Alhaji Sam Sumana v Attorney-General & Anor (SC 4 of 2015) [2015] SLSC 1203 (9 September 2015)

1 S.C. 4/2015. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SIERRA LEONE (IN ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION) IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 124 AND 127 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE ACT NO.6 OF 1991 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN: ALHAJI SAMUEL SAM-SUMANA - PLAINTIFF AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL MINISTER OF JUSTICE - 1 st DEFENDANT OF SIERRA LEONE VICTOR BOCKARIE FOH - 2 nd DEFENDANT CORAM: The Hon. Mr. Justice V. V. Thomas, Acting Chief Justice - Presiding The Hon. Mr. Justice N. C. Browne-Marke, JSC. The Hon. Mr. Justice E. E. Roberts, JSC. The Hon. Ms. Justice V. M. Solomon, JSC. The Hon. Mr. Justice P.O. Hamilton, JSC. COUNSEL: C. F. Margai Esq., S. Banja Tejan-Sie Esq., M.P.Fofanah Esq. and R. B. Kowa for the Plaintiff. Berthan Macaulay Jnr. Esq., Lahai Farmer Esq., Osman Kanu Esq., and Ernest Beoku-Betts for the 1 st Defendant A. E. Manly-Spain Esq., L. Dumbuya Esq., S. K. Koroma Esq., B. Koroma Esq., R. A. D. Jones Esq., and R. A. NylenderEsq., for the 2 nd Defendant. JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON THE 9 th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2015 HON. MR. JUSTICE V.V. THOMAS – ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE The Plaintiff, by Originating Notice of Motion dated 20 th March 2015 supported by two affidavits, has instituted an action in this Court in its Original Jurisdiction pursuant to section 124 and 127 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act No. 6 of 1991 (the Constitution) for the determination of 2 two questions and prays that if the answers to those questions are negative, for c ertain reliefs (hereinafter referred to as “the action”). The provisions of the Constitution pursuant to which the action was instituted state as follows: “124. (1) The Supreme Court shall, save as otherwise provided in section 122 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other Courts— (a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution ; and (b) where any question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the power conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.” For present purposes, subsection (2) is not relevant and so I will not reproduce that subsection. “127. (1) A person who alleges that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect. (2) The Supre me Court shall, for the purposes of a d eclaration under subsection (1), make such orders and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for giving effect to, or enabling effect to be given to, the declaration so made. (3) Any person to whom an order or direction is addressed under subsection (1) by the Supreme Court shall duly obey and carry out the terms of the order or direction. (4) Failure to obey or to carry out the terms of an order or direction made or given under subsection (1) shall constitute a crime under this Constitution.” It is clear from the papers filed by the parties in this action that several provisions of the Constitution call for interpretation before the questions posed by the Plaintiff can be answered by the Court. These questions are as follows: “(a) Whether the Constitution of Sierra Leone empowers the PRESIDENT “to relieve the Vice -President of his office and duties” in any way Other than by the procedure set out in sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution? 3 (b) Whether the “Supreme executive authority” of the President mentioned in Section 40(1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone includes the power to “relieve the Vice - President of his Office and duties”, other than by the procedure set out in Sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution?” The reliefs prayed for are in the following terms: “If the Answer to the questions is NO, then the Plaintiff will seek the following further reliefs: (i) For a declaration that the Public Notice announcing that the Vice-President had been relieved of his duties and office (Exhibit A herein) is unconstitutional, null and void, and of no effect. (ii) For a declaration that the appointment of Victor BockarieFoh as Vice -President of Sierra Leone is also unconstitutional, null and void, and of no effect. (iii) For an Injunction restraining the said Victor BockarieFoh from acting in the Office of Vice -President of Sierra Leone, pending the hearing and determination of this action. (iv) For a declaration that the elected Vice-President of Sierra Leone (the Plaintiff herein) remains in Office as Vice-President thereof unless and until removed from Office as required by Section 50 and 51 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone.” My appreciation of the issue before the Court is the interpretatio n to be placed on certain provisions of the Constitution so as to determine whether the President has the power to relieve the Vice President of his duties and office. For reasons to be advanced later in this judgment, the President does not have any power under sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution, nor does he play any direct role in the procedure set out in those sections. The second question posed by the Plaintiff in the action virtually asks the same question but this time it is directed to determining the extent of the President’s powers (if any) encapsulated in the expressi on “supreme executive authority” mentioned in section 40 (1) of the Constitution. The first 3 paragraphs of the Press Release from the Office of the President dated March 17, 2015 and exhibited as “A” in the Plaintiff’s supporting affidavit are instructive in answering the questions posed by him. I reproduce same and his immediate response thereto hereunder for ease of reference: 4 “On the 6 th day of March 2015, t he National Advisory Committee (NAC) of the All Peoples Congress (APC) took a decision to expel Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana from the APC; and by letter dated 6 th day of March 2015, Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana was duly expelled from the APC. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, as guardian of the Constitution of Sierra Leone pursuant to Section 40 (3) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991, I have taken note of the decision of the public will recall, and I have also taken note of the fact that on Saturday March, 15, 2015, Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana sought asylum from a foreign embassy demonstrating a willingness to abandon his duties and office as the Vice President of our beloved Republic. And whereas Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana is no longer a member of a political party in Sierra Leone and therefore does not have the continuous requirement to hold office as vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, provided for in Section 41(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991, I hereby relieve Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana of the duties and from the Office of Vice President of Sierra Leone with immediate effect, pursuant to my supreme executive authority as President of the Republic of Sierra Leone as enshrined in Section 40(1) of the sa id Constitution of Sierra Leone”. In his response to the aforesaid Press Release from the Office of the President, the Plaintiff in a Statement issued by him dated 18 th day of March 2015, and also exhibited to his affidavit as “B”, stated inter alia, “That the President has absolutely no power to “relieve me of the duties of Vice -President” in any part of the Constitution, Act No. 6 of 1991, but the said Constitution makes provision at section 55 thereof for the office of the Vice-President to become vacant either: a) On the expiration of the term of office of the Vice-President; b) If the Vice-President resigns or retires from the said office (…); c) If the Vice -President is removed from Office in accordance with either the provisions of Section 50 or 51 of the Constitution; OR d) Upon the assumption by the Vice-President to the office of the President under Section 49(4) of the said Constitution.” 5 On the 19 th March 2015, a Press Release was issued by the Office of the President appointing the 2 nd Defendant as Vice President in the following terms: “The General Public is hereby informed that following the vacancy which occurred in the Office of Vice-President, and pursuant to section 54 (5) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 (Act No. 6 of 1991), it has pleased his Excellency, the President to appoint Mr. Victor Bockarie Foh as vice-President of the republic of Sierra Leone with immediate effect.” The provisions of the Constitution which are relevant in order to answer the questions posed for the Court’s determination, are as follows: 1. Section 35(1) dealing inter alia with the registration and conduct of political parties. 2. Section 40 (1) which states that there “shall be a President of the Republic of Sierra Leone who shall be Head of State, the supreme executive authority of the Republic and Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces.” 3. Section 41 which provides as follows: “No person shall be qualified for election as President unless he— (a) is a citizen of Sierra Leone; (b) is a member of a political party; (c) has attained the age of forty years; and (d) is otherwise qualified to be elected as a member of Parliament.” 4. Section 42 (1) which provides that “a Presidential candidate shall be nominated by a political party”. 5. Section 48(4) states that where any person holds or performs the functions of the office of President, no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against him in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official or private capacity. 