
Judgment
Boham v Tettey (J4/05/2025) [2025] GHASC 97 (17 December 2025)
Boham v Tettey is a judgment from Ghana on 17 December 2025. Cite it as [2025] GHASC 97. Search it by the party names, the citation [2025] GHASC 97, or Ghana judgment.
GhanaPDF · 455 KB[2025] GHASC 97Judgment
December 17, 2025
GHANA
Boham
v.
Tettey
J4/05/2025
[2025] GHASC 97
Proceeding. Judgment. Ghana.
1
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
ACCRA - A.D. 2025
CORAM: LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) JSC (PRESIDING)
ASIEDU JSC
DARKO ASARE JSC
DZAMEFE JSC
ADJEI JSC
CIVIL APPEAL
NO. J4/05/2025
17TH DECEMBER, 2025
YOOFI BOHAM …… DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT
VRS
MUSTAPHA ADJIN TETTEY …… PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
2
LOVELACE-JOHNSON JSC:-
The designation of the parties at the High Court will be maintained in this appeal.
The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for the following reliefs
(a) Declaration of title to all that piece of land being and lying at Abosso Okai near Mataheko in
the Greater Accra Region of Ghana and bounded on the North East by Victor Nettey’s land
measuring 60 feet more or less, on the North West by Victoria Elemo Adade vor’s land
measuring 116 feet more or less, on the South West by a proposed road measuring 60 feet
more or less, on the South East by a proposed road measuring 110 feet more or less and
covering an approximate area of 0.16 acres which said piece of land is more particularly
delineated on the plan which shows the relevant measurements.
(b) Recovery of possession of the said parcel of land
(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the defendant whether by himself, his agents, servants
workmen, assigns or anybody however described who drives authority from defendant from
interfering with plaintiff’s use of the said land.
(d) General damages for trespass
(e) Cost
The defendant denied this claim and further counterclaimed for declaration of title to the
land claimed by the plaintiff, damages for trespass, recovery of possession of any portion
3
of the land entered upon by the plaintiff, an order for plaintiff to remove all offending
structures on the land and perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff, his agents, and
assigns from ever entering the land
At the end of the hearing the trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The Defendant
appealed against the said judgment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the judgment of the trial High Court. Still dissatisfied, the defendant has launched
the present appeal on the following ground:
a. The judgment is against the weight of evidence
The defendant stated that other grounds of appeal would be filed upon receipt of the record
of appeal. No such were filed. The relief sought is “that the whole judgment be set aside
and judgment entered in favour of the Defendant/Appellant”
The present appeal will therefore be considered on the omnibus ground earlier stated.
This court has stated ad nauseum that notwithstanding the duty of an appellate court to go
through the entire record to determine if the findings and conclusions in the judgment on
appeal are borne out by all the evidence led, it is the appellant appealing on this ground
who has to pinpoint any alleged lapses in the said judgment which will trigger this process.
The appellate court on its own does not embark on a fishing expedition, so to speak, looking
for reasons to set a judgment aside.
See the case of Republic vs. Conduah ex parte Aaba (substituted by Asmah) [2013-2014] 2
SCGLR 1032 and a host of other cases which discuss this duty on an appellant in such
circumstances.
4
What are these lapses complained of by the defendant? Has he been able to satisfy this court
that, these lapses, if there are indeed any such, would , if cured, change the conclusion or
judgment given against him in this matter and make him the successful party?
The summary of the defendant’s complaints in this regard as gleaned from his somewhat
haphazard statement of case are as follows
i) The trial court failed to call a witness from the Land Title Registry Division and
the Regional Director of Survey and Mapping Division of The Lands Commission
before concluding that the Land Title certificate of the defendant was invalid
raises ‘serious p rocedural and evidentiary concerns’ and so the refusal of the
Court of Appeal to subpoena officers from these Divisions amounts to a serious
omission which omission denied the court an opportunity to interrogate the
authenticity of the certificate and also denied the defendant the opportunity to
rebut the allegation of fraud and irregularity of the said certificate.
ii) The defendant also complains that the trial court on 19th February 2019 had ruled
that a motion for a supplemental witness statement had been struck out as invalid
upon the basis of Practice Direction which had no statutory backing. This
according to the defendant’s counsel can be viewed as a miscarriage of justice
iii) The trial court failed to summon the surveyor who prepared the composite plan
to testify and make himself available for cross examination and thus
‘compromised the integrity of the process’, an act counsel describes as a
‘fundamental procedural error’. Counsel submits that the court of appeal’s failure
to comment on this infraction impacted the fairness and transparency of the
proceedings.
