Faalongbasoglo v S (J3/02/2025) [2026] GHASC 48 (29 July 2026)

1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA - AD 2026 CORAM: BAFFOE-BONNIE CJ (PRESIDING) PROF. MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) JSC KWOFIE JSC ADJEI-FRIMPONG JSC ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. J3/02/2025 29TH JULY, 2026 ALBERT DIYUOH FAALONGBASOGLO …………. APPELLANT VRS THE REPUBLIC …………. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT KWOFIE JSC: 2 This appeal was launched against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kumasi dated the 2 nd of November 2023 , which affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the High Court, Wa. The trial High Court had convicted the appellant of the offence of stealing, contrary to section 124(1) of the Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) and sentenced him to eighteen (18) months I.H.L. The trial court also ordered the appellant to refund the sum of GHS83, 025.00 to his employers GN Bank the complaint’s therein within fourteen (14) days of the judgment. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND TRIAL BEFORE THE HIGH COURT The appellant was arraigned before the High Court, Wa on one count of stealing contrary to section 124(1) of the Criminal and Other Offences Act 1960 (Act 29). The particulars of the charge filed by the prosecution was that between September 2017 and June 2018, the appellant who was then the manager of the Hamile Branch of GN Bank dishonestly appropriated the sum of One Hundred and Fourty -Nine Thousand, One Hundred Ghana Cedis (149,100.00) belonging to his employers GN Bank. The facts on which the charges were laid were that the complainant, the Regional Manager of GN Bank authorised the Regional Operations Officer of the bank to inspect the activities of the appellant, who was then the Manager of the Hamile Branch of GN Bank. Upon the conduct of a cash count, it was detected that the accused had stolen an amount of GHS119, 525. 00 and a further audit revealed that the total amount stolen by the appellant was GHS149 , 100.00 . During investigation s, the appellant admitted the offence and in his investigation caution statement admitted to stealing GHS124,000.00 to cover a theft engaged in by a subordinate when he (the appellant) was a branch manager at Tumu. 3 However, investigations at the Tumu branch revealed that the appellant handed over the branch without any cash shortage. In the course of the investigations, the appellant refunded an amount of GHS64, 340.00. TRIAL AT THE HIGH COURT After a full trial in the High Court, Wa , the appellant was found guilty of the offence of stealing, convicted and was sentenced to 18 months I.H.L. The court also further ordered the appellant to refund the sum of GH¢83,025.00 to his employers GN Bank. APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL Dissatisfied with his conviction and sentence, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Kumasi against the said conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeal , after evaluating the evidence on record in dismissing the appeal against the conviction and sentence stated that: “the judgment and the law established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant dishonestly appropriated the sum of GHS 119, 525.00 belonging to the complainant bank. He confessed to the said appropriation which the evidence established to be dishonest. The High Court judgment dated 15 th February 2022, by which the appellant was convicted for the offence of stealing is supported by the evidence on record”. The Court of Appeal thus affirmed the judgment of the trial High Court. APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 4 Still dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, Kumasi, the appellant has now launched this appeal to the highest Court of the land with a final throw of the dice by a Notice of Appeal dated 17th January 2024 on the following grounds of appeal: I. That the conviction and sentence should be set aside on grounds that it cannot be supported by the evidence on record. II. That the Court of Appeal erred in law in upholding the decision of the trial court that the appellant was guilty of the offence of stealing a sum of money different from the sum of money stated in the charge sheet. III. The Court of Appeal erred in fact by finding that the appellant failed to challenge the finding of the cash counts at the trial court despite evidence on record to the contrary. IV. The Court of Appeal erred in fact by failing to hold that the appellant herein alleged confessions were given under duress. V. The Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to hold that the trial court’s determination that the appellant herein’s alleged confessions were not given under duress without a mini-trial being conducted, was wrongful despite the appellant raising same at the trial. ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court of Appeal erred when it upheld the decision of the trial court that the appellant was guilty of stealing the sum of GHS119 , 525.00 which amount was different from the sum of GH149 , 100.00 which the appellant was alleged to have stolen and which was stated in the charge sheet. He submitted that it is absurd for the Court of Appeal to hold that the appellant cannot be held accountable for the sum of GHS149,100.00 as originally stated on the charge sheet but proceeded to uphold the judgment of the trial court that the appellant dishonestly appropriated the sum of GHS119,525.00 5 Counsel further submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the trial Court’s decision that the appellant’s confession were made voluntarily without conducting a mini-trial to examine this issue even though the appellant raised issues and concern s about duress during the trial. Finally, counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed in relation to the cash counts to produce the tracing dates and specific activities leading to the shortages. He submitted that there is no evidence directly showing that the appellant appropriated any money belonging to the bank and the report of the cash counts was not credible and so the appellant should not have been liable for the alleged shortage. SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT Responding to the arguments of the appellant, counsel for the respondent submitted that essentially the principle is that an appeal is a rehearing and an appellate court has a duty to examine afresh the material proffered by the prosecution in proof of the charges against the appellant. Counsel also referred to section 406 (1) of the Criminal and Other Offences Procedure Act 1960 (Act 30) and submitted that no error, irregularity or misdirection in any charge shall lead to reversal or alteration in appeal or review unless such error, omi ssion, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. He submitted that in this instant case, no errors as regards the evidence or irregularities were made to warrant a reversal or overturning of the appellant’s conviction and sentence. Counsel referred to the cash count certificates for cash counted on 9/5/2018 as Exhibits A and B, the Hamile Branch Supervisory Report, Exhibit C, Query for Non Compliance and the response to the query as Exhibits D and E the letter of undertaking and Repayment Schedule prepared by the appellant Exhibit G and submitted that the appellant did not 6 challenge the testimony of the PW1 the Regional Operations Manager of the Complainant bank. He added that the appellant admitted responsibility for the stolen money and submitted a schedule for the repayment of the stolen amount. Counsel added that when the appellant accepted responsibility for the suppressed funds in the repayment schedule Exhibit G, he admitted dishonestly appropriating money belonging to GN Bank the complaint bank and his employers. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE The appellant was charged with a single count of stealing contrary to Section 124(1) of the Criminal and other Offences Act 190 (Act 29) Being a Criminal charge Section 11(2) of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323) which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt comes into play. The section provides: “11(2) In a Criminal action, the burden of producing evidence, when it is on the prosecution as to any fact which is essential to guilt, requires the prosecution to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence, a reasonable mind could find the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt” It is trite that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every conceivable doubt but was explained in the case of Republic vs. Yeboah (1974) 1 GLR 268 as follows: “it is indeed pertinent to remind ourselves of the dict um of Denning J (as he then was) on the stan dard of proof in criminal cases: in Miller vs. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL ER 372@373 he said : “Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong 7 against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. But nothing short of that will suffice” Also it is important to note the rehearing principle echoed by Francis JSC in the case of Appiah vs. The Republic (1987-88) 2 GLR 377 where in his Lordship stated thus at page 381: “An appeal is essentially a rehearing, consequently it has been our duty to examine afresh the material proffered by the prosecution in proof of the charges against the appellant and, in relation to the applicable law, to test the legal viability of the appellant’s conviction. We have also considered critically the possibility of the appellant being the innocent victim of a criminal conspiracy” All the 5 ground s of appeal filed and argued by counsel for the appellant can be sub summed under 2 main grounds that is i) That the appellant was found guilty and convicted of stealing the sum of GH₵119,525.00 which amount was different from the higher sum of GH₵149,100.00 which the appellant was charged with and was stated in the charge sheet and ii) That the Court of Appeal was wrong in affirming the decision of the trial court that the appellant confessed to stealing the sum of GH₵119,522.00 It is worth pointing out that the case of the prosecution essentially was that the appellant stole an amount of GH ₵149,100.00 from the Hamile Branch of the GN Bank where the appellant was in charge as the Branch Manager at the time of the loss of the amount. The prosecution proved that the said amount had been stolen when cash counts were conducted at the branch by the Regional Operations Manager of the bank Philip Zingsong PW1. 8 The evidence shows that the cash count is the process where an operations Manager of the Bank conducts a cash count with the officer in charge of a branch of the bank, check the physical cash at the bank and cross-check with the cash on hand in the system (vault) to ensure that they tally. The cash count process from the evidence on record is the accepted procedure in the bank used to determine if there has been a shortfall or shortage in the cash at the bank. The evidence shows that separate cash counts were conducted at the Hamile branch by the PW1 and the appellant. The first cash count which was conducted on 9 th May 2018 showed a shortfall of GH ₵124,003.93 and a cash count certificate Exhibit A was signed by both the appellant and the PW1. A second cash count was conducted on the 20 th of June 2018 at the same branch by the PW1 and the appellant and the differen ce or shortage of cash was now GH ₵119,525.00. A third cash count was conducted by the PW1 and one Ambazu Ferdinand at the branch on 6th July 2018 and the shortage had risen to GH₵149,100.00. This third cash count on 6th July 2018 was conducted in the absence of the appellant because he had been reported to the police and Ambazu Ferdinand had been asked to take over the Hamile branch of the bank as Branch Manager. When the appellant was queried by his Superior Officer for the shortage of the sum GH₵119,525.00 which he could not account for , he replied in a response that the difference was as a result of suppression by his former CSO Mr. Yusif Bawa Tundemah who absconded with the amount. He promised “to fix the difference in the next one month as I have already instituted a police investigation regarding his whereabouts”. The record shows that after the cash count of 5th July 2018 conducted in the absence of the appellant which showed a shortage of GH ₵149,100.00, the appellant refunded in total 9 GH₵64340.00; it was the GH₵149,100.00 which formed the basis of the charge of stealing GH₵149,100.00 in the charge sheet. At the end of the trial, the appellant was found guilty of stealing the sum of GH¢119,525.00 and convicted and sentenced to 18 months I.H.L. Counsel for the appellant in his Statement of case has stressed strenuously that it was wrong for the appellant to have been convicted of a lesser amount of GH¢119,525.00 when he had been charged with stealing a higher amount of GH¢149,100.00 as stated in the charge sheet. He submitted that it was wrong for the Court of Appeal to have affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the appellant wrongfully appropriated GH¢119,525. In its judgment the Court of Appeal explained in detail why it accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant wrongfully appropriated the lesser amount of GH¢119,525.00. The Court stated as follows: “Based on the two cash count exercises PW1 fired a query to the appellant on the missing GH¢119,525.00. The query was admitted as Exhibit D. In response to the query the appellant authored exhibit E. He explained that the shortfall was a suppression by his former CSO, Bawa Yusif who had absconded with that money but had promised to repay it. Appellant claimed to have referred the matter to the police for investigation. He promised to refund the amount within a month. The respondent accordingly accepted liability for the shortfall of GH¢119,525.00, to the respondent, that sum of money was dishonestly appropriated by the appellant. Appellant’s version was that the sum was suppressed by another staff member Bawa Yusif. If appellant is to be believed then he could not be personally blamed for the loss of the money, since his subordinate allegedly took it. He would have only accepted ultimate responsibility as the manager of the Hamile branch, responsible for losses that occurred there. The evidence on record however supports the case of the respondent, rather than the appellant. In Exhibit H, which is a c autioned 10 statement dated 5th July 2018, the appellant admitted the aforementioned shortfall at the Hamile Branch where he was the Manager. He stated: “it is not true that I stole this amount but rather it was my Customer Service Officer (CSO) Mr. Bawa Yusif at Tumu Branch in 2017 under my supervision when I was the Tumu Branch Manager. When I detected it he told me that he was going to pay it, I did not report to the Regional Manager since he promised to refund the money. He was later transferred to Gwolly branch and he vacated post and bolted away but still management w as not aware of the money. I was transferred to Hamile Branch which I took responsibility for since I did not report earlier to the police or the authorities. However on the 3 rd June, 2018, I reported it to the Tumu police for investigation” Further the Court of Appeal stated: “The appellant by the above statement agreed that the shortfall of GH¢199,525.00 occurred at the Hamile Branch. The evidence established that the Tumu and Hamile branches have separate accounts which are not mixed to each other. The appellant never felt the need to explain as to how the Tumu and Hamile accounts beca me interconnected to the extent that a loss at Tumu reflected in Hmile and vice versa ……. The dishonesty of the appellant was evident in his refusal to give credible account of the missing money and resorts to the peddling of falsehoods as a cover - up. We concluded that the appellant, without the knowledge of his employer, took that amount from the Hamile branch for a purpose known only to himself” It is difficult to appreciate counsel for the appellant’s contention that the prosecution did not prove that the appellant appropriated the sum of GH¢ 119, 525.00 in the face of evidence on record and the analyses by the Court of Appeal. 11 Indeed the figure of GH¢149.000.00 which the appellant was charged with was admitted by the appellant in his Letter of Undertaking Exhibit G dated 9th July 2018 and he accepted responsibility for the total amount of GH¢ 149,100 that had been suppressed under his watch at the Hamile branch of the bank. The Court of Appeal rightly in our view took the view that the figure of GH¢149,100.00 was arrived at during a cash count conducted in the absence of the appellant contrary to the bank’s own operational procedures on 6th July 2018. The Court of Appeal stated clearly as follows: “The cash count of 6 th July, 2018 violated appellant’s fundamental right to notice and hearing. Any cash count that took place behind the ba ck of the appellant amounted to a violation of the bank’s own procedure and is not credible. The amount of cash stated in the cash count certificate of 6 th July 2018, could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt, as having been dishonestly appropriated by the appellant. A Court of law cannot endorse the condemnation of a man behind his back, when he had not been given an opportunity to be heard, which he squandered. We determined that the result of the cash count of 6th July 2018 was not credible for which reason he cannot be held accountable for it. The acceptance by the appellant of the sum of GH¢ 149,100 or GH¢124.000 in the further investigation caution statement (Exhibit J) the charge statement (Exhibit K ) or the undertaking he authored (Exhibit G) are not binding on account of the wanton breach of the cash count protocols of the bank. Our review of the evidence, the judgment and the law establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant dishonestly appropriated the sum of GH¢119,525.00 belonging to the complainant bank. He confessed to the said appropriation which the evidence established to be dishonest. The High Court judgment dated 15 th February, 2022 by which the appellant was convicted for the offence of stealing is supported by the evidence on record” 12 Indeed in our view, the decision of the Trial Court and the Court of Appeal to reject the figure of GH¢ 149,000 with which the accused had been charged and which amount he had undertaken to repay and rather convict him of the lower amount of GH¢119,525.00 arising out of the 2 nd cash count conducted on 20 th June 2018 and which he admitted appropriating was actually to the benefit of the appellant. With regard to the appellant’s complaint that his confession statements were not made voluntarily the record shows otherwise. Indeed the Court of Appeal in its judgment, specifically referred to exhibits J (the investigation caution statement of the appellant ) and the Letter of Undertaking Exhibit G and stated as follows: “it is a well-beaten path of criminal law that an extra-judicial statement voluntarily made by an accused is binding on him. We found that the confessions in the documents aforementioned were made voluntarily by the appellant. The confession statement in the further confession statement Exhibit J was made in the presence of an independent witness. Counsel for the appellant suspected foul play in that document for the reason that the said statement was thumb printed by the appellant who usually and prior to that statement, signed all his documents. Once the appellant did not deny ownership of the thumbprint, it’s presence alone, instead of his signature, was not enough to ne gate the confession made therein, if he voluntarily made the statement. The undertaking was made by the appellant when he was unfettered and enjoyed his freedom of movement. His own witness Tsame Ngamenthema (DW1) told the court that he convinced the appellant to accept liability for the sum of GH¢149,000.00. After that he led him to the Circuit Court to prepare the undertaking. There was no doubt therefore that the undertaking was voluntarily by the appellant” In our view, the Court of Appeal went to great lengths to address the voluntar y nature of the confession statement and the further confession stateme nts and it is baffling how 13 counsel for the appellant has expended so much time on that issue. The contention that the confession statements were not made voluntarily has no basis whatsoever and we reject same. On the whole, we fi nd that there is no merit whatsoever in the appeal and we dismiss same accordingly. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kumasi dated 2 nd November 2023 is hereby affirmed. (SGD.) H. KWOFIE (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) P. BAFFOE-BONNIE (CHIEF JUSTICE) (SGD.) PROF. H.J.A.N MENSA-BONSU (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) 14 (SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) CONCURRING OPINION ACKAAH-BOAFO JSC: i. Overview: [1] My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading, in draft, the opinion of my learned and able brother, Kwofie JSC. I concur in the reasoning and conclusion contained therein, leading to our decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. I, however, wish to addr ess some of the grounds of appeal and make certain observations on the judgment of the High Court, as contained in the Record of Appeal (ROA). I now proceed to set out my views in this opinion. [2] The appellant, Mr. Faalongbasoglo, was found guilty on 15 February 2022 by the High Court, Wa, in the Upper West Region, on a single count of stealing and was sentenced to eighteen (18) months' imprisonment with hard labour (IHL). The trial court further ordered him to make restitution in the sum of GH¢83,025.00 to the Receiver of GN Bank, his employer at the time of the commission of the offence. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, sitting in Kumasi, which, on 2 November 2023, dismissed his appeal and affirmed his conviction by the High Court. From the record, the appellant has served the custodial portion of his sentence. 15 [3] The appellant is now before this Court, the final court of the land, and contends that this Court ought to reverse his conviction and enter an acquittal on the grounds that the conviction is not supported by the evidence on record. He further contends tha t the trial judge erred in failing to inquire into the voluntariness of his confession statement and in admitting the statement into evidence without first conducting a mini-trial. [4] My Lords, the reasons to be elaborated upon in respect of some of the grounds of appeal support my concurrence that the appeal be dismissed. In my view, the trial court properly found the appellant guilty on the basis of the overwhelming evidence on record. The evidence adduced at the trial established all the essential elements of the offence charged. I am not persuaded that either the trial court or the first appellate court committed any reviewable error that occasioned a miscarriage of justice warrantin g the intervention of this Court. [5] My learned brother, Kwofie JSC, has set out the facts and discussed the grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal filed on 17 January 2024. I, therefore, do not intend to rehearse the entire factual matrix or the arguments advanced by Counsel fo r the Appellant and the Respondent. I shall confine myself to a consideration of the fourth and fifth grounds of appeal and shall refer to the relevant facts and submissions of counsel where necessary. [6] For purposes of convenience and consistency throughout this opinion, Mr. Faalongbasoglo, procedurally designated as the Appellant/Appellant, shall simply be referred to as “the Appellant,” while the Republic, procedurally designated as the Respondent/Respondent, shall be referred to as “the Respondent.” 16 [7] My Lords, as indicated above, the Appellant was convicted by the High Court, Wa, on 15 February 2022, after trial, on the sole count of stealing and sentenced to eighteen (18) months’ imprisonment with hard labour. The Court further ordered him to pay the sum of GH¢83,025.00 to the Receiver of GN Bank, his employer at the time of the commission of the offence, within fourteen days of the judgment. The Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which, upon consideration of the record of appeal and the submissions filed by the parties, affirmed the judgment of the High Court. ii. The Instant Appeal: [8] The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal, has filed the instant appeal by way of a Notice of Appeal filed on 17th January 2024, and prays this Honourable Court to set aside the decision of the first appellate court on the following grounds: 1. The conviction and sentence should be set aside on grounds that it cannot be supported by the evidence on record. 2. The Court of Appeal erred in law in upholding the decision of the Trial Court that the Appellant was guilty of the offence of stealing a sum of money different from the sum of money stated in the charge sheet. Particulars of Error of Law a. The Court of Appeal erred when it held that the Appellant in upholding the decision of the Trial Court that the Appellant was guilty of the offence of stealing GH¢119,525.00 which is different from the sum of GH¢149,100.00 stated in the charge sheet. 17 3. The Court of Appeal erred in fact by finding that the Appellant had failed to challenge the findings of the cash counts at the trial court despite evidence on record to the contrary. 4. The Court of Appeal erred in fact by failing to hold that the Appellant herein’s alleged confessions were given under duress. 5. The Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to hold that the Trial Court’s determination that the Appellant herein’s alleged confessions, were not given under duress, without a mini -trial being conducted, was wrongful, despite the Appellant raising same at trial. 6. Further or other grounds of appeal may be filed upon receipt of the record of appeal See pages 234-236 of the ROA. [9] Although the Appellant indicated that further grounds of appeal might be filed, no additional grounds have been brought to the attention of this Court. The appeal shall, therefore, be determined on the five substantive grounds of appeal filed. It is noteworthy that the relief sought by the Appellant is an order setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, which conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. [10] As indicated, my opinion is focused only on Grounds Four and Five of the Grounds of Appeal, the substance of which concerns the Appellant’s complaint that both the trial court and the first appellate court failed to properly address the confession statement and its admissibility. The Appellant calls upon this Court, inter alia, to review 18 the decisions of the two courts below on the ground that the trial court ought to have conducted a mini-trial before admitting the said statement in evidence. iii. The Court of Appeal Decision: [11] On the question of the admissibility of the Investigation Caution Statement (Exhibit J), which contained the Appellant’s admission that he had stolen GH¢124,000.03, and the Undertaking (Exhibit G), which contained an acknowledgment of the shortage of GH¢149,100.00, the first appellate court further stated at pages 231-232 of the ROA as follows: “The respondent placed so much weight on the alleged confessions made by the appellant in his investigation cautioned statement (exhibit J) and in the undertaking (exhibit G) signed by him. Indeed, in exhibit J, the appellant confessed to stealing GH¢124,000.00 from his employer. In exhibit G, he admitted that an amount of GH¢149,000.00 had been “suppressed” under his watch at the Hamile branch of the bank. In each case, he undertook to make good the shortfall. It is a well-beaten path of criminal law that an extra judicial statement voluntarily made by an accused is binding on him. We found that the confessions in the documents aforementioned were made voluntarily by the appellant. The confession statement in th e further confession statement, exhibit J, was made in the presence of an independent witness. Counsel for the appellant suspected foul play in that document for the reason that the said statement was thumb printed by the appellant who usually and prior to that statement, signed all his documents. Once the appellant did not deny ownership of the thumbprint, its presence alone, instead of his signature, was not enough to negate the confession made therein, if he voluntarily made the statement. 