6. Section 50 which makes provision for the process by which the President “shall cease to hold office and a vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred” by reason of infirmity of mind or body. (mental or physical incapacity). 7. Section 51 which makes provision for the process by which the President “shall cease to hold office and a vacancy shall be deemed to have occurred” where Parliament has resolved that “the President has been guilty of such violation of the Constitution or as the case may (be) such gross misconduct”. 6 8. Section 53(1) which states inter alia that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power in Sierra Leone shall vest in the President. Subsection (4) of this section further states that the functions of the President shall be construed as reference to his powers and duties in the exercise of the executive authority of Sierra Leone and to any other powers and duties conferred or imposed on him as President by or under this Constitution or any other law. 9. The whole of section 54 and in particular subsections (2), (3), (5)and (8) which provide as follows: (2) A person --- (a) shall be designated a candidate for the office of Vice -President by a presidential candidate before a presidential election. (b) shall not be qualified to be a candidate for t he office of Vice -President unless he has the qualifications specified in section 41. (3) A candidate shall be de emed to be duly elected as Vice -President if the candidate who designated him as candidate for election to the office of Vice-President has been duly elected as President in accordance with the provisions of section 42. (5) Whenever the office of the Vice -President is vacant, or the Vice -President dies, resigns, retires or is removed from office, the President shall appoint a person qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament to the office of Vice -President with effect from the date of such vacancy, death, resignation, retirement or removal. (8) The provisions of sections 50 and 51 of this Constitution relating to the removal from office of the President, shall apply to the removal from office of the Vice-President. 10. Section 55 which provides as follows: “The office of the Vice -President shall become vacant --- (a) on the expiration of the term of office of the President ; or (b) if the Vice-President resigns or retires from office or dies; Or (c) if the Vice -President is removed from office in accordance with the provisions of section 50 or 51 of this Constitution; or (d) upon the assumption by the Vice-President to the office of President under subsection (4) of section 49.” 7 In both the Plaintiff’s Statement of Case and in his Counsel’s arguments and submissions, emphasis has been laid on the literal interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution . The central pillars of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Case are the following submissions, namely: Firstly, “That Section 40 (1) of the Constitution does not make any provision for the President to relieve the Vice-President of his position for any reason whatsoever and no such wor ds are to be found therein……. that Section 40 (1) is merely a general provision setting out the “Style and titles” of the President, and nothing more can be read into it.” Secondly, Plaintiff’s Statement of Case relied heavily on the Nigerian Supreme Court decision in Attorney-General of the Federation of Nigeria & Ors. Vs Alhaji Atiku Abubakarr & Ors. (2007), (the Atiku Abubakarr case) and submitted that the President violated the Constitution and acted beyond his powers by purporting to relieve th e Vice-President of his office and duties as there is no such provision in the Constitution. Thirdly, it is further submitted that having regard to the similarity of the Nigerian and the Sierra Leone Constitutions, this Court should accept and adopt the Jud gment in the said Nigerian case and illustrated the said alleged similarity by reference to Section 143 (ii) of the Nigerian Constitution and Section 51 of the Sierra Leone Constitution. Lead counsel for the Plaintiff, C. F. Margai, Esq., in argument, referred to the Plaintiff’s Statement of Case dated and filed on the 30 th March 2015. He contended that the Court has been called upon to answer certain questions by interpreting the relevant provisions of the C onstitution and in doing so, every word must be presumed to have its significance and given a reasonable and natural meaning so that the true intention of Parliament is not misrepresented. Counsel cited the case of Gruderiche vs. Comptroller of Customs [1920-36] ALR S.L. 157 in support of this proposition. He s ubmitted that the only way the P laintiff can be removed from office is by the provisions found in section 55 (c) of the Constitution whether or not the word used is relieved or removed from office. He maintained that there is no other provision in the laws of Sierra Leone which addresses the removal of the Vice President from office. Counsel then referred the Court to section 40 (3) of the Constitution as the basis upon which the President relieved the Vice President of his duties and office an d to section 41 (b) of the Constitution. Counsel submitted that section 40 (3) of the Constitution does not give the mandate or authority to the President to remove an elected Vice President from office and that section 41 (b) of the Constitution has been 8 totally misrepresented and misused. He contended that the language used in the relevant provisions of the Constitution are quite plain, simple and not convoluted and that the literal rule in the interpretation of statutes is applicable in the case before the Court. It is Counsel’s contention that even assuming that section 41 (b) of the Constitution is triggered by the expulsion of the Plaintiff from the APC Party (which was not conceded by Counsel) all that can possibly do is to trigger an opportunity for invoking section 51 of the Constitution. Counsel finally submitted in respect of section 41(b) of the Constitution that the President’s act to relieve the Vice President of his duties and office must be condemned by the Court as unconstitutional, null and of no effect. Dealing with section 40 (3) of the Constitution, Counsel submitted that the subsection does not clothe the President with executive powers and that it is subsection (4) of section 40 and section 53 (2) that grant executive functions and powers to the President. That these provisions do not give the President any power or mandate to relieve the Vice President of his duties and office and consequently the Plaintiff should be granted the declarations sought. Counsel referred to section 54 of the Constitution and submitted that b oth the P resident and Vice President are elected together on the same ticket and their removal from office are governed by the same provisions. That the vacancy mentioned in section 54 (5) of the Constitution is explained in section 55 of the Constitution dealing with vacancy in the office of the Vice President. Lead Counsel for the Plaintiff further referred the Court to the Atiku Abubakarr case in the Nigerian Supreme Court and said he believed that it is the main authority that should guide this Court in the Plaintiff’s action. Counsel referred to page 10 of the copy of the judgment in tha t case that he supplied to the C ourt dealing with the general principles of interpretation of statutes including constitutions. The leading judgment in this Nigerian Supreme Court case is that of his Lordship Sunday Akinola Akintan JSC who expressly stated that the approach of the Nigerian courts in interpreting statutes and the Constitution is the literal approach. The learned Justice went on to state that this approach is the one that has been adopted in numerous cases but went on to say that in interpreting the Constitution, “a liberal approach should be adopted”. Counsel went on to submit that in Nigeria, section 143 of the ir Constitution provides that the process of removal of the President is by impeachment by the Federal National Assembly and that in Sierra Leone, the relevant provision is section 51 of the Constitution and that the two provisions are virtually the same. Counsel in conclusion submitted that unless there is evidence before the Court of an infraction by the Vice President in the performance of his constitutional functions or has 9 committed gross misconduct, sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution cannot be tr iggered. That even where there is an infraction of the Constitution or gross misconduct by the President, the action to remove from office should be taken by Parliament and not the President. 