5
iv) There is also a complaint about the disparities in the signature of the plaintiff in
his indenture of 1990 and his witness statement of 2017 and that of his witness on
a payment receipt and the latter’s witness statement. It is submitted by counsel
that th ese raise the possibility of forgery and fraudulent conduct and could
seriously undermine the plaintiff’s credibility and the integrity of the whole case.
v) It is also contended that while the plaintiff stated in his address at the Court of
Appeal that publication of defendant’s land title was done on 1 st January 1997, it
was actually done on 18th January as per exhibit 10. It is submitted that this was a
contradiction in the plaintiff’s case and yet the court relied heavily on this date to
discredit the defendant’s evidence. The affirmation of this finding by the Court
of Appeal, it is submitted, shows a failure of due diligence on that court’s part
because it took the plaintiff’s unsupported assertion at face value without taking
into account critical details which could have ‘significantly impacted’ its
conclusion. This was a serious error of jud gment on the part of the Court of
Appeal which has resulted in an ‘inaccurate and unjust conclusion’ regarding the
defendant’s Land Title Certificate, his counsel submits.
The Plaintiff’s answer to all the submissions by the defendant is simple. It is contended that
all the issues raised are not part of the evidence on record and since the omnibus ground of
appeal relates to evidence on record, then they are not relevant or appropriate for arguing
such under this ground of appeal. It is submitted that ‘the defendant instead catalogued
pieces of evidence he intended to call but failed to do so’.
The above submission, respectfully is incorrect. Any fact, document or testimony admitted
in court forms part of the evidence on record so a newspaper publication, a failure to have
a witness cross examined, or the wrong evaluation of any testimony can be raised under the
6
omnibus ground as a lapse whose cure can lead to a different conclusion in the case. To
accept the very limited scope of the omnibus ground proffered by counsel for the plaintiff
will lead to injustice
The question to be answered at this stage is whether the alleged lapses are such as will
change the judgment of the Court of Appeal should they be found proven. It is to be borne
in mind that not all proven lapses, even if corrected will affect the outcome of an appeal.
One must also bear in mind this court’s admonition to be slow to interfere with concurrent
findings of fact made by a trial court and confirmed by a first appellate court unless these
findings are clearly at variance with the evidence on record or contrary to law. See the case
of Sylvia Gregory vs. Nana Kwesi Tandoh IV [2010] SCGLR 971
In sum, the lapses the defendant complains of, shorn of all the many submissions are four
and relate to the failure of the trial court to call certain officials from the Lands Commission
to testify, the striking out of his supplemental witness statement, the failure of the Surveyor
to testify and the dependence on the wrong publication date of a newspaper. It is alleged
that the Court of Appeal’s judgment became tainted by the same complaints through its
affirmation of the judgment of the High Court.
What did the court of appeal say on these issues in its judgment?
The defendants first additional ground of appeal before the Court of Appeal related to the
failure of the trial court to subpoena the Regional Director of survey and Mapping at the
Land’s Commission. This is what the first appellate court stated at page 204 of the record of
appeal [ROA]
7
“……we find it necessary to touch on those grounds of appeal without plentiful words in
disposing of them………..The issuance of a Land Title certificate is premised on the fact that
an applicant submitted a foundational document being an indenture or any docu ment
recognised under law by the Lands Commission for registration. From the evidence, the
appellant had none to submit before the Lands Commission.
Therefore the finding by the trial Judge at page 147 of the record of appeal that there was no
document registered or unregistered purporting to convey the land to the appellant……for
which reason the title certificate had no credibility but tainted cannot be impeached….…The
non invitation extended to the Regional Surveyor of the Survey and Mapping
Division under that circumstances did not occasion any injustice to the appellant”
We agree with the conclusion that this lapse, if it can be called such, did not occasion any
injustice to the defendant. This is because, the evidence of this witness could not have cured
the absence of a document which should have been a basis for the defendant’s land tile
certificate, secondly he had a counterclaim which he had to prove and win on its merits by
producing relevant evidence. He was at liberty to call witnesses he felt needed to succeed
on his counterclaim. The court and plaintiff were not under any duty to call witnesses to
help make his case. Nothing stopped him from subpoenaing the surveyor who drew up a
composite plan to come and testify in court in support of his case.
