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Bedijo Owita v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.465 of 2026) [2026] UGCA 211 (24 June 2026)

Bedijo Owita v Uganda is a criminal appeal from Uganda on 24 June 2026. Cite it as [2026] UGCA 211. Search it by the party names, the citation [2026] UGCA 211, or Uganda criminal appeal.

UgandaPDF · 3.3 MB[2026] UGCA 211Criminal appeal

June 24, 2026

UGANDA

Bedijo Owita

Appellant

v.

Uganda

Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.465 of 2026

[2026] UGCA 211

Proceeding. Criminal appeal. Uganda.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA HOLDEN AT ARUA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.465 OF 2026 (Arising from Criminal Scssion Case No.086 of 2015) (CORAM: Christopher Goshiraboke, Tibulyn Mtrgoret tnd Cornelia Kakoozo Sabiiti JJA) BEDIJO OWITA APPELLANT VE,IIS[IS UGANDA RESPONDENT (Appeal from the decision of Hon. Justice Namundi Godfrey delivered at the High Court of Artta on l6't'March 2018) JTJDGMI]NT OF COTIIIT Introduction This is a first appeal arising out of the judgement delivered by the High Court of Uganda at Arua on l6'h March 2018 in Criminal Session Case No.086 of 2015, wherein the Appellant was indicted and convicted of the offence of murder contrary to Sections 188 and 189 ofthe Penal Code Act Cap 120 (now Sections 171 and 172 of the Penal Code Act Cap 128). The Appellant was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment and being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, he only appealed against the sentence. Background The Prosecution's case was that in the year 2013, at Dei "B" village Dei parish Panyimur subcounty Nebbi district, the Appellant murdered Angeonga Munguriek Page 1 of u oa q'@yl u, who was his spouse. That in Septernber 201 3, the deceased went missing and after unsuccessful searches, the relatives reporled the matter to Dei police station. That the police later on received inforrnation that the deceased was a lover to the Appellant and conducted a search at the Appellant's house. The postmortem report showed that the head was cut off and that sorne parts of the body were missing. That the Appellant made a charge and caution statement in which he stated that the deceased was his lover who convinced him to have unprotected sexual intercourse but in the month of September 201 3 informed him that her former husband died of H.l.V AIDS and she was under treatment for the same. That they immediately, had a fight and the deceased fell down fiom the bed and died forcing him to bury her inside the house without anyone knowing. The Appellant denied committing the offense and upon trial, the learned Judge convicted him of the offence of murder and sentenced him to 30 years of imprisonment. Ground of Appeal Being dissatisfied with the Judgement, the Appellant appealed against the sentence on the following ground- That the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact when he sentenced the Appellant to 30 years' imprisonment which sentence is manifestly harsh and cxcesslve. Representation At the hearing of this appeal, the appellant was represented by Counsel Ronald Onencan on State brief. The respondent was represented jointly by Nakafeero c' Page 2 of 11 daM Fatinah, Chief State Attorney and Joan Keko, Chief State Attomey tiorn the Office ol the Directoratc olPublic Prosecutions. At the hearing, counsel for the Appellant brought to the attention of the Court the Application (COA-00-CR-CN-0016-2017) filed by the Appellant seeking leave to appeal out tinre or seek to enlarge the tirne within which to file Memorandun.t of Appeal or in the alternative that the Mernorandurn of Appeal already filed on record be validated and adopted by the Court. In reply to this application, counsel stated that they had no objection. Accodingly, the Court granted the Application and validated the Memorandum of Appeal tiled by the Appellant. Counsel for the Appellant further sought leave to appeal against the sentence only pursuant to Section l3l (l ) (b) of the Trial on Indictment Act, Cap 25. This application was not objected to by counsel for the Respondent. Accordingly, the Court granted leave to the Appellant to appeal against the legality and severity of the sentence. Both counsel for the appellant and the respondent flled written submissions, which were duly adopted by the Court as their respective legal arguments in support ofand in opposition to the appeal. DUW of the first Annellate Court It is important that before getting into the merits of this Appeal, we remind ourselves of the duty of the first appellate court. Article l3aQ) of 1995 Constitution read together with Section l0 of the Judicature Act provide that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from