19 The undertaking was made by the appellant when he was unfettered and enjoyed his freedom of movement. His own witness, Taame Ngmentema (DW1) told the court that he convinced the appellant to accept liability for the sum of GH¢149,000.00. After that, he led him to Circuit Court to prepare the undertaking. There was no doubt therefore that the undertaking was made voluntarily by the appellant” iv. Summary of Arguments of the Parties: Appellant’s Submissions: [12] Counsel for the Appellant began his submissions by restating the well-established principle that an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Relying on Article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution and sections 10(2), 11(2), and 15(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), he submitted that both the evidential and legal burdens remained on the prosecution. He cited Commissioner of Police v Isaac Antwi [1961] GLR 408 and Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) 25 Cr App R 72 at 95, emphasising that the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt. [13] On Grounds four and five which speak to the admissibility of the confession statements, Counsel for the Appellant submits that Exhibits G and J were obtained under duress and, accordingly, could not lawfully be relied upon. He relies on section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), which renders a confession inadmissible unless it is made voluntarily. Counsel further relies on section 120(4)(b) and (c), which provide that a statement is involuntary where it is induced by cruel or inhuman conditions, phy sical suffering, or by a threat or promise made by a public official or a person interested in the outcome of the proceedings. In support of his submissions, Counsel cites, inter alia, Republic v. Kwashie & Another [1971] 1 GLR 488; Agyekum v. The Republic [1975] 2 GLR 99; 20 Republic v. Agyiri [1982-83] GLR 251; The State v. Sem [1962] 1 GLR 77; Konkomba v. The State [1965] GLR 698; Ekow Russel v. The Republic (J3/5/2014) (13 July 2016); Amponsah v. The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 98; and Frimpong alias Iboman v. The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297. [14] With regard to Exhibit J, Counsel contends that the statement was not authored by the Appellant. He points to the opening language of the statement, which refers to the Appellant in the third person before subsequently addressing him in the second person: “I suspect Albert Diyuoh Faalongbasoglo wish to make statement ... You are reminded of your legal right to consult a counsel of your choice.” Counsel submits that, if the statement were genuinely authored by the Appellant in the first person, it would instead have stated, “I wish to make a statement” and “I am reminded of my legal right.” He argues that the language employed in the statement is indicative of the fact that it was scripted by the investigator and that the Appellant’s thumbprint was procured u nder coercion. Counsel further submits that the Appellant did not read Exhibit J before affixing his thumbprint to it. [15] As regards Exhibit G, Counsel for the Appellant submits that the undertaking and payment schedule contained therein were likewise produced under continuing duress. He contends that, once the voluntariness of the confession evidence was challenged, the trial court was required to conduct a voir dire or mini -trial to determine whether the statements had been made voluntarily. In support of this submission, Counsel relies on Frimpong v. The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297, which, he argues, sets out the procedural safeguards applicable to statements made by persons who are arrested, restricted, or detained. 21 [16] Counsel further submits that the failure to object at the precise moment the statements were tendered in evidence was not fatal to the Appellant’s case. He relies on section 8 of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323, which empowers a court to exclude inadmissible evidence on its own motion, as well as section 52(b) of the same Act, which permits the exclusion of evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Respondents’ Submissions: [17] In response, the Respondent contends that Exhibits G and J were made voluntarily and accepts that both constitute confessions within the meaning of section 120 of NRCD 323. The Respondent, however, maintains that the statutory requirements for their admissibility were satisfied. [18] With respect to Exhibit G, the Respondent argues that the statement was not made to a public officer and was given on 9 and 10 July 2018, at a time when the Appellant was on bail and was neither under arrest nor subject to any restriction or detention. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the only applicable requirement was that the statement be made voluntarily. Relying on Duah v The Republic [1987-88] 1 GLR 343 (CA), the Respondent contends that a confession made outside a situation of arrest, restriction, or detention is admissible once the prosecution establishes that it was not obtained through fear or by reason of any hope of advantage held out by a person in authority. 22 [19] As regards Exhibit J, the Respondent submits that although the statement was made while the Appellant was under arrest, it was taken in the presence of an independent witness, Reyana Dery Farouk of Dondoli, who certified that the statement was made volunta rily and that the Appellant understood its contents. The Respondent relies on Ekow Russel v The Republic (supra) and Frimpong v The Republic (supra) in support of the importance of confession evidence and the statutory requirements under section 120 of NRCD 323. [20] The Respondent further argues that the Appellant did not object to the tendering of Exhibit J and did not cross -examine PW2 on any allegation of coercion at the time it was tendered. Instead, the allegation of coercion was raised only during cross - examination, after the Appellant had relied on Exhibit J as evidence that he had requested an audit. The Respondent therefore characterises the allegation of coercion as an afterthought that ought not to be accepted. [21] The Respondent also disputes the Appellant's reliance on section 8 of NRCD 323, citing Republic v High Court (Criminal Division 1), Accra, Ex parte Stephen Kwabena Opuni; Attorney-General (Interested Party) (2021) JELR 109037 (SC) and In re Okine (Decd); Dodoo and Another v Okine and Others (2004) JELR 68329 (SC) [2003 -2005] 1 GLR 630. The Respondent relies on these authorities for the proposition that a court's power to exclude evidence suo motu is limited to evidence that is inadmissible per se. [22] According to the Respondent, Exhibit J was not inadmissible per se, as no statutory provision rendered the statement inadmissible on its face. Rather, its admissibility depended on the facts and circumstances surrounding its making. The Respondent 23 therefore submits that, in the absence of an objection when Exhibit J was tendered, the trial court was not required to exclude it suo motu. Accordingly, the Respondent maintains that the trial court was entitled to admit Exhibit J and rely on it in determining the case. v. My Opinion & Analysis: [23] My Lords, as stated above Grounds 4 and 5 of the appeal challenge the admissibility of Exhibits G and J on the ground that they were obtained involuntarily. The Appellants further contend that the Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to hold that the tr ial court ought to have conducted a mini -trial or voir dire to determine the voluntariness of the alleged confessions before relying on them. In essence, both grounds challenge the admissibility of Exhibits G and J, which are out -of-court statements tendered to establish the truth of their contents and would, ordinarily, be inadmissible as hearsay. [24] A confession is an out-of-court statement made by an accused person admitting a matter that constitutes, forms an essential part of, or provides a basis for inferring the commission of the offence charged. Under section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), a confession constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible only if it was made voluntarily. Where the accused is under arrest, restriction, or detention by the State, additional safeguards apply, including the presence and certificat ion of an independent witness who understands the relevant language and is able to read and understand the statement. In Ekow Russel v. The Republic (supra), Akamba JSC similarly described a confession as an express acknowledgment by an accused person of the truth of the main fact charged or of an essential part thereof. 