The trial court’s statement that there was clearly no dispute as to the identity of the land the
subject matter of dispute was justified in the light of paragraph 3 of plaintiffs statement of
claim and Paragraph 1(a) of the Defendants Counterclaim which show that the parties were
disputing over the same land.
“Plaintiff’s Paragraph 3
That Plaintiff says that he is the owner of a piece of land being and lying at
Abossay Okai near Mataheko in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana and
8
bounded on the North East by Victor Nettey’s land measuring 60 feet more or
less, on the North West by Victoria Elemo Adadevor’s land measuring 116 feet
more or less, on the South West by a proposed road measuring 60 feet more or
less, on the South East by a proposed measuring 110 feet more or less and
covering an approximate area of 0.16 acres which said piece of land is more
particularly delineated on the plan which shows the relevant measurements.
Defendant’s Paragraph 1(a)
Declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land described in schedule to
statement of claim”
The court in its discretion chose not to call the surveyor to tender his report, which, in any
case, the court was not bound by. As stated earlier, nothing stopped defendant from calling
this officer of the Lands Commission as a witness.
It is for these reasons that we affirm the finding of the court of appeal that the defendant
suffered no miscarriage of justice in respect of these inactions on the part of the trial court.
The court cannot comprehend the submissions by counsel for the defendant about his
supplementary witness statement which was allegedly struck out by the High Court as
invalid. Counsel refers this court to a ruling by that court at page 61 of the ROA whose
subject matter is rather a refusal for a composite plan to be drawn. The ruling in question
states as follows:
“it is observed that on the Pre -Trial Check List of Defendant, a request has
been made for an order for composite plan to be drawn. Looking at the nature
of the reliefs sought and the counterclaim of Defendant, it is clear to me that
9
the Parties are talking about the same piece of land. I will therefore turn down
that request”.
The record shows that this supplementary statement was struck out, rightly, because it was
filed without leave. If the defendant was minded so to do, he could have sought leave to
have that statement form part of the record. In any case this was not a grou nd of appeal
raised before the Court of Appeal.
Regarding the issue of the alleged publication of the required notice on a public holiday,
the Court of Appeal did indeed state that the publication was done on 1 st January 1997, a
confirmation of the position taken by the high court in its judgment. A careful study of
Exhibit 10 shows that the publication was done on Saturday, January 18 1997. Clearly then
both the High Court and Court of Appeal were mistaken about this date. The Court of
Appeal’s statement that
‘As to how 1st January being a public holiday there was any newspaper in circulation….’
is not borne out by the record. The defendant’s complaint in this regard has merit and is
upheld.
Does this proven la pse affect the judgment of the Court of Appeal? Will correction of the
date of the publication lead to judgment being given for the defendant on his counterclaim?
It is our considered opinion that it will not, for the simple reason that, the record shows that
the publication was done years after the defendant had acquired a Land Title Certificate!
Exhibit 9, the land Title certificate was issued on 8 th January 1992. The publication which
was required by law to be done before its issuance for the purpose of giving notice to the
world so that any affected party could file a caveat, was done on 18 th January 1997, about
five years thereafter! So long as the publication was done after the issue of the certificate,
10
the Court of Appeal was right in its affirmation of the High Court’s finding that exhibit 9
was not genuine. At the very least, it was compromised and could not carry any weight.
In conclusion, in relation to the defendant’s complaints, with the exception of that relating
to the date of publication earlier discussed, which we have found does not affect the
conclusion of the Court of Appeal, we are satisfied that the standard laid d own in In Re
Republic v Conduah supra and similar cases, has not been met. In other words, the
defendant has NOT been able to satisfy this court that certain pieces of evidence had been
wrongly applied against him or/and incorrectly or improperly applied by the court.
A quick evaluation of the evidence led by the defendant in support of his counterclaim as
against that led by the plaintiff in support of his claim at the trial justifies the affirmation by
the Court of Appeal of the findings by the High Court.