2 nd Counsel for the Plaintiff, M. P. Fofanah Esq., addressed the Court on behalf of the Plaintiff in relation to his case against the 2 nd Defendant. Counsel referred to the 2 nd relief prayed for in the action which seeks a declaration that the appointment of the 2 nd Defendant is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect. Counsel also referred to the Press Release issued by State House announcing the appointment of the 2 nd Defendant pursuant to section 54 ( 5) of the Constitution. Counsel contended that membership of a politica l party is not a continuing requ irement for the office of Vice President and submitted that under section 41 of the Constitution, membership of a political party is only a necessary pre-requisite for candidacy to the office of President and Vice President. That after election, membershi p of a political party ceases to be of any legal consequence and effect. He said this submission is made in tan dem with the provisions of the Public Elections Act, 2012 and further submitted that the reason why the 1991 Constitution took away membership of a political party for the offices of President and Vice President upon election is to uphold the sovereign mandate of the people who elected them into office. He referred th e Court to sections 2 and 35 (1) of the Constitution in support of his submissions. It was Counsel’s view that the provisions of the Constitution are so clear and unambiguous that the Court does not require any legal meaning or interpretative criteria to conclude that where a President has been duly elected together with his Vice President, it is only Parliament that has the mandate to remove either of them. On section 54 (5) of the Constitution, Counsel submitted that it must be construed subject to section 55 which exhaustively enumerates the only instances in which a vacancy in the office of Vice P resident can be legally created and consequently no vacancy was legally created when the President relieved the Vice P resident of his duties and office. Counsel submitted that the 2 nd Defendant is therefore unlawfully occupying a position which legitimately belongs to the Plaintiff. He referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England 3 rd edition, volume 36 paragraph 626, and submitted that since the Vice President was elected or deemed to be elected, the power to remove him from office rests with the elected representatives (Parliament). 2 nd Counsel for the Plaintiff, M. P. Fofanah Esq., submitted that membership of a political party under section 41 of the Constitution is not a requirement for the office of Vice President after election but that if the Court is of the view that there is such a requirement, then its breach 10 becomes a violation of the Constitu tion. Counsel further submitted that the requirement under section 41 of the Constitution of membership of a political party is only referable to candidacy before elections and that one cannot be a candidate after election. But that if the Court holds that there is such a requirement to hold the office of Vice President after elections, then any breach of that requirement can only be a ddressed under section 51 of the Constitution by Parliament and not the President. In line with the Statement of Case filed on behalf of the 1 st Defendant, his Counsel, Berthan Macaulay Jnr. Esq., in argument before the court formulated 5 issues which he contended are to be addressed by the Court in order to answer the questions posed in the action. I shall reproduce the issues hereunder as stated in the said Statement of Case as follows: 1. What is the legal meaning of section 41 and in particular sub -section (1) (b) of the Constitution? And if, as contended by the 1 st Defendant, it imposes a continuous obligation on the holder of the office of Vice President, and in the instant case, imposed an obligation on the part of the Plaintiff herein, what is the effect, if any, if the holder of that office ceases to meet that obligation or qualification? 2. If as contended by the 1 st Defendant, section 55 of the C onstitution is triggered when th e holder of the office of Vice President ceases to meet the obligation or qualification set out in Section 41 (b) of the Constitution, what is the legal meaning and ambit of the said section 55 of the Constitution? 3. If this Honourable Court were to hold that section 55 is triggered, as aforesaid, as contended by the 1 st Defendant, what is the import, if any of Sections 50 & 51 of the Constitution in relation to the nature of the matter dealt with under section 41(b) of the Constitution? 4. If as contended by the 1 st Defendant, the holder of the Office of Vice President has ceased to meet the obligation or qualification set out in Section 41 (b) of the Constitution, and section 55 of the Constitution is triggered but sections 50 & 51 of the Constitution do not apply, on whom does the obligation lie to effect the vacating of the Office of Vice President? 5. Should this Honourable Court accept and adopt the re asoning and conclusions of the Supreme Court of Nigeri a in the case of S.C. 31/2007 (S upreme Court of Nigeria) Attorney-General of the F ederation & others vs Alhaji AtikuAbubakarr (hereinafter referred to as the “Atiku Abubakarr Case”) without having first independently and properly 11 construed the relevant sections of the Constitution as enjoined by Section 124 (1) (a) thereof? In dealing with the legal meaning of section 41 of the Constitution in argument before the Court, Counsel submitted that the obligations stated in that section are continuous obligations of the holder of the office of Vice President which are not limited to the time of election. He relied on the case of Dr Sorie Kennedy Conteh & Ors. vs T he Minister of Local Government & Ors (2006), a decision of this Court and the opinions of the editors of Halsbury’s Laws of England , 4 th edition and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 5 th Edition. He further submitted that when the literal rule of interpretation is applied to section 41 of the Constitution, it does not produce the interpretation canvassed by the Plaintiff limiting the obligations therein to the period before election to t he office because the section does not state that membership of a political party is taken away as a requirement upon election. He f urther submitted that the plain meaning rule (the literal rule) does not apply in the instant case in relation to section 4 1 of the Constitution since an informed interpretation will not lead to the conclusion that the legal meaning corresponds to the grammatical meaning. According to Counsel for the 1 st Defendant, the 2 nd issue for determination is the legal meaning of section 55 of the Constitution which deals with vacancy in the office of Vice President. Counsel contended that the list mentioned in section 55 is not exhaustive since it does not contain express words to the effect that the office of Vice P resident will only become vacant in the instances mentioned in that section. He submitted that if section 41 (b) of the Constitution creates a continuous obligation of membership of a political party for the office of Vice President after election (among other obligations) then a vacancy in the office is created once a holder of the office loses such membership. He submitted that section 54(5) of the Constitution gives one instance of vacancy in general terms and this is relevant in construing section 55 of the Constitution. He urged the C ourt to apply the purposive approach and the construction as a whole interpretative criteria in relation to sections 41 (b) and 55 of the Constitution and reject the expression unius, exclusion alterius principle (i.e. the express mention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another) which according to Lopes L. J. in Colquhoun vs Brooks (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 52 at 65 is “a valuable s ervant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes and documents.” 12 Thirdly, Counsel for the 1 st Defendant dealt with the import of sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution in relation to section 41 (b) of the Constitution and submitted that the P laintiff’s argument that the Vice President can only be removed pursuan t to sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution is not tenable because these constitute only one circumstance in sectio n 55 under which the office of V ice President becomes vacant. Counsel further submitted t hat sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution deal specific ally with mental/physical incapacity and /or gross misconduct in carrying out the f unctions of the office of Vice P resident and that ceasing to be a member of a political party (by way of expulsion in the instant case) does not fall within the ambit of sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution. The fourth issue canvassed by Counsel deals with the person or authority who should act in the event that the Vice President fails to meet the continuous requirement of membership of a political party as provided for in section 41 (b) in situations where s ections 50 and 51 are inapplicable. Counsel referred to various sections of the C onstitution (including section 40 (1) which describes the President as supreme executive authority) and this Court’s decision in Issa Hassan Sesay & Ors. vs. The President of the Special Court &Ors . S.C. 1/2003 (Judgment delivered on the 10 th May 2005) and submitted that in the circumstance where the office of the Vice President has become vacant, other than pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution, the President as the supreme executive authority of the Republic of Sierra Leone has the power to relieve the Plaintiff from his office as Vice President. Lastly on the Atiku Abubakarr case, Counsel noted that the case is at the centre of the Plaintiff’s case but urged the Court not to be persuaded by that decision until it has critically analysed the approach and reasoning in the case while independently and properly construing the relevant provisions of our Constitution which the Court is called upon to interpret. In support of his views on the relevance of the Nigerian case to the matter before the Court, Counsel referred to various sections of Halsbury’s Laws of England 4 th Edition. Counsel for the 2 nd Defendant, A.E. Manley-Spaine Esq., referred to a num ber of provisions of the Constitution and said that he relied on the Statement of Case filed on behalf of the 2 nd Defendant dated the 17 th April 2015. In that Statement of Case, Counsel made a number of submissions in support of the proposition that all the relevant provisions of the Constitution must be construed and viewed as a whole to determine whether section 41 (b) creates a continuous 13 requirement for the holder of the office of Vice President. Counsel stressed the relevance of section 35 (1) of the Constitution and the fact that party political affiliation is fundamental to the operation of the democracy practiced in Sierra Leone. Counsel relied on the cases of Attorney- General vs. Wilts United Dairies (1921) 37 TLR 884 C.A. and dicta of former Chi ef Justice Tejan-Jalloh in Charles F. Margai vs. Solomon Berewa (2007) in support of his several submissions and urged the Court to answer the questions posed in the action in the affirmative and refuse the reliefs prayed for in the action. In argument before the Court the issue of whether this Court has ju risdiction to determine the action one way or the other was raised by Counsel for the 2 nd Defendant as a matter which must be decided as an initial first step. In dealing with this issue, Counsel raised 4 points as follows: 1. Whether in the light of section 48 (4) of the Constitution, the action is maintainable at all in view of the fact that while he holds or performs the functions of President, he is immune from any civil or criminal proceedings in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him either in his official or private capacity. Counsel challenged the formulation of the questions posed in the action. 