
Civil appeal
Baimba Jalloh C/o Foamex Garage v Haroun Sankoh Ministry of Youths & Sports & Anor (CIV APP 58 of 2008) [2013] SLCA 17 (29 November 2013)
Baimba Jalloh C/o Foamex Garage v Haroun Sankoh Ministry of Youths & Sports & Anor is a civil appeal from Sierra Leone on 29 November 2013. Cite it as [2013] SLCA 17. Search it by the party names, the citation [2013] SLCA 17, or Sierra Leone civil appeal.
Sierra Leone — Court of AppealPDF · 1.5 MB[2013] SLCA 17Civil appeal
November 29, 2013
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Baimba Jalloh C/o Foamex Garage
Appellant
v.
Haroun Sankoh Ministry of Youths & Sports & Anor
Respondent
CIV APP 58 of 2008
[2013] SLCA 17
Proceeding. Civil appeal. Sierra Leone.
~ r~ , 4-0
.. '. ,
0
0
0
CIV. APP. 35/2012
0
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SIERRA LEONE
BETWEEN:
ERIK AIAH JABBA APPELLANTS
ALFRED ROGERS
·AND
BAI SAMA SANKOH
"
7
ILLIAM A.B. TUCKER
KE.NEI K.J. FOMOLU
MINIRU A.Y. KOROMA
CORAI\-1:.
RESPONDENTS
HON.l\IR. JUSTICE P.O. HAMILTON J.S.C.
HON.l\fRS. JUSTICE A. SHOWERS J.A.
HON. l\1RS. JUSTICE V.M. SOLOMON J.A.
SOLICITORS
C.F. MARGAI ESQ. FOR THE APPELLANTS
M.P. FOFANAH ESQ. FOR THE RESPONDENTS
JUDG1\11ENT DELIVERED THIS 20ft.. DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2012
. HAMILTON J.S.C.
This is an Appeal against the Ruling delivered by Hon. Mr. Justice Abdulai H.
Cham1 J. dated 21st March, 2012.
A brief background in relation to this Appeal is needed in order to properly
determine this appeal. .
1
f Lf(
. By a Petition dated 22nd September, 2011 the Petitioner (herein after referred to as
"the Respondents") petitioned . the Respondents (hereinafter referred to as "the
a Appellants") in the High Court to ·interpret the Constitution of the People's
Movement for Democrat~ic Change Party (P.M.D.C.} ~s stated in paragraph 3 of the
said Petition amongst others. This Petition was accompanied by a joint affidavit
signed by the respondents on 22nd September, 2011 as well as a notice dated 22nd
September, 2011 requiring the Appellants to enter an appearance and for which
appearance was entered on behalf of the Appellants on 1Oth October, 2011.
"By a Notice of Motion dated 11th October, 2011 together with supporting affidavit
and exhibits the Appellants herein applied to the Court for the setting aside of the
petition and service thereof for gross irregularity.
By Notice of l'vfotion dated 13th November, 2011 the Respondents applied for an .
interim injunction.
, On 141h November, 2011 the Respondents filed a joint affidavit with exhibits
justifying their paid up membership to the party. On 17th October, 2011 the
Respondents flied a joint affidavit correcting a perceived error contained in an
earlier affidavit of 22nd September, 2011.
On 18th November, 2011 a ruling was delivered Of! the motion to set aside the
petition and service thereof. Answer by the Appellants to the petition dated 22nd
September, 2011 was filed dated 20th November, 2011. An affidavit in opposition
on behalf of the Appellants sworn to by Robert Baoma Kowa on 18th January, 2012
opposing the motion dated 13th October, 2011 which motion was for the injunction.
2
. -·
I '"' •.