The record shows that the plaintiff led credible evidence about how he acquired the land
from on Kwaku Okyere in 1990 who had acquired it from E A B Brock in 1989, and whose
title was registered at the Land Title Registry. An indenture was executed on the transaction
and tendered in court as exhibit B. The appearance of the name of one John Kwame Donkor
was sufficiently explained away, to the satisfaction of the trial court by the plaintiff and did
not appear to remove from his case.
On the other hand, defendant pleaded that he acquired the land in 1984 from one Yartey
Ansah who had also acquired it from one “Nathaniel Nii Brock on behalf of his father namely E.
A. B. Brock the owner of the land” in 1984. See paragraph 2 of the Statement of Defence
However during his cross examination in court, he said he got the land from E. A. B. Brock.
Crucially, the defendant was unable to tender any lease of the land to him from Yartey
Ansah or the Brocks. It was implied in one of his exhibits, a letter from his counsel, exhibit
6, that an indenture was executed between him and Yartey Ansah Anan but it could not be
11
traced at the Lands Department. Exhibit C, the search report does not mention him as
having acquired this land from Yartey Ansah or anybody. His name does not appear on it.
He also failed to adduce any similar evidence acceptable under the evidence Act an d the
law relating to his acquisition of the land in dispute.
Without such evidence his counterclaim crumbled because his claim of title had no basis. It
could not be resurrected by his Land title certificate which the trial court found was not
genuine, a finding affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The absence of the re quired evidence
proving his root of title sounded the death knell of his case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is definitely supported by the evidence on record
In conclusion we find no merit in this appeal and d ismiss it. The judgment of the Court of
Appeal dated 15th June 2023 is hereby affirmed.
(SGD.) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
12
(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
(SGD.) S. DZAMEFE
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
CONCURRING OPINION
ADJEI JSC:-
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the lead opinion of my sister and the president
of the panel, Lovelace -Johnson (Ms.), JSC to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I
agree with the reasons and the conclusion reached. I, however, wish to provide this opinion
in support of the lead judgment.
The Plaintiff/Respondent/Respondent hereinafter called the Plaintiff) issued a writ against
the Defendant/Appellant/Appellant (hereinafter called the Defendant) in the High Court
for a declaration of title to a parcel of land at Abosso Okai near Matehoko in Accra, recovery
of possession, perpetual injunction, General damages, and costs.
The Defendant filed his statement of defence and counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for
the same reliefs in respect of the same land. The main dispute before the High Court for
determination was which of the two parties is the owner of the disputed plot. The Plaintiff
13
claimed his root of title through one Kwaku Okyere in 1990, who executed an indenture
and was duly registered at the Lands Commission after a search confirmed that he was the
owner of the plot. The Defendant, on the other hand, averred that he purchased the land
from one Yartey Ansah Annan in 1984, who had also purchased it from Nathaniel Nii Bruce
JN of Osu on behalf of his father, by name E.A.B. Brock. The Defendant also averred that he
has a Land Title Certificate issued to him by the Lands Commission in 1992, following
thorough investigations by the Commission.
On 26th January, 2021, the High Court, after having heard the parties, granted all the reliefs
sought by the Plaintiff, and dismissed the Defendant’s counterclaim as unproven. The
Defendant, dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, filed an appeal against it on 7th May,
2021, to the Court of Appeal, praying for the reversal of the judgment and for the Court to
enter judgment in his favor.
The original notice of appeal contained the omnibus grounds of appeal only, and the
Defendant sought leave from the Court of Appeal to file additional grounds of Appeal,
which was granted on 16th May, 2023. The additional grounds of appeal were as follows:
“(1) The learned trial Judge’s failure to subpoena the Regional Director of Survey
and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission deprived the Court the opportunity
to explain the technical information and explanation of any perceived irregularities
which influenced the learned trial judge’s conclusion that the defendant/ appellant’s
land title certificate was fraudulently obtained.
(2)The learned Trial Judge having on the 8th day of March, 2018 ordered the Regional
Surveyor of the Survey and Mapping Division of the Lands Commission to draw up
a composite plan of the disputed lands, erred when he failed to subpoena him to
court to tender the composite plan in evidence.
14
(3) The learned trial judge failed to examine critically the patent disparities in the
signatures of the plaintiff in his indenture dated 29th July, 1990 and his witness
statement of 25th July, 2017.