2. Whether the questions posed in the action for determination by the Court can be answered at all as canvassed by the Plaintiff. As I understand it, the objection taken by Counsel is that the question presupposes that the President has powers under sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution to remove the Vice President from his duties and office. 3. Whether the Plaintiff can avail himself of section 127 of the Constitution in instituting this action. 4. Whether the parties against whom the action has been instituted are the correct parties. Counsel stressed that since the action complained of was taken by the President personally and not by the Government of Sierra Leone, the Attorney -General ought not to have been cited as a party which is possible under the State Proceedings Act, 2000. He said the President acted single -handedly in relieving the Vice President of his duties and office. Counsel also challenged the naming of the 2 nd Defendant as a 14 party to the action since he has done nothing to be appointed as Vice President and there is no permanent injunction prayed against him. Nowhere in the papers filed or in the arguments and submissions made by Counsel for the Plaintiff is it alleged that any enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of any enactment is inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution. In these circumstances, it is my view that the action herein should not have been instituted in the matter or pursuant to section 127 of the Constitution. The reference to the Public Elections Act 2012 by the 2 nd Counsel for the Pla intiff, Mohamed P. Fofanah Esq. in argument , for purposes of comparison with a provision of the Constitution does not constitute a valid basis for maintaining that the action was instituted pursuant to section 127 of the Constitution. Nor is the Public Notice announcing tha t the Vice –President had been relieved of his duties and office (the Press Release) such an enactment. If authority is needed in support of my aforesaid view that section 127 of the Constitution is inapplicable in the instant case, that authority is the decision of this Court in Samuel Hinga Norman vs. Dr Sama Banya & Ors. S.C. 2/2005 (unreported) Judgment delivered on 31 st August 2005. In my judgment, there is no reason for us to depart from this Court’s earlier decision in this case. The decision in the earlier case was that the SLPP Constitution is not an enactment and therefore cannot be the subject -matter for invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to section 127 of the Constitution. This action, in my judgment can be maintained only for an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions pursuant to section 124(1) (a) of the Constitution. The parties to the action as instituted by the Plaintiff are as stated above. The issue as to whether the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice (the 1 st Defendant) ought to have been made a party has been raised in argument by the 2 nd Defendant against whom relief No. 4 is relevant. I do not recall that Counsel for the 1 st Defendant took the point. In our earlier ruling on the applicat ion for an interlocutory injunction, my brother the Honourable Mr. Justice Browne -Marke, had opined in paragraph 5 of his separate and concurring opinion that it seems that the action was brought against the Government of Sierra Leone which is why the 1 st Defendant is named as a party. This possibility is provided for in the State Proceedings Act, 2000. However nowhere in the Public Notice exhibited as Exhibit “A” in the supporting affidavit to the Originating Notice of Motion is there any evidence that the decision to relieve the Plaintiff of his functions and duties of Vice President, was a decision of the Government of Sierra Leone. In my judgment the 1 st 15 Defendant was incorrectly made a party in the action as the said decision of the President is expressly stated to be that of his, alone. I agree with Counsel for the 2 nd Defendant on this point. I express this opinion in spite of the provision in the Rules of this Court which provides for the service of an Originating Notice of Motion , as is filed in this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction, on the Attorney -General and Minister of Justice. Once he has been so served as in this case, he is at liberty to respond if he so wishes (see paragraph (4) of rule 92 (2) of the Rules of this Court) and is not named as a defendant in the action. In these circumstances, I opine that the 1 st Defendant’s response is permissible although he has been incorrectly named as a defendant. Another feature of this action which has been taken up by Counsel for the 2 nd Defendant relates to the interpret ation of section 48 (4) of the Constitution which deals with the immunity of the President in proceedings instituted or continued against him. In my judgment this action is neither civil nor criminal proceedings instituted against the President, it is sim ply an action for the interpretation of the Constitution and the reliefs prayed for are declaratory in nature. Whe ther any declaration made by this Court which is effectively against the President can be enforced against him is quite another matter particularly in cases such as this one where he is not named as a defendant. The 2 nd relief prayed for seeks a declaration challenging the appointment of the 2 nd Defendant by the President and the question is whether this Court can make such a declaration in light of the current formulation of section 48 (4) of the Constitution? My opinion is that the Court is simply asked to declare what the law is on the questions posed in the action. However, I note that the exercise of the executive power of Sierra Leone which is vested in the President , is declared by section 53 (1) to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution. So that it is appropriate for any exercise of such executive power to be challenged if it is alleged that such exercise is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. The Court dealt with the 3 rd relief prayed for in its Ruling dated 5 th May 2015, and so it is unnecessary to deal with that relief in this judgment. How is the Cou rt to understand the questions posed in the light of the r eliefs that the P laintiff seeks? The 1 st question ends with the words “in any way Other than by the procedure set out in sections 50 and 51 of this Constitution”. The 2 nd question also ends with the words “other than by the procedure set out in Sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution”. Both sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution deal respectively with the removal of the President by the actions of the Cabinet and the Legislature for reasons of his mental or physical incapacity, violations of the Constitution and gross misconduct. The latter provision describes the relevant misconduct as “any violation of 16 the Constitution or any gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office ”. Section 54 (8) of the Constitution states that sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution relating to the removal from office of the President “shall apply to the removal from office of the Vice-President”. My understanding of the Plaintiff’s case as stated in the questions posed for determination is that these are the only circumstances in which the Vice -President can be removed from office or relieved of his duties and office. It is only in the case of mental or physical incapacity to remove the President or Vice -President that the action is initiated by a cabinet resolution. It must be observed that the final decision to remove either of them from office on the ground of misconduct is taken by a two -thirds majority vote in Parliament. Sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution do not give the President any power to remove the Vice -President either expressly or impliedly so that to link the removal of the Vice -President by action of the President to these provisions only creates confusion and befogs the real issue for determination. If I were to put the question before the Court in simple straightforward language, I would say it is concerned with whether the President has any power under the 1991 Constitution to relieve the Vice -President of his duties and office as stated in exhibit A, the Press Release from State House, dated 17 th March 2015. The Plaintiff’s case is that the President does not have any such power, but the 1 st Defendant’s Counsel has strenuously argued (after amendment of his Case which was granted by this Court on the 27 th July 2015) that on a purposive interpretation of the Constitution, the President does have such a power. The 2 nd Defendant in the Statement of his Case dated 17 th April 2015 urged this Court to answer the questions posed in the affirmative and refuse the reliefs , although in argument he has described the questions posed as non -questions because they are based on a premise or presupposition that the President has removal powers under sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution. The role of the Court, in a matter of this nature which calls for the interpretation to be placed on the constitutional provisions which are relevant in answering the questions posed, and responding to the said submissions made, is to determine the intention of Parliament when it enacted the said provisions. The issue is to determine whether when the provision in section 41 was enacted , particularly as it relates to section 54 (2) (b), the intention of Parliament was to limit its requirements to the time of election of these officials or whether these were requirements that should last throughout their respective tenure in office. I note that no such limitation is expressly stated in the Constitution. 