A joint affidavit of the Respondents sworn to on 19th January, 2012 in reply to that .
sworn to by Robert Baoma Kowa on 18th January, 2012 was filed. A Notice of
Motion on behalf of the Appellants dated 24th January, 2012 was filed with
supporting affidavit and exhibits applying to the Court
to strike out the petition as
being premature and an abuse of the due process of law for non compliance with
the doctrine of exhaustion . A Ruling dated 21st March, 2012 was delivered and it is
against this Ruling that the Appellants have now appealed to this Court on the
following grounds:
GROUND ONE
His Lordship imported extraneous and extrinsic evidence into the proceedings
()
thereby blurring his judicial vision in delivering a considered Ruling, hence the .
erroneous conclusion reached.
PARTICULARS
"The application is supported by two affidavits both deposed and... And I so
direct" (P.4 Parg.2 ofRuling).
GROUND TWO
His Lordship without Legal justification, departed from the guidelines in the
interpretation of Section 6 of the Political Parties Act. No.3 of 2002 when dealing
with such matters, as contained in the Supreme Court Judgments: S.C. No.2/2005
Samuel Hinga Norman AND Dr. Sarna S. Banya & Ors. (P.266-347) S. Ct.
()
Judgments/Rulings 2002-2005 AND SC. No.3/2005 - Samuel Hinga Norman
AND S.L.P.P. etc. (P.36-77) reported in S.C. Judgs/Rulings 2006; and instead held
that the matter before him was distinguishable, without indicating how.
3
I ' -
I.
I.
0
.PARTICULARS
a. "Counsel for the petitioners argues that the Samuel Hinga Norman case the
Respondent's Counsel relied on was on Section 27(1) of the Political Parties
Act and I so hold. I have maintained that Section 6 of the Political Parties
Act is not in mandatory terms and thus failure to have recourse to the
o commission does not affect the petitioners locus standi" (P.l2 Para. I).
b. Given the above, "it can be safely said that this case is distinguishable from
the Samuel Hinga Norman case and I am therefore not bound by the
. decision in that case" (P.J2 Parag.2).
GROUND THREE
o His Lordship without the petitioners seeking an Order of injunction against the
People's Movement for Democratic Change (P.M.D.C.) Party, not a party to the
proceedings, in his Order two (2) slammed an injunction on the party from holding
further elections and/or National Conference until the petition is determined.
PARTICULARS
"That no further elections and/or National Conference of the People's Movement
for Democratic Change (PMDC) Party should take place or be held until the
hearing and determination of this Action".
GROUND FOUR
His Lordship dismissal of the application to strike out the petition is most
unreasonable, devoid of any judicial reasoning save that it was froth with prejudice
of a political nature.
4
,
GROUND FIVE
o His Lordship's granting of an injunction at this stage, is not only a reversal of an
earlier position held by him that, if at the end of the proceedings he were to uphold
·the Petitioners' petition, then the appropriate Orders would be made, but to say the
least, his granting of the injunction which is a 'U' tum is an attempt to pre-empt
the outcome of the petition.
0
GROUND SIX
His Lordship's Ruling in its totality cannot be supported by the facts then before
him.
GROUND!
Counsel for the Appellants in dealing with this ground of appeal submitted that His
Lordship wrongly assumed that the notice of motion dated 24th January, 2012 was
supported by two affidavits that of 24th January, 2012 and 20th January, 2011 and
that the supplemental affidavit preceded that of 24th January 2012 which is not the
case since there exists no affidavit in opposition sworn to on 24th January, 2012.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents in reply in his synopsis states that whilst it is .
true that there was no supplemental affidavit to the motion of 24th January, 2012
but submitted that the affidavit exhibited as RBK!-5 and marked supplemental
c ·affidavit sworn to on 20th January, 2012 which is exhibited in the supporting
affidavit of Robert Baoma Kowa sworn to on 24th January, 2012 was close only in
time to the main affidavit of 20th January, 2012 that it could be easily mistaken as a
supplemental affidavit filed in support of the main affidavit.
5
' .