24 [25] A confession constitutes incriminating evidence because it amounts to an admission by the accused of having committed a crime. For this reason, the law requires that a confession be made voluntarily, be reliable, and be obtained in accordance with the prescribed procedural safeguards. Under section 120(4) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), a confession is inadmissible where it is procured through external pressure recognised by law, including cruel or inhuman treatment, physical suffering, threats, promises, fear of prejudice, or the hope of advantage held out by a person in authority or by a person interested in the outcome of the case. [26] Where a statement is made while the accused is under arrest, restriction, or detention by the State, section 120(2) imposes an additional safeguard. The statement must be made in the presence of an independent witness who understands the language spoken by the accused and is able to read and understand the language in which the statement is recorded. Where the statement is in writing, the independent witness must certify that it was made voluntarily in his or her presence and that its contents were fully understood by the accused. [27] Where the accused challenges the voluntariness of the statement, the court is required to conduct a voir dire, or mini -trial, to determine whether the statement was made voluntarily before admitting it in evidence. The procedure is therefore applicable where the accused contends that the statement was obtained under duress or other improper influence, or was otherwise not made voluntarily. Where, however, the accused simply denies having made the statement at all, the issue is ordinarily one of whether the statement was made by the accused, rather than one of voluntariness, and may therefore fall to be determined as a matter of fact at the trial. 25 [28] My understanding of the law is that a mini -trial is not required merely because a confession is sought to be tendered in evidence. An accused person or counsel must object to the tendering of the confession at the time it is sought to be admitted in evidence. It is upon such an objection that the court is mandated to conduct a mini -trial to determine whether the confession was made voluntarily and in compliance with section 120 of the Evidence Act. However, where the complaint relates merely to inaccuracies in the statement, or where no objection is raised on the ground of involuntariness at the time the statement is tendered, the statement may be admitted, with the objection going to its weight. The accused may then cross -examine the relevant witness on the alleged inaccuracies. See Asare alias Fanti v. The State [1964] GLR 70–77. [29] Nevertheless, an accused person who fails to object at the time the confession is tendered may still lead evidence in his or her defence to establish that the statement was not made voluntarily. The accused may also subpoena and cross -examine the independent witness on the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. Accordingly, the admissibility of an alleged confession may be raised as part of the defence, in which case the judge is duty-bound to consider the issue in the judgment. This is consistent with section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), which provides that: “Evidence that would be inadmissible if objected to by a party may be excluded by the Court on its own motion.” [30] Section 8 of the Evidence Act, NRCD 323, empowers the Court, on its own motion, to exclude legally inadmissible evidence. Thus, even on appeal, an appellate court may take notice of the admission of legally inadmissible evidence and exclude it, 26 notwithstanding the absence of an objection. However, where evidence relating to an unpleaded fact is admitted without objection, and is not inadmissible per se, the Court is entitled to consider it in assessing the merits of the case. An appeal or review may succeed only where it is demonstrated that the admission of such evidence resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice. [31] At pages 156–157 of the Record of Appeal, Exhibit G was tendered and admitted without objection. On 14 April 2021, counsel for the Appellant withdrew from the case, following which the Appellant elected to represent himself, a choice he was entitled to make. The record further shows that, when Exhibit H was tendered on 22 June 2021, the Appellant objected to its admission on the ground of relevance, but the objection was overruled. In respect of Exhibit J, however, there is no indication that the Appellant raised any contemporaneous objection to its admission on the ground of duress or involuntariness. Neither did he cross-examine PW2 on any alleged coercion, oppression, or undue influence in relation to the exhibit. His cross -examination focused principally on the counting of the cash rather than on the voluntariness of the statement. [32] The issue of duress or coercion in relation to the making of Exhibits G and J was raised for the first time when the Appellant opened his defence. At page 170 of the Record of Appeal, the Appellant testified in examination -in-chief that he had been subject ed to severe treatment at the police station and that, in order to secure his liberty, he accepted liability for the shortage of GH¢149,100.00. In light of this evidence, the Court of Appeal properly considered the issue of the admissibility of Exhibits G and J and concluded that they were admissible. 27 [33] With regard to Exhibit J, the Court of Appeal made a clear finding that the statement was voluntarily made in the presence of an independent witness. The Court also considered the Appellant’s contention that the document bore his thumbprint rather than hi s usual signature. In substance, the first appellate court held that, since the Appellant did not deny that the thumbprint was his, the mere fact that the statement bore a thumbprint instead of a signature did not, by itself, invalidate the confession, provided that the statement was voluntarily made. In my view, this conclusion is consistent with section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), which focuses on the voluntariness of a confession and compliance with the applicable statutory safeguards, rather than on whether the accused authenticated the document by means of a signature or a thumbprint. [34] It must be noted that the mere fact that one document was signed while another was thumb -printed cannot, without more, render a confession inadmissible. To hold otherwise would permit a resourceful accused person to sign one document and thumb- print another and thereafter challenge the admissibility of both documents solely on that basis. There is no principle of law that precludes a literate person from signing one document and thumb-printing another. The presence of a signature or thumbprint may, in appropriate circumstances, as in this case raise an inference that the document was executed or adopted by the person whose signature or thumbprint it bears. In a criminal case, however, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, where the authenticity or voluntariness of the document is in issue, that the signature or thumbprint is that of the accused and that the document was voluntarily executed or adopted by him. In the present case, the Appellant did not deny that the signature and thumbprint were his. His contention was merely that they had been obtained under duress. 