Abaahom and Another v Atta and Others (H1/43/25) [2026] GHACA 10 (28 May 2026)

NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL SEKONDI, 2026 CORAM SAMUEL OBENG-DIAWUO, J.A (PRESIDING) BARIMA YAW KODIE OPPONG, J.A FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A SUIT NO: H1/43/25 28TH MAY 2026 1. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI 2. ALHAJI ABUBAKR ANDERSON--------- PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS VERSUS 1. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA 2. TUFUHEN KWASI KETU IV--------DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 3. KOFI ADAM AFADZI 4. KWEKU TAWIAH JUDGMENT FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU, J.A: 1.0 General Overview This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court delivered on 13/05/2024. According to Goodreads, a notable quote on fairness and justice by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart is: “Fairness is what justice really is.” NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 2 2.0 Facts: The Appellants in this case were originally seven (7) in number as of 21/10/2021, when the Writ of Summons was issued. The present two (2) Appellants together with Nana Kwesi Andoh II (suing for themselves and on behalf of Ekumfi Immuna Community) and Nana Odwiren Ababio VII with Ebusuapanyin Kofi Bekoe (suing for themselves and on behalf of Odomna Family of Immuna) as well as Ebusuapanyin Kofi Gyapoh and Opanyin Sumaila (suing for themselves and on behalf of Kojo Andam Twidan Family of Immuna) originally issued a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim against the Respondents who were also numbered six (6) in total. They were Ex-Tufuhen Kwesi Kwetu III (a.k.a. Amoa Anderson), Ebusuapanyin Kojo Atta, Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu IV, Safohen Kojo Annan, Kojo Afadzi and Kweku Tawiah. In the course of the suit, the first Defendant, Ex-Tufuhen Kwesi Kwetu III (a.k.a. Amoa Anderson) died. Pursuant to a Notice of Discontinu ance filed on 18/07/2022, the Plaintiffs discontinued the case against him. The Writ was accordingly amended to remove his name on 24/01/2023. Subsequently, Nana Odwiren Ababio VII and Ebusuapanyin Kofi Bekoe, who were the first two (2) Plaintiffs on the original Writ representing the Odomna Family of Immuna applied to the court to be disjoined from the suit and the court granted their application on 06/06/2023 (ROA 169 -172, 177). Another application for disjoinder was filed on 26/06/2023 by Ebusuapanyin Kofi Gyapoh and Opanyin Sumaila (suing for themselves and on behalf of Kojo Andam Twidan Family of Immuna), and the court granted their prayer on 27/06/2023. On 30/06/2023, the Writ of Summons was again amended to reflect the disputing parties. Pursuant to an order of this Court dated 19/01/2025, the third Plaintiff/Appellant (Nana Kwesi Andoh II) and third Defendant/Respondent (Safohen Kojo Annan) were also struck out from the suit , leaving the present Appellants and Respondents in this appeal. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 3 2.1 Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Case (“Appellants”) By the amended Writ of Summons filed on 30/06/2023 pursuant to leave of court granted on 06/06/2023, the Appellants sought the following reliefs: “ a. A declaration that by the Consent Judgment in the High Court titled Chief Kwame Odwiren Ababaio & 3 Ors Vrs Ebusuapanyin Koto Atta VII & 2 Ors ( Suit No. E1/23/2012 dated 14th July, 2015, the Defendants cannot alienate parcels of Ekumfi Immuna lands to third parties without the consultation, consent and approval of the Plaintiffs, the Kojo Andam Twidan Family of Immuna and the Odomna Family of Immuna. b. An order nullifying all sales, grants or alienations of parcels of Ekumfi Immuna lands to third parties by the Defendants without the consultation, consent and approval of the Plaintiffs, the Kojo Andam Twidan Family of Immuna and the Odomna Family of Immuna. c. An order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants, their relatives, agents, assigns, privies and any persons claiming through them from in any way selling, granting, alienating or developing parcels of Ekumfi Immuna lands without the consultation consent and approval of the Plaintiffs, the Kojo Andam Twidan Family of Immuna and the Odomna Family of Immuna. d. Any other relief that this Court may deem fit to grant.” In the said amended Statement of Claim, the Appellants stated that they are part of the principal elders of Ekumfi Immuna Community who have instituted the action in their respective capacities and on behalf of the Community. The first Appellant is the Head of all Families in Ekumfi Immuna Town known as “Nguabafo Panyin” and the second Appellant is the Town Linguist. The Appellants described the Respondents as the Head of the Kwesi Ketu Twidan family of Ekumfi Immuna, present Tufuhene of Ekumfi Immuna or a member of NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 4 the Kwesi Ketu Twidan family of Ekumfi Immuna and principal elders of the Kwesi Ketu Twidan family of Ekumfi Immuna, respectively. The Appellants also asserted that apart from the Respondent’s family, the other families whose interests are concerned in the subject matter are the Kojo Andam Twidan family of Immuna whose head of family is Ebusuapanyin Kofi Gyapoh and the Odomna family whose head is Ebusuapanyin Kofi Bekoe, who have voluntarily withdrawn from the suit. The Appellants stated that the predecessors of the parties in this suit and that of the Kojo Andam Twidan family of Immuna and the Odomna family of Ekumfi Immuna executed an agreement on 08/12/1953. The said agreement stipulated and vested the communal ownership of all Immuna lands in the Kojo Andam Twidan family, the Odomna family, the Kwesi Ketu family of Immuna and the citizens of Immuna community. According to the Appellants, the Kojo Andam Twidan family of Immuna and the Kwesi Ketu family of Immuna were one inseparable Twidan family of Immuna at the time the agreement was executed in 1953. The family is currently divided into respective lineages of Kwesi Ketu and Kojo Andam Twidan families of Immuna. The Appellants assert that the 1953 agreement further fixed the sharing ratios of all proceeds from the land, dues and payments collected from activities of farmers and fishermen at Immuna among the families of the parties, the Odomna family of Immuna and the Immuna community. They further state that sometime in 2012, the Appellants and/or their predecessors and that of the Kojo Andam Twidan of Immuna and the Odomna family of Immuna had reason to bring an action against the Respondents in the High Court, Cape Coast when the Respondents sought to alienate, grant and sell portions of the Immuna lands to third parties without the consent, consultation and approval of the Appellants and/or the Immuna community, Odomna family and Kojo Andam Twidan families of Immuna. According to the Appellants, this matter was settled out of court and terms of settlement filed and adopted by the court. It is NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 5 the Appellants’ claim that the said terms affirmed the communal ownership of all Immuna lands and provided a new sharing ratio of all proceeds from the Immuna lands, dues, tolls and payments collected from farms and fishermen of Immuna. Notwithstanding the said consent judgment, the Respondents purport and have proceeded to alienate parcels of Immuna lands to third parti es without any consultation, consent or approval from the Appellants, Kojo Andam Twidan of Immuna and the Odomna family of Immuna who are stakeholders with interest in the Immuna lands. The Appellants say that the terms of the consent judgment are binding on all parties in the suit and therefore, the Respondents are estopped from asserting the contrary. The Appellants assert that by Respondents’ conduct, they seek to pocket proceeds of their unlawful sale of Immuna lands to their detriment and that of the whole Immuna community, in breach of the terms of the consent judgment. Therefore, unless restrained by the Court, the Respondents will continue to engage in their unlawful acts of alienating parts of the said lands and pocketing the proceeds therefrom to the detriment of the Appellants, evidenced by the purported sale to Mrs. Willie Mae Penny and Mr. Arthur Penny in 2018. 