Although Learned Counsel conceded this error he submitted that the error or
c oversight did not in any way interfere with the Learned Judge's ruling nor did it
blur his vision as to what was fair and just in the circumstances of the case.
Counsel further submitted that the Learned Judge thinking that the said affidavit
and its exhibits were filed supplemental to the affidavit of the 24th January, 2012
did amend the defect su moto in order to have it rea-d in line with the date of the
main affidavit supporting the motion to read 24th January, 2012 not 20th January
relying on Order 31 Rule 4 of the High Court Rules, 2007. Counsel further
(" submitted that reference by the Learned Trial Judge to an affidavit in opposition
sworn to on the 24th January, 2012 could be a reasonable mistaken reference to the
main supporting affidavit of Robert Baoma Kowa sworn to on the 24th January,
2012. He finally submitted that all these erroneous references were only made
obita dieter and were not part of the ratio decidendi.
Although from the analysis of the Learned Judge it -demonstrated that there were
· o two affidavits in support of the motion of 24th January, 2012 which gives rise to
this appeal it is clear that there was only one affidavit in support of the motion to
which the Respondents did concede and considering Order 31 Rule 4 of the High
Court Rules 2007 to which the Learned Judge did refer in his ruling cures the
mistake or defect that might have arisen.
In my opinion the reference in the Learned Judge's ruling to an affidavit in
opposition sworn to 24th January, 2012 relates to the main supporting affidavit
sworn to on 24th January, 2012 by R.B. Kowa as the affidavit of 24th January, 2012
is not an affidavit in opposition but the affidavit in support of the motion. This
variance does not in any way affect the Ruling of the Learned Judge. This ground
therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
6
GROUND2
oThis ground of appeal is the pivot or gravamen of this appeal. Counsel for the
Appellants submitted that the Petitioners/Respondents should have recourse to the ·
internal settlement of the issues based on Article IV (3g) of the PMDC
Constitution and if dissatisfied should then refer to the PPRC pursuant to Section 6
of the Political Parties Act 2002 before resorting to the Courts and failure to do so
is an infraction of the doctrine of exhaustion. Nowh_ere in the petition nor in the
· supporting affidavit is it stated that Article IV (3 g) of the PMDC Constitution was
o used nor is there a decision nor is it stated anywhere that the respondents took their
grievances to the PPRC under Section 6 of the Act and a decision given.
Counsel further submitted that rather Exh. H1-3 was attached to their joint affidavit
sworn to on 13
1
h November, 2011 especially Exh. H1 a letter from PPRC dated 4th
October 2011 intended to create an impression that the respondents did resort to
the PPRC pursuant to Section 6 of the Political Parties Act, 2002. However,
Counsel submitted that Exh. H1 has no nexus with the petitioners and even if it was
0 - .
· there was nothing before the Court that PPRC had gone into the protest and a
decision given that would have created the way leading to the filing of the petition
in court.
Counsel for the Respondents m his synopsis submitted that even though the
Learned Judge clearly stated why the Supreme Court in the Samuel Hinga Norman
case as well as Section 6 of the Political Parties Act, 2002 were distinguishable and
inapplicable to the present case. He submitted that Counsel for the Appellants
ignored the reasons proffered and chose to attack t4.e personality of the Learned
Judge in the affidavit ofR.B. Kowa sworn to on the 26th March, 2012.
7
: .. ·
,.,
Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submitted that the Learned Judge did
further note that Article IV (3 g) of the PMDC Constitution provides for internal
settlement of disputes with the establishment of the Disciplinary Committee and
that apart from the National Council which is in existence the Appellants did not
('prove that there exist channels which the Respondents failed to exhaust before.
coming to the Court. In this regard the Learned Judge at Pages 335-336 of the
records said:
"Article IV (3g) of the People's Movement for Democratic Change Party
Constitution as quoted above provides for internal settlement of disputes
whether between members or between the parfy and members, according to
the Rules and Regulations of the Party Constitution. The Rules and
Regulations of the Party in particular Rule 5 makes provision for the
establishment of a disciplinary committee and provides as follows:
(a) 1'1 the case of the Disciplinary Committee, there shall be a right of appeal
from the Regional Disciplinary Committee to the National Disciplinary
Committee.
(b) In the case of suspension or expulsion a further right of appeal exists to
the National Counsel.
(c) Where the expulsion is recommended, such expulsion shall be sanctioned
by the conference after review.
Except for the National Council which is in existence, there is no
evidence before me that there is in existence a National disciplinary
8
I I
I I
I
,.,
Committee to which any suspended or expelled member must first seek
recourse to before further appealing to the National Council.
A party which alleges that another party has failed to exhaust local
reinedies must as a matter of fact show that organs/channels for the
exhausting local remedies exist and that other party failed to exhaust
those local remedies. That is what the Respondents have failed to prove
to this Court; that channels for redress exist which the Petitioners failed
to exhaust before evoking the jurisdiction of the Court. It is not enough to
say that the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) Party
Constitution and its Rules and Regulations make provision for the .
establishment of the organs through which an aggrieved member must
exhaust local remedies; the organs must be in existence at the time a
party is alleged to have failed to exhaust local remedies. In the absence
of evidence of the existence of such internal organs for addressing
grievances, the Court cannot hold that the Petitioners failed to exhaust
local remedies ".
. / The above quoted dictum ofthe Learned Judge clearly demonstrates in my humble
I I opinion that there is the internal process within the PMDC which ought to have
I
. I
I
I
~ been in place and with clear evidence that the Respondents failed to exhaust the
internal remedies before proceeding further. There is_no evidence to prove that the
Respondents herein failed to exhaust local remedies.
Counsel for the Respondents submitted that Section 6(d) of the Political Parties
Act, 2002 begins with "When approached by the person or persons concerned"
creates a dis~retion for aggrieved persons or parties to either approach the PPRC to
9
mediate on the dispute.s amongst its leadership or elects not to approach it at all.
Learned Counsel went on to submit that Exh. H1 which did request the PMDC
leadership to put a hold on proposed elections of the party to which Counsel for the
Appellants in a1swer to the Petition did aver that the Respondents urged this Hon.
Court to dismiss the petition as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the
judicial process as the Petitioners should have first referred their grievances if at
all, to the PPRC by virtue of the powers vested in it-by the Act and not invoking
the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court in which the Appellants had taken the view that
the Respondent were mandatorily bound to have first commenced their complaint
with the PPRC.
Counsel finally submitted that the Learned judge submitted that the Learned Judge
did hold rightly that the aggrieved parties were not bound to approach the PPRC to
mediate in the disputes especially so when the 1st Petitioner who is Acting
o Chairman of the Party was never suspended.
·The Learned
Judge in distinguishing the Samuel Hinga Norman's case from this
present case said at Page 337 of the records lines 3-11:
"Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the Samuel Hinga Norman's case
the Respondent's Counsel relied on was Section 27(1) of the Political
Parties Act and I so hold. I have maintained that Section 6 of the Political
o parties Act is not mandatory terms and thus failure to have recourse to the
Commission does not affect the Petitioners locus standi. Given the above it
can safely be said that this case is distinguishable from the Samuel Hinga
7\T " 1vorman case ......... .
10
. The Learned Judge did in his ruling clearly distinguish the case of Samuel Hinga
,Norman and did state clearly Section 27(1) of the Political Parties Act 2002 was
what was relied on in that case. This ground of appeal therefore fails.
GROUND 3, 4, 5 AND 6
Counsel for the Appellants in arguing these four grounds together submitted that
the PMDC was not a party to the Petition and that the motion for injunction . filed .
on the 13th October, 2012 was lucid as to the order sought and those to be affected.
c· Cmmsel further submitted that PMDC cannot by any stretch of imagination be an
agent of the Respondents rather if anything at all it should be the converse.
Learned Counsel finally submitted that the Learned Judge was palpably wrong to
have pronounced an injunction on the PMDC.
Counsel for the Respondents in his synopsis submitted that this ground 1s a
misapplication and misreading of the Ruling of the Learned Judge since in granting
the injunction that no further election and or National Conference of the PMDC
should take place pending the determination of the action, the Learned Judge firstly
found and held that there were triable issues to be tried judicially and secondly
whether damages are an alternative to the granting ofthe injunction.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the injunction granted is not against the
P:rviDC Party but against the conduct of individuals in the Party who are using the
Patty to further their unconstitutional, illegal and undemocratic objectives. He
further submitted that the only way to stop such persons including the respondents
and their agents is to grant the injunction in order that they do not proceed to hold a
flawed and illegal party conference or convention.
11
"
!5t
The Learned Judge in treating the injunction at Pages 300-301 of the records said:
"Let me state here and then that, interlocutory injunctions are equitable
remedies which the Court has discretion to grqnt or not to grant, depending
on the prevailing circumstances. In exercising its discretion, the Court is
guided by certain principles which are laid down in the celebrated case of
American Cynamid Co. V. Ethicon (1975) 1 All E.R. 504. In an application
for interlocutory injunction the first consideration is whether the matter
discloses any triable issues. In answering whether there are triable issues in
this case, I will refer to my ruling of 18
1
h November, 2011 where I held that
the Petitioners have locus standi to bring this petition. And that being the
case, I hold that there are triable issues which the Court ought to determine.
Having answered the first question, I now turf!:. to the question of damages;
whether damages would be adequate compensation for the injury suffered by
the grant of an injunction. Different cases must be treated differently. In this
instance I note that the issue at stake is authority/and or influence. I hold
that the grant of injunction will not affect the Respondents as much as the
refusal will affect the Petitioners. Following the above the balance of
convenience lies in granting the injunction prayed for".
The above quoted dictum of the learned Judge in my humble opinion is right and I
do agree with him.
It is clear from the Petition that the Petitioners did challenge and petitioned the
holding of illegal Regional, District and Constituency Party elections which would
eventually lead to a National Conference which will in the end elect executive
officers of the Party. The injunction granted was aimed at serving the interest of
justice in stopping officials of the Party to proceed to a National Conference in
12
I
., ..
I ~
which the delegates whose election had already been petitioned and impugned
could in the end vote for a National Leader and various other top party officials
which in the end would have been illegal.
0
0
In my humble opinion the injunction granted was not against the party per se but
rather against the conduct of individuals in the parti whose acts and conducts are
being used in the furtherance of their unconstitutional, illegal and undemocratic
acts as members/officials of the Party. The injunction is therefore intended to
temporarily put a hold on the activities of the Appellants, their agents and
supporters from proceeding to hold flawed and illegal party conference or
Convention. It is clear from the petition that the Appellants and the Respondents
are sued in various capacities within the People's Movement for Democratic
Change (PMDC) Party and in no other capacity therefore the injunction is in
relation to the various capacities in the Party. Therefore the Orders made by the
Learned Judge as contained in Orders 1 and 2 are correct and as a result this
ground of appeal fails and is dismissed.
It is clear from all what have been said earlier, this appeal lacks merit and is
~ accordingly dismissed with cost to the Respondents such cost to be taxed if not ·
agreed.
. ............. .
HON. MR. JUSTICE P.O. HAMILTON J.S.C
13
0
f53
. 4 - R>~~ . I ~~: ..................................................................... .
HON. MRS. JUSTICE A. SHOWERS J.A •
. I A (X~: •• ~.~~ ••••• : ••••••••••••••••••••••••
HON. MRS. JUSTICE "\f.M. SOLOMON J.A.
REF: POH/Hl
o·
14