28 [35] With respect to Exhibit G, the Court of Appeal found that the undertaking was made at a time when the Appellant was unfettered and at liberty. The court further relied on the evidence of the Appellant's own witness, Taame Ngmentema (DW1), who testified that he persuaded the Appellant to accept liability for the sum of GH¢149,000.00 and thereafter accompanied him to the Circuit Court for the preparation of the undertaking. On the basis of this evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded that the undertaking was voluntarily made by the Appellant. [36] My Lords, it is noted that the Court of Appeal rejected the reliability of the subsequent cash count conducted on 6 July 2018, on the ground that it was carried out in the Appellant’s absence and in breach of the bank’s own cash -counting protocol. The Court therefore held that the Appellant could not be held accountable for the sum of GH¢149,100.00 disclosed by that exercise. This finding is significant, as it demonstrates that the Court of Appeal did not simply accept the prosecution’s case in its entirety . Rather, the Court carefully distinguished between the admissibility and voluntariness of the Appellant’s statements, on the one hand, and the weight to be attached to the disputed figure arising from the defective cash count, on the other. [37] The law is that an Appellant seeking to overturn the decision of a lower court must demonstrate an error that has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. Section 5 of the Evidence Act reinforces this principle. A judgment will not be set aside merely on the ground that evidence was erroneously admitted, unless the admission of such evidence resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice. In determining whether that threshold has been met, the Court considers, among other things, whether an object ion could and should have been raised at an earlier stage, whether the ground of objection was clearly 29 stated, whether the evidence ought to have been excluded on that ground, and whether the decision would have been different but for the admission of the evidence. [38] In this case, it is my opinion that even if there was some irregularity in the admission of the confession statements, no substantial miscarriage of justice has been demonstrated. Exhibit J was made in the presence of an independent witness, while Exhibit G was prepared in circumstances which the Court of Appeal found to be inconsistent with coercion. The Appellant also failed to raise any proper contemporaneous objection to the voluntariness of the statements. [39] In any event, the confession statements were not the sole basis for the conviction. They were corroborated by the cash -count evidence, the supervisory report, the query and response, the Appellant’s explanation implicating Yusif Bawa, the separate accounts maintained by the Tumu and Hamile branches, and the absence of any credible report of the alleged theft at Tumu. [40] Although the Appellant’s lack of legal representation required the trial court to exercise greater vigilance in ensuring that his rights were protected, self -representation does not, by itself, render otherwise admissible evidence inadmissible. Nor does it require the court to conduct a mini -trial on the voluntariness of a statement where no objection has been raised and the document is not ex facie inadmissible. [41] In the present case, the record does not disclose any such patent illegality. Exhibit J was made in the presence of an independent witness, and the Appellant did not deny that the thumbprint appearing on it was his. Exhibit G was prepared following the 30 intervention of the Appellant’s own witness and in circumstances which the Court of Appeal found to be inconsistent with coercion. The Appellant’s allegation of duress was, therefore, considered but was not established. [42] The proper conclusion is that Exhibits G and J were admissible, as the Court of Appeal rightly held. Their admissibility, however, did not compel the Court to accept every figure stated therein without scrutiny. The Court of Appeal was entitled to admit and consider the documents while, at the same time, discounting the later figure of GH¢149,100.00 because the cash count from which that figure emerged was procedurally defective. That approach was both careful and legally sound. It preserves the important distinction between admissibility, voluntariness, and evidential weight. [43] It must, however, be observed that, in the present day, with the advancement of technology, questions concerning the admissibility of documents such as confession statements ought, as far as practicable, to be reduced to a vanishing point. While complying with Section 120 of the Evidence Act, nothing prevents an investigator, with the consent of an accused person who is voluntarily making a confession, from recording the alleged confession by audio or video and including the recording as part of the disclosures. Such a practice would reduce objections to confession statements and, more importantly, enhance the transparency, safety, and reliability of the process by which such confessions are obtained. [44] Based on all of the above, I would, dismiss Grounds 4 and 5 of appeal. The Court of Appeal correctly treated the alleged confessional material as admissible, correctly found that the Appellant had failed to establish duress, and correctly held that the 31 absence of a mini -trial did not occasion a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case. The Court’s further caution in refusing to hold the Appellant liable for the later figure of GH¢149,100.00 reinforces, rather than undermines, the soundnes s of its approach. vi. Observations from the Record & Disposition: [45] My Lords, before concluding this opinion, I find it appropriate to make certain observations arising from my review of the Record of Appeal. I do so mindful of the fact that this Court, being the final court of the land, has the authority to give direction s on matters of law and procedure for the guidance of the courts. I specifically wish to address the judgment of the High Court in this case, as contained in the Record of Appeal. The judgment of the trial court appears at page 188 of the Record of Appeal, where it is stated as follows: “JUDGMENT Accused was arraigned before court charge with one count of stealing contrary to section 124 (1) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). On the strength of the evidence adduced before court, the prosecution have proved it’s case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accused accordingly is found guilty of the offence and is hereby convicted. SENTENCE Plea for mitigation of sentence on behalf of accused by Akwasi Arhin Esq as a friend of the court. 