2.2 Defendants/Respondents’ Case (“Respondents”) The Respondents denied the claims of the Appellants in their amended defence filed on 03/03/2023 pursuant to leave of the court granted on 27/02/2023. They asserted that the Immuna Community is fully aware that the Immuna lands belong to the Respondents and their members have at all material times approached only the Respondents for grant of various lands. The Respondents further admitted the Consent Judgment of 08/12/1953, but the terms were in respect of only proceeds, dues and payments regarding palm and coconut trees and “Amandze” usually paid or collected from non-indigenous fishermen to Immuna. The Respondents claim that the Appellants know that Immuna lands belong to the Respondents’ family as allodial owners. The Respondents stated that they have prior judgment and registration of Immuna lands since 1949 and 1978 respectively, all NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 6 confirming their allodial ownership of their Immuna lands. The Respondents further asserted that their family has, from age-old time, exercised control and possession over Immuna lands without any protest, interference or hindrance from any quarters till now. It is the case of the Respondents that the Appellants are presently giving a wrong interpretation to paragraph two of the terms and settlement dated 14/07/2015, the subject matter of this suit, despite their awareness that it is only limited to proceeds, dues and payments in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandze” usually paid or collected from non-indigenous fishermen to Immuna and does not affect the sale of individual family lands owned by the allodial owners. The Respondents therefore reiterated that the said terms of settlement signed by the parties did not include the sale of lands and denied the Appellants’ claims. In the Appellants reply to the Respondents amended statement of defence filed on 09/03/2023, the Appellants stated that no judgment has decreed that all Immuna lands are owned exclusively by the Respondents’ family as they allege. The Appellants further asserted that the 1953 agreement and the subsequent consent judgment affirmed the communal ownership of Immuna lands by the respective factions or families of the parties in the suit. They further stated that they resisted all attempts by the Respondents’ family to alienate lands in Immuna to the exclusion of Appellants’ families and factions, which culminated in the action instituted in the High Court in 2012. 3.0 The Trial Court On 17/03/2023, the following issues were set down for trial at the close of pleadings: NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 7 a. Whether or not, per the agreement dated 8th December, 1953 and the Consent Judgment in the suit titled Chief Kwame Odwiren Ababio & 3 Ors versus Ebusuapanyin Kojo Atta & 2 Ors (Suit No. E1/23/2012) dated 14/07/2013, all Ekumfi Immuna lands belong to the parties jointly. b. Whether or not the Defendants’ Kwesi Ketu Twidan Family can alienate Ekumfi Immuna lands to third parties without the authority, consent and approval of the Plaintiffs. c. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings. The Appellants’ first witness was Kenneth Obosu, an elder of Oman of Immuna or Immuna Community. He testified that his late father was a member of the third and fourth Appellants and Respondents’ Twidan Family, which is now separated into two factions. He tendered in evidence a copy of the agreement dated 08/12/1953 executed by the Twidan, Odumna and Oman Families as Exhibit “A”. He also produced Exhibit “B” which was a 1997 court suit regarding a sale of a portion of Immuna land by the Respondent’s family without notice to the Odumna family and Oman of Immuna, Suit N o. 34/94 titled Ebusuapanyin Kweku Minta & 2 Ors vrs. DODDAB Salt Industries Ltd, which was settled by Terms of Settlement signed by the predecessors of all the parties in the suit purportedly acknowledging the communal ownership of the lands. Exhibit “C” was tendered in evidence as the 2012 Suit No. E1/23/2012 in the Cape Coast High Court by the Appellants predecessors, when the Respondents sought to alienate, grant and sell portions of the Immuna lands to third parties without the approval of the Appellants’ families and the Immuna Community, titled Chief Kwame Odwiren Ababio & 3 Ors vrs Ebusuapanyin Koto Atta VII & 2 Ors. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 8 Exhibit “D” was the out-of-court settlement in respect of Suit No. E1/23/2012 and the Terms of Settlement, which was filed and adopted by the court as consent judgment on 08/07/2015. A copy of the search report conducted by the Appellants in relation to the purported 2018 alienation of land by the Respondents to Mrs. Willie Mae Penny and Mr. Arthur Penny without the consent of the Appellants was exhibited as “E”. Exhibit “F” was also produced as another search report evidencing a purported sale by the Respondents to a third party without the approval of the Appellants. Exhibit “G” Series were pictures of some portions of Immuna lands graded by some third parties purportedly confirming that the Respondents are still selling lands without Appellants’ consent. On the part of the Respondents, the second Respondent (Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu IV) testified on their behalf that the consent judgment does not restrict his family from alienating parcels of their Ekumfi lands. He exhibited the 08/12/1953 agreement which was allegedly circumvented/thwarted by a recent agreement entered into as Exhibit 1 and 1A. He also produced Exhibit 2, which was the judgment the Respondents (Twifo family of Immuna) obtained against the Appellants when the Respondents litigated over their lands with the Asona family of Immuna. On 19/06/1978, his predecessor, Nana Kwesi Ketu III made a declaration in respect of the Respondents’ Twidan family lands of Immuna and took steps to register same to the knowledge of the Appellants, but they never protested. This registration was exhibited as 3. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 9 The Respondents also called Ebusuapanyin Kwesi Bondzie (a.k.a Arkra), the overall head of the Royal Twidan family of Arkra. He testified that since 1983 when he was appointed as secretary of the said family and made a principal member, it has always been the Respondents who have controlled and alienated their Immuna lands. The Appellants have never alienated lands, and the Royal Twidan family of Arkra has never shared boundary with the Appellants. Ebusuapanyin Kobina Akyrekyer, head of the Royal Aboradze family of Ekumfi Srafa Mpoano, vested with power to enstool/destool a chief also testified on behalf of the Respondents. He produced Exhibit 4 in this regard. He testified that Srafa lands shares boundary with the Respondents’ Immuna lands and that the Appellants do not have lands at Immuna. According to his testimony, Immuna lands belong to the Kwesi Ketu Twidan family. His testimony was followed by that of Stephen K. Odoom, a principal member of the Nsona Royal family of Owofa. He also testified that since time immemorial, his family has always shared boundary with the respondents until presently. Next was Habiba Seidu Abokoma, a resident of Ekumfi Immuna’s testimony. She testified that in 2015, they purchased two plots of land from the second Respondent (Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu), owners of Immuna lands to build their matrimonial home. The receipt evidencing the payment made to Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu, head of family and principal members of family, was produced as Exhibit 5. She took possession of the lands and constructed an 8-bedroom foundation on one of the plots. Sometime in 2022, she was summoned by one K. Baah to the original first Appellant’s palace. At the meeting, she met the said K. Baah and the head of the Appellant’s royal family called Ebusuapanyin J.J. K. Baah, who informed her that he was interested in purchasing her land to construct a factory. Upon consultation with her husband, they decided that they would not sell the land. She visited her site the following day to see K. Baah and Ebusuapanyin J.J. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 10 and others with a bulldozer, which had totally destroyed her foundation. According to K. Baah, he was acting under the instructions of Nana Odwiren. That the said Nana Odwiren openly said his Odumna family wanted her land to construct a factory. She reported the matter to the Ekumfi Otuam Police Station. Nana Odwiren, K. Baah and Ebusuapanyin J.J. honoured the Police summons and confessed to the police that they were responsible for the damage to her property. While the investigations were ongoing, his grantor, Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu (second Respondent), called her for a meeting because some NPP executives together with Ebusuapanyin J.J. had prevailed on her grantor to plead with her on their behalf to withdraw the matter from the police and promised to purchase another land from Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu (second Respondent) to replace hers and pay every cost she had incurred. She agreed after her initial hesitation. Nana Odwiren III, K. Baah and Ebusuapanyin J.J. therefore purchased another plot of land from Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu (second Respondent) for her, produced as Exhibit 6, hired a bulldozer to clear and prepare the land and paid an amount of GHC8000 for the destruction to her foundation. Opanyin Kweku Seidu, also a resident of Immuna, also testified. His testimony was that 50 years ago, he needed to purchase his own land and build due to flooding in his father’s house where he was staying. He therefore contacted Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu III even before the second Respondent assumed office. According to him, Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu III and Nana Attakwa gave him the portion of land on which he put up his building and from that time until now, he has lived there without any interference. 4.0 Decision of the Court At the conclusion of the trial, the court held in favour of the Respondents. The court held that the Respondents led evidence to establish that despite the 1953 and 2012 agreements, they were still in control of the land and were selling same to third parties. It was further held that as allodial interest owners of Immuna NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 11 lands, the Respondent Kwesi Ketu Twidan family could alienate the land to third parties without the Appellants’ consent. 5.0 Grounds of Appeal Dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 02/08/2024. An amended Notice of Appeal striking out 3rd Plaintiff/Appellant and 3rd Defendant/Respondent was filed on 21/01/2026 pursuant to a Court order dated 19/01/2025. The grounds of appeal were as follows: “a. The judgment is against the weight of the evidence on record b. That the learned trial Judge erred in his interpretation of the Terms of Settlement dated 25th May, 2015 which was adopted as Consent Judgment on 14th July, 2015 to hold that no interest was created in Immuna lands in favour of the Plaintiff/Appellants. Particulars of Error i. That “All proceeds from Immuna land”contained in paragraph 2 of the Terms of Settlement ought to have been interpreted to include proceeds from sale of Immuna lands. ii. That the learned trial Judge failed to deduce that paragraph 2 of the Terms of Settlement identified three distinct sources of income from Immuna lands as separated by the conjunctive word “and”. iii. That the learned trial Judge wrongly applied the ejuisdem generis rule in his interpretation of paragraph 2 of the Terms of Settlement to exclude proceeds of sale of land. c. Further grounds will be filed upon receipt of the Record of Appeal.” NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 12 6.0 Applying the Law and Analysis The Record of Appeal does not show that additional grounds of appeal were subsequently filed by the Appellant. The grounds of appeal will be argued seriatim. Ground A My Lords, Rule 8 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I.) 19 stipulates that any civil appeal to this Court shall be by way of rehearing. Various judicial interpretations have been placed on this procedural rule. The rule beckons this Honourable Court to review the entire evidence on record and arrive at its own conclusions to determine whether the findings of the trial court on both the law and the facts of the case are legally sound. Accordingly, when an Appellant prays the Court that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, he is contending that the learned trial Judge in the court below was erroneous in the examination, analysis and evaluation of the entirety of the Appellant’s case including the compelling evidence presented. In Republic v. Central Regional House of Chief & Ors; Ex Parte Gyan IX (Andoh X interested party) [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 845 at 850, the apex Court explained that: “… the effect of the ground of appeal that the judgment is against the weight of evidence was to empower the appellate court to rehear the matter, not in a literal manner, but to take another look at the evidence and to analyse the whole record of appeal before it. In so doing, the appellate court takes into account the testimonies and documentary evidence at the trial and arrives at its own decision after satisfying itself on a preponderance of probabilities whether the conclusions of the trial Judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence.” NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 13 In the decided case of Nortey (No.2) v. African Institute of Journalism and Communication & Ors (No.2) [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 703, the Supreme Court gave the scope of the omnibus ground of appeal when it pronounced thus: “This Court has stated in numerous cases such as Tuakwa v. Bosom [2001-2002] SCGLR 61,65, Quarcoopome v. Sanyo Electric Trading Co. Ltd [2009] SCGLR 213, 229; Oppong v. Anarfi [2011] 2 SCGLR 556 that an appeal is by way of re- hearing, particularly where the appellant alleges as in the omnibus ground that the decision of the trial court is against the weight of evidence. In such a case it is incumbent on an