Exhibits “11”, “12” and “12a”). Counsel also heavily relies on the Buildaf vs. Catholic Church, case, already referred to above, and states that a certificate obtained during the pendency of a case without disclosing same is void. Counsel indicates that it was the failure of plaintiff to disclose the pendency of two other actions at the High Court which enabled the certificat e to be issued by the registrar. He describes this as a deliberate act and illegal. He also draws our attention to the fact that plaintiff was not in adverse possession as its stay on the land had been challenged all the way to the Supreme Court. He adds that, the trial court ought to have ordered the cancellation of exhibit “C”. On behalf of plaintiff, counsel seeks to water down the above arguments. He contends that, defendants’ reliance on section 98 of Act 1036 for the cancellation of plaintiff’s Land Certificate is misconceived. Counsel argues that section 98 of Act 1036 only applies to 32 disputes that arise in the course of the process of registration of title or interest in land falling within a registration district , but no such dispute was pending at the time plaintiff’s Land Certificate which has now become contentious was issued. He refers us to exhibit B the Court of Appeal Judgment which set aside the High Court Judgment dated 9 July 2018, and argues that the defendants’ statement of defence filed on 8 March 2018 was still in force at that time . And this statement of defence did not challenge plaintiff’s new Land Certificate. Consequently, counsel contends that section 98 of Act 1036 is inapplicable to the instant case. It is apposite to state section 98 (2) and (3) of Act 1036, which we find relevant to these discussions. It reads: “ (2) Where at the time of the publication of a notice under section 96, the Land Registrar has notice of an action or proceeding concerning land or an interest in land in the registration district referred to in the notice is pending in court or is subjec t to alternative dispute resolution proceedings, the Land Registrar shall note any claim under this Act in respect of the same land or interest in land but no further action shall be taken until the matter is determined by the court or settled by alternative dispute resolution.” “(3) Where a dispute is pending as specified in subsection (2), a party shall, in writing, serve notice on the Land Registrar and the Land Registrar shall not take any further action in respect of the registration until the final determination of the dispute”. Upon a careful evaluation of the submissions of both counsel in the light of the above provisions, the critical question which should engage our attention at this point is, whether to the plaintiff’s knowledge, the issue of title to the land in dispute was still pending in court at the time it obtained its Land Certificate No. GA 69426 vol. 46 Folio 367p dated the 2 June 2022. 33 This calls for an examination of the pleadings filed by the parties prior to the setting aside of the High Court Judgment dated 9 July 2018, in exhibit B. On the face of plaintiff’s writ of summons, its claims pertained to special damages for unlawful destruction to his property, general damages for unlawful entry, interest and an order to re-enter the land. We also note that defendants in their original statement of defence filed on 13 March 2018 which can be found at page 26 of the ROA, vol. 2, did not make any counterclaim challenging the plaintiff’s title to the land. However, following Exhibit B and steps taken by plaintiff to obtain the new Land Certificate, defendants filed their amended statement of defence and counterclaim on 18 July 2022. It was in this amended statement of defence and counterclaim that they sought the cancellation of plaintiff’s Land Certificate, among others. So, clearly, there was no dispute as to the registration at the time plaintiff’s Land Certificate was re-issued, and defendants’ sole witness admitted in cross-examination at page 1413 of the ROA, vol. 4 that at the time plaintiff’s earlier Land certificate was issued in 2018, there was no dispute as to registration . The following transpired between plaintiff’s counsel and defendants’ witness: “Q. At the time plaintiff obtained a Land Title Certificate dated 11 January 2018 there was no dispute to the registration. A. Indeed, there was no dispute with registration but on grounds, he was cautioned to halt the process.” Impliedly, at the time the Court of Appeal set aside the ruling of the High Court dated 9 July 2018 which had dismissed plaintiff’s Suit No. GJ/182/2018, and ordered a trial de novo, there was strictly speaking no dispute as to registration pending before the court. Moreover, at the time 1 st and 2nd defendants lawyer objected to the registration process per the letters written to the Lands Commission dated 18 May 2022 and 12 June 2022 i.e. Exhibits 11 & 12, it cannot be said that a dispute as to registration was pending in court. Until defendants filed their amended statement of defence and counterclaim, the court 34 had only been called upon to determine the liability of defendants to the damages claimed and for plaintiff to re -enter the land. By the time plaintiff’s Land Certificate became an issue in court by virtue of the amended statement of defence and counterclaim filed on 18 July 2022, the Lands Commission had already re -issued the Land Certificate to plaintiff. This is a clear case of a State Institution and a party paying around the statute without being caught by any specific provision. We do appreciate the concerns of defendants’ counsel, especially the speed with which plaintiff’s Land Certificate was re - issued after a trial de novo had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in its judgment dated 7 April 2022 . But then, we reiterate that the appeal cannot succeed on this ground as section 98 of Act 1036 was not applicable within that small window which plaintiff took advantage of to obtain the Land Certificate No. GA 69426 vol. 46 Folio 367p dated the June 2022. The Buildaf case is again distinguishable. GROUND H “The Judgment is against the weight of evidence” Defendants’ counsel did not argue ground H of the appeal and the obvious inference is that he abandoned the same. Accordingly, we strike out ground H of the appeal as having been abandoned. The question of “Possession” This was no one of the grounds of appeal. However, we intend to touch on it in exercise of our powers under Rule 8(8) of the Court of Appeal Rules (C.I.19) which provides that: “(8) Notwithstanding sub rules (4) to (7) of this rule, the Court in deciding the appeal shall not be confined to the grounds set out by the appellant but the Court shall not rest its decision on any ground not set out by the appellant unless the responden t has had sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground.” 35 As regards the portion of Okpoi Gonno Land which is the subject matter of this dispute, there is abundant evidence on record which shows that plaintiff’s vendor was in possession from 1994 before assigning its interest to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s visible act s of possession include the construction of structures on the land, a fact which defendants could not successfully discredit apart from bare denial. By section 48(2) of NRCD 323, a person who exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it. This brings to mind the adage that; possession is nine points of the law. See : Lartey vs. Hausa (1961) GLR 773. What is more, t he Supreme Court has in a plethora of cases decided that, a plaintiff in possession has a good title against the whole world except one with a better title . In the more recent case of Adusi & Ors vs. Ghana Publishing Co. Ltd (2022) 178 GMJ 92 at 113, the Court delivered itself thus: “The fact need not be lost that one of the modes for proof of title to land is by possession. For in Seraphim v. Amua Sekyi (1961) GLR 23 it was the holding that “a person in possession can maintain an action against the whole world except the true owner. By section 48(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), a person in possession is presumed to be the owner. Therefore, possession creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership in favour of the occupant of the houses.” The Supreme Court again explained the requirement for a rebuttal of the presumption created under section 48(2) of NRCD 323 in the case of Nana Otuo Antwi Boasiako vs. Nana Adjei (2022) 181 GMJ 131. This is how the Court applied the law: “ Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge that the physical presence of defendant and people claiming through him were the very acts that plaintiff had asserted to constitute trespass, the honourable court appreciated that though possession raises a presumption of ownership by the application of section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), this presumption may be rebutted by cogent evidence. 36 Since possession is a rebuttal presumption, the presence of defendant on that northern part of the disputed land only placed an obligation on plaintiff to prove superior title” See: Elizabeth Osei v. Alice Afua Korang (2013) 50 G.M.J. 26, SC In the case before us, plaintiff’s act of possession is strong enough to stand as proof of ownership until evidence in rebuttal is introduced. Quite apart from this fact, Exhibit “F” also constitutes satisfactory proof of plaintiff’s root of title dating back to a lease engrossed in his vendor’s name. We do not find any cogent evidence from the ROA to override plaintiff’s act of possession over the portion of Okpoi Gonno land which is the subject matter of this appeal. CONCLUSION We have assessed the written Submissions of counsel in the light of the evidence contained in the ROA as well as the applicable laws. We hold that defendants failed to satisfactorily demonstrate any reversible error on the part of the trial judge and there is indeed no basis to interfere with the Judgment of the trial High Court dated 28 March 2024. The plaintiff did not also file any notice of variation of Judgment and so we find no basis to interfere with the award of damages as well as the quantum. Cost of Ghc30,000 to plaintiff/respondent. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety and the Judgment of the trial High Court dated 28 March 2024 is hereby affirmed. Before signing off, we leave you with the words of George Herbert: “Lean compromise is better than a fat lawsuit” . We also invite you to ponder over the statement of Joseph Grynbaum that “an ounce of mediation is worth a pound of arbitration and a ton of litigation”. 37 Costs of GH¢30,000.00 to Plaintiff/Respondent. SGD ANGELINA MENSAH-HOMIAH, (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) SGD MYERS AHMED, JA I AGREE JENNIFER MYERS AHMED, (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) SGD ASEM, JA , I ALSO AGREE CHARITY AKOSUA ASEM (MRS) (JUSTICE OF APPEAL) COUNSEL ❖ ENOCH ADU AMEYAW WITH RHODA AMOAKO DODOO WITH LILY AMANKWAH FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANT ❖ SETH NYAABA FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 38