such decisions of the High Couft as may be prescribed by law. Rule 30(l) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) provides that the first Appellate Courl has a duty to review and re-evaluate the evidence before the trial Page 3 of 11qi cw l o'{d Court, and through exhaustive scrutiny, draw inferences and reach its own conclusions. Therefore, the Courl of Appeal as the flrst Appetlate Court may reappraise the evidence and draw inferences of fact (Also see Kifamunte Henry v Uganda, (SCCA No. l0 of 1997). Having looked at the duty of the first appellate Court, we will now turn to the merits of this Appeal. Appellant's submissions Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the sentence of 30 years passed by the trial Judge is harsh and excessive in nature, considering the mitigating factors and the need for consistency in sentencing. He relied on a number of authorities such as Baryaijuka Mathias aka Buuli Vs Uganda, CACA No. 419 of 2020 where the learned Justices of this Court held as follows; "ln passing sentence, we have also taken inlo account previous cases of a somewhat similar nature. In Godi v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 3 of 2013) [20151 UGSC 17 the appellant who was 22 years of age at the time he committed the offence of murder was senlence to 25 years' imprisonment. In Kakurucu v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 576 of 20141 120221 UGCA 9l 123 March 20221. the appellant who was 3l years of ages at the time of sentencing had his sentence reduced fron 60 years to 25 years of imprisonment. lnTumwesigye Raubenv UgandaCACA No. l8l of 2013, the appellanl was sentenced to 40 years and on appeal, the sentencewas reduced to 20 years'imprisonment. ll/hile in Atiku Lino v Uganda CACA No. 4l of 2009, the Appellant murdered the deceased by cutting her several times causing her death. He was convicted and sentenced lo life imprisonment and on appeal, the sentence was educed to 20 years imprisonment having considered mitigating factors and the age of the appellant, which was 3l at the time he committed the offence. ll/e sentence lhe appellant to 25 years' Page 4 of u(,1 t't@/ ula imprisonnrent and deduct therefrom the period ofnvo (2) years and six (6) months which he spent on remand. The ap;tellant is thLts sentenced to 22 years and six (6) nonths from 3rd Febrtrary 2017, the date of his conviction..." Counsel also submitted that the Appellant's circumstances leading to the commission of the offence were caused by provocation after learning that the deceased's former husband was an HIV victim. He prayed that this Court invokes section 11 ofthe Judicature Act and reduces the sentence accordingly. Respondent's submissions In response, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the learned trial Judge properly exercised his judicial discretion, considered all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, and passed a legal, just, and proportionate sentence given the fact that a life was lost and the remains of the deceased were recovered a year later having been mutilated and buried. Counsel further submitted that whereas courts ought to apply the principle of consistency, each case presents its own facts upon which Court exercises its discretion of sentencing. c\ Page 5 of 11 j d8 He also argued that the sentence of30 years' imprisonment rneted out to the appellant was neither harsh nor excessive. He relied on sections 188 & I 89 of the penal code ActCapl20((nowSections 171 and l72of the PenalCodeActCap I2Sandthe Constitution (Sentencing Guidelines for Courts of Judicature) (Practice) Directions,20l3, the 3'd Schedule under which the maximum penalty for rnurder is death. He submitted that part one provides the starting point for murder to be 35 years and the sentencing range is 30 years to death. Counsel went on to also cite a number of authorities to show that the sentence imposed by the trial Court was not harsh. He cited the case of Muhoozi Denis and another vs Uganda SCCA No. 29 of 2014 where the Supreme Court confirmed a sentence of 30 years meted for the e-{wr'/ appellants and found it not to be manifestly excessive or manifestly so low as to cause a miscarriage ofjustice. He also cited the case of Karisa Moses vs Uganda SCCA No. 23 of 2016 where the Supreme Coufi upheld the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment of the appellant who was last seen entering the house where the deceased's grandfather was found brutally murdered. He further cited the case of Semaganda Sperito and another vs Uganda CACA no 456. of 2016, where this Court upheld a sentence of50 years on the appellants who had killed their brother whose body was recovered l00 meters away from their home. Counsel prayed that this honorable court upholds the sentence because it is not manifestly excessive to justify this appeal. Determination of the Appeal The principles upon which an appellate Court should interfere with a sentence passed by a trial Court were discussed by the Supreme Court in Kyalimpa Edward V Uganda SCCA No. l0 of 1995 where it was held as follows; "An appropriate sentence is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing Judge. Each case presents its own.facts upon which a Judge exercises his discretion. lt is the practice lhat as an appellate Court, this Court will not normalll, interfere with the discretion of the sentencing Judge unless the senlence is illegal or unless the Court is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial Judge was manifestly so excessive as to amount to an injustice" The major contentions of the Appellant are that the leamed trial Judge's failed to consider the rnitigating factors and that the trial Judge failed to follow the principle ofconsistency while sentencing hence arriving at a harsh and excessive sentence. Page 5 of 11 c\ AW ) C-{'@Nl It is trite law that both aggravating and mitigating factors have to be taken into consideration while sentencing. (see Mbunya Godfrey V Uganda SCCA No.4 of 20r r ). We have carefully examined the lower Couft record and noted that the Prosecution on page 96 ofthe record presented the aggravating factors as follows; "The offence caruies a maximum sentence of death. Under the senlencing guidelines, lhe minimum is 35 years. The offence of murder is rampant and there is need to protect the lives of the people. The deceased was killed in a very brulal manner with hands cut off and head and buried in the accused's house. Pray that that convict be given the maximum sentence of death given the brutal manner in which she was killed" On the other hand, the Defence Counsel presented the following mitigating factors as seen on page 96 of the record; "The convict has no known previous criminal record. He has also stayed on remand.from December 2014 to now. He is a young man aged 34 years. He can be a useful citizen. His demeanor in court shows that he is capable of changing. Administering the maximum sentence on the convict will not in any way make him value life and will not be retributive. Pray that court exercises discretion and pass a lenienl sentence on the convict and dispenses with the sentencing guild lines. We propose a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment taking into account he has stayed in prison". Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that the Appellant must have been provoked on learning that the deceased was infected with HIV AIDS and yet she still went ahead to have sexual intercourse with him without informing him of this l'act. L'\ Page 7 of 11 / %uu We have reviewed the Sentencing Notes of the learned trial Judge at page 97 of the record, where he stated as follows; "SENTENCE The deceased died in a brutal manner for reasons best known to the convict. Murder is a serious offence that should not be taken lightly. Indeed, it is on the increase as submitted by the prosecution. I have not seen any mitigation or remorse on the part of the convict even throughout the trial but only blunted denials even of the most obvious facts. I do however believe like counsel for the defence that the maximum sentence is not retributive as the convict will not be able to appreciate the gravity of what he did, taking the law into his hands and killing a young girl and going ahead to conceal the body. I am mindful of the sentencing guidelines which arefor the time being are not mandatory but are for purposes of guiding the courts in giving out sentences that are consistent. I consider a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment appropriate in the circumstances. I have taken into account the period he has been on remand and they will form part of lhe said sentence of 30 years ". From the Sentencing Notes above, it is clear that the trial Judge considered the mitigating factors including the period the Appellant had spent on remand and thus agreed with defence counsel not to impose the maximum sentence of death as it would be retributive. In the case of Aharikundira vs Uganda [20181 UGSC 49 (3'd December 2018), the Supreme Court observed as follows; "ll/hile scntanc'ing, un appellate co rt musl bear in mincl tlnl it is selting guideline.s upon v,ltich lt.rt,er c'ourls .shull.fitllow *,hile senlenc'ing. According to the doclrine of .;tctre tlac'icis. tlrc clcci:;ions o.f ultpellate conls are bintling on llk lower c'ourts. Prccaclants crtrd ltrinciltles c'ontained Iharain act os D\ Page 8 of 11 eru e{brl ,\enlencing guidclinc.\ to llte lovar courts in L'u.\cs intolring sirnilur.fht't.s or o/[enc'es sinc'e thet provide on iruliculion on llra altprol)riula sctllctlc'a to be imlnsed " In the case of Aharikundira vs Uganda (supra), the appellant had brutally murdered her husband and cut offhis legs, hands and other body parts. On trial, she was sentenced to death which was confirmed by this Court. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court took into consideration that the Appellant was remorseful, of advanced age and a surviving mother of six children, hence substituting the death penalty with a sentence of 30 years-imprisonment. In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for courts to always take into consideration the mitigating and aggravating factors while sentencing. The offence of murdel attracts a maximum penalty of death. Under the Constitution (Sentencing Guidelines for Courts of Judicature) (Practice) Directions, 2013, the prescribed stafting point for murder is thirty-five (35) years, and thiny (30) years up to death after taking into account the mitigating or aggravating factors. The trial Judge, after considering both sets offactors, imposed a sentence of thirty (30) years. In the instant case, after considering the circumstances ofthe case and the Sentencing Notes, we find that the trial Judge took into consideration the mitigating factors presented by defense Counsel and weighed them together with the aggravating factors. We are therefore not able to fault the learned trail Judge on the sentence imposed of thirty years' imprisonment for the offence of murder. The Appellant's other main contention is that the learned trial Judge failed to apply the principle ofconsistency in sentencing, and that this led to a harsh and rnanifestly excessive sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment. lt is entirely true that each [\ Page 9 of 11 ul U{w.d case presents its own f'acts and that Courl Inay not solely rely on one case to determine the other. We are mindful of the principle of consistency and uniforrnity in sentencing that requires that Courts take into consideration the sentencing ranges in other precedents to avoid inconsistency in sentencing. (See Mbunya Godfrey Vs Uganda (supra). While consistency in sentencing is an important principle, it is not in itself a sufficient ground fbr this Couft to interfere with the discretion of a sentencing Judge. An appellate court will not interfere with a sentence merely because another cour1, faced with similar f'acts, may have imposed a lesser penalty. In our view, the principle of consistency only guides courts to avoid unjustified disparity; it does not eliminate the discretion of the trial Judge to impose a sentence that fits the particular crime and offender before them. The appellant has a duty to demonstrate that the trial court acted on a wrong principle, overlooked a material factor, or imposed a sentence so excessive as to amount to a miscarriage ofjustice. See: Kyalimpa Edward v Uganda (supra) and Wasaija Alex Vs Uganda Crim. Appeal No.0487 of2017. We must emphasize that uniformity does not mean that all cases must attract identical sentences. No two cases are entirely alike, and differences in facts and circumstances will naturally yield different outcomes. In the instant case, the postmortem report indicated that the murder committed by the Appellant was very brutal and gnresome since the head was cut off and some pafts of the victim's body were missing. Several authorities, including those cited by counsel fbr the respondent, illustrate that sentences equal to or more severe than the one imposed in this case have been upheld by this Court and the Supreme Court. These decisions affirm that the thirty (30) year sentence falls squarely within the permissible range for the offence of t\ Page 10 of 11 eu murder and cannot be said to be harsh or manifestly excessive. The sentence imposed by the trial Judge was neither illegal nor manifestly excessive given the seriousness ofthe offence. DECISION We find no basis upon which to interfere with the sentence irnposed by the trial Judge. We therefore uphold the sentence of thirty (30) years' imprisonment imposed by the trial court, which, after deducting the period the Appellant spent on remand (Appellant was arrested on 2'7tt' December 20 l4) is three (3 ) years, two (2) months and nineteen ( l9) days, resulted in twenty-six (26) years, nine (9) months and eleven (l l) days imprisonment from the date of conviction on l6tr'March 201 8. The appeal accordingly iails and is hereby disrnissed. We so order. Signed, dated and delivered at Arua this day of....]' !4. l':\-c-2026 t Christopher Gashira ba ke Justice of Appeal C\ a rga ret Tibulya Justice of Appeal Cornelia Kakooza Sabiiti .Iustice of Appeal Page 1l of 11 c-t<l_, * J