appellate court such as this, in a civil case, to analyse the entire record of appeal, take into account the testimonies and all documentary evidence adduced at the trial before arriving at its decision so as to satisfy itself that, on a preponderance of probabilities, the conclusions of the trial Judge are reasonably or amply supported by the evidence.” It is settled that legal points may also be addressed under the omnibus ground of appeal provided they arise from the evidence adduced in the court below. See the case of Owusu-Domena v. Amoah [2015-2016] 1SCGLR 790. The learned trial Judge in determining the issue whether all Ekumfi Immuna lands belong to the parties therein per the 8th December 1953 and the consent Judgment in the suit titled Chief Kwame Odwiren Ababio & 3 Ors v. Ebusuapanyin Kojo Attah & 2 Ors (Suit No. E1/23/2012) dated 14/07/2013, pronounced at page 8-9 of the nine (9) page judgment (page 322 -323 of the ROA) as follows: “I am satisfied from the evidence that historically, the allodial title owners of the land were the Defendants’ family. According to the evidence, there was a time the Defendants’ family were faced with litigation concerning the land and got the needed support from the Oman of Immuna; hence, the 1953 agreement … NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 14 In this case, the 2015 Agreement as well as the 1953 Agreement are silent on whether the allodial interest or ownership of the land has been transferred to the state or other families. It is also silent on proceeds from the sale of Immuna lands but detailed on others, such as dues, rents, payments made in respect of coconut and palm trees and Amadzie (sic). I agree with lawyer for the Defendants that going by the ejuisdem genris principle of interpreting documents, the context does not appear to include proceeds from the sale of the land. I am fortified in this view by the fact that the defendants have led evidence to establish that despite the Agreements, they were still in control of the land and were selling same to third parties. I hold therefore that the 1953 and 2015 Agreements did not pass allodial interest or ownership of Immuna lands to the Oman.” Counsel for the Appellants contested the above reasoning by the court below. He argued at paragraph 8 of his written submission that: “… once a vested interest has been created in a person entitling him/her to share in proceeds of an immovable property or movable property, though the person was not originally an owner, the irrefutable conclusion is that a legal and equitable interest has been created in favour of that person in the property such that the property was not to be dealt with by other parties in a way that will be detrimental or extinguish the vested interest of that person.” (Emphasis mine) Counsel further contended that all previous agreements, namely the 1953 Agreement (Exhibit A or 1) and the terms of Settlement (Exhibit B or IA – sale to DODDAB Salt Industries Ltd), established that a communal interest in Immuna lands had been created in favour of the Oman by the purported joint owners, the Twidan family and Odumna family of Immuna. Therefore, the Oman of Immuna had to be consulted for its approval regarding any dealings with Immuna lands by the Twidan family and Odumna family of Immuna that is potentially detrimental to the Oman’s ownership interest. Needless to reiterate NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 15 that these two families, who were originally part of the Appellants, abandoned the battlefield, thus leaving the Oman alone as Appellants in this instant case. Did Exhibit A and Exhibit B in fact vest the communal ownership of Immuna lands in the current Appellants (the Oman)? For purposes of clarity, it is important to quote the operative parts of the 1953 agreement (Exhibit A). It reads: “1. That citizens of Immuna shall have full right at all times to cultivate farms on the portion of the land hereinbefore described without payment of Tolls or Tribute such as are recognized to Native Law and Custom. 2. That all proceeds derivable from the said land, that is to say, dues or payments collected in respect of Palm and Coconut-Nut and Amandzi usually paid or collected from fishermen who are not natives of Immuna are to be apportioned into three parts and shall be distributed as follows: (a) One-third (1/3) share shall be paid to the Twidan and Oduma families First and Second Parties. (b) Two-thirds share shall be paid to the Oman of Imuna the Third Party.” That all proceeds derivable from the said land, that is to say, dues or payments collected in respect of Palm and Coco-nut trees and Amandzi usually paid or collected from fishermen who are not natives of Immuna are to be apportioned into three parts…” A plain or ordinary reading of the provisions of the Exhibit A agreement shows that the Oman or Community had no ownership rights to Immuna lands entitling them through the Appellants to consultation and approval before alienation by the Respondents except rights of user granted them on a portion of the land in the first clause. The Appellants were only given the right to use and profit from the land (crops) but not to alienate or sell the land. Members of a community are only expected, per custom, to perform customary services and hold allegiance to the NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 16 allodial interest holding family or stool as elucidated in the case of Baidoo v. Osei [1957] 3 WALR 289. In contrast, non-citizens or strangers require an express grant to acquire the usufruct in addition to the performance of customary rights usually in the form of payment of rent. See section 5 (1) (b) of the Lands Act 2020, (Act 1036) and the Supreme Court case of Oppong Kofi v. Attibrukusu [2011] 1 SCGLR 176. No ownership right was created in favour of the Appellant by this agreement. The recitals of the 1953 agreement provided the context to the terms reached by the parties. The age-old contest for ownership of Immuna lands was between the Twidan and Odumna families. The moral and financial assistance by the Oman during the battle for the ownership of the land was therefore recognised and compensated with the right to cultivate farms on a portion of the lands without payment of tolls or tribute, as recognised by native law and custom among others. Cultivation of farms is not synonymous with developing the land for residential purposes or to acquire the right of selling to third parties. It is an established fact that in customary land tenure in Ghana, a farmer may have a right to farm on land owned by a family or stool, but the land remains the property of that family or stool. In the case of Togbe Lugu Awadali IV v. Togbe Gbadawu IV (2018) DLSC163, which involved a dispute over land between two families, the Anyigbe Clan (Plaintiff) and the Gbadawu family (Defendant), the Supreme Court confirmed the trial court’s findings that the Plaintiffs are the allodial owners of the disputed land, with the Defendant holding the possessory rights. Therefore, communal ownership of the land by the Oman or community under the 1953 agreement (Exhibit A) was restricted to its rights of user. Counsel for the Appellants also argued that the communal ownership of the land by the purported Twidan and Odumna families as well as the Oman was acknowledged and admitted at paragraph 3 of Exhibit B. The background to this exhibit, which is the terms of settlement filed in Suit No.34/94 intituled NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 17 Ebusuapanyin Kweku Minta & 2 Ors v. DODDAB Salt Industries Ltd, is that a sale of a portion of Immuna land by the Respondents’ family was purportedly made to the defendant in the suit without notice to the Odumna family and Oman of Immuna. The terms of settlement reached as rightly quoted by Counsel for the Appellants in his address to this Court at pages 9-10 ( also found at pages 103- 106 of ROA) were: “ 1. Suit No. 34/94 is revoked and discontinued. 2. Indenture Number CCT 808/79 dated 4th December, 1979 purported to executed between Tufuhen Kojo Entsie, Regent of Twidan Family Stool of Immuna and DODDAB Salt Industries Ltd is declared a nullity and of no effect. 3. Ownership of the land in dispute, the subject matter in the Agreement dated 8th December, 1953 between the Twidan family of Immuna, Odumna family of Immuna and the Oman of Immuna shall be maintained as spelt out in the agreement aforementioned.” (Emphasis mine) This is where the confusion of Appellants stems from. The term “ownership” employed in paragraph 3, when contextualised within Exhibit A, shows that it was loosely employed. The true meaning of that term does not fit the context spelt out in paragraph 3 above. As already explained, under Exhibit A, only user rights were conferred on the Appellants. The mere right to cultivate crops on a piece of land does not automatically confer formal ownership rights over that land. In property law, a distinction is generally made between the right to use land and the allodial title (the right to own the land itself). For cultivation rights to translate into ownership rights, there typically needs to be an express grant, a documented agreement or legal recognition of such transfer, which I cannot also find after combing the entirety of the record of appeal. Exhibit A did not create any ownership of the disputed land except to provide for user rights and two specific revenue streams, to wit, dues or payments collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandzie” collected from non-native fishermen. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 18 It bears noting that words used in agreements must be appropriately selected because precise language defines the rights, obligations and expectations of all parties. Not only does it enhance the enforceability of agreements but most importantly, it reduces the likelihood of legal disputes. Ambiguous language potentially results in misunderstandings, costly litigation and outcomes that are not reflective of the original intention of the parties. Kato Nabirye H. and Asiimwe Kyomugisha T. in their article, ‘Interpreting Contracts: The Importance of Language Precision’ published in Research Invention Journal or Current Issues in Arts and Management Vol 4 (1), 2025, emphasise that clarity in language, achieved through deliberate word choice, contextual awareness and structured syntax, can prevent misinterpretations and simplify dispute resolution. Where the import of documentary evidence relied on by a party is misconstrued or misread, it will not serve any useful purpose to the party seeking to rely on that piece of document. In this case, the provision made under paragraph 3 that “ownership of the disputed land to be maintained as per the 8th December, 1953 agreement” is pointless as the said agreement did not create any formal ownership interest in the Oman except the right to cultivate the apportioned land and a percentage of proceeds derivable from the said land as specified in the agreement. My Lords, I am further fortified in this reasoning by Exhibit C, which is Suit No. E1/23/2012 intituled, Chief Kwame Odwiren Ababio, Ebusuapanyin Kofi Bekoe, Ebusuapanyin Kofi Gyapong & Nana Abraham III v. Ebusuapanyin Kwame Kwgyir, Ebusuapanyin Kobina Amoa Anderson & Tufuhen Kwasi Ketu. The reliefs endorsed on the said Writ of Summons clearly defeat the argument that the 1953 agreement conferred ownership rights on the Oman. The claims set out in Exhibit C, particularly “i” and “ii” as quoted by Counsel for Appellants in his address to this Court at page 15 (also page 107 of the ROA) were: NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 19 “i. A declaration that the Immuna “Awomberew land” are the joint properties of the Plaintiffs Stool Family, Kojo Andam Twidan families and that of the Defendants Twidan Family by the agreement dated 8th December, 1953. ii. A further declaration that Oman of Immuna have an interest in the said “Awomberew land” as evidenced by the 1953 agreement.” Two contrasting claims that affirm and acknowledge the undeniable fact that the Oman, the Appellants herein, have no ownership interest in Immuna land to demand any notice or approval from the Respondents in their rights to alienate the land to third parties. Per their own reliefs, they sought a declaration that Immuna lands are the joint properties of the Kojo Andam Twidan families and the Twidan family. Evidently, if under both exhibits A and B the understanding was that the documents vested in the Appellants ownership interest as claimed by their counsel, the plaintiffs therein (who were part of the original Appellants in this case before applying to be disjoined or struck out of this instant action) and their learned counsel at the time of issuing the Exhibit C writ would have added the Oman to the declaration sought under “i”. However, in the case of the Oman of Immuna, a different declaration was sought, that is, they: “… also have an interest in the said “Awomberew land as evidenced by the 1953 agreement.” which interest, as I have reiterated above, is in respect of cultivation for farming purposes and the percentage of proceeds granted them. The organisation of their reliefs in Exhibit C shows that they admit that they have no ownership rights in Immuna lands to demand the rights of prior consent, consultation and approval before sale by the Respondents, except a percentage of the two revenue streams as enunciated above. This is further reinforced by counsel for the Appellants’ own admission in his address to this Court at page 15 that the said Exhibit C writ is similar to the instant case before this Honourable Court. He aptly explains: NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 20 “ The facts in the statement of claim in exhibit C are similar to the facts in the instant case, that is, the Plaintiffs therein ( including the Plaintiff herein) instituted an action against the Defendants therein (Defendants herein) alleging that Defendants are conducting themselves in a manner detrimental to the interests created in favour of Plaintiffs in Immuna lands.” It is this confusing misinterpretation of Exhibits A and B that has been the bone of contention between the Appellants and the Respondents herein. The action in Exhibit C (Suit No. E1/23/2012) resulted in the terms of settlement, which was adopted by the court as consent judgment on 08/07/2015, Exhibit D. Under the Exhibit D agreement, the fence wall of the Appellants’ case, which is their reliance on Exhibit A and B, was broken into pieces. Exhibit A, which was the famous 1953 agreement, was explicitly revoked. The terms of settlement adopted as consent judgment is captured below: 1. The 8th December 1953 agreement …. “IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID.” 2. “ALL proceeds from the Immuna land and dues or payment collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandze” usually paid or collected from non- indigenous fishermen to Immuna shall be apportioned into five (5) parts instead of the previous three (3) parts and distributed as follows: a. 15% to the Kwesi Ketu Twidan Family, b. 15% to the Kojo Andam Twidan Family c, 10% to the Twidan Family Stool d. 20% to the Odomna Family NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 21 e. 40% to the Oman i.e. (Immuna Community) for the development of the Immuna Community.” The language in both Exhibits A and D is identical. The user rights to a portion of the land was dispensed with in Exhibit D. Both agreements address revenue from palm or coconut dues and Amandze from non-native fishermen. No mention is made of allodial or communal ownership, ownership of the land itself, or restriction on the right to sell, grant, or alienate parcels . Besides, there is no requirement of prior consultation or consent from the Appellants, the community, or the other families or any veto power over sales. Exhibit D is a typical revenue- sharing settlement, not a title-and-veto regime. Nonetheless, the Appellants repeatedly treat the 1953 agreement as still operative or as creating an implied communal interest. Legally, this is indefensible. The 2015 settlement, Exhibit D, did not divest the Respondents of their ownership of the disputed land or their allodial title to the land, a finding the trial court rightly made. The Respondents had prior judgment and registration of Immuna lands since 1949 and 1978 in respect of their Twidan family lands of Immuna. Exhibit 3, which is the declaration made by the Respondents’ predecessors evidenced by the sole registration of the lands in 1983 with Ghana Land Registry No. 409/1983 to the exclusion of the Appellants, speaks loudly. This provides the basis for the setting aside of the joint ownership of the lands by the purported parties, including the Appellants, under the Exhibit D agreement. What is more telling is that, not only was the purported registration effected without any challenge , but the Appellants never sought to impeach the declaration and the registration of same under cross-examination of the Respondents’ witness, again indicative of admission. Thus, the true scope of Exhibit A and D collapses the estoppel argument of the Appellants. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 22 The Appellants produced no admissible evidence beyond the documents themselves. The established legal position is that the party who stands to lose on an issue if no evidence is led on it bears the burden of proof. Sections 14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) scream loudly in this context. Furthermore, the well-settled law as laid down in the Supreme Court cases of Nana Asiamah Aboagye v. Abusuapanyin Kweku Apau Asiam [2018] JELR 65224 (SC) and Agyei Osae v. Adjeifio [2007-2008] SCGLR 499 is that: “Where oral evidence conflicts with or is inconsistent with documentary evidence that has not been impeached on legal grounds or through cross examination, then the court must prefer the documentary evidence to the oral testimony.” The documentary evidence produced by the Appellants in this case do es not support their ownership of Immuna lands to warrant the procurement of their consent and approval in the alienation or sale by the Respondents to third parties. On the contrary, both the documentary evidence and overwhelming testimonies of the Respondents’ witnesses demonstrate that the ownership of the disputed land rests with the Respondents. The Respondents’ evidence of actual practice of grants without protest reinforced their defence. The Cross examination of Kenneth Obosu by Respondents’ counsel (ROA pages 256-257) revealed: “Q: Can you show me one document from the predecessors at the present Defendants in respect of the sale of bare land which has the involvement of any of the predecessors of the Defendants? A: Previously, the land was not sold. It was only recently that the Defendants began selling land. Q: Have there been buildings on Immuna lands since 1953? NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 23 A: Yes. Q: Who gave out those lands for the specific buildings? A: At Immuna, when a subject wants to build, he is not charged for the land. The head of Odumna family, head of Twidan family- Takyi, Opanyin Kwesah and Opanyin Andam represent the Oman. These 4 will lead the person and show him where to build …. Q: Are you aware that even if the Odumna or Kojo Andam family or Oman need land, they purchase same from the defendant’s family, i.e. Kwesi Kwetu’s land? A: I have already mentioned the process for acquiring land as known to the family. I don’t know of others which were not brought to the notice of the Oman.” Notwithstanding the above witness’ statement in answer to the question of who gave the lands for the specific buildings, the gravamen of Opanyin Kweku Seidu testimony that he bought his land from the Kwesi Kwetu Twidan family and has been in quiet occupation of his land sold to him 50 years ago was not impeached under cross-examination by Appellants’ counsel (ROA pages 274-275). The witness was only quizzed about his knowledge of the 1953 and 2012 agreements, and he understandably denied knowledge of them. Relatedly, was the uncontroverted testimony of DWI, Habiba Seidu Abokoma. The Appellants did not contest the issuance of a receipt by Kwesi Ketu family for the purchase of another plot of land for the witness in settlement. Why would you buy or pay for your own land? During the cross-examination of the above-mentioned witness by Appellants’ counsel (ROA pages 267- 268) the following disclosures were made: “Q: You say Immuna belong to the Defendants’ family NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 24 A: That is so. Q: With this knowledge, when you approached the defendants to acquire land, you didn’t inform the Oman and the Odumna family. A: The 1st plot, I acquired it from Kwesi Ketu family. The 2nd one from the same family. At Immuna they are the family that have land. … Q: Are you aware that there was a 1953 agreement between the Twidan family, Odumna Odumna family and Oman of Immuna? A: I don’t know about that land. What I know is that they destroyed my property and reported them to the police. The police came to arrest them but they run away. Later the culprits, the Odumna family, came to apologise and pleaded with the Kwesi Ketu family to intervene. Kwesi Ketu promised that I should leave the matter and they would replace the land for me. Furthermore, the testimony of DW2 Ebusuapanyin Kwesi Bondzie (a.k.a Arkra) by the Appellants was also uncontradicted under cross-examination (ROA pages 269- 271). He testified that since 1983, he has been present when Respondents are selling Immuna lands. Granted, without assuming that the agreement included proceeds from the sale of land, how was transparency and accountability ensured when, from the testimony of this witness, Odumna family and Oman of Immuna are never present when land is being demarcated for purposes of sale? How were the Appellants protecting or securing their interest in the lands? During the cross- examination of this witness, the following ensued: Q: You said since 1983, you have been present when defendants are alienating Immuna lands. A: I didn’t say alienating. But when they have to sell land close to our joint boundary, they call me so we can agree on the extent of the boundary line. Q: So if the defendants’ family are selling land with the consent of other family and Oman of Immuna, you wouldn’t know. NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 25 A: No. I only know that when we have to determine the boundary, then Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu family and our family of which I am the head will meet and agree on the boundary line. Q: So whatever terms upon which the defendants’ family will grant lands along the boundary you wouldn’t know. A: All I know is when it is close to the boundary, then I have to show up to join the Ketu family so I can protect my boundary.” Again, the cross-examination of DW3 Stephen K. Odoom by Appellants’ counsel (ROA pages 272- 273) also confirmed that the Respondents delineate the Immuna lands for sale without the other two parties because both families call on each other to ensure that their interest in their respective lands is protected: “Q: Will you be surprised to know that Defendants’ family had an agreement in 1953 with the Odumna family, giving them interest in land? A: I can’t tell. I only share boundary with them. Q: I put it to you that Plaintiffs have an interest in Immuna lands. A: I can’t tell. It is not my family issue.” Similarly, Ebusuapanyin Kobina Akyrekyer’s testimony was also irreproachable under cross-examination by the Appellants’ lawyer. (ROA pages 277-278). The witness denied knowledge of the two agreements, as he only shares boundary with the Respondents and he is aware that they own the Immuna lands since they both call on each other when demarcations are made during sales to protect their respective lands. During the cross examination of the second Respondent, Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu IV by Appellants’ counsel (ROA pages 263-264), this is the discourse that ensued in respect of the 2011 suit instituted by members of the Odumna, Kojo Andam NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 26 Twidan family and the Oman Committee against Tufuhen Kwesi Ketu IV and his Ebusuapanyin (exhibit C): “Q: … They sought certain reliefs compelling you and your Ebusuapanyin to account to them for an amount of monies collected by way of rent, leases and sale of portions of Immuna land. A: Not correct. Q: They also sought a relief of an order restraining you and your family from dealing with Immuna lands without reference to their families and elders of Immuna. A: Not correct. One Mr. Hagan wanted part of the land to mine salt. When the Oman heard of it, they summoned him but he told them he was now negotiating with me. Oman then sued me and my head of family. Later, the Oman decided that we should settle at home. Q : When the matter was sent home, you successfully settled same. A: That is so. Q : Your terms was put on paper and you and others signed. A: That is so. Q : This settlement was adopted by the court. A: Yes. It was adopted by the court. Q : I put it to you that from all you have said the interest of the other families and the Oman in Immuna lands is confirmed. A: Not correct. They have no interest in Immuna lands. They only have interest in palm, coconut, tolls and royalties from fishermen strangers. Q : I put it to you that your evidence that one K. Baah, a nephew of Nana Odwiri Ababio VII bought land from you is false. A: It is true. The witnesses to the transaction are all there. Q : I put it to you that you and your family are bound by the Terms of Settlement executed in 2012. A: Yes but the agreement does not include the land.” NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 27 Having carefully analyzed the entire record of appeal, taking into account both the documentary and oral evidence of both parties, the weight of evidence in this case was overwhelmingly against the Appellants. The trial Judge’s conclusion was supported by the evidence on the record. The explicit revocation of Exhibit A, the historical possession and prior judgments in 1949 and 1978, the declaration in 1983 confirming the Respondents, Kwesi Ketu Twidan family’s allodial title, the unchallenged grants made by the Respondents both before and after 2015 and the limited scope of the revenue clauses tilt the balance in favour of the Respondents. Ground B Did the learned trial Judge err in his interpretation of Exhibit D, the Terms of Settlement dated 25/05/2015, which was adopted as Consent Judgment on 14/07/2015 when he held that no interest was created in Immuna lands in favour of the Appellants? The purported statement that no interest was created in Immuna lands in favour of the Appellants is unsupported as no such categorical statement was made by the court. The learned Judge emphatically held that the 1953 and 2015 Agreements (Exhibits A and D) did not pass allodial interest or ownership of Immuna lands to Oman, the Appellants. The Judge was, however, admittedly silent on the nature of interest both agreements conferred on the Appellants. As has been copiously explained under the first ground of appeal, it was user rights and the sharing of two revenue or income streams in respect of dues or payments collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandzie” collected from non-natives that were conferred on the Appellants. Both Exhibit A and Exhibit D did not address title or alienation rights. This is clearly supported by their own admission in their reliefs “i” and “ii” in exhibit C, as previously explained, that the court should declare the Immuna ‘Awomberew’ land as the joint properties NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 28 of the Plaintiffs therein and a further declaration that their interest in Immuna land should also be declared by the courts. It is the argument of counsel for the Appellants (page 16 of his address to this Court) that the rendition of paragraph 2 of exhibit D identified three (3) sources of income, earnings or proceeds “which accrues to Immuna Community for sharing between the parties” because of the use of the “and” conjunction which he spelled out by employing his own semi-colon to create the impression that the Appellants are also entitled to a share of the proceeds derived from the sale of Immuna lands as follows: “ All proceeds from Immuna land”; “dues or payment collected in respect of palm and coconut trees”; and “Amandze usually paid or collected from non-indigenous fishermen to Immuna” Appellants’ counsel further argued that the phrase “All proceeds from Immuna land” did not seek to limit the ordinary understanding of the word “proceeds”. He explained that the Longman Active Study Dictionary of English, 1991 definition of the word “proceeds” is: “money gained from the sale of something, or as a result of some activity for getting money” and gives the synonyms of “proceeds’ as “earning, gains, income, profit, returns, revenue, yield.” Consequently, the phrase “All proceeds from the Immuna land.” In counsel’s words: “… can only be interpreted to cover monies gained from the sale of Immuna lands and from activities on Immuna land. Alternatively the phrase could be construed as earnings, gains, income, profit, returns, revenue or yield from Immuna land. Clearly this construction captures the matrix of facts, events. surrounding circumstances and nuances which resulted in the dispute before the High Court, Cape Coast which rendered the signing of the Terms of Settlement. The reliefs sought in Exhibit C were as follows: …” NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 29 For emphasis I will repeat paragraph 2 of Exhibit D: “ALL proceeds from the Immuna land and dues or payment collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandze” usually paid or collected from non- indigenous fisherman to Immuna shall be apportioned into five (5) parts instead of the previous three (3) parts and distributed as follows: a. 15% to the Kwesi Ketu Twidan Family, b. 15% to the Kojo Andam Twidan Family c, 10% to the Twidan Family Stool d. 20% to the Odomna Family e. 40% to the Oman i.e. (Immuna Community) for the development of the Immuna Community.” Reading the text of the various agreements as a whole, it is clear that the drafters of Exhibit D did not intend to suggest that the word “proceeds” should be followed by the phrase “from the sale of land” as argued by counsel for Appellants to provide for three streams of income. The two streams of income in respect of dues or payments collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandzie” collected from non-natives were maintained under Exhibit D. The apex court has cautioned against importing words into provisions contained in statutes and agreements under the guise of interpretation. See the cases of The Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Div) Accra, Ex parte: Justin Pwavra Teriwajah and Henry Nuertey Korboe [2013] JELR 68571 (SC) and Kuenyehia v. Archer [1993-94] 2 GLR 525. If the drafters intended to include proceeds from the sale of land, it would have stated so explicitly. The legal maxim expressio unius est exclusion alteris, meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other, is appropriate in this context. Based on the admonition given by the Supreme Court per Aikins NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 30 JSC in Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority v. Issoufou [1993-94] 1 GLR 24, the maxim does not serve as a bad master, but a good master because, in this case, the exclusion of the phrase “from the sale of land” was not due to inadvertence. Rather, it never occurred to the drafters that it needed specific mention, as it was never their intention to include proceeds from the sale of land in the provision. To give the word “proceeds” an interpretation that it refers to proceeds from the sale of land will fly in the face of the true intention of the parties, given the overwhelming evidence supporting the fact that the Appellants or Oman have never been vested with a formal ownership interest in the land as per their own admission in Exhibit C. If the language used in this context is interpreted to include proceeds from sale of lands, it will result in injustice on the part of the Respondents. It would mean that the totality of the share of earnings by the Respondents as allodial owners would be far lower compared to the other parties to the Exhibit D agreement. Put succinctly, the Appellants will derive income from the proceeds of the sale of land as well as enjoy a whopping 40% of the proceeds from the other two sources of income as argued by counsel for Appellants above. Certainly, this could not have been the intention of the drafters as it does not conduce to common sense. The Respondents should not suffer the unskillfulness of the drafters of Exhibit D. In this connection, the primary aids to interpretation, such as dictionary meaning of words urged upon this Court by counsel for the Appellants, must yield to common sense. In the Supreme Court case of Osei v Ghanaian Australian Goldfields Ltd. [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 69, a common sense approach to interpretation was discussed in the headnote as follows: “The basic rules of construction of documents are that the interpretation or construction must be nearly as close to the word and intention of the maker as is NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 31 possible and the intention must be ascertained from the document as a whole with the meaning and within the context in which they are used.” Given that the word "proceeds" was not qualified by the phrase "sale of land", the phrase should not be imported into the clause to the advantage of a party that the drafters never intended to confer any such benefit on them. Contracts entered into by parties must be upheld, but they must be situated within their appropriate context. The courts exist to give effect to the parties’ written intentions: Gorman & Gorman v. Albert Ansong & Anor (2012) 1 SCGLR 174. The Appellants counsel backpedals at page 13 of his written submission, forcefully urging on this Court a new sharing ratio in three respects not contemplated by the drafters on the strength that that the initial agreement (Exhibit A) which clearly provided sharing ratios in respect of only dues or payments collected in respect of palm and coconut trees and “Amandzi” from non-native fishermen had been set aside in Exhibit D. Documents are not construed in silo and exhibit D in this case will not be construed in silo. It must be reiterated that documents and agreements must be read in whole. In the instant case, a different conclusion may have been arrived at if this Court did not have the benefit of all the various documents and agreements or terms reached by the parties, including the parties who applied to be struck out from the suit. While the Appellants agree with the timeless principle that agreements must be construed as a whole, their reasoning is flawed on account of misconstruction and in the specific case of the 2015 agreement, the misconstruction stems from the needless importation of words and phrases. Appellants’ counsel also contends that the trial judge’s holding that paragraph 2 of Exhibit D should be interpreted ejuisdem generis to exclude proceeds from sale was wrong. Dennis Dominic Adjei JSC explains in his book, Modern Approach to the Law of Interpretation in Ghana (4th edn, 2025 at pages 251-252) NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 32 that in the ejuisdem generis rule in interpretation of enactments and documents, the courts should pay attention to the general words as well as words of the same class preceding them. Put differently, general words or items follow specific words or items. Therefore, the class of the preceding words must limit the meaning of the general word. Thus, where the general words are ambiguous regarding their scope, the rule helps in establishing the intent behind the general words. In the instant case, the ejuisdem generis rule is inapplicable as the general words “ALL proceeds from the Immuna land” rather precede the specific words. This canon of interpretation is designed to interpret a “catch-all” phrase at the end of a list. The learned trial judge was wrong in his application of the rule, and that statement is hereby set aside. Though the trial judge erred in his application of the ejuisdem generis rule, his conclusion is supported by the evidence on the record. The two agreements, Exhibits A and D, bind only the parties to it in respect of the matters agreed. It does not create new rights or restrictions that the text omits. Exhibit D does not confer ownership interest in Immuna lands on the Appellants to accord them the rights to also derive income from the sale of the lands. The word “proceeds” in the context of Exhibit D cannot be interpreted to include “from the sale of land” as it will sin against, among others, the common sense rule in the construction of documents. 7.0 Disposition The appeal is dismissed in its entirety. We award costs of GHC 30,000.00 against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents. SGD FRANKLINA GESILA ADANU (MRS.) (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 33 I AGREE SGD SAMUEL OBENG-DIAWUO (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) I ALSO AGREE SGD BARIMA YAW KODIE OPPONG (JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL) COUNSEL: KOBBY WESLEY OKWANDAHO-MENSAH FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT FRANCIS ESSILFIE-BAAH FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT NANA ABAAHOM III @ ALHAJI OBI & ANOR V. EBUSUAPANYIN KOJO ATTA & 3 ORS - JUDGMENT pg. 34