17 The learned authors in Volume 44 of Halsbury’s Laws of England , 4 th Edition have stated the position thus: Para.1369: “T he Court has the function of authoritatively construing legislation, that is determining its legal meaning so far as is necessary to decide a case before it. This function is exclusive to the court, and a meaning found by any other person, for example an authorizing agency, an investigating agency, an executing agency, a prosecuting agency, or even Parliament itself, except when intending to declare or amend the law, is always subject to the determination of the court”. Para.1372: The object of all interpretation of a written Constitution is to discover the intention of its author as expressed in the instrument. Therefore the object in construing an Act is to ascertain the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Act, considering it as a whole and in its context, and acting on behalf of the people. The meaning of an enactment that corresponds to the intention is known as its legal meaning. The legal meaning may or may not correspond to the grammatical or literal meaning”. This latter point was taken up in the case of Dr. Sorie Kennedy Conteh & Ors. vs The Minister of Local Government &Ors. (cited supra) in which the Honourable Chief Justice had to deal with the situation in which the parties were contending for different legal meanings of a provision in the Constitution. I daresay that the same applies in this case where the parties are contending for different meanings to the requirements in section 41 of the Constitution. The Plaintiff says that on a literal interpretation of the section the requirement of membership of a political party is relevant up to election and not thereafter while the Defendants contend that it is a continuo us requirement which is relevant even after election to office. Some 15 years ago in the case of All Peoples Congress vs Ministry of Social Welfare SC No.4/96 (Judgment delivered in October 1999), this Court had to interpret certain provisions of the Constitution and came to the conclusion that the provisions cannot be construed in isolation, one from another. The then Chief Justice, Desmond Luke, C.J., cited the words of Lord Halsbury L. C. in Leader vs Duffey 13 A. C. 294 at 301 when he said “But I agree that you must look at the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it .” In support of this common sense approach which interprets 18 statutory provisions in the li ght of their context and purpose, Laws L. J. in Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd vs. Ballard (Kent) Ltd [1999] 2 All E.R. 791 had this to say: It is nowadays misleading - and perhaps it always was to seek to draw a rigid distinction between literal and purposive approaches to the interpretation of acts of parliament. The difference between the purposive and literal construction is in truth one o f degree only………….the real distinction lies in the balance to be struck, in the particular case, between the literal meaning of the words on the one hand and the context and purpose of the measure in which they appear on the other”. In the Ghanaian Suprem e Court case of Agyei Twum vs. Attorney -General & Akwetey [2005- 2006] SCGLR 732 at 757, Dr. Date-Bah, JSC put the task before the Court in the following terms: In interpreting constitutional language, one should ordinarily start with a consideration of what appears to be the plain or literal meaning of the provision. But that should not be the end of the process. That literal meaning needs to be subjected to further scrutiny and analysis to determine whether it is a meaning which makes sense within its c ontext and in relation to the purpose of the provision in question. In other words, the initial superficial meaning may have to yield to a deeper meaning elicited through a purposive interpretation. One feature of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone is that party political affiliation is a sine qua non for the positions of President and Vice President . I have come to this conclusion from sections 5 (2) (c), 35, 41 and 54 (2 (b)of the Constitution and the Public Elections Act, 2012.There is no provision in the Constitution for a president or vice president to run for office as an independent candidate. Sections 42(1) and 54 (2) (a) and subsection (3) inform me that both the President and Vice P resident must be members of a political party. This is the basis on which they are elected and deemed to be elected respectively. If I am correct in coming to this view, the appropriate question to ask is whether such affiliation is limited to the period up to the election to these offices or is such an affiliation necessary throughout the period of their tenure in office? When section 41 of the Constitution is read holistically with the other provisions mentioned, I opine that party political affiliation of both the President and Vice President is a prerequisite for holding such positions. This is the context in which this C ourt should endeavour to determine the scope of section 41 of the Constitution , time-wise. What was the purpo se for which the 19 drafters of the Constitution incorporated the qualifications mentioned in section 41 in dealing with the qualifications for the office of Vice President in section 54 (2) (b)? Why should those qualifications be limited to the time of elec tion and no further? As I have considered these questions, I have come to the conclusion that there is no logical reason why those qualifications should be so limited and that was not the intention of the drafters of the Constitution. It is absurd and il logical to come to a different conclusion. The need to avoid absurdity in interpreting statutory provisions has always been recognized by the courts and I hold that this Court should avoid any absurd interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. Truth to be told , there is no provision in the Constitution which specifically and in terms, empowers the President to relieve or remove the Vice President from hi s duties and office. Assuming (without conceding) that this is so on a literal interpretation of the Constitution, the Defendants through their Counsel have argued that this is not the end of the matter because on a purposive interpretation of the several provisions of the Constitution, the intention of P arliament is that section 41 lays down 4 qualifications for the position s of both the President and the Vice President. This in my considered opinion is based on section 54 (2) (b) of the Constitution (cited supra) as far as the Vice President is concerned. I note that section 54 deals with the position of Vice President as is stated in the marginal-note to the section. Section 41 deals with the President but the qualifications mentioned in this section relating to the President are expressly incorporated as the qualifications for the office of Vice President without any time limitation. Section 54 (2) (b) states that a person shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of Vice President (emphasis mine) unless he has the qualifications specified in section 41. The qualifications are those cumulative items numbered (a) to (d) in that section. In other words, any one who should occupy the office of Vice President must have all of those qualifications, both for his election to the office and during his tenure in office. The subsection does not say that a person shall not be qualified to be a candidate for “ election to the office of Vice P resident” but simply that he shall not be qualified to be a candidat e “for the office of V ice President”. The word “candidate” by definition is not exclusively limited , in my view, to the time of the election and no further. The Oxford Dictionary of English , 3 rd Edition at page 253 defines th is common word “candidate” as follows: A person who applies for a job or is nominated for election, as in the example, candidates applying for this position should be computer -literate; a person taking an examination, as in 20 the example, an A-level candidate; a person or thing regarded as suitable for or likely to receive a particular fate, treatment, or position, as in the example, she was the perfect candidate for a biography. Based on the 3 rd definition of “candidate”supra, I interpret section 54 (2) (b) alongside section 41 of the Constitution as saying that a person shall not be suitable for the position of Vice President unless he is (a) a citizen of Sierra Leone; (b) a member of a political party; (c) has attained the age of forty years; and (d) is otherwise qualified to be a member of Parliament. That suitability for the office of Vice President extends beyond his/her election to office. Did Parliament intend that the Vice President should only be qualified for the office at the time of the election and no longer, thereafter? I think not and I so hold. I note that nowhere in section 54 (2) is