32 The prosecutor also submitted that accused be handed the maximum sentence to serve as a deterrence to others. Accused is sentence to a prison term of eighteen (18) months in hard labour” [46] My Lords, what is referred to above, with due deference to the learned Justice, cannot, in my respectful view, properly be regarded as a judgment, as no reasons are given for the conviction of the accused, now the Appellant. It is a fundamental principle of judicial adjudication that a judgment or ruling of a court must do more than merely pronounce the conclusion reached. It must also disclose the reasons that have led the court to prefer one position over another. The judicial function requires a court to demonstrate, with sufficient clarity, the path by which it has moved from the competing arguments and submissions of the parties, as well as the evidence before it, to the conclusion ultimately reached. [47] It cannot be disputed that, at common law, the giving of reasons for a judgment is a fundamental requirement of the judicial process. Although judges and judicial officers are not necessarily required to provide exhaustive or detailed reasons for every aspect of their decision, they are required to demonstrate the reasoning process by which they have connected their findings of fact and the applicable law to the conclusions reached. This is necessary to enable the parties to understand how the ultimate decision was arrived at and, where appropriate, to enable an appellate court to properly review the decision. [48] In the present case, however, the trial judge did not provide any reasons for the conviction. Consequently, there is nothing in the record to reveal the critical link between 33 the facts as found, the applicable law, and the conclusion that the accused person was guilty. In my respectful view, therefore, what is stated above, at page 188 of the ROA, is inherently ambiguous and does not disclose the reasoning process by which the trial judge arrived at the conviction. [49] This Court has consistently disapproved of the practice of issuing judgments that merely state conclusions without disclosing the reasoning upon which those conclusions are based. In Apeah and Another v. Asamoah [2003-2004] SCGLR 226 at 228, this Court explained the principle in the following terms: “Where parties appearing before the appellate judges have filed arguments, cited cases, made submissions and stated their differing positions, the parties would reasonably expect that the appellate court would give indications in the form of reasons as to which of the conflicting positions of the parties had been accepted by the court as the right one. It might not be the best of practices (as the Court of Appeal did in the instant case) to resort to judgment in the form of a memorandum which does not spell out detailed reasons for the stance taken by the appellate justices.” [50] The above dictum even though was directed at appellate proceeding, it nevertheless underscores the obligation of a court to provide reasons for its decision, particularly where the parties have advanced competing arguments and positions on the issues before the court. 34 [51] The Supreme Court of Canada, in another common law jurisdiction, has eloquently and succinctly expressed the rationale for the duty to give reasons in its seminal decision in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at paragraph 22, as follows: “There is a general sense in which a duty to give reasons may be said to be owed to the public rather than to the parties to a specific proceeding. Through reasoned decisions, members of the general public become aware of rules of conduct applicable to their future activities . An awareness of the reasons for a rule often helps define its scope for those trying to comply with it. The development of the common law proceeds largely by reasoned analogy from established precedents to new situations.” [Emphasis mine.] [52] Similarly, in R. v. Morrissey, 22 O.R. (3d) 514, also reported at [1995] O.J. No. 639, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the purpose of requiring a trial judge to give reasons for judgment. Doherty J.A., at p. 525, put it in these terms: “In giving reasons for judgment, the trial judge is attempting to tell the parties what he or she has decided and why he or she made that decision .” [Emphasis mine.] [53] In effect, what is required is a logical connection between the “what” — the decision — and the “why” — the reasons or basis for the decision. In my respectful opinion, therefore, the premise or underpinning of a judge’s decision must be discernible from the judgment, having regard to the evidence adduced and the submissions made by counsel. This is necessary not only to promote transparency and accountability in the administration of justice, but also to enable an appellate court to discern the basis upon 35 which, and the manner in which, the decision was reached, and thereby properly assess whether the decision is sustainable in law and on the evidence. [54] It follows, in my respectful view, that where a judgment merely states the conclusion reached without disclosing the reasoning that led to that conclusion, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate court to properly evaluate the decision and determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal principles to the facts established before it. [55] Against this background, and having regard to the authorities cited above, it is my view that the learned trial judge failed to meet the requisite standard. His decision does not disclose the reasoning or analytical pathway by which he arrived at the concl usions reached. Consequently, the basis upon which those conclusions were founded cannot be adequately discerned from the judgment. While I recognise the challenges that trial judges face in the discharge of their daily duties, in my respectful opinion, th ey must nevertheless endeavour to articulate the reasons for their decisions in a manner that meets the established standards. [56] Having reviewed the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal filed, and the respective statements of case, it is my considered opinion that the Court of Appeal duly discharged its duty as a first appellate court. The Court did not merely or blindly affirm the case of the Prosecution. Rather, it carefully distinguished the defective later cash count from the other evidence on record and affirmed the conviction only to the extent that it was supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. These, therefore, are the reasons 36 why I concur with the opinion expressed in the lead judgment that the appeal ought to be dismissed as being without merit. (SGD.) K. T. ACKAAH-BOAFO (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) COUNSEL YEHODA NII KOTEI KOTEY ESQ. FOR THE APPELLANT ABDUL-SHAQUR SAEED (PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY) FOR THE RESPONDENT WITH JOSHUA SACKEY (PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY) AND ESTHER TETTEH (SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY)