
Reported judgment
Deen v Nicol, 1920-36 ALR S.L. 407
Deen v Nicol is a reported judgment from Sierra Leone in 1920-36. Cite it as 1920-36 ALR S.L. 407. Search it by the party names, the citation 1920-36 ALR S.L. 407, or Sierra Leone reported judgment.
Sierra Leone — African Law ReportsPDF · 152 KB1920-36 ALR S.L. 407Reported judgment
SIERRA LEONE — AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
Deen
v.
Nicol
1920-36 ALR S.L. 407
Proceeding. Reported judgment. Sierra Leone.
DEEN v. NICOL. 192Q-36 ALR S.L. 407
s.c.
DEEN v. NICOL
Supreme Court (Webber, C.J.): December 31st, 1935
[ 1] Civil Procedure - writ of summons - specially indorsed writ - may
only be used by mortgagee to recover possession of land from mortgagor
where attornment clause creating relationship of landlord and tenant: A 5
mortgagee, or his successor in title, cannot proceed by specially indorsed
writ in an action to recover the mortgaged land from a mortgagee in
possession unless the mortgage contains an attornment clause. Although
such a clause is void in certain respects, it is valid to the extent that it
creates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagee lO
and mortgagor, or their successors in title, so as to enable the mortgagee
to initiate proceedings to recover the land by specially indorsed wriL
under the terms of 0.111, r.6(f) of the Supreme Court Rules (cap. 205)
(page 409, lines 17-30).
[2] Landlord and Tenant - creation of tenancy - mortgagor as tenant
attornment clause in mortgage deed essential to create tenancy between 15
mortgagor and mortgagee: See [ 1] above.
[ 3] Mortgage - mortgagee's rights - possession - mortgagee may only
recover possession of land from mortgagor by specially indorsed writ
where attornment clause creating relationship of landlord and tenant:
See [1] above. 20
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for the
recovery of land.
The defendant mortgaged certain premises to another person
who, under the covenant for sale, sold them to the plaintiff. The
conveyance was in fee simple free from incumbrances. The
defendant remained in possession of the premises and refused to
leave, whereupon the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings
by the issue of a writ of summons specially indorsed under the
Supreme Court Rules (cap. 205), O.III, r.6 in which, by virtue of
O.XIV, r.l of the same Rules, he applied for liberty to enter final
judgment for recovery of the land.
The defendant contended that, as there was no attornment
clause in the mortgage deed between himself and the plaintiff, no
relationship of landlord and tenant existed between them, and
therefore the plaintiff could not proceed against her on a special
indorsement of the writ .. The plaintiff did not deny that there was
no attornment clause, but contended that since the Conveyancing
Act, 1881 an attornment clause must be implied, and that the
defendant, being in default of payment, was merely a tenant at
sufferance.
407
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THE AFRICAN LAW REPORTS
The court gave judgment for the defendant.
Cases referred to:
(1) Casey v. Hellyer (1886), 17 Q.B.D. 97; 54 L.T. 103.
5 (2) Daubuz v. Lavington (1884), 13 Q.B.D. 34 7; 51 L.T. 206.
(3) Kemp v. Lester, [1896] 2 Q.B. 162; (1896), 74 L.T. 268.
Legislation construed:
Supreme Court Rules (Laws of Sierra Leone, 1925, cap 205), 0.111, r.6:
The relevant terms of this rule are set out at page 408, line 31-page 409,
10 line 2.
WEBBER, C.J.:
This is a summons under the Supreme Court Rules (cap. 205),
O.XIV, r.l in which the plaintiff asks that he be at liberty to sign
final judgment in this action against the defendant for possession
15 of the land referred to in the indorsement on the writ ..
By his affidavit counsel for the plaintiff stated that by an
indenture of mortgage dated Aprilllth, 1935, certain premises at
No. 65 Sackville Street were mortgaged by the defendant to one
George and that, in the exercise of the covenant for sale, the
20 premises were sold and the plaintiff became the purchaser to
whom a conveyance in fee simple free from incumbrances was
granted.
The ground of the action was that the defendant continued in
possession and has refused to give up possession. In the affidavit
25 reference is made to a letter written by the defendant's solicitor
asking for time up to December 31st, 1935 for the defendant
to quit the premises.
The plaintiff is now proceeding by special indorsement under
the Supreme Court Rules (cap. 205), O.III, r.6 which reads as
30 follows:
"In all actions where the plaintiff seeks to recover a debt
or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant,
with or without interest, arising ... (f) in actions for the re
covery of land, with or without a claim for rent or mesne
35 profits by a landlord against a tenant whose term has expired
or has been duly determined by notice to quit, or has become
liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent, or against persons
claiming under such tenant, the writ of summons may at the
option of the plaintiff, be specially indorsed with a statement
40 of his claim or of the remedy or relief to which he claims to
be entitled. Such special indorsement shall be to the effect of
408
DEEN v. NICOL, 192o--36 ALR S.L. 407
s.c.
such of the Forms in Appendix C, Section IV., as shall be
applicable to the case."
The defendant's counsel contends that there is no attornment
clause in the mortgage deed and consequently no relationship
exists, as between landlord and tenant .. To this contention the
plaintiff refers me to para. 7 of the affidavit which, he says,
estops the defendant denying such relationship. I was referred to
the cases of Casey v. Hellyer (1); Daubuz v. Lavington (2); Kemp v.
Lester (3); and it was contended that without an attornment
clause the plaintiff cannot proceed on a special indorsement of the
writ. Plaintiff's counsel, who did not deny that there was no
attornment clause, contended that since the Conveyancing Act,
1881 an attornment clause must be implied and that the defendant
was merely a tenant at sufferance.
I have given careful consideration to these arguments and I have
come to the conclusion on the authorities quoted that the
defendant's contention is correct. An attornment clause is inserted
in mortgages by an occupying owner in order to give the mort
gagee the remedies incident to his position as landlord. Formerly
the mortgagor attorned tenant at rent equal to the value of
interest which gave the mortgagee a power to distrain for the
interest. This is now void but, and a very great and important but,
it is not void for other purposes.
An attornment clause in a mortgage is essential to create a
relationship of landlord and tenant and it is this which enables a
mortgagee to avail himself of the appropriate summary procedure
for recovery of possession. Under the circumstances I can find
nothing here to justify using the summary procedure permissible
under 0.111, r.6 and I must therefore dismiss the motion with costs
to be taxed and direct pleadings. As to the point of estoppel taken
by the plaintiff in reference to para. 7 of his affidavit, I do not
thirik that this can be regarded as an admission of the relationship
of landlord and tenant. Order accordingly
409
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