the word “election” used as in the case of the opening sentence of section 41 which refers to the President . That opening sentence, in my view, is not part of section 54 (2) (b). This section does not say that a person shall not be qualified for election to the office of Vice President unless he has the qualifications specified in section 41. The absence of the words “for ele ction” i nforms me that this subsection does not deal exclusively with the period before election. Consequently, I hold that section 54 (2) (b) is not dealing only with the time of election of the Vice President in spite of the fact that the word “candidate” is used. Let me further illustrate th e scope of section 54 (2) (b) after the incorporation of the cumulative and qualifying requirements in section 41 of the Constitution . I have no doubt that none of my compatriots whether in -country or in the diaspora would argue with any conviction that a non - Sierra Leonean (according to the Constitution) can be President of Sierra Leone. Where does the conviction that this is so , found in the Constitution? I opine that it is section 41 of the Constitution that makes citizenship a requirement for the position of President either expressly or by incorporation of section 75 of the Constitution. If the Plaintiff is right that the requirements in section 41 are not continuous for the position of President of Sierra Leone (and by virtue of section 54 (2) (b) for the position of Vice President), but are only limited up to the time of election, it would mean that once a president has been elected, he can for example during his tenure as President, renounce his citizenship. Such renunciation of citizenship is a right or privilege granted to him under our citizenship laws, after which election (in the scenario) he can continue to remain President of the country. If he exercises that right or privilege, it cannot amount in my opini on, 21 to a violation of the Constitution as mentioned in section 51 of the Constitution for at least 2 reasons. Firstly what he has done is lawful under a specific Act of Parliament (that is the Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, 1973 Act No. 4 of 1973 as amended) and cannot at the same time be violating the Constitution. Secondly, it cannot be a violation of the Constitution based on the Plaintiff’s contention as far as membership of a political party is concerned, as the requirements (which includes citizenship) in section 41 (according to the Plaintiff) do not establish continuous obligations for the position of Vice President after election to the office. Either these cumulative requirements in section 41 are continuous during the currency of the offices of President and Vice President or they are not. If as I have held, they are continuous and any one of them is not present at any time, then the holder is not qualified for the office. His qualification for the office does not end at the time of his election, but must be so qualified throughout his tenure in office. In my judgment the position in relation to the requirement of citizenship is equally applicable to the requirement of membership of a political party. The requirements are cumulative. The absence of any one of these requirements renders one ineligible for the position of President or Vice President. In the Plaintiff’s case, he was expelled from the political party under whose banner, he was designated a candidate for the office of Vi ce President. He did not resign from the party, so that losing his membership was not his voluntary act and so a violation of the Constitution. It cannot be said that he “committed” any act. Whether or not he ought to have been expelled from the Party is not an issue before the Court. In my opinion therefore, both sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution are inapplicable in resolving the issue before the Court. The situation that the P laintiff found himself is not one of the circumstances for removal fr om office dealt with in those two sections of the Constitution. Losing one’s membership of a political party is neither mental/physical incapacity (section 50) nor is it a “violation” of the Constitution or a gross misconduct in the performance of the fun ctions of his office (section 51). The word “violation” connotes some act on the part of the violator. Once a Vice President loses one of the qualifications specified in section 41 of the Constitutio n, the next logical question deals with the manner in which the vacancy is to be filled. Does the loss of that qualification mean that the loser can no longer hold office as Vice -President? If so, who or which body should be responsible for relieving him of his duties and office? The role of Parliament is limited in the situation of removal from office to the provisions of sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution which in my opinion do not apply to the situation of the Plaintiff losing one 22 of the qualifying requirements for his office. Counsel for the 1st Defendant has forcefully argued that section 55 of the Constitution which deals with “vacancy in the office of Vice President” is not exhaustive and that once a sitting Vice President loses any one of the qualifications for his office as found in section 41 of the Constitution, a vacancy is thereby created. This is where I believe the purposive interpretation of this provision of the Constitution is helpful in determining the legal meaning of the enactment. The facts of this case are not expressly covered by section 55 of the Constitution. It is the combined effect of other provisions of the Cons titution (namely sections 54 (2) (b), and 41 together with 54 (5) which has created a situation not covered by section 55, dealing with vacancy in the office of Vice President. The informed interpretation rule (which is a rule under Common Law) enjoins the Court to “infer that the legislator, when settling the wording of an enactment, intended it to be a fully informed, rather than a purely literal interpretation.” See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4 th Edition, para.1414. T he editors of this work further state in paragraph 1484 that “It is one of the linguistic canons applicable to the construction of legislation that an Act is to be read as a whole so that an e nactment within it is to be treated not as standing alone but as falling to be interpreted in its context as part of the Act. ” I opine, in line with the above propositions, that the provisions in section 55 are by implication modified by the provisions in sections 54 (2) (b) and 41 of the Constitution and thus give rise to the power to appoint a Vice President under section 54 (5). This in my judgment is a proper and legitimate role of the Court in arriving at the legal meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions. Section 40 (1) of the Constitution read in tandem with section 53 (1) and (4) of the Constitution is relevant in determining who or which body is responsible for filling the vacancy that is crea ted by giving an interpretation in accordance with the informed interpretation rule. I have come to this conclusion based on the facts that Sierra Leone subscribes to the system of separation of powers and that the Legislature has been given, as noted above, a limited role as far as removal of the Vice President from office is concerned. In section 40 (1) of the Constitution, the President is described as inter alia, “the supreme executive authority of the Republic”. Section 53 (1) states that “subject to the provisions of the Constitution, executive power in Sierra Leone shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him directly…”. Section 54 (4) cited supra goes on to state how the functions of the President are to be construed with reference to his powers and duties in the exercise of the executive authority of Sierra Leone. When read holistically, these provisions inform me that the President is the highest executive authority in Sierra Leone and his executive powers are only limited by the C onstitution. Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant s have 23 given different interpretations to the powers of the President under section 40 of the Constitution as noted supra. My own view of the matter is that when this section under which the President relieved the Vice President of his duties and office is read alongside the provisions in section 53 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, I hold that the President is adequately empowered to relieve his Principal Assistant (the Plaintiff) in circumstances where he has lost one of the qualifications for holding office as Vice President. This is particularly so when the consequence that should follow, after he lost the said qualification under section 41, is not expressly dealt with by the Constitution and the Legislature at the moment does not have powers to act in those circumstances to resolve the Plaintiff’s complaint. I hold that t here is no provision in the Constitution which c urtails the powers and duties of the President in the exercise of the executive authority of Sierra Leone in respect of the vacancy in the office of Vice President that arose when the Plaintiff lost one of the qualifying requirements for his office. As far as the decision in the Atiku Abubakarr case is concerned on which Counsel for the Plaintiff has placed much emphasis both in the Statement of the Plaintiff’s Case and in oral arguments, it is important to note that while the Nigerian Supreme Court on appeal was answering the questions posed in that action in the light of the 1999 Nigerian Federal Constitution, we are called upon to answer the 2 specific questions set out in the action in the light of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act No.6 of 199 1. The provisions of the Constitution which we have to consider and i nterpret are different in terms from the provisions in the Nigerian Constitution which were considered in the Atiku Abubakarr case as can be discerned from the differences in the questio ns set out for determination in the respective cases. It is my view that this Court is not obliged to follow the decision or reasoning in the Nigerian case without reference to the issue that is before us. I hold that t he combined effect of sections 54 (2) (b) and 41 together with section 54 (5) of the Constitution which call for interpretation in this case , was not the issue before the Nigerian Supreme Court. I further hold that it was never the intention of Parliament in enacting the said provisions that a non -Sierra Leonean can contest for and hold the position of President of the independent and republican State of Sierra Leone. If I am right in this view, I equally hold that it was not the intention of Parliament t hat a candidate can contest for and hold the position of President (or Vice President) if he is not a member of a political party. Both cumulative qualifying requirements are found in section 41 of the Constitution and the Court is called upon to determine the import of one of them (membership of a political party) so as to answer the questions set out in the action. This was not the issue in the Nigerian case. 24 Further, while it may be true to say that section 143 of the Nigerian Constitution is similar to section 51 of the Constitution, there are significant differences which affect the outcome in interpreting the said provisions. I reproduce relevant portions of the said provisions for purposes of comparison: Section 143 (1) and (10) of the Nigerian Constitution states as follows: (1) “The President or Vice President may be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of this section. (10) “No proceedings or determination of the Panel or of the National Assembly or any matter relating thereto shall be entertained or questioned in any court.” Section 51 (1) of the Constitution, on the other hand, states in part as follows: “If notice in writing is given to the Speaker signed by not less than one-half of all the Members of Parli ament of a motion alleging that the P resident has committed any violation of the Constitution or any gross misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office and specifying the particulars of the allegations and proposing that a tribunal be appoi nted under this section to investigate those allegations, the Speaker shall……….” It is clear from the various judgments delivered by the Nigerian Supreme Court Justices that section 143 (1) cited suprawas pivotal in the decision reached in that case. For example, his Lordship Akintan JSC who gave the leading judgment said, after quoting Section 143, “it is clear from the above provisions of section 143 of the Constitution that the process leading to th e removal of the P resident or Vice President is entirely that of the National Assembly.” Later in the same judgment he said “The marginal note to the section reads thus: “Removal of President from office” and the section reads, inte r alia, thus: “The P resident or Vice President may be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of the section….” .We do not have such provisions in our Constitution. Section 51does not state that the President may be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of that section simpliciter, nor does the marginal note indicate that its provisions are dealing with removal of the President from office as in the Nigerian case. The Constitution does not oust the jurisdiction of the co urts in the process of calling into 25 question the misconduct of the President (and the Vice President) as it does in Nigeria.In this case before the C ourt, the issue is not the gross misconduct or violation of the Constitution by the Plaintiff in the performance of his functions while in office. The issue is the fact that while serving as Vice President, the Plaintiff lost one of the qualifying requirements for holding the office. The power to appoint a vice president in Nigeria is subject to the approval of the National Assembly (see section 146 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution). There is no such obligation in the Sierra Leone Constitution (see section 54 (5) of the Constitution) where the office of the Vice President has become vacant in circumstanc es which are not covered on an holistic and purposive interpretation of the Constitution. It is also clear from the judgments in the Nigerian case that their approach in interpreting their Constitution is the literal approach. After stating that the Indian approach to statutory interpretation is the literal approach, his Lordship Akintan JSC said as follows:“The approach of our courts in interpreting statutes and the constitution is the same as declared above. This court had stated the position in numerous cases.” The approach to interpretation that has been adopted in interpreting the Constitution in recent times is that of the purposive approach , which I have adopted in this case in order to give a n holistic interpretation of the several provisio ns which are relevant to the issue before the Court. For the foregoing reasons, I answer the questions in the action herein as follows: 1. On an holistic and purposive interpretation of the several provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act No.6 of 1991, in particular sections 54 (2) (b), and 41 together with section 54 (5) thereof, I answer question (1) (a) set out in the Plaintiff’s Originating Notice of Motion in this action in the affirmative and hold that the President is empowered to relieve t he Vice President of his office and duties in circumstances where the Plaintiff as sitting Vice President has lost one of the qualifying requirements for holding his office . The procedure set out in sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution are inapplicable. 2. On an holistic and purposive interpretation of the several provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, Act No.6 of 1991, in particular sections 40 (1) and 53 (1) and (4) thereof, I answer question (1) (b) set out in the Plaintiff’s Orig inating Notice of Motion in this action in the affirmative and hold that the supreme executive authority of the President includes a power 26 to relieve the Vice President of his office and duties in circumstances where the procedure set out in sections 50 an d 51 of the said Constitution are inapplicable and the Plaintiff as Vice President has lost one of the qualifying requirements for holding his office. 3. That the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiff are refused. 4. That the parties bear their respective costs of the action. THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE V.V. THOMAS ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE 27 HONOURABLE JUSTICE N.C. BROWNE-MARKE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINATING NOTICE OF MOTION 1. The Plaintiff has come to this Court by way of Originating Notice of Motion dated Application herein dated 20 th March, 2015, (hereafter, “Plaintiff’s Action”). As I stated in my interlocutory judgment delivered on 5 th May, 2015, this Action raises issues of immense importance for our jurisprudence. 2. The Motion is made pursuant to Sections 124 and 127 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 – hereafter, “the Constitution.” It seeks the determination of the following questions: (1) Whether the Constitution of Sierra Leone empowers the President “to relieve the Vice- President of his office and duties ” in any way other than by the procedure set out in Sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution? (2) Whether the “ Supreme executive authority ” of the President mentioned in Section 40(1) of the Constitution o f Sierra Leone includes the power to “ relieve the Vice - President of his office and duties” , other than by the procedure set out in Sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution? If the answer to the questions above is No, then the Plaintiff seeks the following further reliefs: (i) For a Declaration that the Public Notice announcing that the Vice-President had been relieved of his duties and office (Exhibit A herein) is unconstitutional, null and void, and of no effect. (ii) For a Declaration that the appointment of Victor Bockarie Foh as Vice - President of Sierra Leone is also unconstitutional , null and void, and of no effect. 28 (iii) For an Injunction restraining the said Victor Bockarie Foh from acting in the Office of Vice -President of Sierra Leone, pending the hearing an d determination of this action. (iv) For a Declaration that the Elected Vice -President of Sierra Leone (the Plaintiff herein) remains in Office as Vice -President thereof unless and until removed from Office as required by Sections 50 and 51 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone. 3. The Plaintiff further states that the capacity in which he brings this action is as (i) a citizen of Sierra Leone; (ii) Elected Vice-President of Sierra Leone. PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVIT 4. The Plaintiff’s suit or action is supported by an affidav it deposed and sworn to by himself on the same day, i.e. 20 th March, 2015. In it, he deposes to the following matters: 1. That I am the Plaintiff in the action herein. 2. That I was elected by the people of Sierra Leone to the office of the Vice-President on the same ticket with President Ernest Bai Koroma in 2007, and again in 2012. 3. That I continued in my office as Vice-President until 17 th March,2015 when I heard on the SLBC Radio and Television that the President had relieved me of my duties and from the office of Vice President of Sierra Leone. A copy of the Press Release issued from State House is exhibited hereto and marked “A”. 4. That I was totally taken aback and astounded, and I immediately sought the advice of my lawyers, as a result of which I issued a S tatement on the 18 th March,2015, stating inter alia, that my purported removal from office is both Unconstitutional and Unlawful. A copy of the said statement is exhibited hereto and marked “B.” 5. That on the same 18 th March, 2015 a Former Vice-President and Attorney-General, Dr Abdulai Conteh, wrote an open letter to the President supporting my position that my purported removal from office was Unconstitutional. A copy thereof is exhibited and marked “C”. 6. That on the same 18 th March, 2015 the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) also issued a statement supporting my view that my purported removal from office was Unconstitutional. A copy thereof is exhibited hereto and marked “D”. 29 7. That in complete disregard of all the views expressed by people right across the board against the action of the President, on the 19 th March,2015 it was announced that the 2 nd Defendant Victor Bockarie Foh had been appointed Vice -President and sworn -in to the said office. 8. That I have been advised by my lawyers, and verily believe that the President has no power under the Constitution of Sierra Leone to relieve me of my office and duties as Vice-President except by the procedure set out in Sections 50 and 51 of the said Constitution, or to appoint someone else in my stead when due proce ss has not been followed. 9. I therefore ask this Court for the reliefs prayed for accordingly. 5. I shall now turn my attention to the exhibits. Exhibit “A” is a copy of the press release. It reads: “On the 6 th day of March 2015, the National Advisory Committee (NAC) of the All Peoples Congress (APC) took a decision to expel Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana from the APC; and by letter dated 6 th day of March 2015, Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana was duly expelled from the APC. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, as guardian of the Constitution of Sierra Leone pursuant to Section 40(3) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991, I have taken note of the decision (and) the public will recall, and I have also taken note of the fact that on Saturday March,14, 2015, Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana sought asylum from a foreign embassy demonstrating a willingness to abandon his duties and office as the Vice President of our beloved Republic. And whereas Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana is no longer a member of a political party in Sierra Leone and therefore does not have the continuous requirement to hold office as Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, provided for in Section 41(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991, I hereby relieve Alhaji Samuel Sam Sumana of the duties and from the office of Vice President of Sierra Leone with immediate effect, pursuant to my supreme executive authority as Presi dent of the Republic of Sierra Leone as enshrined in Section 40(1) of the said Constitution of Sierra Leone. 30 I am in consultations with the leadership of the APC, the party under whose ticket I was elected President, in relation to the appointment of anot her person as Vice President. I shall appoint and announce the name of the Vice President of Sierra Leone, shortly, pursuant to Section 54(5) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act No. 6 of 1991.” ASYLUM SEEKING AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 6. It is quite apparent from the wording of the notice, that two issues precipitated the action of the President: first, the Plaintiff had been expelled from the governing party, the APC, and so did not belong to a political party any longer; this was a requirement of Sub-Section 41(b) of the Constitution, and, according to the press release, was a continuous requirement; second, the Plaintiff had sought asylum in a foreign embassy, and thereby expressed a willingness to abandon his position as Vice President, and the Presiden t therefore had to act quickly and decisively in order to avoid an impasse in which the office of Vice President might remain unoccupied, indefinitely. The particular foreign embassy has not been mentioned, but there is the implied averment that such a mov e on the part of the Plaintiff would have caused grave embarrassment and serious consequences for governance issues in the country. The Plaintiff admits the expulsion, but has said nothing about whether indeed, whilst occupying the office of Vice President of this country, he had for whatever reasons, sought asylum in a foreign embassy. Foreign diplomatic missions and their premises in Sierra Leone, are accorded full diplomatic immunity. Section. This is the effect of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privilege s Act,1961. Sub-Section 3(1) of the Act reads, as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Act every foreign envoy and every foreign consular officer...........shall be accorded immunity from suit and legal process and inviolability of residence, offic ial premises, and official archives to the extent to which they were respectively so entitled under the law in force in Sierra Leone immediately before the passing of this Act.” This Act was passed to give effect to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 to which Sierra Leone is a party. Article 22 of the Convention states: 31 “1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission. 2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. 3.The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” 7. So, the situation which according to the press release had arisen, was that our country ’s Vice President had gone to a place where no one, not even the President, nor our Courts would be able to exercise any form of authority over him. And this was done 8 days after he had been expelled from the party which had taken him to the office of Vic e President. And, as I have stated above, the Plaintiff has not said anything about this allegation. The press release was exhibited by him to his affidavit which was freely deposed and sworn to by him, and it must be taken therefore, that he is fully aware of its contents. And as he has not denied its contents, or, any part of it, it must be taken that he admits the whole of it. The seeking and granting of asylum to anyone, not being a citizen of the country in whose foreign mission the asylum is sought, c ould be embarrassing to the host country, as is evident in the ongoing saga relating to the seeking of asylum by Julian Assange in Eucador’s embassy in London. 8. Exhibit B, is a copy of the Plaintiff’s statement issued to the public. There, he asserts that his removal from office was unconstitutional as, in his view, the President had no power to relieve him of his duties, and that the office of Vice President could only become vacant in the instances set out in Section 55 of the Constitution. He asserts als o that the President’s action was unlawful in that he, the Plaintiff, had been elected by the people of Sierra Leone to the office of Vice President. This statement was issued a day after the press release, exhibit A, was published. Again, there is no rebuttal of the asylum allegation. HON DR ABDULAI CONTEH’S OPEN LETTER 32 9. Exhibit C, is a copy of the open letter written by the Hon Dr Abdulai Conteh, one time, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice of Sierra Leone, between April, 1987 and October, 1991, and a very illustrious one at that, I must say. I can attest to this as one who worked as a subordinate State Counsel under him; he later became 1 st Vice – President and Minster of Internal Affairs between October,1991 and April,1992; and then later, Chief Justice of Belize, and presently a Justice of Appeal in the Eastern Caribbean States Court of Appeal. As I have said earlier, Dr Abdulai Conteh is highly respected in the legal world and he was one of the members of the Constitutional Review Commission set up by the late President Momoh to draw up the present Constitution. He was also, as a member of the Cabinet which submitted the Bill to Parliament for passage into Law. And as a Member of Parliament at the time, he also took part in the debates on the draft Constitution in Parliament. Dr Conteh asserts that since, 1991, the position of Vice President has become elective, and no longer appointive as was the case under the 1971 and the 1978 Constitutions, respectively. The basis of that postulate, is that the Vice President is elected by the electorate. Interestingly, when one studies the Constitution carefully, one would note that though there are copious references to the election of the President in Sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 & 45, there is no independent r eference to the election of Vice President, save as stated below, nor, is there a separate election for the office of Vice President. So let us look at how the Vice President comes into office. Section 54 deals with this matter. It reads: (1) There shall b e a Vice -President of the Republic of Sierra Leone who shall be the Principal Assistant to the President in the discharge of his executive functions. (2) A person – (a) Shall be designated a candidate for the office of Vice President by the Presidential candidate before the Presidential election; (b) Shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of Vice President unless he has the qualifications specified in section 41. (3) A candidate shall be deemed to be duly elected as Vice President if the candidate who designated him as candidate for election to the office of Vice President has been duly elected as President in accordance with the provisions of Section 42. In other words, a candidate cannot become Vice President independently, or, on his own. He can only be deemed to be elected if the person who designated him as candidate for