“Disparities in the signature of the Plaintiff (a) on the indenture dated 29th July,
1990 as compared with his signature on his witness statement. Signature of
Plaintiff’s Witness Statement Samuel Adjei on payment receipt as compared with
Witness Statement dated 25th July, 2017.”
The Court of Appeal granted leave to the Defendant to file his written submission out of
time on 8th November, 2022, and he filed the same on 14th November, 2022. The Plaintiff
also filed his written submission in answer on 30th November, 2022. The Court o f Appeal,
in its unanimous judgment delivered on 15th June, 2023, discussed all the grounds of appeal
together with the written submissions of the respective parties and dismissed the entire
appeal as unmeritorious.
The Defendant, dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal's unanimous decision, filed a notice
of appeal against it on 23rd June, 2023. The notice of appeal contains only the omnibus
ground of appeal; thus, the judgment is against the weight of evidence. The De fendant is
inviting this Court to evaluate the entire evidence on record, correct all factual errors and
legal matters which require factual evidence to resolve them, apply the applicable burden
of proof, and come to an appropriate conclusion. The Appellan t, who alleges that a
judgment is against the weight of evidence on record, is required to direct the appellate
court to the alleged errors or lapses contained in the impugned judgment for the errors or
the lapses to be corrected in accordance with the law . Notwithstanding that the burden is
on the appellant to demonstrate the errors complained of to the appellate court, the court
equally has the right to point out and discuss factual errors or lapses and legal matters that
require facts to resolve them whe n they are indeed against the weight of the evidence on
15
record and require correction, and the correction is wholly unanswerable. However, where
the lapses or the errors are answerable, it would be desirable for the appellate court to allow
the parties to submit on the issue.
The Defendant, who has appealed to this Court and asserting that the judgment is against
the weight of evidence, did not quote a single case to support his appeal; however, the
Plaintiff discussed cases on the subject matter, including Tuakwa v Bosom [2001 -2002]
SCGLR 61, In Re Republic v Conduah; Ex parte Aaba (Substituted by Asmah [2013-2014] 2
SCGLR 1032, and Akuffo Addo v Catherine [1992] 1 GLR 377, SC.
The Defendant alleges that the Court of Appeal relied mainly on documents tendered by
the Plaintiff, and that he suffered as a result of the loss of his papers on the land, which were
reported to the Executive Secretary of the Lands Commission and could no t be recovered.
The exhibit ’6” is the letter written by the Defendant to the Executive Secretary of the Lands
Commission, and the relevant part of it is paragraphs 2-4, which provide as follows:
“It would appear that the indenture of conveyance was executed by my client, and
cannot also be traced at the Lands Commission.
Of late another Mr. Brock has purported to dispose of this same land to somebody
else but the matter is being resolved.
This letter is to ask you most humbly to instruct that no one else is allowed to
register a document affecting this land in the meantime.”
The letter rather exposes the Defendant who claimed to have title deeds covering the
disputed land. He was not sure whether an indenture had been executed in respect of the
land, and stated that it appeared to him that one had been executed but could not be traced.
The Defendant could not conduct a search to satisfy himself that an indenture had been
prepared for the land. A search certificate tendered into evidence and admitted without an
16
objection traces the root of title to the land and all registered interests affecting it. The
registered interests on the land from 1957 to date do not mention the Defendant and his
grantor, and they have not acquired any interest in the land for his grantor to transfer same
to him. From the search certificate, a conveyance dated 30/11/1957 from Mary A. Allotey to
Edmund Alphonso Banor Brock. A conveyance dated 09/03/1989 from Edmund Alphonso
Banor Brock to Kwaku Okyere. A conveyance dated 29/07/1990 from Kwaku Okyere to
Mustapha Adjin -Tettey. A conveyance dated 21/08/2004 from Mustapha Adjin -Tettey to
John Kwame Donkor.
The root of the title excludes both the Defendant and his grantor, and his assertion that it
appeared to him that he had a conveyance in respect of the land is false. The legal effect of
the search remains unchanged, even though it was conducted in 2018, when the prevailing
law was the Land Title Registration Act, 1986 (PNDCL 152). Section 56 (1) and (3) of the
repealed Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL 152), which is on the legal effect of a
search certificate, provides thus:
“(1) A person seeking information concerning a parcel of land or an interest in land
registered under this Act or matters incidental to the parcel or the interest may apply
to the Land Registrar to inspect a register, a sheet of the registry map on an
instrument or a plan filed in the Registry and containing the information on the days
and during the hours and subject to the conditions that may be prescribed.
(3)A person referred to in subsection (1) may apply in the prescribed form to the land
registrar to make an official search in the land register or the registry map and the
land registrar shall issue to the applicant a certificate of the result of the sear ch,
which shall be presumed to be conclusive of the matters stated in the certificate.”
The above provision has been reproduced verbatim under section 222 of the Land Act, 2020
(Act 1036). It provides thus:
17
“(1) A person seeking information concerning land may apply to the Lands
Commission to conduct a search in the records of the Lands Commission and the
Lands Commission shall, within fourteen days after the payment of the prescribed
fees, issue to the applicant a report of the search.
(2) A search report shall be in the manner specified in Form 9 of the Third Schedule,
and the report shall be presumed to be conclusive of the matters stated in the Form.”
The information on the search report shall be presumed to be conclusive on the matters
stated therein, and there being no contrary evidence from the Defendant to rebut it, it is
conclusively presumed that the land was granted by the Plaintiff’s grantor to the Plaintiff.
We further find and hold that the Defendant did not register any conveyance in respect of
the land in dispute. Both the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal were correct in
holding that ownership of the plot is vested in the Plaintiff, as there is copious evidence on
record to prove same.
This Court, in its previous decision in the case of Suleman Suberu (suing per his lawful
attorney), Amina Suberu v Mrs Esi Davidson and Another, suit No. J4/28/2021, held that
registration under both the Land Title Registration Law, 1986, PNDCL 152, as repealed by
the Land Act, 2020, Act 1036, provides that registration provides conclusive evidence, while
a search result is only an administrative response to an enquiry with no binding effect. The
Court held thus:
“Registrations of title under Land Title Registration Law 1986, PNDCL 152 (now
repealed by the Land Act 2020, Act 1036, with all acts done thereunder saved by
section 282 of Act 1036) provides conclusive evidence of interest in land, while a
search result i s only an administrative response to an enquiry with no binding
effect.”
18
The above ratio is not the position of the law, and we hereby depart from it under Article
129(3) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992. We hold that the legal effect of a search is that the
information contained in it is presumed to be conclusive of same, an d the Defendant has
failed to prove that he once upon a time acquired any interest in the land and registered
same with the Lands Commission.
The Plaintiff explained the basis for the name of his grantee, John Kwame Donkor ,
appearing on the search, which was not controverted. He sold the land to John Kwame
Donkor, who could not pay before his death, and his family gave back the land to the
Plaintiff. At common law, a contract of sale can be varied by itself, and where a sale is made
and the buyer fails to pay for the land, the vendor may sue to recover the purchase price, to
restore the property, or to have the property sold. The explanation offered by the Plaintiff
is justified, and as an equitable owner of the land, he can sue in his own name.
The Defendant further alleged that the trial Court denied him the right to subpoena the
Lands Commission to testify to solicit information on the allegations of fraud and
irregularities relating to the Plaintiff’s signature on the lease and his witness statement,
which were at variance. The accusations against the trial High Court Judge are unfair, as it
is the duty of a party to conduct their case in accordance with the law. There is no evidence
on record that the Defendant filed a subpoena to compel the attendance of the Lands
Commission, which the Court did not enforce. The court also did not deem it essential to
call the Lands Commission as an expert or court witness, and the duty was on the Defendant
to contact the Lands Commission and subpoena them, and he cannot attribute his failure to
the court. The allegations lack merit and are dismissed.
19
The issue regarding the composite plan is without merit, as the trial High Court Judge found
that there is no dispute as to the identity of the land, and he was under no obligation to
make an order he considered irrelevant.
The Defendant complains about a supplementary witness statement which the trial High
Court Judge struck out. Still, his discussions on the subject matter refer to the composite
plan indicated on his Pre -Trial Checklist, which the Judge struck out. All the submissions
on the subject matter are misplaced and same is dismissed as without merit.
The Defendant, who has no lease and claims to have a land title certificate, is impossible. It
is a trite learning that, apart from freehold interest, where there are no covenants, a land
title certificate may be issued; in all leases, a land title certificate cannot be issued without a
registered lease. The Defendant claimed that he had a land title certificate in a leasehold
transaction without a lease, rendering his alleged title certificate fraudulent.
Other grounds put the legitimacy of the Defendant’s alleged land title certificate in question.
They include the fact that it was alleged to have been issued in 1992 when the publication,
which is a condition precedent to precede it, was instead issued on Wednesday, 1st January
1997, a statutory holiday when public newspapers were not published. There is an
irregularity with the land title certificate, which goes to the root. The essence of newspaper
publication to precede the issuance of a land title certi ficate is to give notice to persons
whose interests would be compromised as a result of the registration to file a caveat. Still,
in the case of the Defendant, the certificate was issued over five years before the newspaper
publication that was to give notice.
The general principle on pleadings under Order 11 rule 8 of the High Court (Civil
Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) provides that defences that would take the other party by
20
surprise or would render the other party’s claim or defence not maintainable shall be
pleaded to give the opposite party the right to respond. Still, fraud must be distinguished
from other defences, such as laches and acquiescence, the statute of limitatio ns, and
performance, which are rights that a party can waive in a given case.
The three doctrines, namely, limitations, laches, and acquiescence, are matters that must be
specifically pleaded; otherwise, they may take the opposite party by surprise. A limitation
refers to a statutory time limit for bringing an action and must be rai sed to allow the
opposing party to respond. Laches, on the other hand, is not time -bound but an equitable
doctrine that prevents a party from asserting a right if that person has unreasonably delayed
in pursuing it, thereby causing prejudice to the other p arty. In laches, the courts consider
factors such as the length of the delay in asserting a right, the reasons for the delay, and its
impact on the opposing party. Acquiescence occurs when a person passively or actively
consents to another person’s action by failing to assert or object to a right that could be
inferred from the action or inaction, and has the propensity to bar a claim or defence. The
law requires all three doctrines to be pleaded, and where they are not. Still, evidence is
adduced of same, it cannot be used against the opposite party as it will surprise that party
by making his case not maintainable in law without the opportunity to respond, unlike the
effect of unpleaded but admissible evidence which can be used once it is admissible but
relevant and admitted without objection as discussed in the case of Edward Nasser & Co.
Ltd. v McVroom and Another [1996 -97] SCGLR 468 and Abowaba v Adeshina (1946)12
WACA 18. The settled law is that any matter that will render the opposite party’s action not
maintainable in law, and will come as a surprise, such as statute of limitation, laches, and
acquiescence, must be specifically pleaded to allow the other party to be heard. The matters
that are required to be pleaded, including statute of limitations, laches, acquiescence, fraud,
performance, and release, are rights that may be waived. A party who would like to seize
21
the opportunity to exercise them must plead them, unlike matters of nullity and void, which
can be raised at any time when it is not pleaded.
The case of Dolphine No.3 v Speedline Stevedoring Co. Ltd. and Another [1996-97] SCGLR
514, where the Supreme Court unambiguously stated the position which accords with
common law and the Rules of Court that defences of laches, acquiescence, and statute of
limitation shall be specially pleaded.
In a case where fraud is not pleaded but is apparent on the face of the record, it cannot be
ignored merely because it is a public wrong, and an individual cannot decide to waive it.
Fraud is a scarlet sin and vitiates everything, and where it is apparent on the face of the
record, a court such as the Supreme Court cannot overlook it, and the Defendant’s land title
certificate, which is tainted with fraud, shall be declared null and void. The position of fraud
as discussed above accords with some of the re spectable decisions from this Court,
including Apeah v Asamoah [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 226, Dzotepe v Hahormene III [1987-88]
2 GLR 681, SC, Amuzu v Oklikah [1998-99] SCGLR 141, and Okofoh Estates Ltd v Modern
Signs Ltd [1996-97] SCGLR 233.
All the allegations made against the Court of Appeal in its decision are unfounded and
could not be proved. The Defendant, who has a burden to discharge by proving the errors
or lapses committed by the Court of Appeal, has failed to prove any of them, and we find
that the judgment was decided in accordance with the evidence on record and the
appropriate laws on burden of proof. The appeal is dismissed as without merit, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 15th June, 2023, is hereby affirmed.
22
(SGD.) D. D. ADJEI
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
SAM SETH WOOD ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/APPELLANT.
THOMAS GBLORVU ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT.
